

Philosophy as Science and Philosophy as Philosophizing in Heidegger

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Als Mensch da sein, heißt philosophieren.
Martin Heidegger, GA 27, 3.

Abstract.

The author of the article notes that Heidegger, in the period of the development of his project of fundamental ontology, understood philosophy as a science. In this context, he posed the question of the compatibility of philosophy as science and as personal philosophizing. This problem is interpreted here in the context of Heidegger's distinction between the logical and the existential concepts of science. The article's author believes that the switch from latent philosophizing to an explicit philosophizing and then to the scientific character of philosophy is connected to the resoluteness to objectivation of being in its difference from that-which-is.

I. Introduction

Though one takes Heidegger very often as an opponent of science, as well as of any kind of scientific philosophy, the philosopher himself (at least when elaborating his project of so-called fundamental ontology) stated that philosophy is a science. For example, in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927), he states:

For the future we shall mean by 'philosophy' scientific philosophy and nothing else.¹

¹ Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans A. Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 13.

Heidegger titles this philosophy as *ontology*, *de facto* identifying both philosophy and ontology on account of their object. According to him, the proper object of scientific philosophy (understood as ontology) is *being*. In his own words: “Philosophy is the science of being.”² Thus, scientific philosophy is distinguished from any other sciences by the peculiarity of its object. If all the rest of the sciences deal, in each instance, with a certain region of that-which-is (with nature, history, language, mathematical entities and so on), then, philosophy deals only with the being of that-which-is. Being as such does not exist in any sense; it could only *be given* in the human *understanding* of that which it means “to be” in very different senses. Moreover, being not only could be given but also should be given within the human understanding of any kind of human experience of that-which-is, in terms of what *is* and how it *is* could be possible at all. The principle, which grounds Heidegger’s division, between the science of being and science of that-which-is, is termed by him the *ontological difference*, i.e. the difference between that-which-is and the being itself of that-which-is.

Only by making this distinction – *krinein* in Greek – not between one being and another being but between being and beings do we first enter the field of philosophical research.³

Reflecting the ontological difference, Heidegger divides the sciences into two different kinds; namely, there is, on the one hand, *ontological* science as the transcendental-critical science of being and, on the other hand, *ontical* sciences, which are defined also by Heidegger as the *positive* sciences. The philosopher describes the positivity of the ontical sciences in the following way:

all non-philosophical sciences have as their theme some being or beings, and indeed in such a way that they are in every case antecedently given as beings to those sciences. They are posited by them in advance; they are a positem for them. All the propositions of the non-philosophical sciences, including those of mathematics, are positive propositions. Hence, to distinguish them from philosophy, we shall call all non-philosophical sciences positive sciences.⁴

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 17.

⁴ Ibid., 13.

Correspondingly, philosophy as ontological science is *non-positive* science. As such, it may be defined more concretely by the definition:

Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of being's structure and its possibilities.⁵

This brings up the question: what belongs to such a notion of scientific philosophy as the "theoretical conceptual interpretation of being" at all? Two points have to be emphasized in this regard. On the one hand, as with any science, philosophical ontology should correspond to the so-called *logical concept* of science, i.e. it should be presentable as the whole of the true propositions. Heidegger says in *Being and Time*, that the logical concept of science "understands science with regard to its results and defines it as a 'context of casual relations of true, that is, valid propositions.'"⁶ Thus, if philosophy claims to be a science, it has to formulate unambiguous sentences, which have the character of generality and necessity, and thus, can require an intersubjective consent.

Therewith, on the other hand, any science—including philosophy—should be ontologically understood on the base of so-called *existential concept* of science. This notion treats science as a way for the entity to be, which is in its own being always being-in-the-world. In other words, science understood existentially is *one of the possibilities of human being*.

In attempting to explicate knowing, and particularly science as a possibility of the existence of Dasein, we are inquiring into the existential concept of science. What is the science when it is taken as the possibility of human Dasein?...we will consider only two essential determinants which belong to the existence of Dasein: being-in-the-world and freedom. These are sufficient for a preliminary designation of the essence of science.⁷

Thus, in this case, science is understood as a kind of activity of

⁵ Ibid., 11.

⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 327.

⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"*, trans. P. Emad and K. Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 13.

human Dasein. It is of great importance that both concepts, the logical and the existential, do not exclude each other, as if the science were either only a set of propositions or a kind of human activity. C.F. Gethmann is absolutely right saying:

the both, logical and existential understandings of science are not alternatives in the philosophy of science, but they relate to each other in the systematical relation of foundation in accordance with Heidegger.⁸

To be more exact, the logical concept of science is the derivate of its existential one. Conversely, the existential concept of science ontologically grounds science as a set of true propositions—making it possible in general.

It seems to be that one could abstract the logical concept of science from its existential origin in the case of ontic, i.e. positive, sciences, which deal with their objects without thinking of the principles and ways of being of such objects. Any positive science is presentable as the pure result of scientific cognition. In such form, it is possible to transfer it from one generation of scholars to the net.

The question arises, whether both the mentioned concepts of science in Heidegger could be separated from each other with regard to philosophy as non-positive science. Philosophy is the inquiry into principles as such, i.e. into being itself, which is given only in the existential understanding of it. As transcendental science, it goes back always to human existence as its origin and, thus, cannot abstract itself from its existential condition of possibility, and therefore, from the existential concept of science.

This brings up the new question: if philosophy—being science—cannot reduce its existential origin; and at the same time the existence of human Dasein is always something individual and factual, can philosophy claim to be science in the sense of its logical concept. Is philosophy able to formulate propositions, which would have generality and necessity? May it claim any kind of common consent in general? Is philosophy only a private occupation of a private person and, therefore, does it

⁸ Carl Friedrich Gethmann, *Dasein: Erkennen und Handeln: Heidegger im phänomenologischen Kontext* (Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1993), 176.

have any objective and common status, or it can be a general scientific cognition in the rigorous sense?

To answer these questions, one ought to actualize a two-fold inquiry. On the one hand, this is the question of the deep-rooted habit of philosophy in human existence, (i.e. into Heidegger's understanding of philosophizing). On the other hand, one ought to inquire into his treatment of the possible modification of philosophizing (i.e. of the existential notion of philosophy) into philosophy as science in the sense of its logical concept.

II. Philosophy as a Proper Possibility of Dasein's Being in the World

In his book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, Heidegger states:

authentic philosophizing will only then be able to come upon the Question of Being if this question belongs to the innermost essence of Philosophy, which itself is only as a decisive possibility of human Dasein.⁹

Thus, one can define philosophy as a *possibility* of Dasein. Such a possibility accomplishes itself in the action of philosophizing. The last is thereby a definite mode of being of the human being, namely, the mode of being-in-the-world. Certainly, human Dasein—being always already in the world—can also philosophize in addition to everything else. Philosophy belongs to the possible activities of the human being, alongside with positive-scientific research, political practice, artistry, trade, religion and so on. There is no doubt, that there are philosophers as well as scientists, politicians, artists, tradesmen.

Nevertheless, the truth is that philosophy is not an ordinary possibility of being of human Dasein besides the others. As Heidegger said, it is the *decisive* possibility. What does this mean? Why does philosophy, and not, for example, science or art, have the advantage over any other ways of being-in-the-world? To explain matters, one ought to inquire into Heidegger's treatment of the ontological structure of Dasein.

⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. R. Taft (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 158.

First of all, Heidegger treats human Dasein as the “kind” (not in the logical sense of species) of that-which-is, as the very special type of entity. The peculiarity of such that-which-is is in the fact that only it has the direct relation to its own being. In *Being and Time*, the philosopher defines Dasein in the following way:

Da-sein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is optically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned *about* its very being.¹⁰

At the same time, having the relation to its very being, Dasein *relates to being as such*, including the being of the regions of that-which-is, which are not Dasein itself. Thereby, namely being as such or in general is the proper subject matter of philosophy understood as scientific ontology in Heidegger’s view:

We assert now that *being is the proper and sole theme of ontology*.¹¹

Therefore, human Dasein—one and only one among the totality of that-which-is—not only has direct access to the proper theme of philosophy, but also—because of its own concernedness about its very being—is dependent upon it, cares about it. Inversely, being as the subject matter of philosophy—insofar as being in its difference to that-which-is does not exist in Heidegger’s opinion—can only *be given* exclusively within Dasein’s *understanding* of being.

In Heidegger’s own words:

Understanding of being is itself a determination of being of Da-sein. The ontic distinction of Da-sein lies in the fact that it *is* ontological.¹²

In other words, human Dasein—having the exclusive relation to the proper theme of philosophy as well as being in its very being dependent of it—stays always already in the *philosophical situation* of the care about being, not even developing any kind of scientific philosophy. On this ground, one can say that *each Dasein as such is a philosopher potentially*.

¹⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 10.

¹¹ Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 11.

¹² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 10.

The advantage of the notion of philosophy as mode of the being-in-the-world follows from this statement. It presupposes that Dasein can choose in which way it will be ontically, for example, in the ways of scientific research or religious obeisance, but it is unable to choose to be or not to in the direct relation to being, i.e. in the philosophical situation. The main ontic characteristic of Dasein is that it is ontologically. This ontological peculiarity of Dasein has the character of *existential necessity*:

We philosophize not from time to time but permanently and necessarily insofar as we exist as human being.¹³

In this regard, Heidegger points to three priorities of Dasein for any ontological investigation including development of a scientific ontology.

Firstly, he says about the *ontical* priority of Dasein: “This being is defined in its being by existence.”¹⁴ Secondly, the philosopher mentions the *ontological* priority; namely,

on the basis of its determination as existence Da-sein is in itself ‘ontological’ But just as originally Dasein possesses—in a manner constitutive of its understanding of existence—an understanding of the being of all beings unlike itself.”¹⁵

The third priority appears from the first two: “Dasein therefore has its third priority as the ontic-ontological condition of the possibility of all ontologies.”¹⁶

Standard interpretations treat the last priority—namely, the *ontic-ontological*—in the sense that any ontological investigation should begin its path from the analysis of the existential-ontological structure of such an entity, i.e. of a certain ontical region. In other words, any ontological research should find a corresponding ontical foundation by the analyzing of the existential structures of Dasein, which make possible

¹³ Martin Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*. Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 27. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1996), 3.

¹⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 12.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

the understanding of being *as such* for the mentioned entity. Nevertheless, Heidegger's sentence could be understood also in another way. That is, *Dasein is the condition of possibility of any ontological investigation* not only as the departure point of ontological science, *but also as the one and only agent of development of any ontological investigation*. Only the human being needs to develop an ontology and only it is able to do so. Correspondingly, any development of an ontology is the kind of activity characteristic of Dasein, its mode of being in the world.

Yet, the initial stay of Dasein in the original philosophical situation is only latent philosophizing, but not actual philosophizing as such, though the latter is deep rooted ontologically in it.

By contrast, the natural tendency of Dasein's treatment of its very being lies in the reduction of the peculiarity of its way of being, i.e. of existence to the common understanding of being as being in presence. Originally, Dasein understands "to be" with regard to itself in the same way as "to be" with regard to the things which are present within the world. It leaves out of account the existentiality, which constitutes its own being as distinct from the ways of being of other "that-which-is."

And perhaps, an authentic ontological inquiry—the path of which always proceeds *via* existential analysis of Dasein—will be needed for human Dasein to discover its own way of being, i.e. existence. In this case, could philosophy be treated as the peculiar and primary mode of being in the world just because all distinctive features of Dasein's ownmost way of being can be disclosed through it—because this way in its features can be identified and spoken through philosophy? With regard to this, Heidegger gives the following definition of philosophy:

Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, taking its departure from the hermeneutic of Da-sein, which, as analysis of *existence*, has fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it *arises* and to which it *returns*.¹⁷

However, the question arises: what can force Dasein to break its natural tendency to reduce its own being to being-in-presence and start to philosophize on the ground of its original philosophical situation, i.e.

¹⁷ Ibid., 34.

original and direct relatedness to philosophy's subject matter modifying at the same time this situation as such.

III. The Beginning of Philosophizing and its Modification into Philosophy as Science in its Logical Concept

To clarify the problem of the correlation of the initial philosophical situation of Dasein and philosophizing as free action of human being as well as of the one the modification of philosophizing into philosophy as "rigorous science," one ought to notice two basic features by which Dasein is characterized in the formal aspect of its existential structure. Heidegger emphasizes them in Section 9 of *Being and Time*.

Firstly, human Dasein has not any substantial essence, any "whatness." Thus, a human being cannot be treated as exemplifying a more general kind of living entity, for example, *homo sapiens*. (It ought to be noted that human Dasein cannot be understood as a kind of living entity at all because its own way of being is very far different from the life of living entities in Heidegger's view). The philosopher expresses this in the following formulas: "The 'essence' of this being lies in its to be."¹⁸ Or: "*The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence.*"¹⁹ Critical in these theses, and that which is of very great importance for our present investigation, is that the being of Dasein, being without any general essence, is every time singular.

This can be verified by the Heidegger's second thesis on human Dasein: its being is always mine for each Dasein. Heidegger states: "The being which this being is concerned is always my own."²⁰ However, the very being of Dasein—being "in each case mine"—*can be understood either in a mode of inauthenticity or authenticity*. In the first case, human Dasein understands its very being, and its own possibilities to be, from the possibilities to be of the that-which-is, which is not this individual Dasein itself. For example, each Dasein can understand its very being, i.e. existence, on the pattern of the being-in-presence as the way of being of the things presenting within the world. The other example of the inauthentic mode of understanding of its very being by human

¹⁸ Ibid., 39.

¹⁹ Ibid., 40

²⁰ Ibid.

Dasein can be the neutralized publicity of *das Man*, which refers to everybody and nobody at the same time and prescribes to each Dasein how it has to be in its concrete modes and shapes. In opposition to it, in its authentic mode of being, human Dasein understands its very being from, and only from, its possibilities to be. Heidegger summarizes:

Da-sein *is* always its possibility. It does not ‘have’ that possibility only as mere attribute of something objectively present. And because Da-sein is always essentially its possibility, it can ‘choose’ itself in its being it can win itself, it can lose itself, or it can never and only ‘apparently’ win itself.²¹

It was said that the philosophy is one of the most decisive and proper possibilities of human Dasein. Thus, it should be treated as a principal way of Dasein’s being in the world, which is accomplished in the mode of authenticity. Since philosophizing as the development of the existential analytics of Dasein is the certain possibility of Dasein itself discovering existence as its own way of being, one could say that it is also one of the paths to get to the authenticity of Dasein’s being itself.

Thereby, we can put the question: what gives a jump to start to the transition from the mode of inauthenticity, in which Dasein ordinarily exists, to being in the authentic mode of philosophizing? It was said that each Dasein is a philosopher potentially; but *very few Daseins actually philosophize*. In opposition, the natural tendency of Dasein’s being is the escape from philosophizing as a modification of its more general tendency to escape from being in the mode of authenticity to the mode of inauthenticity. (Although this escape from patent philosophizing could be also treated as the possible mode of latent philosophizing.)

Therefore, our former question can be transformed: what motivates the transition from inauthenticity as initial mode of human Dasein, in which it “initially and for the most part” is, to the authenticity of its very being at all?

Heidegger’s answer is: anxiety (*die Angst*). Anxiety draws out Dasein from its being lost in the middle of the inner-world of things present-at-hand, as well as anonymous publicity of *das Man* and bring it back to itself in its peculiar way of being (existence).

²¹ Ibid.

Angst reveals in Da-sein its *being toward* its ownmost potentiality of being, that is, *being free* for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself. *Angst* brings Da-sein *before its being free for...* (prospensio in), the authenticity of its being as possibility which it always already is. But at the same time, it is this being to which Da-sein as being-in-the-world is entrusted.²²

Sure, we would not state thereby that the anxiety is the *initio* as well as *sine qua non* of actual philosophizing. Nevertheless, it is obvious that anxiety has the same function as philosophizing, namely that of bringing-back Dasein to its existentiality as its proper way of being. Analogous to philosophizing, anxiety discovers for human Dasein its existence as its proper being, that is in each case mine—but without developing any explicit conceptual ontology. *Anxiety forces the turn of Dasein from its inauthentic mode of being to the authentic one.* Philosophizing actualizes the same switch. On this ground, we could presuppose that anxiety might be treated as one of the possible fundamental attitudes-of-mind, against the background of which philosophizing can start up to actualize at all. (Other attitudes-of-mind are also possible in this regard – for example, *thaumazein* in Ancient Greek).

It ought to be noted that the attitude of anxiety can take place only with respect to the *imminent* death of each Dasein, which itself is in its existential-ontological structure *being-towards-death*. The philosopher describes the phenomenon of death in the following way:

Death is a possibility of being that Da-sein always has to take upon itself. With death, Da-sein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being. In this possibility, Da-sein is concerned about its being-in-the-world absolutely. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. When Da-sein is imminent to itself as this possibility, it is *completely* thrown back upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being...As a potentiality of being, Da-sein is unable to bypass the possibility of death. Thus Death is the possibility of absolute impossibility of Da-sein.²³

Any authentic philosophizing can also be actualized only in this imminence of death as “the possibility of absolute impossibility of Dasein”, i.e. only under the condition of its ontological *finitude*. Only

²² Ibid., 168.

²³ Ibid., 232.

Dasein as ontological finite entity is able to philosophize and partly is forced to do it in its finitude and the imminence of its death. One can even say that Heidegger thereby gives an existential-ontological reinterpretation of Plato's ancient view of philosophizing as a kind of preparation for *apothneskeintekaitetethnanai*,²⁴ dying and being dead. Anyway, philosophy as proper possibility of Dasein, by which it is able to disclose its own way of being, can be actualized in philosophizing only in the frameworks of that which is primarily unthematically (pre-philosophically) disclosed by anxiety, namely by the imminence of the "possibility of being that Da-sein always has to take upon itself." Being in the mode of philosophizing requests the *resoluteness* to be in this mode on account of imminent death, i.e. to clarify its own ontological structure (existentiality), which correlates with being in general as proper subject matter of philosophy. *This resoluteness constitutes the basis of the mentioned existential notion of science with regard to philosophy.*

The question is now, how can this individual resoluteness of always individual Dasein, which philosophizes, be transformed in philosophy as science with regard to its logical concept, i.e. in philosophy as a set of true propositions about being as such?

We can presuppose that it realizes by the action of the *objectivation (die Vergegenständlichung) of being*. Heidegger thinks that objectivation constitutes the existential-ontological *genesis* of any science:

The genesis of a science originates in the objectification of a *realm* of beings, that is, in the development of the understanding of the constitution of the *being* of the respective beings. In the development of this understanding of being, those concepts emerge which circumscribe what is...the *basic concepts* of the respective science.²⁵

Then again, Heidegger distinguishes two kinds of objectivation. On the one hand, there is *the objectivation of a definite region of that-which-is*. This kind of objectivation constitutes the ontological genesis

²⁴ Plato, *Phaed.*, 64a.

²⁵ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"*, 20.

of non-philosophical, i.e. positive, sciences. He describes it as projection, namely as “the projection, in each case, of the ontological constitution of the beings which are to become the objects.”²⁶

On the other hand, the second kind of objectivation, which underlies the philosophical science, is *the objectivation of being as such*:

Even the basic act of the constitution of ontology, of philosophy, the objectivation of being, *the projection of being upon the horizon of its understandability...*²⁷

This “basic act” requires the *resoluteness to objectivate* being, to which Dasein relates always already without any objectivation. By the way, this projection is based in the resoluteness explicitly to differentiate the both, being and that-which-is, which is inexplicitly and unthematic always already distinguished by Dasein in its initial philosophical situation, in its ontic relation to the ontological sphere, i.e. to being as such.

IV. Conclusion

To summarize, one ought to repeat our crucial questions in renewed formulas. How is philosophy, taken as grounded in the in-each-case-mine resoluteness to philosophize, i.e. in its existential concept, consistent with philosophy as science in its logical dimension? Does the existential basis as well as existential genesis of philosophy not make the results of any philosophical investigation relative to the individual position of the one, who accomplishes the actual philosophizing in each case? Is it possible to find the same universal “horizon of understandability” and its concrete ontological structure for each philosophizing individual (in Heidegger’s case, this structure is temporality and its ecstatic-horizontal structure)? Is it possible to achieve common consent among philosophizing Daseins with regard to the essence of matter? Finally, is philosophy, with regard to the existential concept of science, able to act as a real ontological basis of philosophy as science with regard to its logical notion?

The answers to these questions cannot be given directly here. The fact that Heidegger finally denied his project of grounding philosophy as a science indicates that the concrete relation between the existential

²⁶ Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 321.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 322.

genesis of science and its pure logical structure is very problematic.

Based on Heidegger's own many statements, one can presuppose that he did not see scientific philosophy, with respect to the logical concept of science, as finally locked out of the system of true propositions, which could be transmitted from the ancestral generation of philosophers to the next one in a selfless way. The systems of philosophical-ontological propositions is neither an axiomatic-deductive system (as it was for example in Spinoza) nor a dialectically explicated and locked-up circle of philosophical sciences (as in Hegel, though philosophical science in Heidegger's project also had a circular structure in the sense of hermeneutical circle).

Based on the foregoing, we presuppose that Heidegger's treatment of philosophy with regard to the logical concept of science lies in the notion of a "theoretic conceptual interpretation" (of being)—with emphasis on the term "interpretation." The last—being based on the existential ground of philosophical science—can be only in the mode of the *retrieve*. In this mode, ontological interpretation is each time a handing down of the possibilities of thinking developed by earlier philosophizing Daseins to an actually philosophizing Dasein.

Resoluteness that comes back to itself and hands itself down then becomes the retrieve of a possibility of existence that has been handed down. *Retrieve is explicit handing down*, that is, going back to the possibilities of Da-sein that has been there. The authentic retrieve of a possibility of existence that has been—the possibility that Da-sein may choose its heroes – is existentially grounded in anticipatory resoluteness...²⁸

Perhaps, Heidegger wanted to abolish the conceptual opposition between the logical (systematic) and the historical (existential), by which the structure of philosophical science was described at his time, through the above-mentioned notion of the retrieve. It is obvious, that the retrieve is deeply rooted also in the anticipatory resoluteness of philosophizing Dasein to be itself in its proper mode.

The resoluteness in which Da-sein comes back to itself discloses the actual factual possibilities of authentic existing *in terms of the heritage* which that resoluteness *takes over* as thrown. Resolute coming back to thrownness involves *handing oneself over* to traditional possibilities, al-

²⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 352.

though not necessarily *as* traditional ones.²⁹

In the final count, the death toward which Dasein always exists and which constitutes the condition of possibility of authentic philosophizing—intimately connected with the Dasein's resoluteness—is also ultimate measure of the truth of the retrieve of the possibilities to think of other Daseins.

The more authentically Da-sein resolves itself, that is, understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost eminent possibility in anticipating death, the more unequivocal and inevitable is the choice in finding the possibility of its existence. Only the anticipation of death drives every chance and 'preliminary' possibility out.³⁰

The phenomenon of the death as existential condition of philosophizing becomes thereby the *methodological* criterion of the validity and adequacy of ontological cognition in its logical sense understood as retrieval interpretation, on the basis of the handing down of the possibilities of thinking of other Daseins. Here is the point where the existential condition of the philosophy explicitly turns to the logical structures of philosophy as science. Heidegger says:

If our analytic takes anticipatory resoluteness as its basis, as an existentially authentic potentiality-of-being, and if Da-sein itself summons to this possibility right out of the ground of its existence, is this possibility then an *arbitrary* one? Is the mode of being in accordance with which the potentiality-of-being and if Da-sein relates to its eminent possibility, death, picked up by chance? *Has the being-in-the-world a higher instance of its potentiality-of-being than its own death?*³¹

Therefore, the existential condition of ontological knowledge modifies itself in the pure logical condition of unarbitrariness of rigorous philosophical cognition. Thus, in the words by C.F. Gethmann, philosophical science in its Heideggerian sense (including also philosophy as mode of being) is relativized only ontologically, not ontically.

²⁹ Ibid., 351.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 289.