

# The Play between Prometheus and Epimetheus

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*Prometheus:* Sie [the gods] wollen mit mir teilen, und ich meine  
Dass ich mit ihnen nichts zu teilen habe.  
Das was ich habe können sie nicht rauben  
Und was Sie haben mögen sie beschützen.  
Hier mein und dein  
Und so sind wir geschieden.  
*Epimetheus:* Du stehst allein.  
Dein Eigensinn verkennt di Wonne  
Wenn die Götter, du,  
Die deinigen und Welt und Himmel all  
Sich all ein innig ganzes fühlten.  
*Pr.:* Ich kenne das.  
Ich bitte lieber Bruder  
Treibs wie du kannst und lass mich  
J. W. Goethe<sup>1</sup>

## ***Abstract***

The sentence from Protrepticus makes us question the status of the unconscious in philosophy. Is the unconscious that which I already know but as something that I do not know that I know, so that I must uncover it? Must not philosophy, though a reflection, be seen also and more fundamentally as a construction, whereby it distinguishes itself from a Socratic function? In this last case, would not its “unconscious” be that which is hidden beneath consciousness or by the consciousness that reveals it, yet as a sort of characteristic of writing that, even as it produces propositions, necessarily gives rise to echoes of other phrases, as if the latter were more fundamental or better accomplished than the former? This paper is the discussion of this “seeming.”

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<sup>1</sup> J. W. Goethe, *Prometheus*, in: *Der junge Goethe, neu bearbeitete Ausgabe in fünf Bänden*, Volume 3 (W. de Gruyter & Co, Berlin, 1966), 324-5.

## *I. Introduction*

Does the sentence from the *Protrepticus* (Προτρεπτικόν)<sup>2</sup> apply to philosophy proper, or does it apply to it only because philosophy is a form of knowledge and because one could say of any kind of knowledge that it contains one part which we are conscious of knowing and another part in relation to which, the one who knows it remains unaware that he knows it? This other part was put in evidence by Plato in *Meno* where Socrates was put in a difficult position by a sophistic argument when he was asked: “How will you look for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all?”<sup>3</sup> One cannot escape philosophy any more than one can escape any other knowledge, on the pretext that one remains in a state of ignorance that is epistemologically neutral. Ignorance would always be an insufficient or badly begun state of knowledge; but it would not be a lack of knowledge: it would always be paid for by a false knowledge. Philosophy is no exception to the common lot. Of course we must distinguish one way of philosophizing from another. Admittedly, philosophy concerns those who are supposed to make of it their main occupation, who devote all their time to thinking, who read philosophers, argue with those who also think, read texts and weigh up reasons. Still, more or less distantly related to this technical philosophy, there is also a non-technical philosophy that is conveyed beneath or beside the other, and on which that other feeds, either to be set to work or to be led astray, and this second way of philosophizing is not necessarily consciously perceived, particularly by those who are unable to progress to the status of experts on proofs and argumentation. What is the reality of this knowledge or of this “beneath or beside” philosophy? Has it any consistency?

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<sup>2</sup> The sentence is attributed by many authors (Alexander of Aphrodisia, Olympiodorus, Elias, David, Clement of Alexandria) to Aristotle: “If you ought to philosophize you ought to philosophize; and if you ought not to philosophize you ought to philosophize: therefore, in any case you ought to philosophize.” (*Exhortation à la philosophie. Le dossier grec*, Intr., trad. et Com. par S. Van der Meeren (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2011), 93-9.)

<sup>3</sup> The whole passage of *Meno* 80 d is so worded: “How will you look, Socrates, for a thing of whose nature you know nothing at all? Pray, what sort of thing, amongst those that you know not, will you treat us to as the object of your search? Or even supposing, at the least, that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you did not know?”

Or is it no more than “fantasy” knowledge or “fantasy” philosophy that true knowledge and technical philosophy may well recognize as pale imitations of themselves, or perhaps as sources of opinion that must be suspected? To this “fantasy” knowledge or “fantasy” philosophy, it would be wrong to give the names of *knowledge* and *philosophy*: *opinion* would be the best word for the former; *worldview* would be the best expression for the latter. What relation does knowledge have with these inevitable fantasies that it casts around or projects before itself, which is to say as having preceded itself? Or, more specifically, what is the relation that philosophy entertains with what it is difficult for it not to conceive of as constituting its own origins or its margins?

Philosophizing is not alone in giving itself non-technical prerequisites, presuppositions, surroundings and frameworks. Believers in any religion often resort to the argument that those who do not believe as they do are nothing but believers who ignore themselves and, that if they made the effort to consider what they pretend not to believe in, they would come to believe exactly like the believers themselves. The argument relies on the following parallel: just as, when one believes something, it may happen that one does not know that one believes it, so, when one fancies that one disbelieves something, it may happen that one mistakenly believes oneself to disbelieve, because deep down, one unconsciously believes.<sup>4</sup> Thus, the believer gives himself the advantage over you by identifying what you take to be disbelief with whatever it is that he himself believes, but ill-framed, ill-formed, ill-wrought, or still in progress toward realization. Sometimes, the philosopher may have such a feeling toward what he calls “common sense”. Nearly all the sciences may give rise to such a relation between scholars—at least, of those who think of themselves as such—and the vulgar. Many may pride themselves on their psychology, although they never formally studied the subject, because of a sort of refinement—Pascal’s *esprit de finesse*—they spontaneously ascribe to themselves. Nearly everybody has moral

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<sup>4</sup> Consider the famous sentence that Dostoievski attributes to Kirilov, one of the characters of *The Possessed*: “If Stavrogin believes (has faith), he does not believe that he believes (has faith); if Stavrogin does not believe (hasn’t faith), he does not believe that he does not believe (hasn’t faith).” (Fyodor Dostoesvky , *The Possessed, A Novel in 3 Parts* (London: W. Heinemann, 1913), 579.

ideas, unable though they might be to justify themselves by reasons in front of anybody who would challenge them. Many have confidence in treating themselves or others when they are ill, although they do not have any notion of medicine, physiology or biology which they could lay before somebody who contradicts them. Everybody undertakes calculations in an effort to clarify his horizons and to make his life easier, though he does not know how to warrant them by mathematics. One conceives that racism, sexism or species-ism can blossom as so many “worldviews” just so long as the conception of the Other has not reached a sufficiently critical or technical level.

And so another idea appears that is not only the bare idea of the relative falsity of ideas that seem to precede the technical exposition of particular conceptions, but that seem to warn that the very possibility of an environment in which such technical exposition is conceivable or permissible is itself threatened by that falsity. To believe oneself a subtle psychologist, to practice a false medicine, to have no doubt of what one holds as good and just, to have no doubt of the superiority of one’s ethnic group over other groups, of one’s sex over the other, of one’s species over others, is not only false but is also practically dangerous.

What doubtlessly constitutes the specificity of philosophy derives from its singular situation compared with other fields of knowledge and perhaps also constitutes its own tragedy. When somebody has been persuaded that he has made a mistake in a calculation, seldom is it that, having made it, he still believes in the accuracy of his result against the mathematician that checks it off. Seldom also is it that one who is mistaken in regard to the date of an event when he utters some cut and dried historical judgement, goes on believing that he was not mistaken in front of the historian who has better knowledge of the events. However, as Hegel rightly pointed out and was followed by Stuart Mill in doing so,<sup>5</sup> there are fields in which illusions and mistakes stubbornly persist long af-

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<sup>5</sup> In chapter 7 of Book VI, the last book of *A System of Logic* (whose title is *Of Logic of Moral Sciences*), Stuart Mill refers to “a subject which no one, however ignorant, thinks himself incompetent to discuss” (*Collected Works*, vol. VIII, *A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*, vol. II, Book IV-VI and Appendix (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, University of Toronto Press, 1974, 1996), 879.

ter their identification.<sup>6</sup> Such is the case of philosophy: a specific fate that awaits it must be understood. The field of philosophy is larger than any other. The historian may rectify errors of common sense, but he cannot escape, at least *de jure*, submission to a philosophical judgment that is likely to rely on and exhibit a philosophy of history, more or less latent as a *leidfaden*. Of course, the historian may deny that he relies on a hidden philosophy, since his search for facts is independent of all ideologies; but he uses concepts that always have unexplored propositions or implicit under-propositions, which the philosopher will take as the starting points of his own work, asking himself what remains unexplained thereby.

In *La philosophie silencieuse (The Silent Philosophy)*, Desanti may uphold the thesis that mathematics has developed, during a long period and continues to develop its proper epistemology, without relying on philosophy to do the work: Desanti's argument remains however the argument of a philosopher conscious of what happens in a mathematical treatise but not in quite the same way as the mathematician who writes it. Doubtless, the philosopher can see mathematics solving problems that he could not have resolved by means of the technical tools of philosophy, if it were possible to list them and consider them from all angles; but it is necessary to be a philosopher—maybe from the point of view of a “silent philosophy”—to perceive the supposed superiority of mathematics. If the mathematician is unaware of his own philosophical standpoint, he will fail

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<sup>6</sup> “This science [philosophy] frequently suffers contemptuous treatment even by those who have not taken the trouble to study it but fancy themselves capable of *understanding* without further ado what philosophy is about, and of philosophizing and passing judgments on philosophy, simply on the basis of an ordinary education... People admit that one must study the other sciences in order to be familiar with them, and that one is entitled to pass judgment on them only by virtue of such familiarity. People admit that in order to manufacture a shoe one must have learnt and practised shoemaking, despite the fact that everyone possesses the requisite model for it in his own feet, as well as the required aptitude for the task in his own hands. Only for philosophizing are such study, learning, and effort supposed not to be a requirement. – This convenient opinion has in recent times received confirmation through the doctrine of immediate knowing [*Wissen*], or knowledge through intuition.” (*The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline*, Part. I: *Science of Logic*, §5, transl. by K. Brinkmann & D. O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 32.)

to discern the superiority of his science by which the philosopher pretends philosophy has been overtaken and left behind. Far from abolishing philosophy by this remark, Desanti re-creates it, or, if he does not fill it up himself, at least points it out as a void. One may recognize that it is better to write mathematics, and create new mathematical demonstrations than to know how to write, in a vernacular language, about requisites and consequences, in a sort of doubling of these texts. Be that as it may, the supremacy of a mathematical text appears to the man who writes of these requisites and consequences, and attempts to understand what happens in a mathematical discourse; for it is by no means certain that a man who knows how to write mathematics, and who even invents new mathematics knows how to create or establish the philosophy of his invention, even if it is better to invent new mathematics than to write the philosophy of that invention. So all discourses, including the more creative ones, call for a philosophical discourse, even if they first reduce it to silence and even paralysed stupefaction; but those who produce these discourses are not necessarily those who are able and willing to undertake the philosophical one. Now, the inability to hold a philosophical discourse is less obvious to common eyes than a lack of knowledge in almost any other fields. Thus one comes to the paradox that the philosopher who knows his field technically and who knows how to argue through it, may, when he gets down to work, be disbelieved—as if he were needlessly sophisticating all things—whereas nobody would ever think of discrediting a scholar in any other field when he is labouring in it. The philosophers may even be ridiculous in their own eyes and seem to display a vain pride when they claim some competence in the techniques of their own field. So every individual, even if he is not a philosopher, may be convinced that the reflective actions the philosopher typically performs are worthwhile, but he thinks that the enterprise would be better led by himself rather than by a technical philosopher whose work is disbelieved. How is this paradox possible? How may it appear to be true, when it is so evidently false to the eyes of the technical philosopher who faces the arduous task of convincing the man of prejudice of his own mistake?

## *II. A Socratic Conception of the Protrepticus's Sentence*

The disagreement of Aristotle with Plato, and even Socrates, has often been exaggerated. If Aristotle is the author of the *Protrepticus*, it is not impossible to give a Socratic meaning to the sentence on which we

are commenting. On this view, learning would be fundamentally a recollection; it means that we already know, on a certain unconscious level what we shall know consciously, conceptually, technically, once we have performed the conscious work of struggle against oblivion. We never do otherwise than recognize ideas; we never invent them; we find them. Proof of this is that, whenever we are looking for them, it is necessary to have already a sort of anticipation of them, making us able to locate them, in order to follow the right way among all the possible ways of approaching them. It is as if consciousness, as it searches, is framing for itself an antecedent situation in which it imagines itself as already knowing what it did not yet know well enough to expound it conceptually. So consciousness, like searching, is relative to the ideas that it is looking for in a more embarrassed and handicapped way than at the time when it will conceive them plainly. There are degrees in knowledge and one cannot pass from a state of perfect ignorance to a state of perfect knowledge without any mediation. It remains to be determined whether it is knowledge that invents for itself an archaic situation that never happened otherwise than as a fantasy or whether we must admit the reality of this sleeping state from which knowledge is slowly roused. Can the little attendant of Meno find the length of the diagonal of one foot square only because, in a way, he already knows it? Does not Socrates, who leads him and who already knows the result, project onto the slave's consciousness, to explain his answers, the emerging new requirements that spring out from the set of corrections, as something which gives retrospective structure and purpose in the interplay of advances, setbacks and even temporary paralyses which characterize human problem solving? Does the soul that searches for truth about the diagonal give an answer of to its own thought or does it only fancy that it draws all pure knowledge from itself? Is the impression of recognizing knowledge an illusion, however fundamental—for it seems impossible to escape from it easily—or does it match with some reality?

It seems that Plato, through his character of Socrates, hesitated. In *Meno*, recollection is advanced mythically, as if the soul could enjoy an eternity in which it could describe cycles during which phases of contemplation would succeed phases of oblivion, which are themselves succeeded by phases of renewed contemplation. The temporality of knowledge that can precede itself would betoken the complicity of the soul with the eternity of the ideas. However this mythical version is preceded

by a short conceptual abstract of the argument mounted in opposition to the Sophists which is the reverse, or the sceptical version,<sup>7</sup> of the *Protrepticus*'s sentence:

A man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know. For he cannot inquire about what he knows, because he knows it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry; nor again can he inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to inquire.<sup>8</sup>

If one deciphers this metaphorical plot, one discovers three things. The *first* is that truth is essentially *aletheia* for Plato, disclosure and unveiling: its "searching" must be taken seriously: it is not a construction. It follows and approaches more and more closely, more and more adequately, to the ideas. In other words, as Leibniz showed in his *Discourse on Metaphysics*, it is necessary to distinguish "ideas" from "conceptions."<sup>9</sup> That the mind must conceive the ideas should not lead us to confound ideas with concepts: the concept is the act of conceiving and this act may be right or wrong, perfect or imperfect, clear or obscure. Ideas, on the contrary, are what they are; they cannot be wrong, imperfect or obscure; they can only be

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<sup>7</sup> I mean the sceptical version of the sentence of *Meno*. In *Meno*, the question is one less of knowing than of the impossibility of knowing, whereas in the *Protrepticus*, one knows what one knows, even if one does not know that one knows it. In *Meno*, one does not know what one knows, since if one knew it, one would not be able to recognize it as something that one knows.

<sup>8</sup> *Meno*, 81 a.

<sup>9</sup> Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, § XXVI: "In view to conceive what is an idea, it is necessary to anticipate an equivocation, because many people take the idea for the form or for the difference of our thoughts, and in this way we have the idea in our mind only as we think of it; and every time we think of it anew, we have other ideas of the same thing, though similar to the previous ones. But it seems that others take the idea as an immediate object of the thought or as some permanent form everlasting even when we do not contemplate it. And indeed, our soul has always in itself and for itself the power to represent any nature or form, when it occurs to think of it. And I believe that this power of our soul, as it expresses some nature, form or essence, is properly the idea of the thing, that is in us and that is always in us, either we think of it or not." In *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, Frege is of the same mind with regard to this question.

conceived wrongly, imperfectly or obscurely, with knowledge being the behaviour which aims to seize on ideas, truly, perfectly and clearly. Ideas could exist in a perfect truth even though our mind cannot seize them; and this is what happens for the most part. This means that truths may exist even though no mind is able or willing to say them, think them or teach them. *Two and two are four*, even if nobody is able to think of it. Truths are not made by the mind. The mind is not a creator or fabricator of truth: it can only get hold of something which is outside it, although it is necessary that it should exist in order to have this sort of eternity revealed to itself, and to itself alone. There is a sort of fundamental passivity in the ideas; but this passivity must be actively wrought to be realised.

The *second discovery* is that the fields of knowledge are unequal for the recollection of ideas. Doubtless, philosophy and mathematics are in good place because the mind can, in these fields, draw propositions from itself and get to grips with itself, if we dare say. The same is not true of physics, biology, or history, that entail from the soul a dependence toward something that cannot be drawn from itself and that is more openly connected to an external experience. This is what induced Aristotle to say, very Socratically, that poetry, for instance, was more essential to mind than history.<sup>10</sup> Let us leave aside the idea that an experience of ideas is possible in philosophy as in mathematics: for, even if the idea is well-founded,<sup>11</sup> such an experience is not of the same nature as the experience which is to be had in physics, biology or history. That is what made Nietzsche say, contrary to Socrates whose recollection and

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<sup>10</sup> "Poetry is something more philosophical and serious than history, because poetry tends to give general truths while history gives particular facts. By a "general truth" I mean the sort of thing that a certain type of man will do or say either probably or necessarily. That is what poetry aims at in giving names to the characters. A "particular fact" is what Alcibiades did or what was done to him."(Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451 b 1-5).

<sup>11</sup> We consider it perfectly well founded.

its ideology he fought, that it was necessary to learn physics.<sup>12</sup> Hobbes, who no less than Nietzsche was an adversary of Socrates and Aristotle, performed the same cutting out, putting mathematics on the same side of the divide as politics, and arguing, in both cases, that the mind is entirely dependent on itself to settle and develop its knowledge.<sup>13</sup> It is true that philosophy and mathematics seem to pit the soul against itself. It is not by chance that the *Meno*, like the *Republic*, gives a prominent place to these two sciences in the hierarchy of knowledge.

The *third discovery* is a paradox. It is the man who knows the most that seems the least sure of what he says, and the man who knows the least does not hesitate to speak of what he does not know with complete conviction, even in front of the man who knows the most. One knows the sally of W. Churchman: “Almost everyone knows what it means to say that an event is only probable—except those who have devoted their lives

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<sup>12</sup> “Wir müssen *Physiker* sein, um, in jenem Sinne, *Schöpfer* sein zu können, - während bisher alle Werthschätzung und Ideale auf *Unkenntniss* der Physik oder im *Widerspruch* mit ihr aufgebaut waren. Und darum: Hoch die Physik!” (Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Viertes Buch, n. 335 in *Nietzsche Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Fünfte Abteilung, Zweiter Band, (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1973), 243-4.)

<sup>13</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Treatise of Man*, chap. X, § 5: “Since the causes of the properties that individual figures have belong to them because we ourselves draw the lines; and since the generation of the figures depends on our will, nothing more is required to know the phenomenon peculiar to any figure whatsoever, than that we consider everything that follows from the construction that we ourselves make in the figure to be described. Therefore, because of this fact (that is, that we ourselves create the figures), it happens that geometry has been and is demonstrable”. Certainly one may be overpassed by his own creation, but it remains that mathematics, unlike physics to which they are yet applied though we are not the cause of what to which they are applied, are of the same order than “politics and ethics (that is, the science of *just* and *unjust*, of *equity* and *inequity*) [that] can be demonstrable *a priori*; because we ourselves make the principles—that is the causes of justice (namely laws and covenants)—whereby it is known what *justice* and *equity* and their opposites *injustice* and *inequity* are. For before covenants and laws were drawn up, neither justice nor injustice, neither public good nor public evil, was natural among men any more than it was among beasts.”

to thinking about the matter".<sup>14</sup> The one who has the richest and most intense contact with ideas knows the extent of his ignorance, whereas the other who is not conscious of the processes of knowledge believes himself to be very learned, and takes his conviction for knowledge. To this paradox one must add another which seems to carry us in the opposite direction: Socrates does not give priority to systematically questioning the specialist and the technician in his quest to begin to know about something, but begins precisely with the man who is not on his guard, who has a spontaneous conviction that he knows what he says and who may be easily brought to recognize he knows nothing and, certainly, that he knows no more than those who know that they know nothing of the matter. Oddly enough, Socrates is interested by this latter behaviour and he highlights it and thinks it worthy of investigation as if he wanted to know, in relation to any topic, how it is possible to tell that one knows what one ignores, and as if there was some focus of interest in what will prove to be illusory and false. Anyway it will be necessary to start from this non-knowledge, which takes itself to be an authentic knowledge in order to achieve a certain prudence in making assertions and developing some points truly resistant to criticism; Socrates does not deny all value to this pretended knowledge, however raw and false. This insufficient or twisted relation to ideas is perhaps more important, in order to begin an investigation, than technical knowledge, however much more solid and better established than the latter, not because it has fewer 'fantasies' of knowledge, but because those features are less interesting than those of the latter, more naïve, more spontaneous, when they emanate from the vulgar men. How is it that Socrates ascribes an increased value, at least to this degree, to a form of knowledge which is not to be taken as true, but which revels in its very primitiveness and archaism? Doubtless, Socrates does not want to deal with any individual as if he were a philosopher; the matter is rather, "giving birth" to his convictions, and raising everybody to a position to bridge the gap that separates him from philosophers or, more precisely, from the philosophy he might produce if he got that far, and consequently to begin to having a certain idea of it.

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<sup>14</sup> We loan this quotation from the article of Schoemaker, p. 556. The quoted book is: *Prediction and Optimal Decision; Philosophical Issues of a Science of Values* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1961).

### ***III. Aspects of Non-Knowledge that Fascinate Socrates and, Through Him, Every Philosopher***

We have just seen Socrates grappling with this strange non-knowledge that precedes any knowledge, and that must be detected, examined, spelled, and weighed before being rectified. Let us attempt to fathom the nature of this non-knowledge that is, in some way, a knowledge.

Every act, every motion of the mind, even if it is projected upon some external object, or if it looks to give birth to this latter, seems accompanied or reflected by another act that may be the determination of an object, of an action or of a passion. It accompanies it in the same direction, but not in the same sense. This opposed sense, which one could call generally a *reflection*, *ein Nachdenken*, tends strangely to present itself as the principle of the act, and to believe itself, or to pass itself off as, primary or original. An inversion takes place between the sense that causes or sets things moving and a contrary sense that stems the current of the other and drives movement backwards towards its origin. This counter-sense seems less controlled than the former, and, strangely, more fundamental, as if the foundation came afterwards; as if the Promethean break-out was always reversed by the Epimethean reassembly, the latter being no less valuable than the former. So two acts, felt with an equal immediacy, may be substituted for one another.

This is the reason why everybody who, in any circumstance, feels a sentiment, always also feels himself justified in experiencing it, and does not question the certainty of what he feels. The impression of reflection, which is a sentiment in regard to the other perceptions, believes itself very easily. This fact has been well known since Aristotle showed that some passions, such as anger, are such that I cannot help but experience them whenever I consider that I am not being treated as I ought to be.<sup>15</sup> Malebranche, however, was right to extend the rule to every affec-

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<sup>15</sup> “Hence Achilles in his wrath exclaims: ‘He has dishonoured me, since he keeps the prize he has taken for himself, and [has treated me] like a dishonoured vagrant’, as if being wrath for these reasons. Now men think that they have a right to be highly esteemed by those who are inferior to them in birth, power, and virtue, and generally, in whatever similar respect a man is far superior to another; for example, the rich man to the poor in the matter of money, the eloquent to the incompetent speaker in the matter of oratory, the governor to the governed, and the man who thinks himself worthy to rule to one who is only fit

tion, as if it claims to be a well-founded judgment of circumstances.<sup>16</sup> This assessment, neither thematized nor verbalized, is the preliminary knowledge that embraces and colours our entire existence in an unconscious way, with no possibility of immediately disentangling true from false, right from wrong, good from bad. The “tune” of our sentiments—their *Stimmung*—stands security for the judgments that are tied to it, as if it had hold upon existence itself, and as if captured that experience better than any discourse which takes the risk of being true or false. One understands that philosophy may start from here, and may find here its content and inspiration.

However this phenomenon is a function of language itself, whether or not tied to affections. Pascal, in a famous fragment of the *Pensées*, treats it judiciously as a sort of knowledge.<sup>17</sup> True or false, language is a knowledge because of its central role in determining of the way in which we relate to the objects to which it seems to refer us. Before we are ever disposed to criticize this relation to objects—which critique will itself happen through language—we give our trust without having a rationale (although this lack of rationale does not appear to us) to the acts of language, whatever they are: those of semantic division, those of syntactical order, and sometimes those of an odd logic. We believe in language just as we believe in a well founded knowledge, until we discover with aston-

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to be ruled. [...] Further, men are angry at slights from those by whom they think they have a right to expect to be well treated; such are those on whom they have conferred or are conferring benefits, either themselves, or some one else for them, or one of their friends; and all those whom they desire, or did desire, to benefit” (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, II, II, 1378b7–1379a9, cited in *The “Art” of Rhetoric*, trans. J. H. Freese (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1991), 177-9.)

<sup>16</sup> In the *Traité de morale*, Book I, Chap. XIII, § VIII, may be found what we have called the “law of Malebranche” in our *Essai sur les fictions*: “All the passions justify themselves in a way which, while they are acting on the mind, makes it impossible to reach solid judgments about the object exciting them, for their malignity is such that they are never satisfied when reason fails to yield judgments in their favour” (*Treatise on Ethics* (1648), trans. with introduction by Craig Walton (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993) 137.)

<sup>17</sup> *Pensées*, Laf. 720: “Universal. Ethics and language are particular, but also universal branches of knowledge”.

ishment that other languages arrange their semantics and syntax in other ways; which is certainly a prompt to philosophical insight, but a prompt which we tend to resist a long time—if indeed ever we ever fully embrace it—by relegating these languages to the status of mere foreign languages, clearly inferior to our own mother tongue which, of course, we suppose to hold the true divisions and the true articulations.<sup>18</sup> Our being in the world, insofar as it is affective, speaks of itself in a language that is difficult for us to criticize because we do not have the heart to criticize the very tool we rely on for making sense of that world. We do not have the heart to criticize it because it is that which seems to be for us the inevitable backdrop and essential tool of all philosophical activity. Thus we simply put up with it when this activity does not begin or develop in a technical way, because it seems more fundamental than all that may be criticized. In order for there to be critics or criticism, there must be something, some “matter,” which is believed. It appears to us that no critical activity may be developed without this “matter,” which we must identify, by entering into its particularities, contesting them perhaps, and certainly correcting them where necessary, in order that some philosophy may emerge. In *Cratylus*, Socrates said: “Language is Pan which may rightly be called goat-herd”,<sup>19</sup> *Pan*, because it covers an infinite number of aspects; *goat-herd* because language has *tragos* in it, which means that, in the midst of the flock, led by the herder, are many malicious beings or, if you prefer, because there is a principle of falsity in language.

However, if Plato was right, it is calculation, rather than speech, that

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<sup>18</sup> Diderot’s article on the French language must be read again (in: *Lettre sur les aveugles; Lettre sur les sourds et muets* (Paris: GF Flammarion, 2000), 113., for here we will find expressed by an author usually so subtle and refined in his criticisms, a lot of prejudices that everybody brings forth spontaneously in respect to their mother tongue and to the knowledge it involves.

<sup>19</sup> “Socrates: Then Pan, who declares and always moves—*αει πολων*—all, is rightly called goat-herd—*αιπολος*—being the double-natured son of Hermes, smooth in his upper parts, rough and goat-like in his lower parts”. (Plato, *Cratyles*, 408 c-d)

makes us clever beings.<sup>20</sup> This does not mean that all our calculations are any more correct than our speeches' pretended truth. It simply means that in the human world, calculations are always done, must always be done, even if they are neither elucidated nor explained: sometimes it takes a long time before we learn how to elucidate them in a general or universal way, without abandoning the care of calculation exclusively to the passions. Not a calculation may be performed but, beneath it and taking shape from it, another calculation springs, seeming to tell the truth of the former. Pascal, when he expounded the calculation of probabilities in competitive games, reveals, under the surface scores, the real state of equilibrium among the players. A calculation may be the reflection of another; it may underlie it and be, in a manner, its philosophy. Every calculation is a sort of table that develops other calculations indefinitely. Another instance would develop these insights, at the intersection of mathematics and politics, as Condorcet (following Plato and Hobbes) was able to bring out: there is no ballot that has not, beneath it, its calculations, and that does not demonstrate the inadequacy of the thesis that the simple tallying of votes always designates the correct winner. If one pays attention to "majorities of refusal," whose value is at least equal to, though less obvious than, the value of "majorities of assent," the exclusive and persisting focus of most electoral systems on the latter is by no means self-evidently correct. Numbers give place to other numbers, and it is this giving way, or transformation into other numbers, that constitutes a sort of pre-philosophy. Do not be lulled into believing that this transformation is immediately right or effective: evaluations of probability are usually wrong when made by people who do not know how to do the calculations, and that do not practice them at all, but the suspicion that behind or under numbers lurk other numbers, as series behind series—even though one cannot articulate them in any explicit and determinate fashion—may be thought of as the sketch of a philosophical reflection.

Hence we return to language that, from the beginning and through an infinitely sophisticated system of levels, locates the speaker on points that

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<sup>20</sup> *Epinomis*, 977c: "If we should deprive human nature of number we should never attain to any understanding. For...the creature that did not know two and three, or odd or even, and was completely ignorant of number, could never clearly tell of things about which it had only acquired sensations and memories."

are impossible to locate empirically or, if we prefer, “really.” Language may locate the speaker in a future or in a past such as he cannot have lived in, within points of view of beings from places he does not inhabit; it can make move all the frontiers: between life and death, I and the Other, I and myself at different moments of time, between I as a subject and I as an object. Language engraves symbolically imagined problems that, however impossible it may be to live them empirically, have yet a real effect that could not be real without them. Language introduces “unthinkability,” infinity, impossibility, from which philosophy may extend its points of view; but they may exist in the absence of a technical philosophy capable of taking them over in order to transform them into methods and to criticize them (though it is impossible to do without them). No discourse about death, soul, time, world, the Other, the I, “nothing,” or existence could take place without these “impossible” points of view, the interplay between which must produce rules to govern their use so that speech may simultaneously exploit their infinite potentiality and criticize the “impossibilities” of that exploitation. However, this latter task is neither to everybody’s taste, nor, perhaps, understandable to everybody. Nobody should believe what is spoken of as a lie by Plato: the Socratic assertion that there are different sorts of men whose nature is mixed of gold, or of silver, or of iron and bronze.<sup>21</sup> But surely we are obliged to recognize that not everybody is a philosopher, that only a very few become philosophers to the extent of making philosophy their trade or main business, and that this state of affairs is by no means necessarily a bad thing. Besides, it is not impossible to think that not every language permits a philosophical extension. How many thoughts are intimated to us by the impossible difficulty we sometimes find in conceiving that which we are speaking? If, for instance, it is so easy for us to conceive of our thinking being as immortal, is it not because there is no internal point of view from which to think of death, because the mere thinking of it seems to exclude us from its power? The *I think* can absolutely not include his death, which, whatever else it does, precludes thought.

The sketch we have drawn of the priority of sentiment, language, number and calculation was made from an already somewhat sophisticated point of view, and indeed featured references to what we called a

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<sup>21</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 415a-d. Aristotle upheld in his *Politics* a similar thesis that is mocked by Hobbes in *Leviathan*, ch. XV.

technical point of view (without fully explaining its features). Without this critical point of view, sentient, speaking and calculating beings do not know where their certainty, or what Pascal called their “science”—their knowledge—come from. They passively put up with an unexamined ordering of precedence, in living by an ad hoc transcendence of things and objects, driven by convictions deeper than any criticism or any justification, without knowing from whence they come, and believing that there, in the sphere of language, they perceive accurately, and that there they can drink their fill of a principle of value according to which affects jostle to promote themselves without the slightest relativity to qualify this strange sort of prosopopeia.

What is still not still clear is the status of these orderings of precedence: are they phantasms with which our constructions are surrounded? Are they real priorities that require philosophical developments? Everybody knows the famous fragment of the *Pensées* in which Pascal opposes the opinion of the Duke de Roannez, who defended reminiscence when Pascal’s spokesman warned us against the idea of the retrogression of truth<sup>22</sup> towards a supposed recollection, and argued that solving a problem neither means recalling its solution nor continually turning over its premises as if they contained the solution.<sup>23</sup> The illusion of recollection would be thus more an effect of the statement of the problem than the source of its solution. The desire for a solution in knowledge could no more be the demonstration of the possession of this knowledge than “want is its supply and hunger is the bread”,<sup>24</sup> while if this knowledge is a philosophical one, it could no longer demonstrate the necessity or inevitability of philosophy, as *Protrepticus* seems to claim.

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<sup>22</sup> Bergson had the expression, in French: “movement rétrograde du vrai.”

<sup>23</sup> “M. de Roannez used to say: ‘The reasons occur to me afterwards, but first of all the thing pleases or shocks me without my knowing why, and yet it shocks me for reasons I only discover later.’ But I do not think it shocks for reason we discover afterwards but that we only discover the reasons because it does shock.” (Laf. 983 in: Pascal, *Pensées*, Penguin Books, London, 1995, 327-8).

<sup>24</sup> Jeremy Bentham, “Nonsense upon Stilts or Pandora’s Box opened,” in: *Rights, Representation and Reform. Nonsense upon stilts and other writings on the French Revolution*, ed. P. Schofield, C. Pease-Watkin and C. Balmires (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 330.

In effect, for one to consider knowledge—and particularly philosophical knowledge—to be the cause of what appears, taking things back-to-front, as a sort of pre-knowledge, or to consider such pre-knowledge to be really the cause of the philosophical reflection, one has but to deal with a conjunction of two mental phenomena, or of two acts, or of an act and of its passive reversal, or of the contrary phenomenon. However, it must be admitted, with Bayes and Mill, that the *irresistibility* of the bond between subsequent phenomena is not imperative.<sup>25</sup> Even if we had found the means to expurgate *irresistibility* from the causation that is in matter, it we would still have to resolve the antinomy up against which we have come from the very beginning.

#### ***IV. Philosophy is a construction***

As is well known, Kant distinguishes, even in *a priori* knowledge, *determination* from *reflection*, and, even though he ranks mathematics among the fields of knowledge that construct their concepts, he prefers define philosophy by *conceptual reflection*.<sup>26</sup> Now it appears that this opposition is only apparent: there is as much reflection<sup>27</sup> in mathematics

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<sup>25</sup> *A System of Logic*, in: *Collected Works*, VIII, 839: “That world [necessity] involves much more than mere uniformity of sequence: it implies irresistibility. [But] the causes on which action depends, are never uncontrollable; and any given effect is only necessary provided that the causes tending to produce it are not controlled. That whatever happens, could not have happen otherwise unless something hard taken place which was capable of preventing it, no one surely needs hesitate to admit. But to call this by the name necessity is to use the term in a sense so different from its primitive and familiar meaning, from that which it bears in the common occasions of life, as to a mount almost to a play upon words.”

<sup>26</sup> “Philosophical knowledge is the knowledge of reason by means of concepts; mathematical knowledge is knowledge by means of the *construction* of concepts” (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (Everyman, London; J. M. Dent; Vermont: C E. Tuttle, 1998), 470 [II, Transcendental Doctrine of Method, chap. I, sec. I]).

<sup>27</sup> Even when reflection is defined by Kant as “that state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to the different sources or faculties of knowledge, by which alone their relation to each other can be rightly determined.” (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 216)

as in philosophy, and as much determining knowledge in philosophy as in mathematics. The mathematical problems of probabilities, such as those solvable by the application of Bayes rule for instance, are intended to frame, between two degrees of belief, the reasons I have to think that such or such a situation has such or such chance to come to pass. One can see then that the act of projecting oneself towards a possible future situation in order to define it is bound to an impetus carrying one back towards an initial "*I guess*" that authorizes the act of projecting, in the name of reality, to make its guess while fixing limits to it. Conversely, what would might a philosophy that pretended to reflect upon its objects without having learned to fix them by the determination taught by the sciences look like? One cannot reflect upon nothing or from nothing.

But this point needs to be elaborated carefully. Nowadays there are many philosophers that feign to elaborate a sort of previous state, open only to intuition, which can only afterwards be developed by reasons. Philosophy would receive this state as a "given," and even as sciences were constructing their concepts upon the basis of this previous knowledge while ignoring it, philosophy would have the task of investigating it. Now this previous knowledge is nothing but the unconscious creation of acts by these so-called philosophies, that posit of a mode of non-reflective thinking that they claim to reflect afterwards. However is it not through what they have the desire to say, the desire to feel, the desire to think that these philosophies fill up what they settle as being before any knowledge, included theirs? Like Pascal, and contrary to M. de Roannez's recollection, we suggest that it is the work of reflection that gives to us the "non-reflected." Moreover, this "non-reflected" always takes the form of the reflection which insists that the "non-reflected" comes first. Like all other knowledge, philosophy solves problems by construing solutions, and it must be careful not to put forward as a solution the phantasms that this construction seems to project backwards as if they were its foundation.

Let us take an instance. When philosophy raises ethical problems, it seems always to assume pre-existing intuitive ethical positions by which we think ourselves already informed, and which determine the shape and style of the solutions. One may even fear that reason plays its part in so fine and sophisticated an interlacing web that it is impossible to imagine that it may be untangled, until reason takes over the problem, formulates and solves it. Or, if reason cannot solve it, it might at least

give the problem the shape and limits of a neat antinomy, whose clarity will benefit all those that will in future face the problem, and the challenge of solving it. The conceptualization of ethical problems—what, following R. M. Hare, we may call the critical level—not only spreads out and develops the intuitive level, but drives out the weaknesses, the inadequacies, the inabilities of intuition to raise up to some totality, or to treat some complicated situation otherwise than by calling upon sentiment, and elaborating that sentimental position in the hope that those who do not currently share it will do so once it is clearly enough stated. When philosophy claims only to elaborate an intuitive conviction, it ceases to be a philosophy, and becomes an uncritical laudation and endorsement of positions that it refuses to think out. In the field of ethics and politics, it is surprising to see how many pretended philosophies choose to adopt, when they begin to link different ethical principles, a so-called “lexical order” that consists developing from the first principle all the rules that is possible to derive from it, before passing to another principle which will be dealt in the same way, provided it does not oppose the first; and then repeating this filtering and linking many times. This surprise does not arise in response to the method that really succeeds in linking principles, but in response to the arbitrary choice of the ranking of the principles in first, second, third, or  $n^{\text{th}}$  position. Leaving to intuition the choice of personal liberty as the first principle, then, in second position, the equality principle—as Rawls does in his *Theory of Justice*—may qualify as an apology for a particular system of government, but it should not be mistaken for the product of philosophical method, because on the major point where one waits for the chance to catch the philosopher out—to know—at the very moment for proving that priority must be granted to individual freedom rather than to equality—this method remains silent. One cannot describe as philosophy the mere recapitulation, or even the clarification and elucidation, of prejudices. The coherent arrangement of the principles is a work for politicians, or perhaps rather for theoreticians of politics, and it is a useful work. But it is not a philosophical work, because such a work is limited to the managing of a precedent situation to which it wants, or imagines itself to be, the heir. We should rather adopt the standpoint of R. M. Hare, who distinguishes in ethics between an intuitive and a critical level, and who recognizes that the existence of a critical level is suggested by the contradictions commonly met with at the intuitive level,

but who also emphasizes that the intuitive level does not inspire the ideas of the critical level. Everything is always to be done over again when the task is to criticize. What a philosophical critique performs, upon what seems to precede it, is to bring out the multifarious and potentially contradictory aspects which intuition is unable to resolve.

Philosophy takes the side of critiques and proofs: it must not betray itself by working secretly for a side that it camouflages under the name of *intuition*. The position of the “non-reflected” cannot be the foundation of something from which a valid inference might be made, if only it can manage to make good on its promise to this “non-reflected” position. Philosophy does not proceed without effort or disagreement with regard to just which intuitive convictions it may legitimately fancy to precede it. It goes against the stream of intuition, or, if it is meant to be in the main stream of intuition—where Hume thinks it necessary to locate it in *A Treatise of Human Nature*—the onus is on the philosopher to show that it cannot be otherwise, that reason cannot solve the problem using only its own resources,<sup>28</sup> as, for instance, it is possible for the mathematician to demonstrate that it is not possible to square the circle.

What philosophy must do, instead of following in the wake of a non-knowledge, or of an intuition unable to establish its rights, is—for a given question—to investigate all the possible positions, and so to reverse the supposed priorities. Far from believing supposed data from which one expects to extract a philosophy, it is necessary, when a problem arises, to examine the plurality of its formulations and of its solutions, but also to take care not to leave unexamined the “imaginary” basis of these so listed formulations, an “imaginary” basis that some philosophies claim to have in front of them, as if they must draw their inspiration and even their content from it, even though this imaginary is all too likely to be simply a projection from these formulations themselves.

Imagine a confrontation between the author of *Les données immédiates de la conscience* and a utilitarian author—Bentham or Hare—about ethics. The former closes the door to any calculation of pleasures and pains—calculations which society needs—believing himself to have shown, through what he thinks to be an approach to the

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<sup>28</sup> In the third Book, the author of *A Treatise* endeavours to give the solution of this problem. It can be rationally demonstrated that a problem does escape the grasp of reason, and no sin against reason is committed by the demonstration.

lived experience (*Erlebnis*) that sensations and sentiments are too heterogeneous to supply the commensurability that the calculations require. The latter try to think of sensations and passions in a way which makes possible the calculations wanted by society. Thus, the problem is reversed, but it is by no means clear that this latter utilitarian option is inferior to Bergson's, or that it should instead enter upon the configuration of all the possible formulations of the requisites of the calculation of pleasures and pains, in the way that has been sought after for several thousand years, but perhaps, in a more urgent manner, for two or three centuries. My purpose is not, through this reversal of Bergsonism, to prove that utilitarianism is right against Bergson: my goal rather is to establish that philosophy has no right to give its allegiance to some fundamental belief, whatever the nature of that allegiance and belief. Utilitarianism secrets within its compass a social and ontological "imaginary"; but it does not command belief in this "imaginary," calling it philosophy and denying the title of philosophy to all other positions. In all probability, philosophy, far from being faithful to any such imaginary construction, must draw up a table of the possible positions concerning a question, and proceed to a judicious logical inventory of their respective advantages and disadvantages, in order to make a rational choice. The only alternative is to build philosophy in the wake of beliefs which are, quite erroneously, described as philosophical, and either to be content with the consciousness of the error, or to pretend, consciously or unconsciously, that it does not exist.

If, on every question, philosophy succeeds in making such an inventory of possible positions, of principles that permit their calculation and resolution, without prejudice to the primary principle, but leaving all options open, if the selection criteria (of solutions) are no longer beliefs but reasons, then one might envisage an organization of philosophers similar to the contemporary medical community of Evidence Based Medicine, whose investigations and practices are adding to an immense stock of positions, to which anyone may contribute, and in which anyone may inspire himself in endeavouring to give his reasons, and to explain to the others their deviation from the ordinary rule. Why not consider the entire field of philosophy in this way, with everybody collaborating by contributing to one question or another, and submitting that contribution to examination by others, and to their discussions of its formulation and structure? No research is too singular to find a place in

some table of positions, though its accommodation therein might require a profound rearrangement. One can always locate a position in relation to another, all the more so since the point is not to regard the table as if it were complete, or even as if it ought to aim at completion no matter what the cost. Philosophy appears to exist in this unceasing interaction between positions, rather than in the derivation of a thesis or of a set of theses from positions which it imagines to be precedent to it. More precisely, because it is impossible for philosophy to prevent the interplay of priorities, philosophy is rendered recognizably philosophical only by a confrontation with other philosophies, without requiring any other belief than this one which, when all is said and done, is permitted, and thereafter that the articulations of their respective tables have been produced and reviewed. In the words of Leibniz, though far from Leibniz's conception (which was in a still Platonic mood, and which attacked Hobbes for making truths up as he needed them),<sup>29</sup> the ideas are the effects of the interplay of conceptions, but not their principles. More precisely still: what appear as ideas separate from conceptions result from a certain stabilization of the latter. The most dangerous point of the process concerns the forming of functions, because setting aside the simple confrontations taking place amidst the families of philosophers, it remains the case that, outside these families, confrontations are systematically avoided in order to negotiate academic advantage, political rewards or power, all themselves goods that have nothing to do with philosophical searching. However this difficulty affects not only the organization of the world of philosophers: it has been identified as a stumbling block since Rousseau, for instance, wanted to distinguish the will of all from

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<sup>29</sup> Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, § XXIV: "Truths do not depend on names, and are not arbitrary, as some new philosophers have believed it". Leibniz goes against Hobbes who said in *De Corpore*, Chap. III, 8, that "veritas enim in dicto consistit". "Deductihincquoque potest, veritates omnium primas, ortas esse ab arbitrio eorum qui nomina rebus primum imposuerunt, vela b aliis posita acceperunt" (Thomas Hobbes, *Opera Philosophica Omnia* (Bristol, England, and Sterling, USA: Thoemmes Press, 1999), 31-2.)

the general will,<sup>30</sup> and cast light on this tricky point, without solving it.

The organization spoken of above is hard to settle in some fields, though it seems easier in others. Laplace showed examples of it with astronomy and physics. Paradoxically, it seems harder to settle on knowledge and actions that seem to depend on the mind itself, such as philosophy, mathematics, and politics. *Paradoxically*, one might say, for, if mind feels itself to be accompanied in its action by an experimental or experiential rectification, it yields more easily to such a performance, even though it seems more dependent on something external to it. There not space enough here to show that experience does not make the slightest difference, because it acquires sense only through being incorporated in theories, and because one would be wrong to imagine that theories depend on external experience.

### *V. The Temptation of Hypocrisy*

The “discourse of the beneath,” like the discourse that precedes or skirts technical or critical discourse, is not only imaginary, but it can give rise to a symbolism which it cannot perform by itself: it begets and furthers hypocrisy. When a discourse is split, and when the speaker uses only one of its branches, and refuses to recognize the other branch, even though he knows of its existence and its efficiency, then both discourse and speaker enter the service of hypocrisy. One finds sometimes, in hospitals, people that use what is called “the doctrine of double effect.” For example, when the doctor wants to soothe a particularly violent and long-term pain, he may administer to the patient analgesic doses of which he knows the lethal danger, because of their depressing effects on the heart, without having the intention to kill the patient. Here, the intention is used as a pair of moral scissors that makes cuts in the act so that a part may be retained while the consequences of the other part are delib-

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<sup>30</sup> “When factions, partial associations, are formed to the detriment of the whole society, the will of each of these associations become general with reference to its members, and particular with reference to the State; it may then be said that there are no larger as many voters as there are men, but only as many voters as there are associations. The differences become less numerous and yield a less general result” (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right* (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1924), 123).

erately ignored. So it can be said that law interdicting euthanasia—as is the case in France—was scrupulously obeyed, even though euthanasia is effectively practised; because by means of an act beneficial to the patient (pain-relief), another act is performed which is noxious to the patient (euthanasia), at least so long as the patient wishes to go on living.

Pascal showed, in opposition to some Jesuit moral philosophers of his time, how intention could be used, by its splitting of actions, to consider only what is presentable from a moral or legal point of view, while diverting attention from the depravities that may accompany it.<sup>31</sup> The only skill required is that of choosing a convenient line of division, and to disregard completely the part of the action it would be dangerous to show because it would reveal too easily the immorality of those who, by a conjuring trick, display only the morally uncontroversial aspects of their action.

The case of philosophers who treat as philosophical what they posit as preceding or skirting their technical approach, in order to feign an experience that seems to found their approach is quite similar. To call upon experience is often an alibi intended to warrant a thesis that seems thereby to gain a new support, even though it only actually cuts what support it does have in half. Theoretical philosophy—is it even possible for a philosophy not to be theoretical?—makes itself appear as that which is lacking to experience and that to which experience aspires, as if presenting itself as desired, wanted or called forth could add to it any degree of truth. So there are philosophies that manage this cutting so that they seem to be called forth by the less philosophical part as revealing them to itself. Far from being laid upon an intuition, and upon an “intuited world” that precedes them, these philosophies beget this pretended intuition and “intuited world” precisely to give to themselves and to the reader the impression that they speak of something which is not merely their invention.

This hypocrisy takes all sorts of forms. To name just a few: the

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<sup>31</sup> Pascal, *Provincial Letters*, VIII<sup>th</sup> Letter: “When we cannot prevent the action, we rectify the intention at least, and so correct the viciousness of the means by the purity of the end...Do you understand me now? -Perfectly well, said I, you allow men the outward and material action, and give to God the inward and spiritual intention; and by this equitable division, you connect the human laws with the laws of God” (in *The Life of Mr. Paschal with his Letters Relative to the Jesuits*, two volumes (London, Bettenham, 1744), 137-8).

form of the “already-there-world”—*le monde déjà-là*—in Merleau-Ponty, the form of intuitionist ethics, the form of the pretended “immediate data of consciousness” in Bergson, the form of an alleged “nature” upon which would be settled cultural constructions, the form of a naivety of sensation or feeling that would precede their transformation or sophistication.<sup>32</sup> How could it be possible to seize what is *given, natural, immediate*, as if they were absolute commencements, as if mixture and heterogeneity were not present from the very beginning, without it being possible to attribute to them some end? The trick is for sophistication to gain an acceptance by passing itself off as something immediate and simple, though it is neither immediate nor simple. A long time ago, Pascal noticed that what is considered as memory and custom often presents itself as something natural and immediate, whereas what appears so is more usually a highly complex deposit of a sophistication that refuses to recognize itself as such in order to feign deep roots in existence. How is it possible in such a split purpose that one part could be historical, whereas the other is not only not historical, but (and even) anti-historical? One side of the knowledge is feigned, in order to have its matter echoed and imposed by the other.

This ideology is nearly always accompanied by a notion of *interpretation* that, in a paranoid way, insists that every text read or spoken, whether it be read or spoken by myself or by someone else, does not say what it seems to say, as if a part of its “sense” is concealing itself from anybody would try to grasp it. In such a conception, whether

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<sup>32</sup> So Merleau-Ponty ends the foreword of his *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) in unveiling the phenomenological movement as if it was as “laborious” as “the work of Balzac, of Proust, of Valéry or of Cézanne—by the same style of attention and astonishment, by the same rigour of consciousness, by the same will of seizing the world’s sense or the history’s sense in a nascent state” (xvi). If, as it is undisputable, history exists in Balzac’s work or in Proust’s books, it is not in a “nascent state”—*à l’état naissant*—but in a whirling turbulence that has begun long ago, and that carries along all, sensations, affects, dialogues, the thoughts of the characters, and that leads us to seize, through the perceptions, sentiments, passions, the tune of post-revolution history that is the epoch of the Restoration; the impression of immediacy is really historicized. Affectivity reverberates in the history.

really or only tactically paranoid, no text can reveal, of itself, what it wants to say; another's text seems to wait for the philosopher's interpretation to become itself, and to wait for my hermeneutical achievement to achieve or acquire what it appears to include. The haughtiness of hermeneutics is to believe or to feign that it is the one who seizes the text who gives "sense" to the text. In consequence, as long as the text is not seized by the hermeneutist or by the interpreter, it is not what it is, or it is what it is not. It is not a matter of coincidence that the presumed author of the *ΠΡΟΤΡΕΠΤΙΚΟΝ* is also the author of *ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ*. Thus from the splitting of texts, feelings, convictions, it may always be inferred that a "hidden thing" must be flushed out; and that knowledge is the unveiling of the "hidden thing." Even if we concede that somebody may naively or ingeniously think that there really is something "hidden," how could a philosopher who, day after day, is used to constructing his theories, fool himself or fool the others?

So conducted, philosophy would become a sort of casuistry in which the great "Jesuit" that is the philosopher—or rather the professor of philosophy—delivers and releases the sense that was present, but that nobody else could see. One can build a pedagogic system of philosophy on this scheme, in teaching everyone that he cannot understand by himself the texts he is asked to read; that the situation of the teacher is in some place that the student cannot understand; that the enigmatic questions which will be posed on examination day do nothing but conceal the answers expected from him, as if they had a concealed sense that the whole system of essay-writing—in French: *dissertation*—or commentary endeavours to lay bare. If a great number of students, and a number, in proportion no less great, of teachers believe in the merits of the system that has just been described, and lend themselves to it, as if it were self-evident, a few of them may yet suspect that the reality of exams and competitive examinations—in French: *concours*—rests on a "Laplace system" of EBM (Evidence Based Medicine) that requires a common language, and uses it to impose commensurability, in order to define the rankings, whether ordinal (as in selecting candidates) or cardinal (as in examinations).

Before moving toward the conclusion, I want to show that nobody is compelled to conform to such an ideology, and that its character is better fitted to a religious order than to a department of philosophy.

### VI. Theoretical Knowledge and Practical Knowledge

If the system I have just described of a split discourse in which one part hides a secret sense which the other part endeavours to seize for itself, as if, in a fruit, we should want not only to detect the stone of the fruit but also the almond, if the system has some appearance of plausibility, it is because of the knowledge that, whether one wants it to or not, determines the shapes of questions—either plausible or not, either well asked or not, either solvable or not—and the answers endeavoured to be given to them. Indeed, during the whole endeavour, the problem seems to encrypt the solution one needs to decipher; the knowledge remains pending in the question until somebody either “cracks”<sup>33</sup> the problem or demonstrates that it has no solution.<sup>34</sup> Even if the problems posed do not contain the elements of their solutions, and do not limit the range of possible responses in any way, this conception of critical knowledge is almost irresistible. At the very most, those who more often solve the problem, and that go to a lot of trouble to give a solution, know that it troubles them, and are not so inclined to see the solution included in the question, as in these famous pictures we want turn around and around to see the hunter oddly hidden in one of its parts. But, once the problem is “cracked” (*craqué*) it will look, from the point of view of the possessor of its solution, like an empty pod from which any substance it once contained has escaped, or as the goods and the evils took their flight from Pandora’s box.

If theoretical problems suffer the double misrepresentation of “discovering” and of the transformation of what existed in embryo in the question, is it the same in practical questions? When the solution of a theoretical question has been constructed and has been settled as *an* answer, yea as *the* answer, recognized by the peers of the author who has constructed it, the solution seems to erase and to discredit all the past efforts at resolution. Everything else is dismissed, as if truth, or what is recognized as such at some moment, relegates to the status of error all the trials attempted while the problem was worked on with a view to

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<sup>33</sup> We borrow the expression from C. Villani in the Franglais slang of the high level’s mathematicians. One can read the expression – *craquer un problème* – in: Cédric Villani, *Théorème vivant* (Paris: Grasset, 2012).

<sup>34</sup> That is a sort of solving as much strong as the presentation of one solution.

resolution. Does the same apply to practical questions?

Certainly not. If one wants to consider the question just raised, of the outcome of a problem that was stated, one must not bring the practical knowledge into line with theoretical knowledge. Indeed, if in given circumstances, and taking into account all the bits of information brought within my reach, I perform an action as if a consequence consonant with that information would result from the circumstances of tomorrow; and if, tomorrow becoming today, I notice that what I decided yesterday is at odds with the new situation, it will not be easy to detect an error as it would be in relation to a theoretical problem, especially if I used all the information that the present offered in making my decision for the future. It may happen, taking account of the bits of information at my disposal, that *I was in the right to believe* that things would turn out in a certain way, even though things actually turned out differently, so that my prediction was rendered inaccurate. In reality, even if they are contrary to my predictions, events do not show that I was wrong, and that I might have been accused of deciding irrationally if, when I took my decision, I took it in accordance with the situation as it then existed. One must not calculate the chances of being in the right as the properties of things themselves; things have their reasons but they are not the reasons to believe that a state of affairs will occur. This is the point where the seers are wrong, for they pretend to guess the future as one reads the present or as one remembers the past. Now the soothsayers cannot know the future any better than we do. The future is absolutely free, free from many determinations I recognize; and to believe that something will occur is nothing but a parameter of a situation, and not necessarily the happiest or the most welcome. Whoever believes the seers loses his freedom of action and is fooled by them into believing in an *aletheia*, or some unveiling. It is the notion of *aletheia* that is false (though good for seers). Some years ago, the purposes of the French Minister of Health, Georgina Dufoix were mocked at the time of the so-called affair “contaminated blood”. She said that she was “responsible but not guilty” in relation to the medical disaster that occurred under her eyes without her being able to foresee the catastrophe; but the articles of journalists who laughed at her phrasing should have been more restrained, because not a single piece of information at her disposal at the time could reasonably have led her to suppose that Aids was so dangerous an illness, and so easily transmitted through blood.

It would be wrong to interpret what I have just said as the proof there are two styles of knowledge: the *first* of which is an incomplete knowledge of what will be tomorrow, whereas the *second* is the fulfilment of the first in a complete, correct and true knowledge which it will be possible to enjoy tomorrow. This may be the case in theoretical questions; but it is not the case in practical matters: probabilities have their structure and autonomy that do not disappear in some discourse that would become true in the end, and which would annihilate the world of probabilities. Having recourse to probabilities implies that are used in a time when and a place where the information upon which they depend is intrinsically poor; and, of course, probability theory writes laws that transcend time and place, as does Bayes's rule, but that also allow the subject whoever he may be, to be reduced in circumstances of non-knowledge to making a *guess*, and to expect from the rule nothing but the measure of his chances of making a correct prediction when choosing one possible outcome rather than another.

No wonder that Plato, in the same *Meno* where he sets out reminiscence, takes practical knowledge into account, and gives instances of its not being inferior to theoretical knowledge, and even, in some cases, as being superior to it. This superiority must be understood. Socrates, in this dialogue, in order to make himself quite clear, takes the instance of somebody who knows the way to Larissa and would lead one infallibly to it, though without knowing how to explain the route. In other words, he would not know, as a geographer, the position of Larissa relative to Athens, but he would know how to get to Larissa, and how to lead anybody wanting to go there: does Socrates mean to imply that a man who has nothing but opinions on the situation of Larissa, which he knows how to reach, possesses a knowledge inferior to the geographer's science? No. On the contrary, it seems obvious that, when our goal is to reach Larissa, it is far better to take a guide that has every chance of leading us there successfully rather than to take a geographer who knows theoretically the situation of the city, but who is completely unfamiliar with the journey, and would be completely at a loss to tell us the best route from here to there. There is a specificity in practical knowledge which cannot be measured by theoretical knowledge, in spite of the ambitions of theoreticians; it would be wrong to believe that theoretical knowledge puts an end to the imperfections of practical knowledge, for the latter is perfect in its place and there is no need to confront

and oppose it with the former. One may theorize practical knowledge and show that it does not work in the same way as theoretical knowledge; but its originality must be retained, without trying to replace it with a theory that is not universally applicable.

If one wanted, at whatever cost, to replace practical knowledge with theoretical knowledge, considered as more perfect, one would have to make the sinister, inconsistent and dangerous choice to prefer the man who recites volumes of legislation to the man who capable of winning one's case for one; the man who pours out his medical knowledge to the doctor that cures and heals one; the man who conceptually explains how to make shoes to the shoemaker who actually supplies one with shoes. There is a huge gap between the knowledge of the specialist, who knows all the particularities of his field, and knows how to teach them—though this latter is of course a sort of practical knowledge of teaching—and that kind of knowledge which is sown and cultivated to solve practical problems. In the first case, it may be enough to deliver the knowledge and to arrange it if it lacks of order; the second case requires the judgment of the man who cannot derive all the rules of his actions from mere knowledge. When a man of action is required, it is not necessarily a professor, an expert or a counsellor that is wanted, all being men of understanding rather than of decision. That is why Plato, contrary to all expectations—because he is usually supposed to prefer high contemplation to mere *orthodoxa*, or the mere *pistis* necessary to action—dares say, against the keepers of the Platonic flame, that *orthodoxa* is, at least in certain conditions, superior to theoretical knowledge.<sup>35</sup> Plato was no

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<sup>35</sup> In *Meno*, Socrates defends *right opinion* whose *rationale* is not inferior to the *rationale* of knowledge in practical matters: “right opinion is just as useful as knowledge” (97c); and, a little further on, without challenging the difference between epistemological knowledge and practical knowledge, he adds: “Soc. Am I not in the right in saying that true opinion leading the way renders the effect of each action as good as knowledge does? Men. There again, Socrates, I think you speak the truth. Soc. So that right opinion will be not whit inferior to knowledge in worth or usefulness as regards our actions, nor will the man who has right opinion be inferior to him who has knowledge.” (98b-c). Then, pointing out much more the rationale of which action needs: “Hence true opinion is as good a guide to rightness of action as knowledge; and this is a point we omitted just now in our consideration of the nature of virtue, when

more a Platonist than Marx was a Marxist or, to refer to a famous fragment of Pascal's *Pensées*, than Descartes was a Cartesian. And, far from wanting to make of men some daemons or demi-gods, Plato places humanity under the title of *elpis*, recalling without any doubt in *Laws* the account of Pandora in Hesiod's *Works and Days*.

### ***VII. Further Information about Practical Knowledge***

So, it would wrong to say that, in practical discourse, one part of the discourse is hiding the other, as if it was yet to be revealed. To speak in this way is to pass oneself off as a soothsayer, that is to say a perfect forger or counterfeiter of knowledge. Practical knowledge has, from this point of view, a perfect sufficiency compared to theoretical discourse. The practical discourse, that seems to hide what it cannot know, really tells, without any reserve or mystery, all that it knows. Plato and Aristotle knew this; I particularly made use of Plato: I could have used the practical syllogisms of Aristotle. Now I want to focus the point in a more modern way.

The "principle of Hume" is well known by specialists in ethics. The author of *A Treatise on Human Nature* warns the readers of ethics books against the secret slide from *to be* to *ought to be*, even though this slide is, in his eyes, banned, since it cannot but encourage the concealment of *is* by *ought to be*, and *ought to be* by *is*. Laws written in modern codes are expressed in the present or future indicative, very seldom in the prescriptive mood of *ought to be*, that itself might be better expressed in the imperative, as in the formulae of the Decalogue in the Bible. How can one tell whether the formulation of the law hides behind the present of *to be* an *ought to be* that constitutes the reality thus concealed? Doubtless, it is tempting to notice that the use of the present indicative gives no guarantee that the law does not include an implicit imperative, which would be the mark of a norm I must not infringe. However, things are not so simple and it should be noticed that if one wanted

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we stated that knowledge is the only guide of right action; whereas we find there is also true opinion." (97b-c). This tenet is extraordinary in Platonism we always expect (by prejudice) to see on the side of the defence of knowledge against opinion; one can see how much this prejudice is ill founded, at least in practical questions.

to transcribe laws written in the indicative mood into imperative rules, even if those rules were regarded as merely implicit, it should be asked what prevents their becoming explicit. One may read laws as if they were “moral”—the will to detect the imperative mood beneath the indicative seems to lead to such a reading—but such a perusal is conducted from a subjective point of view that does not capture the specificity of laws: the main point is that laws cannot take the shape of morals. And, really, the utilitarian reading of law, though just as plausible as the moral, if not more plausible, does not require that one cares about duty for duty’s sake. From a utilitarian point of view, the general law charges the man who would be tempted to see his own interest in stealing, murdering, or any other infringement, to calculate. Taking the risk of such a breach would be a bad choice, because it would cause more pain than pleasure to the chooser. In this way, law may be perceived as a proposition containing a prediction that, in an institutional context, makes it contrary to the potential offender’s interest to commit an offence, and thereby bring upon himself a punishment. Thus it is possible to make a non-deontological reading of the law that is at least as accurate as the deontological or the moral reading.

The step we have just taken in a non-deontological direction and sense of law does not permit us to systematize the “mask-discourse,” as if the rule liked to disguise itself as a fact, and as if the fact may appear as a rule. Certainly what matters is not to deny that the play of masks occurs, for I think on the contrary that it frequently does occur. But it is impossible to hold it as the single relation between noun and fact. Breaking with this monoideic and paranoid way<sup>36</sup> of considering the relations between *norm* and *fact*, the one hiding the other indefinitely, even if they would be yet distinct, one could show, against Hume, that many actions take place that fall simultaneously and inextricably under the categories of both *fact* and *norm*, *description* and *prescription*, *is* and *ought to be*, and that their so doing is no evidence of an attempt to conceal the one under the name of the other or to pass off the one for the other. There are statements of facts that have the characteristic of instituting or establishing obligations, and thus of making law.

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<sup>36</sup> We characterize on this way, as previously and without the psychiatric rigour, the delirium of suspicion.

Focusing the purpose of *L'erreur de Hume*—Hume's mistake—on *promises*, Gardies points out that promises would be wrongly analyzed if they were described as duties hidden beneath facts. It is right to assert that if John says to Janet that he promises her a sum of money, or pledges to marry her, if as he says the word he does not gesture expressively to show he is joking, if the matter of the promise is credible and if Janet does not mock the promise, John is obliged to keep it. The promise means that there will be a moment that John is envisaging before others, and which is the moment when John will give the sum of money to Janet, or will marry her. There is no duty hidden beneath the sentence "I promise," because the sentence is as much a formula of duty as the expression of a fact. To promise is to perform an action that, in itself, is not a duty; even if it is true that it announces a duty. It is the action to setting oneself a duty. But it would be wrong to believe that a general duty such as "*one must keep one's promises*" or "*everybody must keep his promises*" lies beneath a particular promise, because, on the one hand, it is no such rule that inclines us to keep our promises, rather the promises themselves, with their self-contained statement of duty; and, on the other hand, since broken laws remain laws, false promises remain promises that cost a lot to the man who does not perform them, at least in some circumstances. Through the promise, I change the world in which I live and in which nothing is forcing me to give money to Janet or to marry her, into a world in which I am obliged or forced to do it. By my promise, I introduce into the world an event that makes the world change its properties.<sup>37</sup>

It is worth noting that promise is not the only act that includes at once the formula of a fact and the statement of a duty to which, in this case, I declare my submission; all the performative statements are similar. *I declare, I swear, I order, I affirm, I exhort, I advise, I beg, I ask, I invite, I announce, I appoint, I concede, I wish, I call, I permit, I indulge* (myself), etc. are comparable with *I promise*. For instance, if, before the courts, *I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth*, I perform the action of swearing, which cannot be performed otherwise than forming one body with its enunciation; so I tell the judge that, from now on, as soon as he invites me to give evidence, all that I

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<sup>37</sup> Jean-Louis Gardies, *L'erreur de Hume* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987), 88.

shall say in my evidence will be true or can be held as true, or turned back on me if I am caught in a lie; I make known to him—if he charges me to do it—that what I witness *is* not only true but that it *must* be true. The intricacy of *being* and *duty—ought to be*—is as complete a mixture in an oath as in a promise, and one could take any of the above performative formulae and analyze it as we have done for the promise.

One point deserves further attention: certain formulae of which we drew up an incomplete list seem to adopt or impose immediately the procedure of judicial rules. Such is the case of a promise, provided it be uttered in institutionalized circumstances. Others refer to mere politeness or to morals, and do not cause such real effects as promises do. One may wonder if some speeches do not accompany falsely, fallaciously, fraudulently, some acts leading them astray. This might be so, for instance, the case of an oath which, as Hobbes showed it in *De Cive*, may distort the act it accompanies. However, it is not my intention to enter too closely upon discussion of this issue here.<sup>38</sup> It is enough to draw, with Gardies, a conclusion that is important to save us from error:

Take care it is not because the performative statements are openly more than mere assertions, that you are right to conclude they are not at all assertions. It is dangerous to infer from the fact that those statements *are presented in the form of* assertions, that this precaution is nothing but an *external appearance*, under which would *hide* their *true nature* of psychosocial act. For it would remain to explain why the veil under which the corresponding act hides itself is precisely, in the case of performative turn of phrase, the indicative mood, the mood itself of the assertion. If you start, on the contrary from the things such as they give themselves, perhaps their *true nature* will be more easily lightened.<sup>39</sup>

Then Gardies emphasizes, with the linguist Benoît de Cornulier, that “performative statements behave themselves grammatically, in minute details, as if they were *assertions*.”

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<sup>38</sup> We began to sketch the work in a conference about *Normativity* given to the Centre Hospitalier Régional of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.

<sup>39</sup> *L'erreur de Hume*, 73.

### *VIII. Conclusions*

The *first conclusion* regards the nature of the *unconscious* that is implied by the standpoint I adopted with regard to the famous issue of the *Protrepticus*. Denying the reality of the pre-knowledge in which the most technical philosophy would be rooted, and considering this pre-knowledge as one of its projected fabrications and nothing but an imaginary product, I would not deny that philosophical discourse implies a sort of unconscious. But the unconscious implied by this discourse is precisely not the part of the mind concealed from consciousness, and that consciousness attempts to appropriate: I mean instead *unconscious* in the style of Lacan; it is not obscure: it lies in the very play of “signifiers” that can burst to view without being decipherable as if they could be translated into signified units that could give them their “sense,” and could easily be substituted for them. The unconscious that the action of knowledge inclines to project in front of or beside itself must be interpreted as a production of the signified, hard to penetrate at first, but soon translucent.

Moreover, in attributing too much to what precedes philosophy, and from which it is supposed to grow up, the philosopher falls into the trap well defined by Diodorus Cronos: he behaves as if a situation could hide what it will be *in posse*; and that is never the case. At least, there is no more reason to expect such a sort of relations in the field of philosophical speculation than in other fields, strategic, economic or practical. The odds are that when a philosophy pretends to issue from a non-philosophical situation that precedes it, it has done nothing else than unconsciously beget the so-called beginnings on which it claims to rely. Integrity in philosophy, which requires a capacity possessed only by a very few, is, in a given situation that requires theoretical developments, to draw the map of the entire system of those developments and to discuss them following a knowledge that may be called “blind,” to use Leibniz’s word.

The *second conclusion* is that it is difficult for philosophy to be imagined as preceding its learning; it may well be lived as an awakening, as if it were “already” in being, but it is a construction. If one describes as philosophy what would be prior to philosophy, it would be in the same way as, in Molière, Monsieur Jourdain names his own discourse *prose* only after the teacher of rhetoric has taught him the difference between *verse* and *prose*. And doubtless, philosophy should be taught as many people as possible, precisely because it is impossible to count on some spontaneous philosophy that is incapable of doubting its

own convictions or problematizing its own methods. Surely, nobody dreams of building a nation, let alone the entire species, with philosophical technicians only; but a state in which the largest number of citizens have learned some philosophy, read some philosophical texts and written dissertations about philosophical questions, may give the expectation that citizens will be in the best situation to debate, and possess the best motives to agree on a range of fundamental points. Perhaps a little ingenuously, foreign philosophers, who do not have in their country the same system as the French—most of whom have been given philosophical lessons in grammar schools—are filled with wonder at the chance so given to a commonwealth to raise itself up. However, on the last point, the electoral ballots and industrial behaviours of the French people may sometimes perplex the observer.

*Thirdly*, it must not be thought that interdisciplinarity between researchers or between teachers is made easier by the teaching to nearly everybody of a didactic philosophy, even if not highly technical. Of course, possibilities are opened to define common objects, and to learn prudence in the formulation of problems and in solving them; but the practice strengthens the Hegelian anxiety I spoke of at the beginning of this article, and it shows that the discourses of the various fields of knowledge are more often added, one on top of the other, than linked together. The demand for accuracy in philosophical discourse is rarely understood and is soon considered as amphigoric to the eyes of the non-expert; and the philosopher may detect, in the purposes of his colleagues in other disciplines—even of the most technical ones—some pockets and moments of un-thought that remind him of the crossing of a distance à la Zeno, i.e. so that one can never know if it has been performed or not, and, once performed, how it was performed.

*Finally*, what was perhaps the most amazing for us in studying the so-called sentence of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* is its dialectic aspect that makes the authors who are the most quoted in commenting on it, such as Plato and Aristotle, equally available to be called upon as witnesses *pro* and *contra* the *thesis* or the *antithesis* included in the sentence. At one moment, Plato may be invoked for the reminiscence, and for a knowledge whose universalizability is open even to a slave; at the next he may be deployed against the universalizability, because he showers with sarcasm the

blacksmith who would marry philosophy!<sup>40</sup> When he is expected on the side of the celebration of *episteme*, he is found making an apology for practical knowledge, as being more valuable and more useful than the knowledge of teachers.<sup>41</sup> As to Aristotle, he is as much the author of *Hermeneutics* as the writer of one of the most sophisticated reflections in the Antiquity on the *practical syllogism*. E. Anscombe is probably wrong when she suggested, in *Intention*, that the moderns have ceased to take care of practical knowledge; the probability theory that the moderns got started in the XVII<sup>th</sup> century takes up the challenge. But I recognize, with her, that it is now high time the issue was widely reopened.

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<sup>40</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 495e.

<sup>41</sup> Kant will give the same speech when, in *Critique of Pure Reason*, he wants to highlight the judgement.