

The Ground of the Self-Movedness and Appearance of Physis

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Abstract

The paper argues that Heidegger, in his textual practice, violates the paradoxical two-foldedness that is central to his reflections on physis. In his text “On the Essence and Concept of Physis in Aristotle’s *Physics* B,1”, Heidegger develops and defends the paradoxical interconnections between the appearance and the self-movedness of physis. This two-foldedness must be grounded paradoxically. Seeing physis must mean both a deferential acquiescence and a thoughtful new beginning. Nevertheless, through Heidegger’s hermeneutical suggestions and historical comments, seeing physis becomes largely indistinguishable from pure stillness and deference. This opposes new beginnings and threatens the central structures of Heidegger’s reflections on physis.

Keywords: Heidegger, Two-Foldedness, Paradox, Aristotle, Nature, Hermeneutics, New Beginning

1. Introduction and Methodology

In his text “On the Essence and Concept of Physis in Aristotle’s *Physics* B,1”, Heidegger emphasizes the central importance of Aristotle’s *Physics* for the history of thought. In the *Physics*, Heidegger notes, “Greek philosophy reached its fulfillment.”¹ As such, according to Heidegger, it is the “foundational book of Western philosophy.”² Understanding Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s *Physics* could, thus,

¹ Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence and Concept of Physis in Aristotle’s *Physics* B,1” in *Pathmarks*. ed. William McNeill, trans. Thomas Sheehan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 185.

² Heidegger, “On the Essence and Concept of Physis in Aristotle’s *Physics* B,1”, p. 185.

help us to illuminate central elements of Heidegger's view of philosophy and of the history of philosophy.

The overall relationship between Heidegger and Aristotle has received, and continues to receive, widespread attention in secondary texts.³ The text "On the Essence and Concept of Physis in Aristotle's *Physics* B,1" is taken into account by many commentators. However, the Heideggerian text is rarely interpreted as a whole *and* on its own, which is the central aim of this essay.⁴ I hope to supplement and criticize Heidegger's reflections on physis on the basis of the presuppositions that Heidegger makes central to his own text. That is, I will not comment on the accuracy of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's *Physics*. When I use the Greek terms that Heidegger frequently employs throughout his interpretation, I understand thereby Heidegger's usage of these terms in his text.⁵ In line with Heidegger's methodology, I will not translate these terms immediately but, rather, attempt to clarify them as much as possible in and through the following reflections.

³ For recent examples, see Michael J. Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle: Philosophy as Praxis*, New York: Continuum, 2008; Walter Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldedness of Being*, Albany: SUNY Press, 2005; Ted Sadler, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being*, London: Continuum, 2000.

⁴ The most relevant readings that interpret the Heideggerian text as a whole and on its own are: Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldedness of Being*, pp. 21-56; William J. Richardson, "Heidegger and Aristotle." *The Heythrop Journal*, vol. 5, no. 1, 1964, pp.58-64. For readings that examine the Heideggerian text as *one part* of Heidegger's overall assessment of either Aristotle or nature, see: Fred Dallmayr, "Nature and Being: Heidegger" in *Return to Nature?*, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011, pp. 117-39; Trish Glazebrook, "From physis to Nature, techne to Technology: Heidegger on Aristotle, Galileo, and Newton", *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 38, no. 1, 2000, pp. 95-118; David Storey, "Heidegger and the Question Concerning Biology: Life, Soul, and Nature in the Early Aristotle Lecture Courses", *Epoché*, vol. 18, no. 1, 2013, pp. 161-86.

⁵ For better legibility, I will transliterate the Greek terms.

2. Physis: Arche as Morphe and Morphe as Arche

For Heidegger, physis has a two-fold essence. The two central determinations of physis – physis as arche and physis as morphe – are essentially interconnected. Physis as arche highlights self-movedness, while physis as morphe highlights appearance. Nevertheless, since each determination properly reflects the two-fold essence of physis, each includes the other side.

Physis is initially introduced as a type of ousia, a type of beingness.⁶ Over the course of his essay, Heidegger reveals that physis is not merely one type of beingness among others but, rather, the essential manner of being.⁷ Being is, thus, essentially marked by physis. Physis, in turn, is essentially marked by movedness. There is a specific type of movedness that belongs to physis. In the conclusion to his essay, Heidegger notes that “if we keep the whole in mind, then we [...] have two conceptual determinations of the essence of physis.”⁸ The first determination is physis as arche. It focuses on the “origin and ordering of the movedness of something that moves of itself.”⁹ The second perspective is physis as morphe. It highlights the “self-placing into the appearance.”¹⁰ Heidegger is clear that the two determinations must be read within their essential unity. “Morphe is the essence of physis as arche and arche is the essence of physis as morphe [...]”¹¹ Thus, the specific movedness that essentially distinguishes physis combines going back into itself and going forth into appearance.¹² As such, Heidegger notes, the “merely spatial image of a circle is essentially inadequate.”¹³ The

⁶ See *ibid.*, pp. 199, 211.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 229-230. “But this *same* treatise of the *Metaphysics*, in its first chapter, says exactly the opposite: ousia (the being of beings as such in totality) is physis tis, something like physis. [...]” In this sense, Heidegger notes, Heraclitus is “one who speaks *directly* of physis and who means by it (cf. Fragment 1) the being of beings as such as a whole.” All emphases are in the original unless otherwise indicated.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

¹² See *ibid.*, p. 227.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

movedness of physis must combine, at one and the same time, the incessant circular motion of going-back-into-itself and the transition into something other that is stable, stands there, present and visible for another.¹⁴ Thus, the movedness of physis must combine four aspects: a physei-being must be in constant movedness, stay within itself, change into another, and stand stably in appearance. Physis as arche initially introduces the constant movedness within itself – self-movedness. Physis as morphe initially introduces the change into something other and stable – appearance. However, physis is *both* physis as arche and physis as morphe. Thus, it must be both self-movedness and appearance. How does Heidegger combine the multitudinous aspects of physis? How does he combine self-movedness and appearance?

3. The Paradoxical Interconnections Between Self-Movedness and Appearance

The essential unity between self-movedness and appearance is paradoxical. Appearance must be present in the self-driven change of self-movedness, and self-movedness must be preserved in the standing otherness of appearance. Therefore, both self-movedness and appearance must be irreducible to immediate notions of movement and perception.

According to physis as arche, physei-beings are moved in such a way that “[...] the arche, the origin and ordering of their movedness, rules from within those beings themselves.”¹⁵ Thereby, physei-beings are distinguished from artifacts. For artifacts, “the arche of their movedness [...] is not in the artifacts themselves but in something else [...]”¹⁶ The self-movedness of physis as arche is tied to appearance. The eidos, the antecedently envisioned appearance, serves as the decisive impulse for movedness.¹⁷ For physis, the impulse to move must come from within the being itself. Thus, the antecedently envisioned appearance must essentially belong to physis itself. A physei-being “in itself and from itself and toward itself orders its own movedness.”¹⁸ Self-

¹⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 188.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 192.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

movedness ensures that a physei-being has a constant impulse to move, and that it stays within itself in its movedness. In order to do so, self-movedness requires inspiration from the stable end of appearance. Yet, is the stable end of appearance that inspires self-movedness ever fully visible outside the physei-being? If a physei-being moves constantly from itself and toward itself, how can another being recognize its proper appearance? How exactly is appearance tied to self-movedness?

Heidegger is adamant about the essential connection between movedness and visible appearance in Greek thought. He notes that modern thinkers must “learn to see how, for the Greeks, movement as a mode of being, has the character of emerging into presencing.”¹⁹ Movedness is not merely change of place. Rather, movedness includes growth and diminution, alterations, and generation. Heidegger, thus, explicitly ties movedness to visible appearance: “every instance of movedness is a change from *something into something*.”²⁰ Furthermore, Heidegger affirms that “what is generated never places itself back into what it comes from.” Therefore,

“if such placing lets the self-placing appearance be present, and if the appearance is, in each case, present only in an individual this which has such and such an appearance, then to this extent, that into which the generation places the appearance surely must in each instance be something other than that from which it is generated.”²¹

Since movedness is defined by a change in appearances – change of place, growth/diminution, alteration, generation –, it becomes visible as a palpable change from a ‘this’ to a ‘that’. Self-movedness must come into visible appearance. Yet, what are the criteria for the visible appearance of self-movedness? How can one recognize that a change is the change of a self-moving physei-being? Is the appearance of self-movedness merely a visible change without any apparent interference from something other (like the hand of a maker)?

The self-movedness that distinguishes physis cannot be immediately *apparent*. The appearance of self-movedness cannot be reduced to

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 181.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 191. Emphasis added.

²¹ Ibid., p. 223. Heidegger earlier identified generation as the central form of self-movedness of physis. See *ibid.*, p. 220.

the lack of visible interference from something other. There is an additional criterion: physei-beings move themselves “specifically inasmuch as they are themselves and are in and with (bei) themselves.”²² Heidegger interprets Aristotle’s example of a convalescing doctor. A doctor has the medical know-how in her brain, that is, within the visible confines of her own body. The doctor regains her health without any visible outside help. Regaining one’s health, according to Heidegger, is a process of self-movedness. Nevertheless, Heidegger is adamant that the doctor’s medical knowledge cannot belong to this self-movedness. Know-how must remain outside of the self-movedness of physis even if the visible location of the know-how is within the perceptible limits of the physei-being.²³ Heidegger insists on this even as advancements in medical know-how lead to measurable, perceptible differences in results. Even if it *looks* as if a difference in medical know-how was the only reason why one doctor survived and the other died, self-movedness cannot include medical know-how. That is, self-movedness cannot be directly measured or observed. Heidegger adamantly defends the paradoxicality of self-movedness. Self-movedness appears but it cannot be reduced to immediate perception. Self-movedness could appear even if it cannot be perceived, and self-movedness could not appear even if it looks to be present. Self-movedness must be both the constant impulse to move itself and the change into something other that stands visibly and stably as appearance. Self-movedness must appear *and* it can never fully appear. Self-movedness requires appearance but it cannot be reduced to immediate perceptions.

Morphe highlights the side of appearance. Morphe is appearance in the sense of “the act of standing in and placing itself into the appearance.”²⁴ Appearance is thus aligned with activity – putting and placing

²² *Ibid.*, p. 198.

²³ The argument could be made that the medical know-how did not originate from within the doctor herself and, therefore, does not belong to *self*-movedness. The doctor was not born with the knowledge of medicine but, rather, acquired it later, presumably from somebody else. Nevertheless, the questions remain: what are the criteria for deciding what belongs to the self-movedness of physei-beings? Can these criteria be directly measured or observed? What are the principles for deciding what is natural for human beings?

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

into the appearance. There is a form of movedness in the appearance. For physis, the movedness of appearance must come from the physei-being itself. For a physei-being, the “appearance places itself forth.”²⁵ There is, thus, a certain form of self-movedness in the appearance of physis. At the same time, standing forth in visible stability is essential for appearance. An individual thing remains for a while and, “by preserving the appearance, stands forth in it and out of it [...]”²⁶ In this way, one addresses a “this and a that as this and that, i.e., as having such and such an appearance.”²⁷ There is stability, clarity, and rest in appearance. This is further emphasized by the concept of entelecheia. Heidegger notes that “we speak of something as properly in being only when it is in the mode of entelecheia.” Entelecheia, for Heidegger, means having-itself-in-its-end. Thus, a physei-being stands visibly in appearance, truly as itself, only when it has itself in its end. Is appearance then a break from, or the end of, movedness? Heidegger refutes such a view. Rather, he notes, “[...] having-itself-in-its-end (Entelecheia) is the essence of movedness [...]”²⁸ “What is decisive”, he says, is “that the Greeks conceive of movedness in terms of rest.”²⁹ What, then, are the criteria to determine that a stable being, nevertheless, is in movedness? How is self-movedness tied to appearance?

Genesis is the central type of movedness of physis. Genesis is an act of generation that “is entirely the presencing of the appearance itself without the importation of outside help.”³⁰ Genesis is the self-movedness of the appearance. The path according to which a physei-being moves in genesis is termed being-on-the-way. In being-on-the-way, “the self-placing is itself wholly of a kind with the self-placing thing to be produced.”³¹ In other words, the self-placing, the self-movedness of the appearance, is not to be separated from the being that stands visibly in appearance. Thus, *both* the movedness and the stable

²⁵ Ibid., p. 221.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 211. “[...] as individual thing, it stays for a while in its appearance and preserves the while [...]”

²⁷ Ibid., p. 210.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 218.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 216.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 222.

³¹ Ibid., p. 223.

appearance are essentially defined as ‘on the way’. A physei-being moves – it is on the way – even when it stands there, rests, remains for a while as “an individual this which has such and such an appearance.”³² The *act of self-placing* – the self-movedness – and the appearance from which and into which it is placed are essentially inseparable. A physei-being is fully on the way even when it stands still, and it stands in appearance even when it changes. The appearance of physis requires self-movedness. Yet, self-movedness cannot be reduced to immediate movements.

For physis, self-movedness requires appearance and appearance requires self-movedness. Self-movedness requires an appearance that is irreducible to immediate perception, and appearance requires a self-movedness that is irreducible to immediate movement. Self-movedness and appearance are maintained in a paradoxical unity. The self-movedness of physis requires a paradoxical appearance, and the appearance of physis requires a paradoxical self-movedness. One side cannot be true unless both are true in their paradoxical unity.³³ If one side is not maintained in its paradoxical structure, both sides are falsified. Yet, how does one reach these insights about physis? In order to acknowledge the paradoxical appearance and self-movedness of physis, one must already recognize both appearance and self-movedness in their paradoxical interconnections. How does Heidegger ground the paradoxical structures of physis?

4. Epagoge: The Paradoxical Ground of the Appearance and Self-Movedness of Physis

Epagoge is the ground of physis. As such, it grounds the paradoxical interconnections between appearance and self-movedness. Epagoge is a manner of seeing that must combine deferential acquiescence and thoughtful constitution.

Epagoge is the central concept with which Heidegger grounds his reflections on physis. Through epagoge, “[it is evident] that all beings from physis are in motion or at rest [...]”³⁴ Epagoge applies to physis as

³² See *ibid.*, pp. 211, 223.

³³ I owe this profound formulation to the teachings and texts by Avron Kulak.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

a whole, that is, it applies both to physis as arche and to physis as morphe.³⁵ Therefore, epagoge grounds the paradoxical interconnections between self-movedness and appearance. Epagoge is connected to vision – it relates to seeing, making visible, coming into view.³⁶ Grounding physis is seeing physis in a particular manner. Since epagoge grounds the paradoxical two-foldedness of physis, the manner of seeing that is proper to epagoge must be two-fold. Heidegger notes that epagoge means “constituting in the double sense of, first, bringing something up into view and then likewise establishing what has been seen.”³⁷ Epagoge is both “seeing and making visible what already stands in view” and “the offensive that first breaks open the territory within whose borders a science can first settle down.”³⁸ When seeing physis, one must see both what is *always already* present and what is *not yet* constituted. What is meant by this two-fold requirement?

Heidegger refers to epagoge in his argument that it is impossible to ground physis by a proof. Physis cannot be grounded by a proof because the very thing that is to be grounded will have already grounded itself by coming into view. “[...] Physis does not need a proof, for whenever a phyei-being stands in the open, physis has already shown itself, and stands in view.”³⁹ Furthermore, “those who demand and attempt such a proof [...] do not see the very thing that they already see, [...] they have no eye for what already stands in view for them.”⁴⁰ Seeing what is always already present includes an element of acquiescence. Seeing must acquiesce in, or defer to, the self-movedness of physis because it always already includes appearance. However, both the self-movedness and the appearance of physis are irreducible to immediate movements and perceptions. That is, the acquiescent manner of seeing that belongs to epagoge and grounds physis cannot correspond to an appearance that is immediately apparent. Thus, acquiescence cannot refer to a complete cessation of movement for the seer. Epagoge must see both self-movedness and appearance in their paradoxical interconnections. That

³⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 187, 202, 207.

³⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 187.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

is, seeing must acquiesce in the self-movedness that always already includes appearance, but it must also constitute the appearance that continuously eludes in self-movedness. Heidegger notes that “the way to what is already seen but *not yet understood, much less conceptualized* is the leading toward that we already mentioned, epagoge.”⁴¹ Due to the paradoxical two-foldedness of physis, physis cannot be seen unless it is properly understood and conceptualized. As Heidegger notes, “if we directly experience and intend physei-beings, we already have in view both the moved and its movedness. But what stands in view here is not yet constituted as what it is and how it is present.”⁴² Seeing physis means “differentiating what appears of and by itself from what does not.”⁴³ It means identifying a properly paradoxical relationship between self-movedness and appearance. This differentiation must be critical. Heidegger notes:

“Through this critical ability for differentiating, which is always decision, the human being is lifted out of mere captivation by what presses upon him and preoccupies him or her and is placed out beyond it, into the relation to being.”⁴⁴

That means, “we must stand above the obvious and factual [...]”⁴⁵ Seeing must be critical, conceptual, and thoughtful. As much as seeing must defer to the self-movedness of physis, which always already includes appearance, it must also actively grasp the appearance of physis, which always eludes in self-movedness. The acquiescence that belongs to epagoge can refer neither to a cessation of movement nor to an immediately perceptible appearance, just as the thoughtful constituting can refer to neither incessant movement nor perpetually inadequate perceptions. Seeing physis must include both acquiescence and thoughtful constituting. In this sense, seeing physis requires never seeing anything new and always seeing anew. One must *see that* which can never come fully into view – constitute the ‘not yet’. At the same time, one must *see so that* physis never comes fully into view – acquiesce in the ‘always al-

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 202. Emphasis added.

⁴² Ibid., p. 187.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 202.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 201.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 202.

ready'. Seeing physis can be neither purely acquiescing and deferential nor purely active and creative. Yet, does Heidegger truly respect the paradoxical ground of physis? Does he actually break open the territory and ground physis?

5. Heidegger's Practice and the Ground of Physis

Heidegger fails to practice the structures that he makes central to the grounding of physis, and fails to affirm the active side of physis. Seeing physis is frequently misunderstood as pure stillness and acquiescence, which threatens the content of Heidegger's reflections.

For Heidegger, the paradoxical relationships of physis are grounded through the paradoxical relationships of physis. However, Heidegger notes, "[...] the physis that Aristotle conceptualized can be only a late derivative of the original physis."⁴⁶ Heidegger calls this original view of physis the "echo of the great beginning of Greek philosophy, the first beginning of Western philosophy."⁴⁷ Heidegger claims that Aristotle's *Physics* was:

"[the] first thoughtful and unified conceptualization of physis [which] is already the last echo of the original (and thus supreme) thoughtful projection of the essence of physis that we still have preserved for us in the fragments of Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides."⁴⁸

What is the thoughtfulness that Heidegger attributes to Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides if Aristotle develops the *first* conceptualization of physis? Heraclitus is described as "one who speaks *directly* of physis."⁴⁹ For Heidegger, Heraclitus' approach is "allowing to physis, in all the purity of its essence, the [hiddenness] that belongs to it."⁵⁰ As such, Heidegger asserts, truth is "[...] essentially *not* a characteristic of human knowing and asserting."⁵¹ Thus, if Aristotle offers the first con-

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 229.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 229.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 186.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 229.

⁵⁰ I am not here referring to the actual claims by Heraclitus himself. Rather, I am referring only to Heidegger's reading of these thinkers.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 230. Emphasis added.

ceptualization of physis, and if the first conceptualization of physis is already indirect and less original, then the original thoughtfulness that belongs to physis excludes any form of conceptualization. It does not need to be conceptualized or lifted up into view. It is always already understood. The side of ‘not yet’ has disappeared. Seeing physis is purely passive, deferential, and acquiescent. It is opposed to any movement that is critical or thoughtful, and it denies new beginnings. As such, seeing physis in its complex fullness is conflated with the immediate material possession of human beings. It is conflated with immediate perceptions and movements. This perspective becomes problematic when the central concept – physis – is presented as thoroughly two-folded, and when this two-foldedness is thoughtfully developed and adamantly defended as irreducible to immediate movements and perceptions.

According to Heidegger, physis is both physis as arche and physis as morphe. It is both self-movedness and appearance, and the paradoxical interconnection between the two is adamantly defended by Heidegger. Physis must be grounded by both deferential acquiescence and thoughtful constituting. Therefore, if the ground of physis is falsified into pure acquiescence, the notions of self-movedness and appearance are also falsified, as is the two-fold structure of physis as both physis as arche and physis as morphe. Physis is not seen unless both self-movedness and appearance are seen in their paradoxical unity. Seeing must be both deferential acquiescence *and* thoughtful constitution. A purely reductive, acquiescent approach threatens to render physis wholly unrecognizable. As Heidegger notes, “only if we already have treeness in view, can we identify individual trees”, and “only what is something other than wood can be wooden.”⁵² Therefore, no part of physis can be properly seen unless physis is seen as a whole, in its paradoxical two-foldedness. Without a properly paradoxical ground, Heidegger’s entire reflections on physis come up empty. If physis is seen immediately, it is never seen.

If the term ‘thoughtfulness’ is indistinguishable from pure acquiescence, what about the other terms that highlight, or appear to highlight, the need for new beginnings, the side of the ‘not yet’? Are the terms “break open the territory”, “making visible”, “constituting”, “lifting up

⁵² Ibid., pp. 187, 194.

into view” truly to be understood as an active beginning? Does Heidegger’s text truly put forth a two-folded grounding of physis? Heidegger undoubtedly has a predilection for the side of ‘always already’. Seeing physis, for Heidegger, means to *let* something be seen, to *let* it be manifest, to *let* it become present.⁵³ Physei-beings lie present, stand out in the open, *already* stand in view, *already* show themselves.⁵⁴ Even logos, the essential clue for seeing physis in its two-fold structure, is described in almost exclusively acquiescent terms.⁵⁵ Language is an indirect product of the word. The word is the “essential foundation of all relations to beings as such”, and the word *belongs* to human beings.⁵⁶ In order to find our path *back* to the word, nothing is needed but acquiescence, stillness, less language.⁵⁷ Epagoge is the ground of physis. There are textual hints that epagoge can be understood in a properly paradoxical way. Nevertheless, doubt remains as to whether these paradoxical assertions hold the truth of Heidegger’s reflections, or whether they are mere linguistic deviations from Heidegger’s proper position on physis – a position that excludes the side of ‘not yet’ in its ground. For instance, Heidegger takes up Aristotle’s comparison that people blind to physis are like people who are blind to color from birth. Reasoning, he notes, “can never bring them to their goal, the only road leading there is *just seeing* [...]”.⁵⁸ Furthermore, “our relation to that which, of and by itself, appears in advance and eludes all proof must be *hard to hold on to* in its originality and truth.”⁵⁹ In other words, it must merely be held on to, not constituted.

Two possible readings could take shape. Either Heidegger develops thoroughly paradoxical structures of physis but fails to enact the full

⁵³ See *ibid.*, pp. 213, 221, 227.

⁵⁴ See *ibid.*, pp. 199, 201.

⁵⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 212-213.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 214. See also *ibid.*, p. 213.

⁵⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 213. “But the words that language uses are only fragments that have precipitated out of the word [...]” What is needed is *legei*, and “*legei* [...] means to reveal what was formerly hidden, to *let it be manifest* in its presencing.” Revealing means “*letting be seen*, from the being itself, what and how the being is.” Emphases added.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

implications of his insights in his textual practice. Or, the truth of Heidegger's reflections lies in the purely still and acquiescent ground of physis that would dissolve the two-fold content of his reflections. I will side with the former reading. The occurrence of properly paradoxical structures shows that Heidegger, at least to some degree, acknowledges the need for a ground that *both acquiesces in the always already and begins anew in the not yet*. This acknowledgment, however, is not sufficiently enacted in Heidegger's text. This is certainly the more generous and, arguably, the more active reading despite Heidegger's hermeneutical suggestions, which hardly encourage active readings. Heidegger wants "to place us *into* the Greek, and in so doing to disappear in it."⁶⁰ The structures of physis that Heidegger develops are fascinating and insightful, yet, his views on the history of philosophy, his practical suggestions, and his hermeneutical comments must be viewed with a heavy grain of salt.

6. Conclusion

Physis is twofold. Physis as arche highlights the self-movedness of physis. Physis as morphe highlights the appearance of physis. Both sides, at one and the same time, highlight one aspect of physis while holding together both sides. Since self-movedness appears and appearance moves itself, self-movedness and appearance are irreducible to immediate movements and perceptions. Grounding these structures requires seeing them in a particular manner. Seeing must reflect the paradoxical relationships. One must see both the side of the 'always already' – the appearance of self-movedness – and the side of the 'not yet' – the continuous impulse of self-movedness in appearance. In other words, one must *see that* which can never fully come into view and *see so that* physis never comes fully into view. Seeing must be both an active beginning and passive acquiescence. Nevertheless, in his textual practice, Heidegger fails to enact new beginnings and thereby comes perilously close to dissolving the central structures of his reflections.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 188.