
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Editor

Sofia Philosophical Review
Faculty of Philosophy
Sofia University
15 Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd.
Sofia 1504
BULGARIA
E-mail: gungov@sclg.uni-sofia.bg

Web site: www.sphr-bg.org
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I. CURRENT DAY HUMANITIES AND MEDICINE REFERRING TO VICO

On Vico, Joyce, and Beckett

Donald Phillip Verene (Emory University)

Abstract

When Joyce was writing Work in Progress, installments of which were appearing in transition and were to become Finnegans Wake, he repeatedly suggested to friends wishing to understand it that they read Vico's Scienza nuova in the original, or, if that was not possible, in Michelet's French translation. No English translation existed at that time. Joyce's interest in Vico likely began through his contact with the Jesuit Father Charles Ghezzi, lecturer in Italian at University College, Dublin, from whom Joyce learned Italian. At that time Joyce also discovered his other philosopher, Giordano Bruno. As Joyce bases Ulysses on the ports of call of Homer's Odyssey, he bases Finnegans Wake on the cycles of history and conception of language of Vico's Scienza nuova. Joycean scholarship has yet fully to pursue the sense in which Vico is at the center of Joyce's imagination. The place to start is Beckett's Our Exagmination essay of 1929.

A personal remark

In planning what was to become a week-long international conference on Vico and Joyce, held in Venice, Italy at the Fondazione Giorgio Cini in June 1985, I wrote to Samuel Beckett to inquire whether he might participate.[1] To amplify my request I enclosed with my letter a postcard purchased in Dublin, Georgia, with a composite picture of several churches and the in-

[1] A selection of the papers presented at this conference appears in Donald Phillip Verene, ed., *Vico and Joyce* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987).

scription, "Home of Beautiful Churches." It was one of several postcards of Dublin for sale there in a drugstore with a storefront sign: *Strange Drug Co.*, reflecting the proprietor, H. J. Strange, R.Ph. The postcards were of sufficient age that the sender was instructed to "Place one cent stamp here."

Vico appears on the first page of *Finnegans Wake* ("by a commodius vicus of recirculation") as does Dublin, Laurens County, Georgia, located on the Oconee River, founded by a Dubliner, Peter Sawyer ("topsawyer's rocks by the stream Oconee exaggerated themselse to Laurens County's gorgios while they went doublin their mumper all the time"). In 1926 Joyce sent to his benefactor, Harriet Weaver, a draft of the first lines of what was to become *Finnegans Wake*, including a key to its references; in it he claimed that the motto of Dublin, Georgia is "Doublin all the time."[2] Joyce had asked an American visitor, Julien Levy, to look up Dublin, Georgia for him; he was anxious to know if it lay on a river.[3] Thus Joyce was able to double Dublin on the first page of the *Wake*, the old world in the new. I am happy to report that the visitor who may go by "the choicest and the cheapest from Atlanta to Oconee" (FW 140.35)[4] will discover that Dublin has upheld the motto Joyce assigned it, as its gorgios have doubled their number (their mumper) such that there now stands next to Dublin, across the Oconee River, an East Dublin.

Beckett sent a very brief but gracious reply from Paris, thanking me for the invitation and enclosed card but saying that to his regret he could not accept. The letter is in the hands of the Beckett Project at Emory University, which is editing and publishing Beckett's correspondence.[5] Beckett was in-

[2] Letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, 15 November 1926, in *Letters of James Joyce*, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Viking, 1957), 247–48.

[3] Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce*, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 583n.

[4] James Joyce, *Finnegans Wake* (London: Faber and Faber, 1939). Here and hereinafter I have used the standard citation by page and line. I have consulted the new, critically emended edition of *Finnegans Wake*, ed. Danis Rose and John O'Hanlon (Dublin: Houyhnhnm Press, 2010), the pagination of which differs from the 1939 standard edition, but I have retained the page and line of the 1939 edition and its reprintings, since at present that edition is more accessible to most readers than FW_2.

[5] Martha Dow Fehsenfeld and Lois More Overbeck, eds., *The Letters of Samuel Beckett: Volume I: 1929–1940* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Beckett's first letter in this volume, dated "23/3/29" concerns his essay for *Our Exagmination*. I would like to thank Lois Overbeck for kindly reading a draft of this essay.

troduced to Joyce when he arrived in Paris in November 1928. In December Joyce suggested he write an essay, and the topic to write it on, for *Our Exagmination*.[6] In June the essay appeared in *transition*, at Joyce's urging, set from the proofs of *Our Exagmination*. Beckett had just turned twenty-three. It was his first published essay.

It would have been interesting to know of any reflections Beckett might have had on the essay or its topic, more than fifty years later. In those years Beckett became a major literary figure in his own right, receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1969 and having his own works become a subject of interpretation. Putting aside the obvious reason not to accept my invitation—of making the trip to Venice to speak in the stuffy, artificial atmosphere of an academic conference—my guess is that Beckett preferred the views of his essay simply to stand. It is a classic of Joyce interpretation that has yet to be fully absorbed, as I wish to show.

In the remarks that follow I would like first to say something of my views of Vico's presence in *Finnegans Wake* and then, as an *appassionato* of Vico as well as of Joyce, to attempt to draw out some aspects of Beckett's essay that I think are well worth attention in the study of Vico's connection to Joyce. In so doing I wish to presuppose what I have worked out much more fully in my *Knowledge of Things Human and Divine: Vico's New Science and "Finnegans Wake"*. It is, to my knowledge, the only single-authored book-length study of the topic of Vico and Joyce.[7]

Vico and Joyce

Adaline Glasheen, in *Third Census of "Finnegans Wake"*, in identifying Vico as one of the citizens of the *Wake*, cites Joyce's comment that Vico's views gradually forced themselves on him through the circumstances of his own life. She then states: "Unfortunately, knowledge of this work has not forced itself on Joyceans, who by and large read it in an abridgement which omits much

[6] *Our Exagmination Round His Factification For Incamination of Work In Progress* (Paris: Shakespeare and Company, 1929). Beckett's essay is pp. 1–22.

[7] Donald Phillip Verene, *Knowledge of Things Human and Divine: Vico's New Science and "Finnegans Wake"* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003). The only other work which comes to mind is the curious small volume of juxtaposed quotations from Vico, Joyce, and others by Norman O. Brown, *Closing Time* (New York: Random House, 1973).

that matters in *FW*; and I find it generally supposed that *The New Science* is little more than an almost invisible scaffolding which encloses *FW* and is unnecessary to an understanding of *F*W. I don't agree and direct the reader (for starters) to Samuel Beckett's essay in *Our Exagmination*."[8]

Joyce's well-known remark about Vico, made to his friend Padraic Colum: "I use his cycles as a trellis," is often quoted as an obvious explanation of Joyce's connection to Vico. It is in fact a subtle and precise remark. A trellis is a scaffold of latticework for support of climbing plants. But it is also possible to speak of "a trellis of interlacing streams"—one is reminded of the many rivers of the *Wake*. Etymologically, "trellis" is a fabric of coarse weave but specifically, *trilicius* (Vulgar Latin) is "woven with triple thread." "Trellis" as such has within it the sense of three (*tres*)—Vico's three ages of gods, heroes, and men, and his three principles (beginnings) of humanity—religion, marriage, and burial.

James Atherton's well-known *The Books at the Wake* acknowledges the *New Science* as one of the books but gives it no pride of place. Things have not become better among professional Joyceans; they have become worse. *The Cambridge Companion to James Joyce*, edited by Derek Attridge, has only the slightest mention of Vico.[9] The professors and critics (whom Joyce predicted his work would keep busy for a long time)[10] populating the Joyce industry in departments of English throughout the Anglo-

[8] Adaline Glasheen, *Third Census of "Finnegans Wake": An Index of the Characters and Their Roles* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), 298. The abridgement of which Glasheen speaks is *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, revised and abridged translation by Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (New York: Doubleday, 1961); reissued by Cornell University Press, 1970. Vico is also discussed in Stuart Gilbert's essay, "Prolegomena to Work in Progress" in *Our Exagmination*, 51–56, but in a more conventional way than Beckett's.

[9] Derek Attridge, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to James Joyce* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). An exception to interpretations of Joyce that ignore Vico is John Bishop, *Joyce's Book of the Dark: Finnegans Wake* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), chap. 7. In this regard, see also Hugh Kenner, *Dublin's Joyce* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987; 1956), chap. 18. William York Tindall's *A Reader's Guide to Finnegans Wake* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1969) also consistently calls the reader's attention to the places Vico appears in the *Wake*.

[10] Joyce said he wrote *Finnegans Wake* in the way he did, "To keep the critics busy for three hundred years." See Ellmann, *James Joyce*, 703.

American world publish works that approach Joyce from every conceivable angle except through his connections to Vico. One impediment is that barely any of them can approach Vico in the original Italian, as Joyce did and as Beckett did, although today they might consider reading the excellent full English translation of the *New Science* of Bergin and Fisch. It is, however, a difficult book, which I would rank alongside Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Hegel*'s Phenomenology of Spirit*.

Joyce's other philosopher is Giordano Bruno, "the Nolan" of Nola (near Naples). Beckett claims that when Joyce used the expression "the Nolan" in his early "The Day of the Rabblement," the local philosophers were unable to understand it, concluding finally that it was a reference to one of the more obscure Irish kings. Joyce links Vico and Bruno, as in the Latin passage of the classbook section of the *Wake*, where he writes "Jordani et Jambaptistae" (FW 287.24), recirculating the first letters of his own name, JJ (using the *I* of Latin in its elongated form). Both Bruno and Vico are philosophers of contraries.

In *Lo spaccio della bestia trionfante* (*The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast*), Bruno writes: "the beginning, the middle, and the end, the birth, the growth, and the perfection of all that we see, come from contraries, through contraries, into contraries, to contraries."[11] In the *Wake* Bruno's title appears as "Trionfante di bestia!" (FW 305.15). This doctrine of the coincidence of opposites in Bruno is influenced by Nicholas of Cusa, who is presented in the *Wake* in terms of both Vichian *corso* and *ricorso* and Brunian contraries: "Now let the centuple celves of my egourge as Micholas de Cusack calls them, —of all of whose I in my hereinafter of course by recourse demission me—by the coincidance of their contraries reamalgamerge in that indentity of undiscernibles" (FW 49.33–50.1).

We find also "the learned ignorants of the Cusanus philosophism" (FW 163.16–17), a reference to Cusanus's *De docta ignorantia*. Joyce's principle of contraries appears on the first page of the *Wake* as "twone." Cusanus's doctrines of God as *maximum absolutum* and metaphysics of *coincidentia oppositorum* is the key source for Bruno's metaphysics, as Bruno

[11] Giordano Bruno, *The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast*, trans. Arthur D. Imerti (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 90–91.

himself makes clear, saying "the Cusan speaketh divinely."[12] But an understanding of Bruno or Cusanus has not even fared as well among the Joyceans as an understanding of Vico. Glasheen remarks in her census: "To my knowledge, no Joycean has yet read Nicholas of Cusa."[13] In the essays of the *Cambridge Companion* there is no mention of Cusa, and attention to Bruno is confined to a page and a half characterizing his career and addressing why he likely appealed to Joyce.[14]

To devise interpretations of Joyce and especially *Finnegans Wake* without knowing the languages in which Joyce was fluent, those of the countries of continental Europe in which he lived and wrote, Italy, Switzerland, and France, is to go on a fool's errand. Italian, German, French, and ability in Latin are required as a basis for Joyce interpretation.[15] The *Wake* constantly plays on these languages, as well as others. "Are we speachin d'anglas landadge or are you sprakin sea Djoytsch?" (FW 485.12–13). Also, to produce interpretations of the *Wake* that are not based on a real comprehension of the central sources to which Joyce himself pointed is to miss the lesson Beckett's essay teaches, and is additionally foolish. Vico describes the conceit of scholars as taking the unfamiliar and putting it into terms familiar to themselves. His remedy for this is his axiom that "doctrines should take their beginning

[12] Giordano Bruno, *On the Infinite Universe and Worlds*, trans. Dorothea Waley Singer in *Giordano Bruno: His Life and Thought* (New York: Schuman, 1950), 307. On the influence of Cusanus on Bruno, see J. Lewis McIntyre, *Giordano Bruno* (London: Macmillan, 1903), 140–48.

[13] Glasheen, 206.

[14] Attridge, ed., 57–59. In *How Joyce Wrote "Finnegans Wake": A Chapter-by-Chapter Genetic Guide*, ed. Luca Crispi and Sam Slote (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2007), no mention is made of Nicholas of Cusa, although there are a few pages that mention *coincidentia oppositorum* and Bruno. Vico is mentioned a number of times, but largely in passing.

[15] In addition to these major languages, Joyce spoke Danish. He had ability in Modern Greek (but not ancient Greek), partly due to his early residence in Trieste. In a letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver, Joyce wrote, "I speak four or five languages fluently enough" (Ellmann, *James Joyce*, 512). Roland McHugh, *Annotations to Finnegans Wake* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), delineates use or plays on words or phrases in sixty-two languages or dialects (xiv–xv), but Italian, German, French, and Latin dominate.

from that of the matters of which they treat" (NS par. 314).[16]

Vico in Finnegans Wake

I would like to call attention to four aspects of Vico that are present in *Finnegans Wake*. The second and third of these are treated in Beckett's essay; the first and fourth do not appear in it as such. Vico is present in many ways within the *Wake*; the more one seeks these out, the more one finds those previously missed. These four are: Vico and H.C.E. are the same person; Bruno's contraries become Vico's cycles; Vico's "common mental language" is Joyce's language; and Vico's claim that "memory is the same as imagination" is Joyce's guiding principle.

Humphrey Chimpden Earwicker or H.C.E., "Here Comes Everybody" is both the modern family man and all of us that have ever been, are now, or ever will be. But in a very prominent and particular way, he is Vico. If *Finnegans Wake* is a rewriting of Vico's *Scienza nuova*, it is also a rewriting of Vico's *autobiografia*. Finnegan's fall and rise on the first page of the *Wake* is parallel to Vico's fall headfirst from a ladder and miraculous survival, described on the first page of his autobiography. Vico's fable of himself, his autobiography, is a series of seven falls and rises that comprise a providential pattern.[17]

Vico is the protagonist of *Finnegans Wake*. He is Earwicker. "Wick" is a row of houses, or village, and is derived from the Latin *vicus*, Vico's name. Vico is also the vicar, both in the sense of the custodian of divine knowledge and as the representative of the divine on earth—the agent of providence, the vicar of history. Vico is "the producer (Mr. John Baptister Vickar)" (FW 255.27). G. B. Vico is H. C. Earwicker. The initials of Earwicker can be derived from Vico's initials by cycling one letter forward in

[16] *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). Here and hereinafter cited by the paragraph enumeration common to this English translation and most contemporary Italian editions, such as Giambattista Vico, *Opere*, 2 vols., ed. Andrea Battistini (Milan: Mondadori, 1990). Regarding the defects of the translation of the *New Science* by David Marsh (New York; Penguin, 1999), see Donald Phillip Verene, "On Translating Vico: The Penguin Classics Edition of the *New Science*," *New Vico Studies* 17 (1999): 85–107.

[17] Donald Phillip Verene, *The New Art of Autobiography: An Essay on the "Life of Giambattista Vico Written by Himself"* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), esp. chap. 1.

the alphabet, thus: G. → H. and B. → C. Vico is vic or "old vic" (FW 62.6) → wick. "W" is a double "v." The "v" is pronounced as "w" in classical Latin (*vicus*, pronounced "weekus"). Earwicker is Vico's name in English. We can hear Vico in "Earwicker."

In part 3, Joyce merges the identities of Vico and H.C.E. Vico becomes H.C.E.'s middle name:

> *— Hail him heathen, heal him holystone!*
> *Courser, Recourser, Changechild* . . . . . .
> *Eld as endall, earth* . . . . . (FW 481.1–3).

Vico is the courser and recourser, the child of change. He is also the changeling, the child of circumstances left by fairies in the cycles of history. Joyce continues, "I have your tristich now; it recurs in three times the same differently" (FW 481. 10–11). Each of the three lines of this tristich (group of three lines of verse) begins with one of the initials of H.C.E., which also recalls each of Vico's three ages: "*—Hail him heathen*" is the appearance of Jove to the giants of Vico's first age; the middle is Vico, as if he were a heroic figure of the second age; *Eld* is old age (Norwegian), the decline of the third age. In the recourse each age recurs "the same differently."

Earvico is the one who hears the thunder, who hears the presence of providentiality in history. Vico has the ear for it, "for you cannot wake a silken nouse out of a hoarse oar" (FW 154.9–10); "there's no-one Noel like him here to hear" (FW 588.27–28); "the old hayheaded philosopher . . . old Earwicker" (FW 47.01–15) in the Ballad of Persse O'Reilly; "the ear of Fionn Earwicker" (FW 108.21–22); "Ear! Ear! Weakear!" (FW 568.26); "Earwicker, that patternmind, that paradigmatic ear, receptoretentive as his if Dionysius" (FW 70.35–36). Vico has the mind that finds the providential patterns and the paradigmatic ear to hear them. Like "Dionysius's ear," the chamber in Dionysius's palace in Sicily through which he could overhear what his enemies were saying, Vico can hear the murmurings in history that others cannot. Vico can hear and see what others cannot. Vico is "earsighted" (FW 143.9–10).

Bruno's *coincidentia oppositorum*, as taken from the ontology of Cusanus, is the principle that the absolute maximum and the absolute minimum coincide. Cusanus approaches this idea through a number of mathematical examples. The one most quickly grasped is that, if a curved line is extended

to form the widest curve possible, at its maximum its difference from a straight line is an absolute minimum. These contraries, then, coincide. If such absolute contraries coincide, then any set of contraries that are less than absolute coincide, each in its own way. Change is the mutation of opposites.[18] If we conceive this mutation in moral terms, as Bruno describes in *The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast*, "we see that man, changing nature and modifying his affects, from a good man becomes wicked, from a temperate man, intemperate; and, on the other hand, that from one who seemed to be a beast, he ends up by seeming to be another better or worse. . . ."[19]

In the dream of the night world of *Finnegans Wake*, Joyce replaces cause in human affairs with coincidence, even with "cocoincidences" (FW 597.01). Although dreams can be causally analyzed, as in Freudian psychology, in the dream itself causality often plays little or no role. Coincidence and mutation of contraries reign.[20] In Joyce's "dreamoneire" (FW 280.01) of *Finnegans Wake*, all is connected by the transformation and juxtaposition of opposites, but the result is not chaos. The result is "every person, place and thing in the chaosmos of Alle" (FW 118.21). It is a kind of cosmos because a narrative is possible. The whole can be spoken through its parts, its particulars. In the dream of the *Wake*, any sense of scientific causality or historical progression is irrelevant and in fact impossible.

Louis Gillet wrote: "Of course, it is no longer a question of Time and Space in this indivisible duration where the absolute reigns. These two comrades, who did their cooking for so long on the scrap-iron stove of Kantian categories, find their pot knocked over by a kick from James Joyce. Their soup is spilled out—chronology disappears and all the centuries are contemporary."[21] In *Ulysses*, Stephen remarks: "Maeterlinck says: *If Socrates leave his house today*

[18] See the mathematical examples in Nicholas Cusanus, *Of Learned Ignorance*, trans. Germain Heron (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), Latin and English opposed texts. Cf. Giordano Bruno, *Cause, Principle and Unity*, trans. Robert de Lucca (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1998), 5th Dialogue, esp. 97–101.

[19] Bruno, *Expulsion*, 78.

[20] Donald Phillip Verene, "Coincidence, Historical Repetition, and Self-Knowledge: Jung, Vico, and Joyce," *Journal of Analytical Psychology* 47 (2002): 461–80.

[21] Louis Gillet, *Claybook for James Joyce*, trans. Georges Markow-Totevy (London and New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1958), 66.

he will find the sage seated on his doostep. If Judas go forth tonight it is to Judas his steps will tend. Every life is many days, day after day. We walk through ourselves, meeting robbers, ghosts, giants, old men, young men, wives, widows, brothers-in-love, but always meeting ourselves."[22] We may add, from *Finnegans Wake*, "As who has come returns" (FW 382.28).

When Bruno's coincidence of contraries is joined with Vico's cycles, the *corso* and *ricorso*, the three ages—gods, heroes, and men—of his *storia ideal eterna* (ideal eternal history), change becomes not only a metaphysical and moral transformation back and forth between opposites, but a process of historical repetition. History, in the Vichian and Joycean sense, however, is not the past providing a basis for and leading into the present, with the present looking toward the novelty of the future. History is memory. As the Florentine historian Francesco Guicciardini puts it: "All that which has been in the past and is at present will be again in the future. But both the names and the faces of things change, so that he who does not have a good eye will not recognize them."[23] Memory, Mnemosyne, is the mother of the Muses, and the Muses sing of what was, is, and is to come. And as Hesiod says, in so doing, they can sing both true and false songs: "Singalingalying. Storiella as she is syung" (FW 267.07–08). Or as in *Ulysses*: "Fabled by the daughters of memory. And yet it was in some way if not as memory fabled it."[24] Or as Joyce invites us, early in the *Wake*: "This the way to the museyroom. Mind your hats goan in! . . . This way the museyroom. Mind your boots goan out" (FW 08.09–10.22–23).

Finnegans Wake, like all books of wisdom, is a complete speech. It contains all that there is, and anything that it does not say does not lie outside it, because whatever is not explicitly in it can be reached through it. When Bruno's somewhat stable exchange of contraries is taken up in Vico's "wholemole millwheeling vicociclometer," everything is connected: "the dialytically separated elements of precedent decomposition for the verypetpurpose of subsequent recombination so that the heroticisms, catastrophes and eccentricities transmitted by the ancient legacy of the past, type by tope,

[22] James Joyce, *Ulysses*, ed. Hans Walter Gabler (New York: Vintage, 1993), 175.1042–46.
[23] Francesco Guicciardini, *Ricordi* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1977), 131. My trans.
[24] Joyce, *Ulysses*, 20.7–8.

letter from litter, word at ward, with sendence of sundance . . .” (FW 614.27–615.02). Then, “Of cause, so! And in effect, as?” (FW 615.11). Such is Joyce’s literary metaphysics.

In several places in the *New Science*, Vico speaks of a “common mental language” (*lingua mentale comune*), a mental vocabulary (*vocabolario mentale comune*), or a “mental dictionary” (*dizionario mentale*) (NS pars. 145, 445, 527, 542), but he gives little description of it. His most informative statement regarding it is in axiom twenty-two: “There must in the nature of human things be a mental language common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as these same things may have diverse aspects” (NS par. 161; see also 32, 335, 482). He claims further that “This common mental language is proper to our Science, by whose light linguistic scholars will be enabled to construct a mental vocabulary common to all the various articulate languages living and dead. . . . As far as our small erudition will permit, we shall make use of this vocabulary in all the matters we discuss” (NS par. 162).

Since this is a mental language, it can never be spoken or written as such; it can never be a *characteristica universalis*. Yet such a mental language must exist or we could not identify any particular language as language. Since human nature is constant from nation to nation, there must exist in the human mind an order of meanings such that any particular language may be regarded as an attempt to draw these meanings forth in its own way, much as an orator draws forth his speech from topics or places, and the same places can be used to draw forth other speeches. If we work backward from the myriad of articulate languages, we should be able to reach commonalities that would most nearly represent this original mental language from which the world is made by the human mind.

Original speech, for Vico as it is to a great extent for Joyce, is onomatopoetic. Vico gives a powerful example of such in connection with the primordial experience of thunder: “When wonder [*maraviglia*] had been awakened in men by the first thunderbolts, these interjections of Jove should give birth to one produced by the human voice: *pa*!; and that this should then be doubled: *pape*! From this interjection of wonder was subsequently derived Jove’s title of father of men and gods” (NS par. 448). The third paragraph of the first page

of the *Wake* begins with "the fall," followed by Joyce's first hundred-letter thunderword. In it, along with many thunderwords from various languages, is the combination of thunder in Italian and English: "tuonnthunn" (*tuono*, Italian; "thunder," English)—the two languages combined in the title, "Finnegans" (*fine* with its *n* doubled, and "again").

As we shall see, the language of *Finnegans Wake*, that Beckett so expertly describes, in answering Rebecca West in his essay, is as close as we can come to grasping the common mental language as a language expressing the particular universals of humanity.[25] Vico points the way to this conception of language; Joyce enacts it. If we wish to know what Vico's common mental language is, we have only to immerse ourselves in the language of the *Wake*; when we do, language will never be the same for us. After any great literary production, the language in which it is written is never the same. After Joyce, language itself can never be the same.

Richard Ellmann reports that "Joyce accepted Vico's idea that the phantasmal faculty was essentially a function of memory: 'Imagination is nothing but the working over of what is remembered,'" and Joyce remarked to his friend Frank Budgen that "imagination is memory."[26] In his discussion of the true Homer, Vico states: *"la memoria è la stessa che la fantasia* [memory is the same as imagination]" (NS par. 819). In claiming this, Vico is glossing Aristotle's line in his little treatise *On Memory*: "if asked, of which among the parts of the soul memory is a function, we reply: manifestly of that part to which imagination [*phantasia*] also appertains; and all objects of which there is imagination are in themselves objects of memory" (450a 17–19). Vico defines memory as a threefold function of the mind: "Memory thus has three different aspects: memory [*memoria*] when it remembers things, imagination [*fantasia*] when it alters or imitates them, and ingenuity [*ingegno*] when it gives them a new turn or puts them into proper

[25] In addition to Beckett's remarks to the criticisms made by the novelist and literary critic Rebecca West, see William Carlos Williams, "A Point for American Criticism," in *Our Exagmination*, 173–85. See also the reprinting of West's 1930 article from the *New York Herald Tribune Books* in *James Joyce: A Literary Reference*, ed. A. Nicholas Fargnoli (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2001), 326–29.

[26] Richard Ellmann, *The Consciousness of Joyce* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 3 and 135.

arrangement and relationship" (NS par. 819).

Finnegans Wake is the theatre of memory of humanity. Joyce forces the reader, as he forced himself, to employ all three of these aspects at once. He forces us to recall all of ourselves and all of history, and as we recall this totality, his language alters and imitates what is recalled. Furthermore, everything is given a new turn such that we see the similarities in the dissimilar and a proper arrangement emerges. What otherwise seemed disconnected and discrete becomes part of the whole. Among Joyce's last words in *Finnegans Wake* is memory: "Us then. Finn, again! Take. Bussoftlhee, mememormee!" (FW 628.13–14). But softly. Remember me.

There is a modern view that the object of imagination is novelty—that its purpose is to create the novel. Vico and Joyce have demonstrated otherwise. An admirer of Joyce, and a man of letters in his own right, is Jorges Luis Borges. Borges is the other major literary figure besides Joyce to employ Vico in a text. (In this respect, however, one might also mention the use of Vichian themes in the novels of Carlos Fuentes, such as *Christopher Unborn*.) Borges has incorporated Vico and his discovery of the true Homer in "The Immortal." The protagonist says: "In 1729 or thereabouts, I discussed the origin of that poem [the *Iliad*] with a professor of rhetoric whose name, I believe, was Giambattista; his arguments struck me as irrefutable."[27]

The essay is introduced through an epigraph from Bacon's essay, "Of Vicissitude of Things." "Solomon saith: *There is no new thing upon the earth*. So that as Plato had an imagination, *that all knowledge was but remembrance*; so Solomon giveth his sentence, *that all novelty is but oblivion*."[28] The wisdom the immortals know is "that over an infinitely long span in time, all things happen to all men. . . . No one is someone; a single immortal man is all men."[29] Novelty is an impossibility. It is only a name for something that we have not remembered or it is nothing at all because it did not enter memory. Memory is the heart of culture. We can agree with the poet Giuseppe Ungaretti, who tells us with complete clarity, *"Tutto, tutto,*

[27] Jorge Luis Borges, "The Immortal," in *Collected Fictions*, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: Penguin, 1998), 193.

[28] See Francis Bacon, *The Major Works*, ed. Brian Vickers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 451.

[29] Borges, 191.

tutto è memoria [Everything, everything, everything is memory]."[30]

Commentary on Beckett's Essay

I wish to conclude with some comments on Beckett's essay, made from a Vichian perspective. In such a short space I make no attempt to summarize the essay itself. Beckett had at his disposal the extracts from Joyce's work, whereas we readers today have the full, final text of *Finnegans Wake* that appeared a decade later.

1. Joyce said, of the twelve authors of the essays of *Our Exagmination Round His Factification For Incamination Of Work In Progress*: "I did stand behind those twelve Marshals more or less directing them what lines of research to follow."[31] The title is from a line in Joyce's work (FW 497.02–03). "Exagmination" is examination merged with Latin *agmen* (a mass of persons in movement, an army on the march, a stream). "Incamination" contains a play on the Italian verb *incamminare*—"to put on the right road" (the Vico road), also "round" (the Vico road "goes round and round"), and *factum* (what is made, Vico's famous principle of *verum esse ipsum factum*, "the true is the made." Beckett speaks for himself but we can assume that he also speaks for Joyce.

2. Beckett's title is "Dante... Bruno. Vico.. Joyce" with no dot or period after Joyce. Beckett discusses each of these four figures but gives no explanation in the essay of the structure of the title or its significance. As a reader, I have two thoughts on it; one is chronological; the other is linguistic. If one recalls the birth dates of Dante (1265) and Bruno (1548), a span of approximately three centuries intervenes; between Bruno and Vico (1668) a span of a century is involved; between Vico and Joyce (1882), two centuries. The reader is reminded of the sequence of these figures in history, with Joyce just now taking his place.

Linguistically, the title contains two sentences. The first contains the ellipsis between Dante and Bruno. What is omitted is how we comprehend the movement from Dante, the "Tuscan Homer," as Vico calls him, the summar-

[30] Giuseppe Ungaretti, in a lecture on Vico in São Paulo, Brazil, in 1937. See *Vita d'un uomo: Saggi e interventi* (Milan: Mondadori, 1974), 345.

[31] *Letters of James Joyce*, vol. 1, 283.

izer of medieval Thomism, to Bruno, the philosopher-heretic who, as Joyce says through Stephen Dedalus, "was terribly burned."[32] The second sentence is incomplete because what Joyce is and how we are to understand him is not yet finished. The ellipsis between Vico and Joyce is only partial because the gap between Vico and Joyce is not great. Vico is recycled in Joyce.

The first sentence and the second "sentence" can be juxtaposed or "recoursed." Vico is the poetic-philosopher who carefully asserts that his views are for the greater glory of "our Christian religion," but his cyclic conception of history is wholly pagan, presided over by a providence that does not lead to a final day of Resurrection. Joyce is not a heretic but a permanently lapsed Catholic whose world, in *Finnegans Wake*, as Beckett explains, corresponds to Purgatory. The four figures reflect Joyce's tetralogical manner of thinking and his interest in the square and the circle. As he once remarked, instead of squaring the circle, he circled the square.

3. Beckett begins by calling attention to how Vico has folded philosophy and philology into each other as a single method. Vico says "philosophy undertakes to examine philology" (NS par. 7). Philosophy fails by half in directing its efforts toward the true (*il vero*) as the universal in human nature, and philology fails by half in directing its efforts toward the certain (*il certo*) that is composed of those particular acts, done by choice.

4. Beckett opposes Croce's view of Vico: "It pleases Croce to consider him as a mystic, essentially speculative, '*disdegnoso dell'empirismo*.'"[33] Croce's *La filosofia di Giambattista Vico* (1911) was the standard comprehensive interpretation of Vico's philosophy of the day.[34] The sentence in full is "Ora, l'ispirazione del Vico era genuinamente ed esclusivamente teoretica, punto pratica o riformistica; altamente speculativo il suo metodo a

[32] James Joyce, *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, ed. Seamus Deane (New York: Penguin, 1993), 271; cf. *Stephen Hero* (New York: New Directions, 1944), 170.

[33] *Our Exagmination*, 4.

[34] Benedetto Croce, *La filosofia di Giambattista Vico* (Bari: Laterza, 1965). Beckett could also have consulted Robert Flint, *Vico* (Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1884) that appeared as a volume of the series "Philosophical Classics for English Readers." The interpretation in it would have been more to Beckett's liking; perhaps he did not know of it. Joyce likely knew it at some point, as we find, in the *Wake*: "A chip off the old Flint" (FW 83.10).

disdegnoso dell'empirismo; idealistico, e perciò antimaterialistico e anti-utilitaristico, il suo spirito [Now, Vico's inspiration was genuinely and exclusively theoretical, not at all practical or reformulatory, his method was deeply speculative and distaining of empiricism; his spirit was idealistic and thus antimaterialistic and antiutilitarian]."[35]

For Croce to claim Vico is "deeply speculative" is not the same as to claim that he is a mystic. Croce was a Hegelian and thus by "speculative" he is likely referring to Hegel's "*spekulativer Satz*" or "speculative sentence," upon which Hegel claims his manner of thinking is based, and he definitely has in mind Hegel's overriding contrast between speculation that is the thought of reason (*Vernunft*) and thought based on reflection or understanding (*Verstand*).[36] By saying that Vico disdained empiricism, Croce means that Vico's method rejects the philosophical doctrine that all thought derives from sense impressions, as is to be found in Locke or Hume. In claiming this, Croce is not claiming that Vico disdains the empirical in human existence. For Croce, Vico was the Italian Hegel, having a philosophy of objective idealism, a view that led Croce to write a fictional account in which Hegel, at the end of his career, is introduced to the writings of Vico and endorses them as like his own.[37]

Where Beckett's understanding of Vico really divides from Croce's is in Beckett's grasp of the fundamental importance of Vico's conception of poetic characters or imaginative universals (*caratteri poetici o universali fantastici*). Beckett loosely cites Vico's line declaring that the discovery of this original form of language is *la chiave maestra* or master key to his Science that cost him a good twenty years to accomplish (NS par. 34). As Vico says: "the first science to be learned should be mythology or interpretation of fables" (NS par. 51).

5. Beckett characterizes Vico as "a practical roundheaded Neapolitan." This is a statement taken directly from Joyce. In *A Portrait* Stephen refers to

[35] Croce, *La filosofia*, 77. My trans.

[36] See Hegel's *Vorrede* in *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, 6th ed. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952). On the difference between speculation and reflection, see Donald Phillip Verene, *Hegel's Absolute: An Introduction to Reading the "Phenomenology of Spirit"* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), chap. 1.

[37] Benedetto Croce, "An Unknown Page from the Last Months of Hegel's Life," trans. James W. Hillesheim and Ernesto Caserta, *New Vico Studies* 26 (2008): 143–65.

his Italian teacher Father Ghezzi as "little roundhead rogue'seye Ghezzi."[38] Padraic Colum, the Irish poet and playwright, reported that on one of their walks in Paris in about 1927, discussing *Work in Progress*, Joyce referred to Vico in a similar fashion: "'He was one of those round-headed Neapolitan men,' Joyce told me. I forget whom he mentioned as another of them."[39]

The other was quite likely Bruno of Nola, since Nola is part of the comune of Naples. In the *Wake*, at the beginning of the classbook section, in which all of Vico's terminology is glossed in its marginalia, is "Old Vico Roundpoint" (FW 260.15). "Roundhead" is not a term known to me, nor to the *O.E.D.*, except in its Cromwellian associations, which do not seem to fit, given Cromwell's treatment of the Irish. The Vico road goes round and round, but to derive "roundheaded" from this seems trite or at least not especially clever. In Beckett's context of criticizing what he takes to be Croce's view of Vico, the term seems to mean "hardheaded," empirically minded, thinking in relation to facts, and probably a bit stubborn. In a novel about academic life, *Matricide at St. Martin's* (1995), by the Dublin-born Ruth Dudley Edwards, appears the comment: "'You need the whistle-blowers and the people who don't mind being unpopular and the people with tunnel vision." 'But not too many of them,' said the Bursar. 'They're almost all Roundheads.'"[40]

6. The term Beckett settles on, for Vico, is "Vico, the scientific historian."[41] A case can be made for this as a precise designation for Vico. Broadly speaking, Vico can be called a philosopher or a philosopher of history, but he is most correctly an advocate of his own "new science," which is made up of both philosophical reasoning and philological analysis. Beckett rightly insists that Vico's unique conception of Providence is fundamental to this science. Vico uses the word "Providence" in 120 lines in

[38] Joyce, *A Portrait*, 271.

[39] Mary and Padraic Colum, *Our Friend James Joyce* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968; 1958), 82. Andrea Battistini, "Beckett e Vico," *Bollettino del Centro di Studi Vichiani* 5 (1975), regards "roundheaded" as *coined* by Joyce: "Riecheggiando persino degli stilemi tipicamente joyciani per i loro fantastici accostamenti—si pensi soltano alla definizione del Vico come 'una specie di "testa tonda," di puritano partenopeo,' del tutto identica a quella coniata da Joyce," 79.

[40] Ruth Dudley Edwards, *Matricide at St. Martha's* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 167.

[41] *Our Exagmination*, 5.

the *New Science* that are spread throughout the text of the work.[42]

The definition Beckett quotes in Italian is quoted by Croce in *La filosofia* from the last few paragraphs of the *New Science*.[43] Vico does not use "Providence" in this passage, but it is to the mind of Providence that he is referring. He says that the world of nations has been made by men themselves but that this world has issued from "a mind often diverse, at times quite contrary, and always superior to the particular ends that men had proposed for themselves; which narrow ends, made means to serve wider ends, it has always employed to preserve the human race upon this earth" (NS par. 1108; cf. pars. 342, 344). Croce, in the conclusion to *La filosofia*, claims that Vico's Providence, as the objective, logical order of history, is what Hegel formulated as the "cunning of reason" (*List der Vernunft*).[44] This claim is symptomatic of Croce's Hegelianizing of Vico.

Beckett is quite clear that Joyce adds a fourth age to the three ages—gods, heroes, and men—of Vico's *corso* and *ricorso* of ideal eternal history, that of Providence.[45] This point is missed by some Joyce scholars who, not having read Vico, speak of Vico's four ages, presuming that Joyce's cycle is taken over directly from Vico. They have not only missed what Vico said, they have also missed what Beckett said. As Beckett states: "Part 4 is the day beginning again, and corresponds to Vico's Providence, or to the transition from the Human to the Theocratic, or to an abstraction—Generation. Mr. Joyce does not take birth for granted, as Vico seems to have done."[46] Joyce's "Providentiality" is what holds together Vico's *corso* and *ricorso*.

Regarding the course and later recourse a nation undergoes, Beckett grasps Vico's sense of decline, which includes "a six-termed progression of

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[42] See *Principj di Scienza Nuova d'intorno alla Comune Natura delle Nazioni: Corcordanze e indici di frequenza dell'edizione Napoli 1744*, ed. Marco Veneziani (Florence: Olschki, 1997), 629–30.

[43] Croce, *La filosofia*, 113.

[44] Ibid., 223.

[45] Beckett claims (p. 4) that Vico derived his three ages from the report of Herodotus that the Egyptians had three kinds of writing (*Hist*. 2.36). Vico mentions this but is clear that his principal source is Varro's view of three ages, found in the odd little book of Censorinus, *De die natali*, sec. 21 (NS par. 52).

[46] *Our Exagmination*, 8.

motives: necessity, utility, convenience, pleasure, luxury, abuse of luxury."[47] Beckett is paraphrasing Vico's axiom sixty-six: "Men first feel necessity, then look for utility, next attend to comfort, still later amuse themselves with pleasure, thence grow dissolute in luxury, and finally go mad and waste their substance [*finalmente impazzano in istrapazzar le sostanze*]" (NS par. 241). Beckett says: "At this point Vico applies Bruno—though he takes very good care not to say so."[48] Change, for Vico and for Bruno, is a transformation of opposites. Vico cannot mention Bruno by name because Bruno is a heretic and the Inquisition was unofficially present in Naples.

Vico does mention Bruno indirectly but prominently in describing the proof that governs his science, claiming that the matters of his science "have been established by divine providence, the course of the things of the nations had to be, must now be, and will have to be [*dovettero, debbono e dovranno*] such as our Science demonstrates, even if infinite worlds were born from time to time through eternity, which is certainly not the case" (NS par. 348). This is likely an endorsement of Bruno's doctrine, such as can be found in his *De l'infinito universo et mondi* (*On the Infinite Universe and Worlds*), emphasized by declaring that such is "certainly not the case."

7. A fundamental aspect of Joyce's language on which Beckett does not remark is its intention to be humorous, to produce laughter. Joyce once told Jacques Mercanton: "I am nothing but an Irish clown, a great joker at the universe,"[49] and to a drinking companion he once corrected "*In vino veritas*" to "*In risu veritas*."[50] As the ballad of Tim Finnegan says: "Lots of fun at Finnegan's wake." Joyce speaks of Dante as "the divine comic Denti Alligator" (FW 44.06). The sense of the humorous pun guides the language of the "Litter" that concludes *Our Exagmination*. Since part of the purpose of the volume was to answer the critics of *Work in Progress* Beckett may have deliberately avoided mention of the humor of Joyce's work lest it become grounds for not taking seriously the greatness of Joyce's talent.

[47] Ibid., 5.
[48] Ibid., 5–6.
[49] Jacques Mercanton, "The Hours of James Joyce," in *Portraits of the Artist in Exile: Recollections of James Joyce by Europeans*, ed. Willard Potts (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 229.
[50] Ellmann, *James Joyce*, 703.

In responding to Rebecca West's criticisms of Joyce, Beckett instructs her and thus the reader in how to approach Joyce's use of language. We must put aside the distinction between form and content. In Joyce's speech the words used to speak about a thing become the thing itself. Joyce's speech is a series of what today philosophically can be called "performative utterances," in which what is said does not refer to some separate act but is the act itself. The words become what the words themselves are about. Beckett points out that such semiotics are not unknown in literature. They can be found, for example, in passages of Shakespeare and in Dicken's *Great Expectations*. Although there are precedents for this language use, what we should realize, I think, is that Joyce does not, in *Work in Progress* or in *Finnegans Wake*, *sometimes* use words in this hieroglyphic way—*he uses words in nothing but this way*. Thus his work requires a new science of reading and a new kind of reader.

Beckett draws a parallel between the Italian that Dante created in order to write the *Divina Commedia* and the English Joyce created in order to write *Work in Progress*. It is commonly said that Dante wrote in Florentine dialect, but Beckett points out that the Tuscan in which Dante writes was spoken by no one: "He did not write in Florentine anymore than Neapolitan. He wrote a vulgar that *could* have been spoken by an ideal Italian who had assimilated what was best in all the dialects of his country, but which was certainly not spoken nor ever had been."[51] Beckett adds, however, that whereas Dante's language derived from what was spoken, "no creature in heaven or earth ever spoke the language of '*Work in Progress*.'" But he adds: "It is reasonable to admit that an international phenomenon might be capable of speaking it."[52]

I find it difficult to imagine what this "international phenomenon" would be. What would it be like to be "sprakin sea Djoytsch?" What kind of "landadge" would it be? We would be communicating directly by means of Vico's *lingua comune mentale* within the theatre of memory that surrounds us, without the security of our categories and most especially with that of causality replaced by coincidence and cocoincidences.

[51] *Our Exagmination*, 18.
[52] Ibid., 18-19.

A Vichian Perspective on Pathogenesis and Therapy

Alexander L. Gungov (University of Sofia)

Abstract

This article discusses two approached to causation corresponding to two levels of medical theory and clinical practice: J.S. Mill's inductive methods, which are interested in identifying causes but not in tracing the mechanisms of causation, and G.B. Vico's verum-factum principle, which pays attention not only to particular causes, but to the way they are linked among themselves. The first approach represents what is known as etiology in medicine, while the second one could contribute to the better understanding of pathogenesis, more successful prevention, and less disappointing treatment.

What can an 18th century Italian philosopher do for contemporary medicine? Recent Vico scholarship has proved that the sage of Naples was a universal mind capable of supplying extraordinary ideas to almost all fields of humanities and social science. How about medicine? It might sound surprising, but the fundamental principle of his early writings is prone to serve as a rich source of insight for preventive medicine and clinical practice. A statement as simple as "The true is precisely what is made" (*verum esse ipsum factum*)"[1] turns out to shed some unexpected light on the ongoing debate on medical causality. The full expression of this principle is "the true and what is made are interchangeable, [that is–A.G.] they are convertible."[2] Vico's innermost intention here is to stress that to be in possession of the truth of something one needs to be able to construct or reconstruct a thing. Apparently, a watchmaker has no secrets in the watch making, neither a carpenter in the craft of making desks and bookshelves. The real point here is one of even broader theoretical scope: the same principle applies to all aca-

[1] Gimbattista Vico, *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1988), 46.
[2] Ibid., 45.

demic disciplines from mathematics to ethics passing through the entire knowledge of mankind. Regrettably for humans, genuine truth is accessible only in geometry and arithmetic since only these two fields are created by us; everything else owes its existence (being made) and its truth to God. We can have only a pale image of what is made by God; Vico calls this kind of image certainty. He even uses an analogy to compare divine truth to a statue and human truth to a painting.[3] Painting is an abstract image (in the Hegelian sense) of what is true; that is, it is unilateral, undeveloped, and approximate. In most cases human cognition is like this, deserving in Vico's terminology the name of *consciousness*, because "human 'making' […] is incomplete (and cannot in principle be completed) in relation to the true and [it] yields a kind of cognitive 'witnessing' of the object."[4] While divine cognition is at the same time real making due to which it holds the complete truth of *science*, scientific truth is achievable only when we master causes, only when we can produce and reproduce the exact steps according to the proper order of what we study. Vico identifies a cause with the above type of producing or activity and the effect with the result, i.e. with what is made through intelligent activity and is therefore true.[5]

In Vico, we have unfolded understanding of causality that takes into account the whole process. It implicitly avoids the numerous logical fallacies usually associated with causality. This is very different from Kant's prominent notion of cause and effect. Kant illustrates the category of causality by the so called transcendental scheme of causality, which is defined as "consequence of events in time." Although most of the present day sets of causation rules claim that the cause has to precede the effect, Kant's view of causality falls easy game to the infamous *post hoc, ergo proper hoc* fallacy. Furthermore, his celebrated attempt to overcome Hume's "arbitrary" idea of

[3] Ibid., 46.

[4] Donald Phillip Verenene, *Gimbattista Vico: Signs of the Metaphysical Imagination* (Toronto: Toronto Semiotic Circle, 1994), 83.

[5] Gimbattista Vico, *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians*, 64. Gimbattista Vico, *On the One Principle and One End of Universal Law*, in: T. I. Bayer and D.P. Verene, eds., *Gimbattista Vico. Keys to the New Science: Translations, Commentaries, and Essays* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 40. Donald Phillip Verenene, *Gimbattista Vico: Signs of the Metaphysical Imagination*, 83.

causality, as a mere human habit, by the *a priori* category permeated with necessity, is just a formal dictum and not much practical help. For all practical purposes, causality being the habit of an experienced person is quite a useful tool: the habit of a billiard player ensures that a ball being hit at a certain angle moves in the proper direction to score a point; the habit of an internist to reduce edema via the administration of diuretics, reduction of salt intake, and taking other anti-hypertension medications, if necessary, will improve a patient's condition; the habit of a surgeon to consider acute chest pain as a symptom of aorta aneurism rupture can save patient's life if applied in time.

"True is whatever proves to work in a given situation and is acknowledged as such by the community of experts in the field" a pragmatist would claim. If physicians are certain that eating veal liver will reduce anemia in patients, this is a true conviction and it is not necessary, at least for time being, to deliberate on why exactly this happens. "True is the correspondence of an empirical event to its concept" Hegel would say. Concept is not just a notion for Hegel–it is the unfolding of something from its elementary level through the most sophisticated stage. The concept would be the self-aware experience of a pulmonologist warranted by specialized and general medical knowledge, which will allow diagnosing coughing, sputum, chest pain, and fatigue as tuberculosis and not as pneumonia even though there is no evidence of weight loss and only blood-free sputum is excreted. Or as Alasdair MacIntyre believes, truth of one's life can be achieved only through placing oneself into a story telling that honors and encourages certain virtues contributing to the wellbeing of the community one belongs to. The Hegel-MacIntyre view is much closer to Vico's than to the pragmatist because it insists on the intelligent unfolding of the entire process, on the proper order of following steps, and on the insight about the outcomes; in a word, on the mastering through causes of the entire mechanism of producing a certain event or managing each step in reaching the knowledge one is searching for.

1. John Stuart Mill's Etiological Causality

The Vichian approach to causation features evident affinity with Hegelian ideas but marks a radical difference from J.S. Mill's inductive methods. Both Vico and Mill are zealous to discover proper causality and man-

age it. Nevertheless, Mill adopts a black-box method aiming at identifying the exact cause/s leading to a given result. While Vico firmly advocates an enlightened attitude to causation, this could be called speculative in the Hegelian manner. It insists on elucidating, by all means, the totality of causation; it views causes in the context of all consecutive links and transitions that make it possible to achieve the intended result. This applies to science in Vico's sense. But inductive sciences deal with the certain and not with the true because they are interested in causes and not in intermediate links. Their "truth is found and not made."[6] The difference between Vico and Mill is not one of degree of perfection but of fundamental principle, "because the logical idea of perfect induction does not entail the idea of the creation of an object known,"[7] which is exactly Vico's *verum-factum* criterion.

Mill's and Vico's projects fit accordingly with what in medicine is called etiology and pathogenesis. The contemporary theoretician of medicine Edmond A. Murphy offers an apt cooking metaphor to describe the relationship between these terms at the background of disease: "The etiology is like a list of ingredients. Pathogenesis is like a recipe. Disease is like a cake."[8] Mill's expertise is in the realm of the ingredients. He strives to find causes but pays little attention to how causes combine in order to come up with a disease. While acknowledging the significance of causes, Vico simultaneously highlights the universal order that causes comply with to produce an event, often through an extraordinary recipe.

In order to find out which are the ingredients, that is, the causes, we need, generally speaking, the presence of a correlation (also termed association) and a counterfactual condition. A correlation between A and B is identified when the number of B in A is bigger than the number of B in non-A and a counterfactual is present if the members of A would not have been members of A and all other conditions would remain the same, then the

[6] Donald Phillip Verenene, *Giambattista Vico: Signs of the Metaphysical Imagination*, 85.

[7] Donald Phillip Verenene, *Vico's Science of Imagination* (Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1981), 40.

[8] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 247.

number of B in A would have been lower.[9]

It is a commonplace that the fatty diet (A) correlates with colon cancer (B). What this means is that the incidence of colon cancer (B) among the people having mostly fatty food (A) is higher than among the people who avoid fatty food (non-A). Following the same pattern, being a male correlates with suffering heart disease as being pregnant correlates with diabetes in young women. When a correlation between two elements exists, there are five logical possibilities of determining cause and effect:

1. B causes A.
2. A and B mutually cause each other.
3. A and B are both caused by C (no cause between A and B).
4. A and B correlate as a result of accidental factors.
5. A causes B.[10]

However, even if there are strong reasons to choose one of the above options, this still does not mean that the cause has been determined with certainty because, simply speaking, correlation per se is not causality. In order to have a cogent proof pointing to something as a cause, a counterfactual condition is indispensable. Consider the belief that chicken soup or eggnog consumed regularly for a week or two is an efficient cure for the flu. Not much skepticism is needed to conclude that even without the application of the above homemade medications the flu most probably would be gone in a fortnight. A counterfactual claim is a very powerful tool to confirm or reject a cause, but it works properly only when everything else remains the same, i.e. the *ceteris paribus* condition is met. To demonstrate this requirement, American logician John D. Mullen proposes a curious intellectual experiment. Is there a correlation between bits of tobacco in one's shirt pocket and cancer incidence? Yes, such a correlation certainly exists. But cleaning shirt pockets of tobacco would serve as counterfactual evidence of causation between smoking and cancer incidence only if the *ceteris paribus* condition is ***not*** observed. In other words, if the smoker not only cares about the content

[9] John D. Mullen, *Hard Thinking: The Reintroducing Logic into Everyday Life* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, Inc., 1995), 184.
[10] Ibid., 181-184.

of his or her pockets but stops smoking.[11]

There are suggestions that causation can be distinguished from correlation using four criteria: 1. chance (random error), 2. bias (systematic error), 3. effect-cause relationship, and 4.confounding. To ensure causal inference, each of these possibilities must be excluded. Random error and bias can lead to wrong findings that do not correspond to truth. Random error might happen with measurement or from the variability inherent in sampling. Pseudo-causal outcomes due to systematic bias may occur from off-target measurements by the researcher, the instrument, or the patient. Effect-cause and confounding are based on true relationships, but they are not cause-effect. A positive or negative association between a factor and an outcome might feature a real *effect-cause* relationship, but not a *cause-effect* one. For example, it might be concluded that conducting deep anesthesia (vs. light) causes poor intraoperative and postoperative outcome for patients, when in reality patients who are already with complications intraoperatively are those who require, that is, "cause" deeper anesthesia to keep them stable during surgery. Finally, confounding might explain the association between the initial factors and the outcome, where a confounder is an agent associated with both. In confounding, a third factor (e.g., smoking) is a cause of the outcome (e.g., cancer) and also of the initial factor (e.g., coffee drinking), resulting in an association between coffee drinking and cancer that is real but not causal.[12]

Some other authors try to substitute or make the correlation-counterfactual criterion more concrete by introducing a detailed list of criteria. These criteria include temporality, meaning that a cause generally precedes its effect; contiguity, which requires cause and effect to be connected; the evidential criterion, which points out to the confirmatory support of the cause and effect for each other; and the explanatory criterion, which takes into account the fact that causes shed light on their effects.[13] It is not difficult to see that all the above criteria are present in a causal relationship but they are just the expres-

[11] Ibid., 147, 184.

[12] *Encyclopedia of Medical Decision Making*, edited by Michael W. Kattan, (Los Angelis: SAGE, 2009), 113.

[13] James A. Marcum, *An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine* (Springer, 2008), 35.

sion of everyday common sense reasoning and even truisms. Moreover, all of them constitute a fallacy trap and fail to make the requirements more specific. The temporality claim makes sure not to put the cart before the horse but it immediately jeopardizes sound reasoning through the *post hoc* fallacy without supplying any warranty against it; contiguity repeats the correlation criterion but without paying any attention to the indispensable counterfactual and *ceteris paribus* condition; evidential and explanatory criteria seem necessary and well justified but they are permeated by the *non sequitur* fallacy, which warns hasty and overly confident thinkers that although there might be some reasonable evidence that something is a cause and that it could explain quite plausibly the emergence of an effect, still, there is no causal relationship between the supposed "cause" and "effect."

A very witty and at the same time useful suggestion concerning similar rules of evidence in medical causality and criminality is made by Milos Jenisek. He identifies seven elements in which mayhem and murder in criminal law correspond to morbidity, mortality, and medical causation:

Mayhem and murder in criminal law

1. Criminal present at the scene of the crime
2. Premeditation
3. Accessories involved in the crime
4. Severity or death related to state of victim
5. Motivation-the crime must make sense in terms of gain to the criminal
6. No other suspect could have committed the crime in the circumstances given
7. The proof of guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt

Morbidity, mortality, and medical causation

1. Agent present in lesion of the disease
2. Causal events precede onset of disease
3. Co-factors and/or multiple causality involved
4. Susceptibility and host response determine severity
5. The role of the agent in the disease must make biologic and common sense

6. No other agent could have caused the disease under the circumstances given

7. The proof of causation must be established beyond reasonable doubt or role of chance[14]

J. S. Mill's above-mentioned inductive methods claim to be an efficient instrument which, without much theoretical deliberation or philosophical hesitation, gives a decisive impetus to science and practical fields, medicine included. Mill's methods are clearly summarized by a medical expert and a logician, Milos Jenicek and David L. Hitchcock, in their book on *Logic and Critical Thinking in Medicine*:

1. The **method of agreement**. If two or more cases of a phenomenon share only one feature, that feature is the cause (or effect) of the phenomenon.

2. The **method of difference**. If a case in which phenomenon occurs, and in one it does not occur, differ by only one feature, the feature occurring with the phenomenon is the cause, or a necessary part of the cause, of the phenomenon, or is its effect.

3. The **joint method of agreement and difference**. This principle combines the previous two.

4. The **method of residues**. If we subtract from a phenomenon what is already known to be the effect of some antecedent circumstances, then the remainder is the effect of the remaining circumstances.

5. The **method of concomitant variations**. If an antecedent circumstance is observed to change proportionally with the occurrence of a phenomenon, it is probably the cause of that phenomenon. [15]

1. The method of agreement can be described by the following scheme:

ABCD → abcd

ABFG → abfg

[14] Milos Jenisek, *Foundations of Evidence-Based Medicine* (London: The Parthenon Publishing Group, 2003), 218.

[15] Milos Jenicek and David L. Hitchcock, *Evidence Based Practice: Logic and Critical Thinking in Medicine* (AMA Press, 2005), 156.

AFMN → afmn

Therefore *A* is the cause (or effect) of *a*.

The above schematization illustrates the idea that the common feature *A* is the cause of the phenomenon *a*; all other features: *B, C, D*, etc. are irrelevant. Inductive methods, and induction as a type of inference, lead only to probable but not necessary conclusions. This mere probability is even more evident in preventive medicine and clinical practice: the same harmful condition does not impact negatively all exposed to it, neither does the same cure always relieve the same symptom. Not all coal-miners and stonemasons suffer of silicosis, not all shop attendants spending endless hours on feet develop vein dilatation, not all long experienced smokers end up with lung cancer, neither all loving moms that give anti-flu vaccine to their kids enjoy a flu–free winter. . . There is a simple explanation to this tendency repeated time and again by medical practitioners and professors: every human organism is quite specific in spite of the same anatomy and physiology and tends to be idiosyncratic. Still, there are rare cases where the method of agreement can be witnessed in its pure form in medicine. Two such examples are quoted by Irving M. Copy in his already classical *Introduction to Logic* textbook. Physicists, who have been targeted by stray neutron rays while working with cyclotrons in atomic-energy laboratories, are inflicted by no exception with an identical disease, cataracts. This case proves cogently the insidiousness of nuclear radiation according to the method of agreement. Not so strong but still leaving no doubts is the finding of a much lower rate of dental decay in several American cities (that are very different in their geographic and demographic conditions) in comparison with the average. It was attributed to the unusually high percentage of fluorine in their water supplies. This conclusion led to adoption of fluorine in dental prevention and treatment.[16]

2. When we discussed correlation and causality, we mentioned the counterfactual condition; it is an embodiment of the method of difference. Apparently, this is a very convincing technique since determining whether a

[16] Irving M. Copi, *Introduction to Logic* (London: MacMillan Company, 1969), 330, 331-332.

correlation is at the same time a cause can depend on the counterfactual. Nevertheless, there are plenty of cases in human diagnosis and therapeutics when this seemingly invincible method is undermined. If an experiment is conducted aiming at determining whether vitamin A is of any importance for optimal health, following the method of difference, the withdrawal of vitamin A from one's diet would be expected to affect negatively that person's health. Contrary to this assumption, the sharp cease of vitamin A, or any other fat-soluble vitamin intake, normally will not lead to any harm to one's health for some time. The reason for this is not the weakness of the method but an instance of confounding: vitamin A is stored in considerable quantity in the body fat.[17] Despite this kind of uncertainty, the method of difference is a very powerful tool for identifying a cause in any field and in medicine particularly. It is a commonplace today that yellow fever is transmitted by mosquito bites. However, in the early 20th century this was not the case. It was experiments based on the method of difference that helped to prove this causal connection. A room was divided by a mosquito net. On one side of the room a non-immune volunteer was placed along with several mosquitoes fed on yellow fever patients. The other side was mosquito-free, when two other non-immune persons entered it and remained there for more than a week. The first person was bitten and suffered a yellow fever attack. The two persons on the mosquito-free side did not show any signs of sickness.

Another experiment was held to prove that mosquito bites and not the excreta of yellow fever patients or anything which had been in contact with them were the cause of the infection. Three non-immunes were placed in a mosquito-proof house using sheets and other belongings of yellow fever patents. They did not catch the disease. The experiment was repeated by other non-immune volunteers with the same result. That they were not immune was demonstrated later when they were infected either by mosquito bite or by injection of contaminated blood.

The method of differences was applied three times in the above experiments. This is schematized below. In the first experiment, *A* denotes the feature of being bitten by a mosquito carrying yellow fever; *a* denotes the yellow fever symptoms; *BCD* denote the situation of living in the room

[17] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 232.

where the experiment was held; and *b*, *c*, *d* denote features common to all the volunteers:

ABCD → abcd first non-immune
BCD → bcd second non-immune
BCD → bcd third non-immune
Therefore *A* is the cause of *a*.

The second experiment is described by feature *A* denoting a bite of the mosquito which caused infection *a*, while the feature *M* of being in contact with belongings of yellow fever patients is an unlikely cause of the infection:

BCDM → bcdm non-immunes in the house
ABCDM → abcdm same non-immunes subsequently bitten
Therefore *A* (rather than *M*) is the cause of *a*.

If both experiments are considered together, the following pattern of argument appears: first, the non-immune person who was bitten by a mosquito and was brought into contact with matter from a yellow fever patient; second, another non-immune who was not bitten but was in contact with belongings of an infected person:

AM → am
M → m
Therefore *A* is the cause of *a*.[18]

3. The joint method of agreement and difference combines the strength (hopefully not the weaknesses) of the previous two methods:

ABC → abc ABC → abc
ADE → ade BC → bc
Therefore *A* is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of *a*.

This method is especially productive in the medical world. It was used to prove that polyneuritis in fowl is due to polished grain. For this purpose, a group of chickens was fed on white rice. They developed the disease and died. Another group was fed on unpolished rice and none of the chicken contracted polyneuritis. If the two groups are considered separately, the method of agree-

[18] Irving M. Copi, *Introduction to Logic*, 334-335.

ment appears as applied twice; if the chickens from each group are compared, then the method of difference is present. This experiment was continued when some polyneuritic chickens were fed on polishings from rice which soon made them recover. Those not given polishings died. The conclusion that the rice polishing is the means of cure is made again following the method of difference. The same joint method has been used by Ilya Metchnikoff to prove the therapeutic features of his famous calomel ointment. He inoculated two apes with syphilitic bacteria and in an hour applied the ointment to the scratched spot of only one of them. Later on, the untreated ape developed syphilis symptoms while the other one had absolutely no signs of the disease.[19] Again we should be very cautious when applying the joint method of agreement and difference to epidemiological, preventive, and clinical reasoning. Even its double hedging might not always be able to guarantee an entirely cogent conclusion. It is a matter of experience that not all smokers develop lung cancer and not all non-smokers avoid this fatal malady. The first reason for this is the individual reaction of human organisms to risk factors. The second one is confounding conditions. It is not a rare event that confounding tendencies brings paradoxical situations. Let's assume that in a community smokers there are interested in sport and spend most of their working time in a pollution-free environment. In the same community, non-smokers show no interest in sport and hold jobs in the local mining and chemistry industry. Supposing this, it would not be surprising when a health check of this community determines that the non-smokers suffer a higher rate of respiratory problems. The obvious conclusion would be that smoking is a preventive factor in respiratory conditions. In this particular case, applying the other component of the joint method–the method of difference–will prove that the above conclusion is wrong, since quitting smoking, provided all other things remaining the same, would not make most of the smokers less healthy. Nevertheless, such a successful refutation is not always possible when confounding intervention is at play.

4. Method of residues can be represented by the formula below:
ABC → abc
B is known to be the cause of в

[19] Ibid., 338-340.

C is known to be the cause of c
Therefore *A* is the cause of *a*.

It is clear that when the causes of certain elements of an event are known, the rest of the present circumstances will cause the remaining elements of this event. According to the method of residues, the storage of hemoglobin in human organism was identified in the 1920s:

> The mystery was: "Whence came this outpouring of hemoglobin?" It was not credible that the bone-marrow could have provided the body with new corpuscles with the rate required. Moreover, there was no evidence of increase of immature corpuscles in circulation . . .

The question then was forced upon us: Has the body any considerable but hidden store which can be drawn upon in case of emergency? . . . In search of a locality that might fulfill such a condition one naturally seeks in the first instance for some place where the red blood corpuscles are outside the circulation system–some backwater outside the arteries, capillaries, and veins. There is only one such place of any considerable size in the body–that place is the spleen.[20]

5. Copi rightfully observes that all inductive methods so far discussed act through various types of elimination. There are numerous cases, however, when elimination is impossible. In such situations another approach can be adopted: to check if the gradual change in the circumstances will lead to a change in the phenomenon and, if yes, to determine a causal relationship. This strategy can be schematized in two ways:

$ABC \rightarrow abc$
$A^{+}BC \rightarrow a^{+}bc$
$A^{-}BC \rightarrow a^{-}bc$
Therefore A and a are causally connected.
or
$ABC \rightarrow abc$
$A^{+}BC \rightarrow a^{-}bc$

[20] Ibid., 346.

$\underline{A^{-}BC} \rightarrow \underline{a^{+}bc}$

Therefore *A* and *a* are causally connected.

Both formulae represent the method of concomitant variations. The first one stands for direct variation; that is, the circumstances and the phenomenon vary in the same direction: if the circumstances increase or decrease, the phenomenon will accordingly increase or decrease too. However, an inverse variation is possible as well: in this case the circumstances and the phenomenon will vary in opposite directions; the increase of one leads to the decrease of the other and vice versa.

The method of concomitant variations is almost miraculously illustrated by the correlation between gasoline usage and lung cancer in the United States. Between the beginning of World War I (1914) and the Cold War (1950), lung cancer mortality increased nineteen times and the gasoline consumption increased at exactly the same rate; while during World War II rationing (1940-1945), gasoline consumption dropped about 34% and the lung cancer dropped by almost the same percentage.[21] In this example, each of the correlations serve as a counterfactual condition for the other one establishing in this sense the causality of the other correlation. Of course, this will be the case assuming that the *ceteris paribus* condition is observed.[22]

The method of concomitant variations seems to be a quite secure instrument but there are abundant cases where the variation between circumstance and a phenomenon is transformed from direct to inverse or vice versa. Such trends are known as non-monotonic. Examples of non-monotonic changes are found in many drug actions: epinephrine in small doses contributes to both blood coagulation and thrombus formation, but in larger doses has inverse impact on both; aspirin in large doses is uricosuric, while in small doses causes the retention of uric acid. Minimal doses of heparin decrease platelet life span, but therapeutic doses prolong their survival, and really large doses also reduce platelet life span. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that aging produces monotonic trends, but although it is accepted that serum cholesterol levels rise with age, in men the trend is re-

[21] Ibid., 346-349.

[22] In this case, as in many others, it is apparently not observed, but still it can be stated with a high level of probability, that the given correlation is causation.

versed after the age of forty to forty-five.[23] Besides, it is commonly observed that nearsightedness improves after a certain age.

2. Various modes of causation in medicine.

Speaking about causality in medicine, usually the first major achievement quoted is the significant breakthrough in infectious disease causality achieved by Henle and Koch in the late 19th century. For a long time, their criteria were paradigmatic for determining the cause of an infection. It is important to stress that the Henle-Koch 3 criterion set combines the pattern of Mill's inductive methods with the Vichian requirement of producing/reproducing and explaining mechanisms. First of all, the microorganism identified as the cause of an infection has to act ***univocally***; that is, it must be present in all cases of a given disease and only there in a form that characterized the given pathology; then, it has to be possible to ***isolate*** the microorganism from the host and to ***reproduce*** it by growing it *in vitro*; finally, there must be ***identity*** of effects proved through inducing the disease to a healthy organism by a microorganism in direct exposure grown *in vitro*.[24]Although highly respected, Henle-Kock causality postulates have often been criticized for being incomplete and, most recently, some arguments have been launched doubting "that the evidence of establishing human immunodeficiency virus or HIV as the causative agent of AIDS does not satisfy or fulfill the Henle-Koch's postulates."[25]

A number of criteria-sets have been developed in order to complement and improve Henle-Koch's pioneer work. In 1957, Huebner proposed nine requirements to guarantee the causal relationship in diseases of viral origin:

> 1. Virus must be a real entity (passages in animal and tissue culture); 2. Virus is not a simple contaminant; 3. Antibody response must result from active infection; 4. Specific tissue and

[23] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 367.

[24] Margherita Benzi e Raffaella Campaner, "Spiegazioni e cause in medicina," in: Alessandro Pagnini, curatore, *Filosofia della medicina* (Roma: Caroce editore, 2010), 176; James A. Marcum, *An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine*, 37; Milos Jenicek and David L. Hitchcock, *Evidence Based Practice: Logic and Critical Thinking in Medicine*, 156.

[25] James A. Marcum, *An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine* (Springer, 2008), 38.

> cell changes related to the virus are identified; 5. The virus must be constantly present (associated) with a specific illness; 6. Controlled trials in volunteers show inoculation followed by a specific syndrome; 7. Distinct epidemiological pattern of disease spread in the community exists; 8. Disease is preventable by a specific vaccine (if available); 9. Material resources available for all above criteria assessments.[26]

Later on in 1993, Evans outlines criteria for epidemic causation:

> 1. Agent isolated from most cases; 2. Agent isolated more commonly in sick than healthy individuals; 3. Incubation period of the agent corresponds to that of the disease; 4. A fourfold or greater increase of antibody titer during the illness; 5. Measures to control agent, vehicles, and people prove effective; 6. Disease and mode of spreading reproducible in susceptible and experimental animals; 7. No other agent shows the same causal association.[27]

Two years earlier, in 1991, the same researcher identified criteria proving a subclinical (unapparent) infection:

> 1. A well-defined clinical syndrome; 2. Known and identifiable causes of syndrome demonstrable by laboratory tests (antibodies, antigen isolation or identification); 3. Ability to differentiate between the laboratory markers of acute and of past infection; 4. Occurrence of subclinical cases concurrently with clinical cases, especially during an epidemic or in close contact with subclinical cases.[28]

The above rules are valid mostly in the cases of infectious diseases. There is a comprehensive set of criteria valid for disease causation in gen-

[26] Milos Jenicek and David L. Hitchcock, *Evidence Based Practice: Logic and Critical Thinking in Medicine*, 156.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Milos Jenicek and David L. Hitchcock, *Evidence Based Practice: Logic and Critical Thinking in Medicine*, 156.

eral, introduced by Austin B. Hill in 1965, that has since become a keystone in understanding and studying medical causality. In Hill's web of criteria, the central place is occupied by ***the strength of association.***[29] By this is meant that the stronger the relationship between the variable (assumed as the cause) and the one (assumed as the effect), the more probable it is that this is the real cause and not an external consideration. This criterion takes into account the rate of increase of the appearance of the disease in the experimental group compared to the control group. The second criterion is ***the temporal relationship***. It requires the factor hypothetically being the cause to precede in time the factor supposedly being the effect. The next criterion requires the multiple observations of the same association, made by multiple investigators in different places and different moments as well as by different methods to be ***consistent*** in order the causal hypothesis to be strengthened. It guarantees homogeneity of findings across various studies. The following criterion is that of ***theoretical plausibility***: a certain association is more cogent when it stands on solid theoretical grounds concerning the disease's mechanisms. The fifth criterion is coherence and claims that causal hypotheses should not oppose the established cognition already existing in the field, including the well known biological facts in the history of the disease. Hill's seventh criterion discusses ***the biological gradient*** or the linear dose-response relationship for the association of the agent and appearance of the disease. The hypothesis that smoking causes lung cancer is corroborated if the incidence increases with the increase in the number of cigarettes smoked daily or with the number of years smoking. Apparently, this criterion is based on the inductive method of concomitant variation. The last two criteria concern ***experimental proof*** and ***analogy***. Here the experimental evidence would be a production of disease in an animal model or creating conditions when the probable cause is excluded, leading to the absence of the disease; this includes the possibility of preventability and curability. Under this rubric also come clinical trials and "cessation studies." The experimental proof epitomizes the joint method of agreement and difference. Analogy concerns the possibility of a phenomenon commonly accepted in one area to be extended to another area. More specifically, this is paying at-

[29] The Term "association" refers to the same reality as term "correlation" used above.

tention to an analogous situation in which the causal relationship is previously established for the given or similar disease.[30]

A separate set of specific criteria have been adopted for a chronic disease (from Yerushalmy and Palmer in 1959):

> 1. Suspected characteristic is more frequent in persons with the disease than in those without it; 2. Persons with the characteristic develop the disease more frequently than do persons without the characteristic; 3. Strength and specificity of an association with the characteristic of interest must be better than in association with other characteristics.[31]

Various causes that lead to diseases, help prevention, or constitute a cure possess different functions. The most popular and, perhaps, the most significant classification in terms of function is the one discriminating necessary causes from sufficient ones. While a necessary cause refers to an agent which must be present in order for an event to take place, also known as *conditio sine qua non*; a sufficient cause refers to an agent, a minimal number of conditions, or a complete set of conditions which produce an event, provided the necessary cause is present too. In this sense, *mycobacterium tuberculosis* is the necessary cause of tuberculoses since always when the later is diagnosed, the *mycobacterium tuberculosis* is discovered too; poorly controlled elevated levels of blood sugar are determined to be the necessary cause of diabetic nephropathy, diabetic retinopathy, and diabetic neuropathy because all the above mentioned impairments require abnormally high levels of blood sugar over long periods of time in order to exist. In a similar way, *helicobacter pylori* is the necessary cause of stomach and duodenal ulcer. Following this pattern in identifying the necessary and sufficient cause of the endemic malaria spread, it is evident that the necessary cause in this case is *plasmodium malariae* and the role of sufficient cause is

[30] Margherita Benzi e Raffaella Campaner, "Spiegazioni e cause in medicina," in: Alessandro Pagnini, curatore, *Filosofia della medicina*, 177-78; James A. Marcum, *An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine*, 38; Milos Jenicek and David L. Hitchcock, *Evidence Based Practice: Logic and Critical Thinking in Medicine*, 155.

[31] Jenicek and David L. Hitchcock, *Evidence Based Practice: Logic and Critical Thinking in Medicine*, 156.

played by the *anopheles mosquitoes* and by the excessively warm and humid climate.[32] In the same way, malnutrition is a sufficient cause of tuberculoses, compromised immune system of flu and cancer, poor personal hygiene in being infected by hepatitis A, hereditary condition of diabetic retinopathy, and lack of exercise of diabetic neuropathy. From a logical perspective, a necessary cause meets the requirements of the inductive method of difference, while a sufficient cause acts according to the method of agreement. This means that if the necessary cause is absent, the event is absent too; and if the sufficient cause is present (provided that the necessary cause is already there), the event must take place. (The necessary cause per se is not capable of producing the event that it is the necessary condition of). Practically speaking, a necessary cause should be taken into account when the aim is to eliminate an event and a sufficient cause should be considered when an event is produced. Apparently, to eliminate tuberculosis *mycobacterium tuberculosis* it has to be destroyed and, in the unlikely situation of aiming at producing intentionally the same disease, poverty and malnutrition have to be spread. Actions of sufficient causes can be viewed under a different angle in prevention and therapy. Strengthening one's immune system (a sufficient cause) can prove to be instrumental in producing the healthy condition of curing flu and washing one's hands and body (another sufficient cause) can serve as a warranty against hepatitis A and other infectious diseases.

Characteristics of the necessary and the sufficient cause can be combined forming a necessary and sufficient cause. This will mean that if the necessary and sufficient cause is absent, the certain event/disease will not be present either; and if the combined cause is present, the event cannot also be absent. In medicine this situation is illustrated by neurosphilis, which accounts for Argyll-Robertson pupils, "absence of reflex without change in the contractile power of the pupil,"[33] that is, reaction to accommodation but not to light. If Argyll-Robertson pupils are ob-

[32] Milos Jenicek and David L. Hitchcock, *Evidence Based Practice: Logic and Critical Thinking in Medicine*, 157.

[33] Agnes Clare Frenay and Rose Maureen Mahoney, *Understanding Medical Terminology* (Boston, MA: WCB/McGraw-Hill, 1998), 371.

served, than neurosyphilis is present; and vice versa, if this sign is absent, the neurosyphilis can certainly be excluded. For such a sign that points out to only cause, on the one hand, and this only cause always produces the given sign, on the other, the term "pathognomic" is used. Translated into the two main rules of inference, *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*, necessary and sufficient cause will allow the inference to be made in both directions without leaving place for a wrong/invalid inference. Normally, *modus ponens* has one correct version $(a \rightarrow b) \bullet a \rightarrow b$; i.e. if neurosyphilis is contracted, it produces absence of reaction to light by the pupils; however, in this particular case, the invalid version of modus ponens $(a \rightarrow b) \bullet b \rightarrow a$ is valid too since Argyll-Robertson pupils are an indispensable sign of neurosyphilis. Exactly the same is the situation with *modus tollens*: not only $(a \rightarrow b) \bullet \sim b \rightarrow \sim a$ (the absence of Argyll-Robertson pupils ensures a healthy condition) is valid, but also $(a \rightarrow b) \bullet \sim a \rightarrow \sim b$ (disease-free status will entail the proper reaction to light by the pupils). There is no doubt that the necessary and sufficient causes and the pathognomic signs significantly facilitate the task of diagnostics and therapy as they exclude the possibility of logical error.

Some scholars try to develop in detail the relationship between necessary and sufficient cause. This brings to life the acronym INUS, which stands for Insufficient but Necessary Part of Unnecessary but Sufficient Condition. To illustrate this condition, it is appropriate to ask the question: "What is the cause of flu?" The answer to it will depend on the scope of the question; whether we inquire about the cause of flu in general affecting all human beings or about what causes the flu of a specific group of people or even of a certain person. In the first case, the adequate answer would be "the flu virus" while in the second and third case, we will need to take into account the concrete living conditions that made the given individual susceptible to the flu. Similarly, comparing *vibrio cholerae,* as the cause of cholera, and sugar, as the cause of tooth-decay, it is evident that in the former instance we are dealing with a necessary cause since *vibrio cholerae* is inevitably present in all cases of cholera, but in the latter instance sugar is not identified as the cause of

all possible events of decay and, therefore, is not a necessary cause.[34] Both the exhausted organism being the cause of flu and sugar being the cause of decay can be names INUS. It is not entirely clear what would be the exact difference between an INUS and a sufficient cause unless we ascribe an INUS status to a sufficient cause in those cases when the necessary cause (only in the presence of which a sufficient cause suffices to trigger a disease) cannot be or is not strictly identified.

All three, the necessary cause, the sufficient cause, and the INUS can be considered as proximate causes and they answer the questions what and how. According to R.M. Nesse and G.C. Williams, there is another type of cause which answers the question "why": By this they mean finding the reasons why humans as a species get certain diseases and not others. The proponents of evolutionary causation claim that certain diseases emerge due to the change in the relationship between the environment and some genes; when the environment is transformed, genes that used to be beneficial for the organism's adaptation are not any more and this leads to diseases. This is especially true for cancer causation because the molecular and genetic components are not sufficient and evolutionary components are needed in order to obtain the full picture of this malady. Following this premise, the higher incidence of breast cancer in western societies can be explained by the fact that the exposure to estrogen (a proximate cause of breast cancer) is not broken by multiple pregnancies.[35]

Another group of authors, who are not content with the classical approach to causality, try to view medical causation from a humanistic or holistic angle. They condemn the search for a unique mechanistic cause as misleading and argue on behalf of a systematic approach. It is claimed that the cause of a patient's illness is multifactorial where no single cause can be defined as predominant. They complement the physiological aspect of an illness with psychological and social elements. For example, an elderly man who has caught pneumonia, been recently widowed, experiences severe dif-

[34] Margherita Benzi e Raffaella Campaner, "Spiegazioni e cause in medicina," in: Alessandro Pagnini, curatore, *Filosofia della medicina*, 188.

[35] James A. Marcum, *An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine*, 39.

ficulties moving around due to joint problems, and is undernourished, becomes prey of the bacterium.[36]

A more detailed description of the causal relationship shows that the case when a single cause leads to a single effect is just one of the possibilities. The comprehensive picture of cause-effect interaction is much more complex. Above, we have already mentioned that a cause can produce two or more different effects–testosterone in males causes susceptibility to heart disease, excessive face and body hair, low voice, etc. Two different causes can be responsible for effects that are related and practically inseparable and finally come up as a single unified effect. For example, glucose is produced by various sources in the body; similarly, vertigo may be caused in the same patient at the same time both by low blood pressure and irregular cardiovascular activity.[37]

Another possibility is when two causes conjoin and only conjointly produce a certain harmful effect. A classical illustration of is a rare type of hemolytic anemia known as glucose-6-phosphat dehydrogenase deficiency. It is due to a genetic abnormality in the above mentioned enzyme and taking, by bad luck or just by negligence, one of the drugs on the risk list, including sulfonamides and aspirin or simply eating food containing *vicia fava*. Still another kind of interaction is present when a conjunction of several factors produces different effects. This is well known in phenylketonuria, which is also an inherited disease where the enzyme that converts the amino acid phenylalanine into another amino acid shows certain defects. If phenylalanine is not excluded from the diet (it is present in most foods containing protein and in sweeteners), the enzyme deficiency combines its action with the dangerous, in this case, amino acid and produces various deviations from the norm in learning abilities, head size, hair color, etc.[38] Neither the glucose-6-phosphat dehydrogenase hemolytic anemia nor phenylketonuria can be classified strictly under the rubric of necessary and sufficient cause. Under even a

[36] Ibid., 40.

[37] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 116.

[38] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 116, 239-240. *BMA Illustrated Medical Dictionary*, edited by Michael Peters (London: DK, 2002), 446.

superficial reflection it is clear that each of the conjoint causes acting in both cases must be present in order for the disorder to emerge; but neither of them alone would suffice for the disease to occur; that is, by no means can they play the role of a sufficient cause. In terms of necessary and sufficient causes, this is an unusual situation where two necessary causes lead to an effect without the help of a sufficient cause. These cases remain to be strange even against the background of INUS adjustment. The Insufficient but Necessary Part of Unnecessary but Sufficient Condition claims that a combination of several sufficient conditions can bring about a certain disease. None of the sufficient conditions of the "S" in INUS is necessary; i.e. the statement "If one of them is absent, the disorder will be absent too" is just not true.[39] From a certain logical perspective, the INUS conditions and the conjoint causes are opposite and complementary. In the case of INUS, a number of unnecessary but sufficient conditions acting together substitute the necessary cause and act as if a necessary and sufficient cause are present. On the other hand, the conjoint causes, being necessary by definition in their joint action, bring a result common to the operation of a sufficient cause (in the presence of the necessary one): when the conjoint causes act, the disease cannot help but occur as well.

Two other combinations of causes are known as sorites and parastasis. The first one has borrowed its name from logic when a premise leads to a conclusion and this conclusion becomes another premise giving birth to a new conclusion until the final conclusion is reached. In the theory of causality sorites stands for a serious of causes each of them being an indispensable link in order for the next one to appear. For instance, an exhausted immune system would be a risk-condition for

[39] When we speak about a necessary cause in this sense, the invalid form of *modus tollens* turns out to become justified: $(a \rightarrow b) \bullet \sim a \rightarrow \sim b$; for instance, if there is no flu virus, there is no threat to catch the flu either. This happens not because a mysterious transformation of logical rules takes place in their application to medical cases, but because a necessary cause is either a necessary and at the same time a sufficient cause or forms a necessary and sufficient cause conglomerate with the assistance of some sufficient causes. In both cases, one to one relationship is present, which makes even the invalid version of *modus tollens* practically true.

pneumonia, which could cause heart failure (especially in elderly patients), and the heart failure could result in an ischemic stroke. Unlike sorites, in parastasis several causes can operate through several pathways in order to produce the same effect. In disease causation only one of these pathways would be sufficient to bring disorder; while in therapy, only one of the pathways through which a medication brings a beneficial effect might be enough. As regards normal physiology, the sorites is viewed as the weakest-link system and the parastasis as the last-failure system. In the first case, a disorder would occur whenever one of the links fails–presumably the weakest one–and in the second case, the system will fail only when all links fail. Yet another type of causality is called first-failure (bingo) system. It can be schematized with various cause chains leading to the same effect. It is sufficient that one of the chains operates in order for the effect to appear or, again in physiology, it suffices only one vital chain to fail and the whole system/organism fails. A tooth loss illustrates this: it can happen either due to untreated decay and its complications such as periodontal disease or simply by trauma. When the first of these undesirable events occurs, the tooth will be gone with no need for any of the other possibilities to be present too.[40]

3. Disease mechanisms and pathogenesis in the prism of Vichian *verum-factum*.

It was mentioned above that a subtle distinction exists between etiology and pathogenesis. Edmund A. Murphey explains the difference between the two in a concise and eloquent way:

> The classical example is sickle cell disease. It has been known since Ingram's classical study (1959) precisely what the nature of this disorder is, the homozygous[41] state for hemoglobin S. The disease state is complex: stunted growth, red cells that deform in a low oxygen tension, infarction of the spleen, anemia [hemolytic–sickle shaped red cells become fragile due to the crystallized hemoglobin S

[40] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 116, 243-244.
[41] Identical genes controlling a specified, inherited trait.

> in the capillaries[42]–addition mine, A.G.], increased susceptibility to infections by pneumococcus and salmonella, and florid, so-called sickle cell crisis. *The pathogenesis of this disorder–is still larger a mystery 36 years later, and radical treatment remains unsatisfactory*[43] [italics mine, A.G.].

Over the last several decades, physicians have learned how to alleviate this life threatening condition. Folic acid supplements are administrated to possibly reduce anemia, immunization is made and preventive doses of penicillin are prescribed in order to protect against infection. Crises are handled with intravenous infusion of fluids, various antibiotics, oxygen therapy, and analgesics. If a crisis is not managed by this means, blood transfusion is carried out.[44] However, as Murphy puts it, "radical treatment remains unsatisfactory" because medicine still has not mastered the entire causal process and cannot reproduce it theoretically or on animal models. As Vico would say, medicine is not in possession of the genuine truth about the sickle cell disease. There are examples when disorders with unclear or not very clear pathogenesis are relatively well treated with drugs whose therapeutic qualities are not entirely understood; in some other cases, vague pathogenesis is approached with crystal clear pharmaceutical means (like in the above instance), and conditions well known in terms of disease mechanisms could be improved by medications with still debatable functions. Nevertheless, the really adequate treatment is possible only when there are no secrets in either pathogenesis or medication operation. Let's suppose a new drug has been discovered whose pharmaceutical features are not known yet, but which is proved to be efficient in infection treatment. Having in mind that an infection process can be schematized in the following way:

microorganisms	→ they	→ they produce	→ toxins cause
invade	multiply	toxins	over disease

[42] *BMA Illustrated Medical Dictionary*, edited by Michael Peters (London: DK, 2002), 509.
[43] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 247.
[44] *BMA Illustrated Medical Dictionary*, edited by Michael Peters (London: DK, 2002), 509.

the above drug with unknown functions might either prevent the entry of microorganisms like insect repellent or chloride in drinking water, or it might not allow them to multiply as antibiotics do, it might reduce and stop the action of toxins in the same way as the antitoxins do, or, finally, it might prevent the host reaction to the toxins similarly to the function of anti-inflammatory medications.[45] In which of these pathways the new found drug is involved is not merely of theoretical interest. This understanding is of primary importance in achieving the potentially most successful treatment, in making an accurate and precise prognosis, in foreseeing drug interaction and undesirable adverse effects.

Causal explanation *a la* Mill is considered to be simply witnessing a correlation of events, with no certain ontological ground for this correlation. Or to put it in another way, any kind of substantive causal structure is absent on which causal explanation is laying. In this sense, to claim that an infection is due to a bacterium would assume only a regular concurrence of the bacteria's presence in the emergence of the disease. Recently, this drawback seems to be alleviated by W. Salmon's 1984 notion of "causal mechanical" explanation, which implies that causation depends on real causal mechanisms and causal explanation is impossible without giving account of those mechanisms. Moreover, Phil Dowe proposes a "process explanation" where the relationship between cause and effect presupposes some concrete interactions or processes.[46] These two improvements of the fundamental causal principle supporting Mill's inductive methods are very similar to the early 18th century Vichian *verum-factum* maxim and by no means with more elucidative power over their predecessor.

One of the tactics to be used in making the step from Mill's etiological causation to Vichian pathogenesis recreation is Cayley's formula for producing simple (noncyclical) process tries. It relates the number of given facts with the number of options of arranging the linear connection between these facts. The table below shows the correlation between the number of facts and the number of tries:

[45] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 237.
[46] James A. Marcum, *An Introductory Philosophy of Medicine*, 141.

Number of facts	Number of linear tries
1	1
2	3
3	16
4	125
5	1,296
6	16,807
n	$(n+1)^{(n-1)}$[47]

How this procedure works can be shown through a detailed reflection on the pathological transformations that gout brings to the affected organism. Gout is known as a disease characterized by high levels of serum uric acid (U), harmful effects on the vascular system (V), and shortened life span of platelets (P). In order to make sense of the pathological mechanism, we need to bear in mind several etiological facts: uric acid is a consequence of the destruction of nucleic acids which are produced to a great extent by the platelets' turnover. Platelets, on the other hand, play the major role in thrombogenesis, while it is believed that thrombi are an important contributor to atherosclerosis. Furthermore, platelets are fagocytic, and whenever they engulf any foreign elements, uric crystals being no exception, they release substances which act as adhesives and facilitate thrombosis. Atherosclerosis correlates with shortening of platelets life span, a correlation that may be considered causation. Besides, atherosclerosis also correlates with higher serum uric acid levels. These etiological findings about gout could be combined in various plausible ways in order to determine the real pathogenesis of disorders in patients suffering from this malady.[48]

Cayley's formula in the table above shows that there are 16 options in combining linearly these three facts. Let's concentrate on six of them which seem to be more convincing:

> Conjecture 1. Gout shortens platelets survival, which raises the uric acid level; uric acid crystals form in the arterial wall, which leads to atheroma. $X^{49} \rightarrow P \rightarrow U \rightarrow V$

[47] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 229.
[48] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 227.
[49] X stands for gout as the cause of the three disorders under consideration.

> Conjecture 2. Gout, by making platelets more adhesive, shortens their survival. Atheroma results, which leads to vascular damage to the kidney and promotes uric acid retention. X→P→V→U
>
> Conjecture 3. Gout raises the uric acid level, producing crystals that are phagocytosed by platelets, which as a result die prematurely, leading to thrombosis, encrustation, and atheroma. X→U→P→V
>
> Conjecture 4. Gout raises the level of uric acid, which crystallizes in the arterial wall, leading to atheroma, which, by providing a foreign surface, shortens platelet survival. X→U→V→P
>
> Conjecture 5. Gout causes vascular disease, which, by presenting a foreign surface, shortens platelet survival, which increases the turnover of nucleic acid and raises the serum uric acid levels. X→V→P→U
>
> Conjecture 6. Gout leads to vascular disease, which leads to kidney damage and uric acid retention, which in turn promotes phagocytosis and shortens platelets survival. X→V→U→P[50]

The question is how to choose the correct possibility(s) which allow us to created a theoretical model free of criticism and an acting animal model; that is, to master the entire mechanism of pathogenesis and be able to reproduce gout and its harmful consequences as a sign of knowing the truth about this disease. One of the quantitative strategies would be to separate the facts in disposal into two or more groups of facts and in such a way simplify the task: for example, if there are 4 components among which disease pathways need to be sought, this would mean 125 pathways according to Cayley's formula. In order to make the search more efficient, the 4 facts in disposal could be divided in two groups containing 2 components each. After this modification, according to Cayley's formula again, in each group will be 3 pathways

[50] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 228-29.

to be investigated, or the total of 6 pathways.[51] This simple operation will facilitate to a great deal the whole task and will guarantee, if not perfect, at least entirely acceptable and sufficient results.

In addition to linear tries, facts can be grouped in cyclical tries. This makes the pathogenesis mechanisms even more complicated. We will not be considering the precise number of pathways, but will limit ourselves in giving an example illustrating this type of causation. Impaired kidneys often leads to hypertension and the elevated blood pressure usually damages kidneys further on; furthermore, hypertension could cause heart failure, while the heart failure may impact and worsen both the kidney and blood pressure disorder. The following scheme provides a clear image of the above mechanisms (the sign ← is used to show that a given pathogenesis component not only interacts with the previous one, this is symbolized by ↔, but also with the initial element): K↔H↔ ←HF.

To make a further step in distinguishing Mill's inductive etiology from Vichian pathogenesis aiming at the true disease/treatment mechanisms, the theory about the levels of causal mechanisms can be applied. A mechanism can be viewed as a hierarchically organized system requiring a mechanistic explanation; that is, an explanation in terms of pathogenesis, to be held on several levels:

1. Considered in isolation, a mechanism shows its specific characteristics. This is a commons causal explanation that focuses on the input-output relationship. This is the essence of Mill's inductive approach.

2. A contextual explanation puts the mechanism in perspective of other mechanism it is a part of and to which it contributes via its activity.

3. Finally, the mechanism can be considered in a constitutive way regarding it according to the constitutive parts that render possible the input-output relationship characterizing the mechanism. The second and the third level of explanation easily could be recognized as elements of the Vichian attitude to causation in general and pathogenesis in particular.[52]

[51] Edmond A. Murphy, *The Logic of Medicine*, 229-30.

[52] Massimo Marraffa, "Funzioni, meccanismi e liveli," in: Alessandro Pagnini, curatore, *Filosofia della medicina*, 213.

The Vichian belief in recreating a pathological condition either as an incontestable theoretical model or as an efficient and undoubted animal model is capable of shedding some light on such an insidious disorders as elevated blood pressure. Bearing in mind the *versum-factum* principle as an interpretative tool can help the researcher and clinical practitioner to resolve a number of problems in treating both routine and resistant hypertension. Medical research and clinical practice prove more and more certainly that the main organ regulating blood pressure level is the kidneys. There are two kidney systems that are pivotal in blood pressure control: the rennin system, which ensures proper blood pressure mainly through arterial tone or vasoconstriction, and the nephron or excretory system, which is in charge of the fluid volume in the arteries in order to guarantee, in this manner, optimal blood pressure. The simple scheme of the interaction of these two systems is as following: when the fluid volume and salt level are high, the rennin secretion is low; and vice versa, when the rennin secretion is elevated, the salt retention and fluid volume accordingly become reduced. However, both systems not only oppose each other but also supplement their functions. The nephron system, reabsorbing salt, causes sodium dependent volume increase, which, on its part leads, to a salt-related type of vasoconstriction. On the other hand, the rennin system, with direct and indirect impacts on the nephron, also participates in reaching the optimal fluid volume while it induces is own vasoconstriction acting directly on the arterioles.[53] This double mode of interaction makes the process of keeping the homeostasis of blood pressure extremely complex, becoming easily susceptible to flaws in coordination and emergence of disorders. In the same guise, when hypertension is present, its regulation is complicated and dysfunctions can occur at any moment.

Low blood pressure stimulates kidneys to secrete rennin out of which angeotensine I is produced. The only function of this hormone is to serve as a resource for supplying angeotensine II through the anegetensine I convert-

[53] John H. Laragh, "The Rennin System and Renal Regulation of Blood Pressure," *The Kidney: Physiology and Pathophysiology*, Second Edition, edited by D.W. Seldin and G. Giebisch (New York: Raven Press, Ltd., 1992), 1411.

ing enzyme. Angeotensine II has three direct actions: 1. it is a powerful arterioral vasoconstrictor; 2. it causes sodium reabsorption by the kidneys; 3. it facilitates the production of the sodium-retaining hormone aldosterone. This concerted triple vasoconstrictive and sodium retaining effects protect or restore blood pressure. When the homeostatic state of blood pressure, renal perfusion, and sodium supply in the kidney are restored, rennin secretion is terminated.[54]

Due to these two systems of pressure control (rennin-mediated vasoconstriction and sodium/volume-related vasoconstriction), there are two main forms of hypertension. The first one is characterized by high levels of rennin and low sodium retention and reduced arterioral fluid volume; it is known as "dry hypertension". The other one features high sodium and fluid volume and low rennin secretion. These two forms can be distinguished through different features. In terms of arterioles, the peripheral resistance is higher in rennin dependent hypertension; aldosterone production is also higher as well as the levels of hematocrit, blood urea, and blood viscosity, while plasma volume, cardiac output, and tissue perfusion are lower. Rennin induced hypertension is accompanied by postural hypotension because of the low fluid volume. The clinical representations of abnormal rennin-mediated vasoconstriction are high-rennin essential hypertension, renovascular and malignant hypertension; poorly regulated sodium/volume-related vasoconstriction in clinical practice is expressed by low-rennin essential hypertension and primary aldosteronism. Dry hypertension leads to a number of vascular disorders, which are lacking in a sodium/volume dependent one: among them are heart attack, renal damage, and retinopathy-encephalopathy. Successful treatment also depends on the specific type of high blood pressure–dry hypertension is well curbed by angeotensine converting enzyme inhibitors and by beta blockers, while sodium/fluid volume dependent hypertension is reduced with calcium channel blockers, diuretics, and alpha blockers.[55]

Furthermore, studies show that angeotensine converting enzyme inhibitors are quite effective in diminishing systematic and pulmonary arte-

[54] Ibid., 1412.
[55] Ibid., 1435-36.

rioaral resistance in high rennin congestive heart failure, while very weak in cases of heart failure of similar level but low plasma rennin. In the latter circumstances calcium channel blockers prove to be extremely helpful, supporting the hypothesis that the low-rennin type of vasoconstriction probably involves calcium transport. In general, it seems clear that low-rennin hypertensive patients tend to have a relatively benign type of hypertension. There is a belief that *any* renal rennin secretion is not normal when the blood pressure is already elevated, because in such a situation the rennin secretion is expected to be close to zero. Therefore, hypertensive patients secreting high or even normal rennin have an abnormal function and it might be that this abnormality could decipher the cause of their form of hypertensive disease. In comparison, patients with low rennin hypertension feature a more adequate renal response to systematic hypertension, implying their sodium balance is more positive. Having in mind that for a certain level of high blood pressure, their fluid volume and, therefore, their tissue perfusion would be relatively higher than is medium or high rennin patients. This leads to a lesser chance the low rennin patients to suffer of ischemic vascular damage in their coronary and cerebral circulation than the last two groups.[56]

The bipolar model of blood pressure regulation, via rennin secretion and sodium/water retention, could be applied in understanding the mechanisms of so called essential hypertension, whose cause is usually not associated with kidney damage.

> It has recently been proposed that there are two functionally abnormal nephron populations in essential hypertension: a) minor subgroup of hyperfiltrating nephrons with impaired sodium excretion, chronically hypersecreting rennin, and b) a larger subgroup of normal but adapting, hyperfiltering nephrons, reacting to the elevated blood pressure with chronically suppressed rennin secretion and increased GFR [glomerular filtration rate–A.G.] and distal sodium supply.

[56] Ibid., 1439, 1444.

> The theory, if fully demonstrated, could go far toward explaining the operative mechanisms and untangling the contradictions that have for so long made essential hypertension an enigma. Discordant nephron populations, acting at odds with each other, may lie behind the appearance of plasma rennin "normality" even when such parameters as those of blood pressure, response to ACE inhibitors and saline infusions, and sodium retention are clearly abnormal.[57]

Still, within this theory a number of questions remain unresolved. Can we claim with no doubt that the discordant nephron groups are the initial cause of the essential hypertension or they are just a consequence (though explaining well the enigmatic character of this disease) of some other causes? If the second option is assumed to be true, then, do the discordant nephron actions really contribute to worsening the elevated blood pressure? Or are they perhaps neutral regarding any change in blood pressure, or even partially contributing to the alleviation of the hypertension; that is, this abnormality aims at homeostasis restoration and is not a deviation from the norm responsible for the high blood pressure?

Our 18th century Italian scholar, G.B. Vico argues that medicine was practiced by the heroes of ancient times,[58] by the ones who were the fathers of the big families, later founders of cities and states, and the first law givers. Heroes were the ones who possess authority, that is, who were the authors of the socio-political world imposing the order they believed was true. Vichian heroes were free to act but not because they would act arbitrarily like the Cartesian God and in order for their arbitrariness to rule the entire universe. They acted out of prudence based on their powerful imagination and very weak reason. Although they were not aware of the profound causes of the social world or of the certain diseases they would cure, their prudence was linked, according to Vico, to true reason, which is capable of identifying any single cause and tracing all the rings in a chain of causes. In such a

[57] Ibid., 1443.

[58] Paolo Cristofolini, "'La medicina eroica' e 'il fisicare presente'," in: *Il corpo e il sue facolta. G.B. Vico*, a cura di G. Cacciatore, V. Gessa Kurotschka, E. Nuzzo, M. Sanna e A. Scognamiglio (Laboratorio dell'ISPF, I, 2005, 1), 238.

way heroes produced what Donald Phillip Verene call metaphysical narration permeated with the specific logic of practical prudence rooted in metaphysical wisdom. Vico is against any dark spots, enigmas, or occult elements in science.[59] However, he does not believe either in principles that guide any kind of algorithm types or "decision trees" because they prevent the awareness of the links among the stages of an event and substitute blind routine action for the ability to understand a mechanism. And in medicine fully understanding the mechanism of a disease (being able to reproduce its pathogenesis) and of the mechanism of its treatment (being in a position to manage the treatment so that no disastrous surprises happen) is the strongest guarantee of avoiding failure.

[59] Ibid., 239.

II. HEGELIAN REMINISCENCES IN A NEW INTERPRETATION

The Right of Desire in Hegelian Philosophy of Law

Haralambi Panicidis (University of Sofia)

Abstract

The present analysis aims to show that according to Hegel's logic the unity of thought and will founds itself as an activity, such that by objectifying its own self-development, differentiates itself in diverse forms: each necessarily resulting in the other depending on the functional and dynamic re-evaluation of its distinct elements. It gives Hegel the opportunity to summarize his radical rationalism adequately, those elements with which the will (and desire) are developed as an immanent factor of society. It was found that some specific sentences and expression of its activities are in the condition not only to create the image but the historical content of the given historical epoch as well. Moreover, they give the specifics of a person's self-relationship beyond natural data. In spite of Hegel's intentions in Philosophy of Law, the unguarded transcendental human desire, however, is an important condition for social and cultural phenomena, their stability and importance.

1

Even to the philosophically educated, integrating the theme of desire into Hegel's philosophy seems to be somehow a useless effort. One thing seems to have already found its complete expression and it is all related to the proud self-determination and the domination of spirit; the other one has nothing but the confusing contradiction and unpredictability of this non-perfect universe of desires; those possessing irresistible charm and which

fulfill human life with its unending, subtle, uncompleted aspirations, as if we should want to get away and forget as soon as we can. Desire did not escape Hegel's attention - even if we conditionally accept that it was not his own passionate urge of desire, peculiar to every great investigator, that brought him to reflect on it. One of Hegel's texts, in which the theoretical analysis of desire is tangibly present, even though not as an object of systematic interpretation, is his *Philosophy of Right*.[1]

The analysis in *Philosophy of Right* is dedicated to considering of the objective spirit, taken as the reason in humans' lineal life, i.e. the superindividual wholeness that integrates particular individuals in a community and that is displayed through their different connections and relations. It also gives the internal impulse of spreading the historical content and modes of that community. In this way Hegel tries to understand and explain specific modes of development, in and through which the freedom of spirit is accomplished. The first level or mode of this accomplishment is the abstract right, followed by morality, which already has to do not with the purely external, but with the internal modes of objective spirit, the latter connected to "the right of subjective will", and finally to the morality in which the essence of objective spirit finds its completion through concurrence of its external and internal modes. Morality embraces all the organizations of human life, which further the realizations of lineal generality of reason in common life. Here, in the sphere of morality, the objective spirit traverses again a peculiar triad of objectifying itself through family, civil society, and state. According to Hegel, right gets activation and effectiveness in regulation of civil relations due to the will, which contains or embraces the needs, inclinations, desires, interests, and aims of the individuals who create those relations. That is why one of the fundamental issues in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is the examination of genesis, structure, and functional determination of the meaning of will in the mechanism of both legal influence over social life and in the entire context of social interaction.

[1] I do not forget in any way the multiple interpretations, from every point of view, on the issue of desire in the chapter *Independence and Dependence of Self-Conscious: Lordship and Bondage* from Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*. Those interpretations are also good evidence on the fact that the systematic analysis on Hegel's understanding of desire, as we found it in the whole corpus of his works, is still pending. The text, which is proposed here, is also an attempt for widening the analysis of other significant works of the great philosopher.

2

While still in preface to the *Philosophy of Right* we come across the first analytical inclusion of the issue on desire that meanwhile delineates the character and the intention of its reception in Hegel. In it, will and desire directly connect to each other. The thesis being explicated is that the essential difference between humans and animals is in the realization of their actions. In their situations is the intention of the first and the impulse of second: the animal "has no will, because it cannot place before its mind what it desires", writes Hegel.[2] Animals lack the inner interaction between a theoretical and practical approach to the world, which is the essential peculiarity of man's active behavior.

Will is an expression of the practical approach of man to the world and one does imagine what he or she desires because he or she has a will. While constituting the possibility of desires to pass through a specific image, i.e. including them in the structure of a concrete subjective inclination, the will gives the purposefulness of their outlet on realization in the range of reality. This is how the drawing of desires in the real world becomes conscious and is done on a peculiar level of awareness; in other words, the accomplishment of desires is related to or mediated by a determined knowledge of themselves.

Returning to Hegel's thoughts about the essential definitions of will and the accessibility to desire: "The territory of right is in general the spiritual, and its more definite place and origin is the will, which is free. Thus freedom constitutes the substance and essential character of the will, and the system of right is the kingdom of actualized freedom. It is the world of spirit which is produced out of itself, and is a second nature."[3] That is, the essential definition of will is that it is a social quality, not a pre-cultural relict transformed by the social.

It is not hard to guess that desires are being determined by will hereafter and they would not succeed in escaping the will's embrace, as far as they manage to socialize because of it. Immediately after that Hegel adds an extended explanation of his understanding on freedom of will.

> "Freedom of will is best explained by reference to physical nature. Freedom is a fundamental phase of will, as weight is of bodies. When it is said that matter is heavy, it might be meant that the predi-

[2] G.F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, transl. S.W. Dyde. Canada: Batoche Books, 2001, 29.
[3] Ibid, 28.

> cate is an accident; but such is not the case, for in matter there is nothing which has not weight; in fact, matter is weight. That which is heavy constitutes the body, and is the body. Just so is it with freedom and the will; that which is free is the will. Will without freedom is an empty word, and freedom becomes actual only as will, as subject. A remark may also be made as to the connection of willing and thinking. Spirit, in general, is thought, and by thought man is distinguished from the animal. But we must not imagine that man is on one side thinking and on another side willing, as though he had will in one pocket and thought in another. Such an idea is vain. The distinction between thought and will is only that between a theoretical and a practical relation. They are not two separate faculties. The will is a special way of thinking; it is thought translating itself into reality; it is the impulse of thought to give itself reality. The distinction between thought and will may be expressed in this way. When I think an object, I make of it a thought, and take from it the sensible. Thus I make of it something which is essentially and directly mine. Only in thought am I self-contained. Conception is the penetration of the object, which is then no longer opposed to me. From it I have taken its own peculiar nature, which it had as an independent object in opposition to me."[4]

From this point of view, the theoretical approach of man to the world is expressed in the following way: "The I is at home in the world, when it knows it, and still more when it has conceived it"[5] while the active man defines himself and stands out through differences. The differences he puts are his own; he owns the definitions and purposes, too. In the logic of Hegel's statement, the unity of thinking and will is peculiar for showing such an activity that would differentiate, while objectifying its self-development, into various modes. Those are necessarily coming one from another, depending on the functional and dynamic prevailing of one of their structure-determining elements. That would allow Hegel to adequately ground those parameters of his radical rationalism, through which the will (and, implicitly, the role of accomplishment, too, in this context) reveals itself as an immanent factor in the development of human society. It turns out that

[4] Ibid, 28-29.
[5] Ibid, 29.

the specific definitions of will's activity are capable of forming not only the aspect, but the historical content of a given historical epoch. Even more: they are the ones to specify a certain self-relation of man to himself, beyond his natural determinateness. It is a definitely unrestrained transcending, which makes its own durability a cultural fact, too.

Here is what Hegel means: "The will contains (a) the *element of pure indeterminateness*, i.e., the pure doubling of the I back in thought upon itself. In this process every limit or content, present though it be directly by way of nature, as in want, *appetite*, or impulse, or given in any specific way, is dissolved. Thus we have the limitless infinitude of *absolute abstraction*, or *universality*, the pure *thought* of itself. (Italics mine.)

Those who treat thinking and willing as two special, peculiar, and separate *faculties*, and, further, look upon thought as detrimental to the will, especially the good will, show from the very start that they know nothing of the nature of willing … The will on *one side* is the *possibility of abstraction* from every aspect in which the I finds itself or has set itself up. It reckons any content as a limit, and flees from it. This is one of the forms of the self-direction of the will, and is by imaginative thinking insisted upon as of itself freedom. It is the *negative* side of the will, or freedom as apprehended by the understanding. This freedom is that of the void, which has taken actual shape, and is stirred to passion. It, while remaining purely theoretical, appears in Hindu religion as the fanaticism of pure contemplation; but becoming actual it assumes both in politics and religion the form of a fanaticism, which would destroy the established social order, remove all individuals suspected of desiring any kind of order, and demolish any organization which then sought to rise out of the ruins. Only in devastation does the negative will feel that it has reality. It intends, indeed, to bring to pass some positive social condition, such as universal equality or universal religious life. But in fact it does not will the positive reality of any such condition, since that would carry in its train a system, and introduce a separation by way of institutions and between individuals. But classification and objective system attain self consciousness only by destroying negative freedom. Negative freedom is actuated by a mere solitary abstract idea, whose realization is nothing but the fury of desolation.'[6]

[6] Ibid, 30-31.

As to the individual existence of this intoxication of uniqueness, of the omnipotence that is unexpectedly revealed to the effort here and now (felt, sensed, taken as one's own) becomes a unique inspiration for every kind of creative work of both demolition and creativity. At that time, at the time of revolutions, appetites have no limit, but they simply and directly make their aspirations measureless, they give to the world at once and up to the last their frantic generosity, as they anticipate this would be possible in that moment only. In the doom of solitude of relatively calm epochs, individual effort to seek the will is capable of going even further beyond the confines set by the domination of reason to be obviously restraining self-destruction. The negative phase of will "implies that I break loose from everything, give up all ends, and bury myself in abstraction. It is man alone who can let go of everything, even life. He can commit suicide, an act impossible for the animal, which always remains only negative, abiding in a state foreign to itself, to which it must merely get accustomed. Man is pure thought of himself, and only in thinking has he the power to give himself universality and to extinguish in himself all that is particular and definite. Negative freedom, or freedom of the understanding, is one-sided, yet as this one-sidedness contains an essential feature, it is not to be discarded. But the defect of the understanding is that it exalts its one-sidedness to the sole and highest place.

This form of freedom frequently occurs in history (i.e., in the destroying art of the historical, in the negative social activity, in the personal self-denial). To the Hindus, the highest freedom is declared to be persistence in the consciousness of one's simple identity with himself, to abide in the empty space of one's own inner being, like the colourless light of pure intuition, and to renounce every activity of life, every purpose and every idea. In this way man becomes Brahma; there is no longer any distinction between finite man and Brahma, every difference having been swallowed up in this universality. A more concrete manifestation of this freedom is the fanaticism of political and religious life. Of this nature was the terrible epoch of the French Revolution, by which all distinctions in talent and authority were to have been superseded. In this time of upheaval and commotion any specific thing was intolerable. Fanaticism wills an abstraction and not an articulate association. It finds all distinctions antagonistic to its indefiniteness, and

supersedes them. Hence in the French Revolution the people abolished the institutions which they themselves had set up, since every institution is inimical to the abstract self-consciousness of equality.[7] Accordingly, the human desires themselves play a considerable role in forming the abstract self-conscious of equality. Those are the desires, which seem to turn, under the pressure of mass psychological euphoria, to a peculiar explosive mixture. The destructive power of that mixture realizes in the special uniformity of a pure striving for change, which sweeps up anything in its way.

After presenting a large-scale picture of his view's peculiarity, in which the historical activity of volitionally-defined actions in the social sphere pours out, Hegel again turns back to an investigation of the dynamic structure of human individuality. He does so now to explicitly show the complex, ambiguous, and asymmetrical role of the will and the desires in addition to those processes which constitute the unique specificity of man being both a natural and a social being.

According to Hegel, "The will, which is at first only *implicitly free*, is the *direct* or *natural* will. The distinctive phases, which the self-determining conception sets up in the will, appear in the direct will, as a directly present content. They are *impulses*, *appetites*, *inclinations*, by which the will finds itself determined by nature. Now this content, with all its attendant phases, proceeds from the rationality of the will, and is therefore implicitly rational; but let loose in its immediate directness it has not as yet the form of rationality."[8] He underlines with regard to this, that the only thing that empirical psychology makes in such a case is that it "enumerates and describes these impulses and inclinations, and the wants which are based upon them. It takes, or imagines that it takes this material from experience" - without trying to succeed in achieving what "the *objective side* of impulse is, and what impulse is in its truth, apart from the form of irrationality which it has as an impulse, and also what shape it assumes when it reaches existence."[9] "Impulse, appetite, inclination are possessed by the animal also, but it has not will; it must obey impulse, if there is no external obstacle. Man, however, is

[7] Ibid, 31-32.
[8] Ibid, 36.
[9] Ibid, 37.

the completely undetermined, and stands above impulse, and may fix and set it up as his. Impulse is in nature, but it depends on my will whether I establish it in the I. Nor can the will be unconditionally called to this action by the fact that the impulse lies in nature."[10] It is interesting to note Hegel does not try to cover the internal tension that is hard to be tamed - the tension between the will as a socializing factor and the pre-cultural (i.e. natural) definitions of man, which are now marked by being included in the structures of social wholeness.

This objective bipolarity of desires is integrated in the concrete dynamical stereotype of every individual and it is expressed in the personal specifics of his adjustments to the manner of their accomplishment. Because of that Hegel takes the system of this content, which is directly situate in will, as "a multitude or multiplicity of impulses, every one of which is mine in a general way along with others, but is at the same time universal and undetermined, having many objects and ways of satisfaction."[11] In the area of double indeterminateness, will makes decisions and thus it gives form to singularity: "The will… only by resolving is actual". The making of decisions ceases the indeterminateness, in which every type of content is only possible, while here the very indeterminateness of will is the neutral for them, but that is exactly why the will itself is an "infinitely fruitful germ of all existence [which] contains within itself its definite character and ends, and brings them forth solely out of itself."[12] Thus, only "by resolution will fixes itself as the will of a definite individual, and as thereby distinguishing itself, from another."[13] But according to Hegel this urge of the will to put itself in the real world as a will of a concrete individuality is not a synonymously defined act of its immediate placement in the context of a certain reality. The very decision is being revealed and based on as a result of an immanently subjective and dialectically subordinated logic of the processes, which are set in the structure of the decision in its wholeness. The uncompromising rationalism of Hegel is being explicitly displayed here.

[10] Ibid, 37.
[11] Ibid, 37.
[12] Ibid, 37.
[13] Ibid, 37.

> "To the intelligence, as *thinking*, the object or content remains *universal*; the intelligence retains the form merely of a universal activity. Now the universal signifies in will that which is mine, i.e. it is individuality. And yet, also, the direct and formal will is abstract; its individuality is not yet filled with its free universality. Hence at the beginning the *peculiar finitude* of the intelligence is in will, and only by exalting itself again to thought and giving itself intrinsic universality does the will transcend the distinction of form and content and make itself objective infinite will. It is therefore a misunderstanding of the nature of thought and will to suppose that in the will man is infinite, while in thought and even in reason he is limited. In so far as thought and will are still distinct, the reverse is rather the case, and thinking reason, when it becomes will, assigns itself to *finitude*."[14]

It is this very finitude, which has been objectified in a certain individuality, which makes it necessary for the will to be set as a concrete will through the peculiarity of its own action in the world of reality. For "a will which resolves nothing, is not an actual will; that which is devoid of definite character never reaches a volition… By volition alone man enters actuality."[15] Through that kind of entering the reality the indeterminateness of possibilities in hesitation closes and one can choose his behavior. This is a behavior which turns out to be not a synonymously predetermined event, which happens in the sphere of the finite human actions, but an internally contradictive actuality of happening of the various modes of human activity. This actuality is dynamically changing the fields of its structure-determining moments. Thus the human will, being an expression of freedom, can manifest itself as a caprice.

[14] Ibid, 37-38. The manners and the content of this final part of the fragment we can take in a certain convention and, making a peculiar critical reference, we can take it as an expression of a negative position towards Schopenhauer's conception of will. I call it "convention", as far as I am not acquainted with Hegel knowing for himself the text of Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Representation*.

[15] Ibid, 38.

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The theme of caprice arises not only as actually reproducing, but concerns both human behavior and self-relation in its extrapolation of the various spheres of social life. I would allow myself to quote Hegel's theses in that relation in a little bit more detailed manner. Their own significance is in their explicit expression. This significance is related not only immediately to the concrete views of Hegel and to the precision of their argumentation, but they have that explanation pregnant with complete meaning due to the heuristic potential of the dialectic method. And, of course, last but not least, I would also like to underline that the thoughts of Hegel quoted below are directly connected to the theme about the role of desires in the social-historical activity of people. The caprice is in its accomplishment a specific realization of human activity. It necessarily keeps in itself all the personal qualities and definitions of individuals who can accomplish that activity, including their theoretical self-conscious, which uncritically takes the seeming of caprice for freedom. The finite will, which has merely from the standpoint of form doubled itself back upon itself, and has become the *infinite* and self-secluded I, stands above its content of different impulses and also above the several ways by which they are realized and satisfied. At the same time, as it is only formally infinite, it is *confined* to this very content as the decisive feature of its nature and external actuality, although it is undetermined and not confined to one content rather than another. As to the return of the I into itself, such a will is only a possible will, which may or may not be mine, and the I is only the *possibility* of deputing itself to this or that object. Hence amongst these definite phases, which in this light are for the I external, the will exercises choice.

Freedom of the will is in this view of caprice, in which are contained both a reflection free and abstracted from everything, and a dependence upon content internally or externally provided. Since the content is in itself (or implicitly necessary as an end), and in opposition to this reflection is a definite possibility, caprice when it is will, content is contingent in its nature.

The usual idea of freedom is that of caprice. It is a midway stage of reflection between the will as merely a natural impulse and the will as free absolutely. When it is said that freedom as a general thing consists in doing what one likes, such an idea must be taken to imply an utter lack of devel-

oped thought, containing as yet not even a suspicion of what is meant by the absolutely free will, right, ethical system, etc. Reflection, being the formal universality and unity of self-consciousness, is the will's abstract certitude of its freedom, but it is not yet the truth of it, because it does not have itself for content and end; the subjective side is still different from the objective. Thus the content in such a case remains purely and completely finite. Caprice, instead of being will in its truth, is rather will in its *contradiction*.

In the controversy carried on, especially at the time of the metaphysics of Wolf, as to whether the will is really free, or our consciousness of its freedom is a delusion, it was this caprice which was in the minds of both parties. Against the certitude of abstract self-direction, determinism rightly opposed a content, which was externally presented and not contained in this certitude coming from without. It did not matter whether this "without" was about impulse, imagination, or in general a consciousness so filled that the content was not the peculiar possession of the self-determining activity as such. Since only the formal element of free self-direction is immanent in caprice, while the other element is something given to it from without, to take caprice as freedom may fairly be named a delusion. "Freedom in every philosophy of reflection… is nothing more than this formal self-activity."[16]

What we should point out in the richness of the last quotation from Hegel are some important distinctions he makes in relation to his own theoretical position in defining the rich aspects of the concept of caprice. Also, we should point out the available stages of reconsideration of previous theoretical constructions, which interpret the freedom issue. The first and maybe the most significant thing is defining caprice as a seeming of freedom, or, which is the same as a peculiar, specific, objective mode of non-freedom. Being such a mode of non-freedom, caprice reveals itself only in human activity. The possibility of its realization in this manner is, according to Hegel, based on the very inner inclination of a certain reflexivity, which builds the motivational aspects of a correlation to the world of a concrete individuality. This point of view is a precondition for a critique to both the everyday images of caprice and the philosophical and theoretical concepts which derive from such images.

[16] Ibid, 38-39.

> "Since I have the possibility of determining myself in this or that way, since I have the power of choice, I possess caprice, or what is commonly called freedom. This choice is due to the universality of the will, enabling me to make my own this thing or another. This possession is a particular content, which is therefore not adequate to me, but separated from me, and is mine only in possibility; just as I am the possibility of bringing myself into coincidence with it. Hence choice is due to the indeterminateness of the I, and to the determinateness of a content. But as to this content the will is not free, although it has in itself formally the side of infinitude. No such content corresponds to will; in no content can it truly find itself. In caprice it is involved that the content is not formed by the nature of my will, but by contingency. I am dependent upon this content. This is the contradiction contained in caprice. Ordinary man believes that he is free, when he is allowed to act capriciously, but precisely in caprice is it inherent that he is not free."[17]

Freedom is being objectified, according to Hegel, in the active relations of man to the world, not in the reflexive self-relation of man to the world. That is why man is free just then, when his activity is in accordance with the essential definitions of its objects. Thus freedom is revealed in the multitude of modes that make it possible for man to objectify his essential powers and de-objectify the essential definitions of the object world he can approach.

> "When I will the rational, I do not act as a particular individual but according to the conception of ethical observance in general. In an ethical act I establish not myself but the thing. A man, who acts perversely, exhibits particularity. The rational is the highway on which every one travels, and no one is specially marked. When a great artist finishes a work we say: "It must be so." The particularity of the artist has wholly disappeared and the work shows no mannerism. Phidias has no mannerism; the statue itself lives and moves. But the poorer is the artist, the more easily we discern himself, his particularity and caprice. If we adhere to the consideration that in ca-

[17] Ibid, 39.

> price a man can will what he pleases, we have certainly freedom of a kind; but again, if we hold to the view that the content is given, then man must be determined by it, and in this light is no longer free."[18]

It seems to me that here, finally, we could propose an objection to Hegel. The great artists create different works of art. Those are different in their expression, in their structure, in the feeling they emanate, in the composition, in the shape, in the realization, and so on. The concrete individuality or the detachment of the artist is what allows him to get out of the material one thing or another and to give that thing a new shape and a new existence also, a different existence for the other things. The "in-buildment" of individuality is what creates the particular objectivity of the created. Its "disappearing" in this objectivity should not be regarded as a self-reflected or active refusal of oneself in creating and into the created, but as the only possible discernable re-embodiment of oneself in the objective coolness of "the matter". Through the act of creative effort the material takes the unique shape of a perfect alloy of the complete image. This is what brings it the charm people enjoy during the various historical ages. In my opinion, only in this sense may we speak of the disappearance of the artist's peculiarity because it is inseparable from the lasting, it is the accomplishment of the creative process, and it is not simply left or abandoned or forgotten. As long as the unity of form and content in works of artistic genius is, or is considered to be, or is valued as a unique perfection, then the generality is here a concrete generality. Of course, we could impartially refer what has been said so far about the self-overcoming of the subjective in the objective until reaching a complete wholeness, to the extraordinary achievements in the area of art. It is not the same if we look at things from the point of view of daily human action. The arbitrariness more often and more directly shows its willfulness there. For in practical activity the contradiction involved in caprice is the dialectic of the impulses and inclinations, it is manifested in their mutual antagonism. The satisfaction of one demands the subjection and sacrifice of the satisfaction of another. Since an impulse is merely the simple tendency of its own essential nature, and has no measure in itself, to sub-

[18] Ibid, 39-40.

ject or sacrifice the satisfaction of any impulse is a contingent decision of caprice. In such a case caprice can act upon the calculation as to which impulse will bring the greater satisfaction, or some other similar purpose.

Impulses and inclinations are in the first instance the content of will, and only reflection transcends them. But these impulses are self-directing, crowding upon and jostling one another, and all seeking to be satisfied. To set all but one in the background, and put myself into this one, is to limit and distort myself, since I, in so doing, renounce my universality, which is a system of all the impulses. Just as little help is found in a mere subordination of them, a course usually followed by the understanding. There is available no criterion by which to make such an arrangement, and hence the demand for a subordination is usually sustained by tedious and irrelevant allusions to general sayings.[19] Here the analysis of Hegel is really coming closer to the adequate explanation and description of the considerable role of certain ontological prerequisites, which give the essential difference of the various types of individual purpose-laying. Through those types the inexhaustible variety of human life does not cease to surprise every investigator of its own. This is the basis, according to him, to build on concrete behavioral and moral systems. Their normative and axiological interpretations are being further developed in both certain forms of theoretical thinking and various religious ideas and doctrines. Their judgment on inclinations is manifested in the fact that

> "…the phases of the direct or natural will are immanent and positive, and thus good. Hence man is by nature good. But natural characteristics, since they are opposed to freedom and the conception of the spirit, and are, hence, negative, must be eradicated. Thus man is by nature evil. To decide for either view is a matter of subjective caprice. The Christian doctrine that man is by nature fallen is loftier than the opposite that he is naturally good, and is to be interpreted philosophically in this way. Man as spirit is a free being, who need not give way to impulse. Hence in his direct and unformed condition, man is in a situation in which he ought not to be, and he must free himself. This is the meaning of the

[19] Ibid, 40.

doctrine of original sin, without which Christianity would not be the religion of freedom."[20]

The main premise which sets up such a thinking is being explicated, according to Hegel, in the fact that: "in the demand that impulses must be purified is found the general idea that they must be freed from the form of direct subjection to nature, and from a content that is subjective and contingent, and must be restored to their substantive essence. The truth contained in this indefinite demand is that impulses should be phases of will in a rational system. To apprehend them in this way as proceeding from the conception is the content of the science of right."[21]

Nevertheless, this and other similar positions, according to him, are not enough to satisfy the requirements of the philosophical approach to the problem. As always, he is loyal to the last in his extreme rationalism. In the absence of the corrective of self-criticism of the possibilities of his speculative method, again, Hegel does not manage to get an actually relevant decision of the problem. In that case his philosophical approach is being reduced only and solely to the analysis of dialectics of the moments of self-conscious. Here is what we are offered:

"The self-consciousness of the will in the form of appetite or impulse is sensible, the sensible in general indicating the externality of self-consciousness, or that condition in which self-consciousness is outside of itself. Now this sensible side is one of the two elements of the reflecting will, and the other is the abstract universality of thought. But the absolute will has as its object the will itself as such in its pure universality. In this universality the directness of the natural will is superseded, and so also is the private individuality which is produced by reflection and infects the natural condition. But to supersede these and lift them into the universal, constitutes the activity or thought. Thus the self-consciousness, which purifies its object, content or end, and exalts it to universality, is thought carrying itself

[20] Ibid, 40-41.
[21] Ibid, 41.

> through into will. It is at this point that it becomes clear that the will is true and free only as thinking intelligence, i.e., so with the true will; that which it wills, namely, its content, is identical with it, and so freedom wills freedom."[22]

In the concrete case, Hegel's stand does not, according to me, exceed the non-philosophical interpretations he criticizes, but he evades them when including them into the speculative logics of self-development of concept. In this way he falls into the illusion to think that this problem's solution can be found only in the sphere of theoretical thinking. Briefly put, the social interiorizing of the volitional inclinations or actions of man is a structure-constituting element, which alters and transforms simultaneously its entire attitude to the world and his being into the world. It is also strengthening one's positions as the only acceptable thing in the elimination (which happens to be possible only in theory) of that side of his unique essence - as a creature of desire, too - which he has. And it not possible to get it from nature, as he wishes to be a social creature also. Nature has ensured his steadiness as a biological individual.

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In my last reflections I did not mean to undervalue the actual heuristic abilities of Hegel's speculative method as they are brilliantly revealed in his analysis of the social implications of the conception I stated above. That conception concerned the immanent characteristics of caprice as a subjectively-functional subject's inclination and the self-reflectiveness related to it. As a starting point I will use Hegel's thesis that "self-consciousness, affirming to be vanity all otherwise valid marks of action, and itself consisting of pure inwardness of will, may possibly convert the absolute universal into mere caprice. It may make a principle out of what is peculiar to particularity, placing it over the universal and realizing it in action. This is evil, and the evil itself has its root in a self-certitude, which exists for itself, knows and decides for itself."[23] Here he mentions those decisions where the good or the evil nature of deeds relies on the multitude of seemingly good reasons, which are not actu-

[22] Ibid, 91.
[23] Ibid, 118.

ally in accordance with the objectivity of the subject and, thus, the subjectivity is the one to decide. This is how desire and caprice turn out to be the crucial thing about good and evil. This way, according to Hegel, morality and religiousness, and sociality as a whole are also undermined.[24]

> "The summit of the subjectivity, which apprehends itself as ultimate, consists in a consciousness of itself as judge of truth, right, and duty. It is aware, indeed, of the objective ethical principle, but does not forget or renounce itself, or make any earnest effort to sink itself in this principle and act from it. Although it is in relation to this principle, it holds itself free from it, and is conscious of itself as willing and deciding in a certain way, and as being able quite as well to will and decide otherwise. You, let us suppose, honestly take a law to be something absolute; but, as for me, I too have a share in it, but a much grander one than you, for I have gone through and beyond it, and can turn it as I please. It is not the subject-matter which is excellent, but I am the excellent thing, and am master of law and fact. I toy with them at my pleasure, and can enjoy myself only when I ironically know and permit the highest to be submerged. This form, indeed, makes vain the whole ethical content of right, duty, and law, being an evil and in itself a wholly universal evil. Yet to it we must add the subjective vanity of knowing itself as empty of all content, and yet of knowing this empty self as the absolute."[25]

In this fragment a supersensitive fore-sense is found and the enraged solitude of the gentle concern which fore-sees fatefulness for human society in the fragility of its being in the world.

That's enough if we remember what victims of the 20th century gave because of the subjectivity of the personal self-importance that has objectified its measureless confidence. There is no circle, according to Hegel, which can be closed, but only an endless possibility for both "tearing apart" and bounding with the repetition of evil. The personification of evil has the power to get the freedom for an ontological play with the existence of the world. This play could

[24] See 126-127.
[25] Ibid, 127-128.

gain the predominance of generality - the subjectivity has taken the shape of a generality, the shape of an active or acting generality, even when individuality of evil does not hide, but demonstrates itself. The very generality of evil, which has veiled the social body, could be hardly found in the banality of evil, in the resignation of individual existence together with it.

And yet, the desires!...

The desires love playing; they are adhered to our play with them.

As to Hegel, even illuminated by reason, desires are still ontologically unpredictable and, being such, he prefers to forget about them in every one of those modes before reason or concept reaches itself.

The warning remains. The play of desires, the playing with desires not only creates a parallel world, but this can turn out to be a playing with the world itself. For any play is an ontological event and because of that it often has unpredictable consequences. Every kind of play has not only its movement in space but the movement in the soul, in the time of motive, in passion, in desire, in the quality of the individual and, thus, caprice could also turn out to be a rule. The caprice itself is the total manifestation of subjectivity, not the subjectity, i.e. it is the responsibility of the individual. It is easiest to substitute good for evil in play and it is namely in play where you could most successfully hide this substitution. It is also obvious that through play everyone could easily learn to do so.

Playing with our desires is a play with existentially given things, a play with existential definitions. The desires themselves are a play of existentially given things with existential definitions in man. It is exactly because of this ironically confusing duality of desires in Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* that an actually possible play with desires is being gambled away, but with no desire. Thus, in the end, the ontological essence of desires in it is reduced to an indeterminate quantity of a modus with its manifestations which we can find under the all-embracing control of reason and reflection. The very rights of desires are seemingly integrated in the system if as content, where they are exposed to the inconvenience of the prejudice of a concrete theoretical approach. This approach has delineated the range of their existential validity within the framework of an actually significant philosophical illusion they share with, in no pretence, many of the secrets of their own social-historical vocation.

III. PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTION TO EDICATION

Pedagogy/Diagnostics

Peter S. Borkowski (American University in Cairo)

Abstract

This paper presents a pedagogy for student writing tasks for introductory philosophy discussions. The approach is based on the view that motivation for speculative thinking comes primarily from the perception of a problem, which I refer to as a pain, an intellectual pain that demands a solution. The solution is not necessarily a final cure but an "attempt": the etymology of the term "essay". The steps are: pain (awareness of a problem), nature of the pain, possible methods of analysis, and proposed solution.

Philosophy begins in pain

The idea that philosophy begins in wonder is attributed to Plato (*Theaetetus*, 155c), and we have it from Aristotle: "For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize" (*Metaphysics*, 982b). On closer inspection, it is difficult to imagine that philosophy begins this way. P.T. Raju observed that philosophical problems, like problems generally, are serious in a way that does not cause wonder: Confucius became a philosopher by contemplating the chaos of his times in China, the thinkers of the Upaniśad were very much affected by the corruptions and defects of their epoch, and in Buddhism, philosophy begins with the idea of

suffering.[*] The consternation that the sophists caused Socrates is well known. We can see this pain-motivator occurring in others who were inspired to compose restorative works, such as Boethius and Dante. Contemporary philosophical and social movements are oriented towards particular pains (environmental, feminist, Other, bio- and business-ethics, philosophical counseling, etc). From pain comes motivation for critical action. The suggestion is not novel. We may here remark the turn to therapeutic applications in so many areas: there is puppet therapy, art therapy, music therapy, creative writing therapy, and so on. Book sales of the "how-to-be-happy" genre are enormous. All camps collect their resources to offer some kind of therapy. How much more important it is that philosophy should speak of knowing what does and does not require therapy.

An "intellectual pain" can be expressed as irritation, perplexity, enigma, inconsistency, contradiction, interruption, disappointment (as Simon Critchley says in a repackaged existentialism), and even that very unnatural modern human disorder: boredom. These are examples of unease and therefore dis-ease: things to be terminated. But we know them or sense them against a comfortable cognitive state or belief. In a similar way, pains are known against their opposites. St. Augustine was teaching this when he wrote "It is by their ideas that we judge of what things ought to be like", and St. Bonaventura likewise wrote: "Since privations and defects may be known only through positive features, our intellect does not fully resolve the understanding of any one created thing unless it is assisted by an understanding of the purest…" Cognitive irritations arise when a proposition or text presents to a person the sense of defect. Such is the basis for a pedagogical task in critical-response writing: knowing why one was settled before a new unsettling question or perplexity came along.

Pain (awareness)

Not all students perceive the same pains. Sometimes they perceive a similar pain (e.g., the contradiction of technology's simultaneous benefits and curses) in different ways (e.g., in terms of the environment, in terms of

[*] P.T. Raju, *Introduction to Comparative Philosophy*. University of Nebraska Press, 1962, 257.

displacing human crafts and livelihood, in terms of effects on family unity or a citizen's right to privacy). If this is true, then it is a corollary that not all perceive the same joys in the same respects. Those joys will come from finding some satisfaction in the essay's pursuit of a resolution to their pain as individually perceived - not necessarily a terminal resolution of the question itself. Thus, a measure of satisfaction is to be sought in how to deal with a problem without solving it once and for all time. The activity of resolving things is set to occur within the horizon of one's own curiosity.

My assumption is that a question for analysis that is framed as a personal pain is more of a motivation than one framed as a homework task to be completed for a grade. The most abstruse and opaque questions of continental and analytic philosophers can be made intelligible to young students by means of establishing the connection (relevance, etc) to some real, lived experience. On this point many philosophers are agreed: theory should lead to practical action, at least to help students to understand why they feel something to be painful.

What kind of pain is it? If we hold to the maxim "de gustibus non disputandum est", then the same should be true about pains: we cannot dispute about what is and is not painful to another. In this case, students select their own questions. However, even with a single question for a task, different people will perceive it to be painful in different ways. Here are possible reactions to a shared, group question:

> *– How do I know that my senses are not deceiving me?*
> Silvia: This question bothers me. The problem seems to be the reliability of memory, not the senses.
> Toma: This question doesn't sound right. The problem seems to be that the question itself is not framed properly.
> Kosta: This question is troublesome. It doesn't fit with what is revealed in holy Scripture.
> Stefan: This question is not about the senses; there is ambiguity in the term "deceive".
> Ana: This question bothers me because it has already been answered by Berkeley.

Dictating to Ana that the problem is what Silvia says could reduce Ana's motivation. In smaller groups, the approaches can be shared and this would further increase awareness about the scope and pursuit of philosophy.

Nature of the pain

Each of the reactions above can be treated in a solid philosophical paradigm using various methods of analysis. Professors need not be concerned with the student's choice; the point is for the students to identify how it is painful to them and then to proceed by identifying the sort of pain it is.

If the question assigned contradicts known physical or logical laws, then the irritation is an aporia. If it could be interpreted as a psychological reaction or psychologism, then an analysis of the source of the question might be in order. It could evoke an enigma or symbolic significance. It does not matter as long as the pursuit of analysis is grounded in a personally motivating impetus. If at the beginning the first accomplishment is showing why a student's reaction is unjustified or even absurd ("This question bothers me because my uncle used to ask these kinds of things all the time") or the result of some misunderstanding ("This question bothers me because I didn't think it was possible to analyze it"), then much has been achieved. Whether the solution to an irritation is based in contingency and circumstance, or is objectively the same for everyone and can be demonstrated as true or false is an important learning distinction. So we proceed:

– *What is the nature of this pain?*
Silvia: The nature of the pain is epistemological.
Toma: The nature of the pain is logical.
Kosta: The nature of the pain is theological.
Stefan: The nature of the pain is semantic.
Ana: The nature of the pain is that it conflicts with my present convictions.

Possible methods of analysis

These responses and the philosophical literature relevant to them will require guidance by the instructor, who fills the role of a socratic midwife, drawing out the method and its appropriate sources. Based on the key terms

in the question and the student's reaction to it, the method can be designed.

Analysis in the etymological sense of the word (*ana-lusein*) is "to loosen" or "to break up"; and this is what Aristotle surely meant when he wrote that analysis is like untying a knot. The possibility of obtaining a solution comes only after one knows what kind of knot one is holding. The term "diagnostics" expresses our project well: *diagignoskein*, to discern, distinguish, to know thoroughly. A problem is identified, its nature understood, and analyzed.

> *– How can you go about fixing the pain?*
> Silvia: I might be able to relieve it by analyzing the purpose of memory - "what it does" instead of "what it is" - how it can be said to be reliable, and see if there is anything that can be relied on if it breaks down.
> Toma: A possible method of analysis is to examine how the key terms of this proposition "know", "senses", and "deceive" can and cannot be used together.
> Kosta: My hypothesis is that a solution can be obtained by surveying the relevant passages of Scripture and relevant commentaries of Church Fathers and theologians. Then I might compare these to opposing views.
> Stefan: It seems that the resolution can be found by examining all the possible meanings of "deceive" in the language and listing their implications regarding the statement in question.
> Ana: I will have to explain Berkeley's position fully and reconsider existing challenges to it as well as newer ones to see if his position still stands.

Proposed solution

The chosen method of analysis (the pursuit) should take one to a new viewpoint. Silvia proposed that the question is a leading question and that it makes unwarranted either-or assumptions about the corporeal senses; she also gave an argument in favor or the primacy of memory as the sine qua non of perception. Toma's solution made several suggestions for reformulating the question and discarded the original one as meaningless. Kosta found

satisfaction from a closer and more attentive reading of biblical and theological teachings and new significance in them after a comparison with several opposing philosophical and psychological views. Stefan's discovery was that satisfaction for him is had by simply knowing how linguists and philosophers of language and metaphor approach the question; he concluded that the purpose of such a question is not to be answered at all but to stimulate "an aesthetics of questioning". And Ana found that she is still confident that there is no matter, only ideas, and recast a new argument in her paper that Berkeley's "esse est percipi" stands in spite of new challenges in the literature presented by the course instructor. She even concluded with a rather novel proposal about how to apply Berkeley to developing self-awareness.

To each his own (pain)

Students are typically certain about what is and is not a pain, what is and is not a "worthwhile question", and so it seems that questions for critical analysis might be more productive when they are formulated as something personal. That little personal issue with a question is often enough to motivate one's entire attention. Such is the Old English proverb: The pain of the little finger is felt by the entire body.

IV. ONGOING DISCUSSION ON LEVINAS

Between Ethics and Politics: An Essay on Lévinas' Philosophy of Justice

Rossen I. Roussev* (Kyungpook National University)

Abstract

This article discusses the non-foundational character of Lévinas' concept of justice and its significance for the entire set of relations issuing from the ethical in all forms of discourse, culture, and politics. It is assembled along the observation that while in Lévinas' philosophy justice serves to reinstate and legitimize these relations within the ethical proximity of the other, it remains all the same transposed within them without a fixed place. This lack of a fixed position for justice, which results from its being constantly questioned within the primordial ethical relation, is taken as an indication of its non-foundational character. Lévinas' notion of justice is linked with his ardent opposition to the foundationalism of traditional philosophy, which he sees as a philosophy of "interiority" and – via Heidegger – as a philosophy of Being, or ontology. Finally, it is put in the perspective of some contemporary research on its political significance.

Emmanuel Lévinas has left us a most challenging and equally fascinating discussion of "justice". The concept is fundamental for him (not indeed in this early Heideggerian sense in which ontology is "fundamental" but) due to the particular status it assumes in his philosophy. This is the status of venue for asserting and inscribing his most definitive philosophic thesis of

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"the primacy of the ethical over the ontological" in the dimensions of discourse, culture, and politics. Yet, despite this its role, the notion of justice in Lévinas' philosophy remains tightly bound with the ethical and defies the status of epistemic foundation anticipated in traditional philosophy.

Here I shall endeavor to present precisely the non-foundational character of Lévinas' concept of justice and its significance for the entire set of relations issuing from the ethical from all forms of cultural and political discourse. I shall assemble my discussion along the observation that while in Lévinas' philosophy justice serves to reinstate and legitimize these relations within the ethical proximity of the other, it all the same remains transposed within them without a fixed place. I regard this lack of a fixed position for justice, which results from its being constantly questioned within the primordial ethical relation, as a most acute indication of its non-foundational character. I shall also need to indicate its inevitable association with Lévinas' ardent opposition to the foundationalism of traditional philosophy, which he sees as a philosophy of "interiority" and – via Heidegger – as a philosophy of Being, or ontology, and subsequently – with Lévinas' endeavor to treat of justice, as well as of all the themes recurring in his writings, "otherwise"; namely, in terms of "exteriority", "otherwise-than-being", or "beyond being".

I shall avoid deepening into his main concerns on behalf of this approach, i.e., that the question of Being, which was for Heidegger the fundamental question of Western metaphysics, is a question of foundation that reaffirms the indifferent, viz. "violent" reduction of the *other* to the *same*; that is, of the *Other* to the *Self*; and that the traditional philosophy of Being has provided – via its concept of "totality" – for the possibility of such political appropriations of this reduction as "war" and "tyranny".[1] Instead, I shall fo-

[1] Lévinas coveys these points in the "Preface" and the first chapter "Metaphysics and Transcendence" of his *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1998), where among other things he writes, "The visage of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy"(21) or "…Heideggerian ontology, which subordinates the relationship with the Other to the relation with Being in general, remains under the obedience to the anonymous, and leads inevitably to another power, to imperialist domination, to tyranny" (46-47); (cf. *Totalité et infini Essai*

cus on Lévinas' unprecedented attempt to invoke a vocabulary of "otherwise-than-being" for a radical revisiting of the topic of justice and its significance beyond the immediacy of the primordial ethical relationship. To be sure, this attempt deserves a much more profound consideration than what can be accomplished within the limits of this essay, but I shall endeavor to trace it here at least within the most characteristic pointers of its

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sur l"extériorité (Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 6, 38). I think that these his points are not very convincing, though. A consideration in this regard would be that if the question of being is the most general of all questions, its reinstatement must be able to bring about within its terms also the points that Lévinas wants to make himself. Besides, his immediate fusion of philosophical and political vocabulary may also be seen as problematic. Lévinas may claim legitimacy for such a fusion within his own notion of priority of the ethical over the metaphysical, only by dropping the primacy of the ontological and promoting the primacy of the ethical "beyond being". By dropping the primacy of the ontological, he no longer needs to meet demands for the constitution of either the philosophical as political, or vice versa. By promoting the primacy of the ethical beyond being, he can simply ordain the philosophical as political or vice versa, if any of these ways is apperceived as ethical. But a number of questions remain unanswered here. Can one solve the difficulty with the justification of any priority, which within the Heideggerian perspective had to be done only in terms of being, by simply dropping the question of being? Can this dropping/promoting itself be justified as nonviolent? Can one simply overthrow a viewpoint without justification and still remain nonviolent, viz. ethical, or anything at all? What kind of ethical can be obtained beyond being? For all his considerations, Lévinas' main concern remains recognizing the kind of violence, which he conceives of as a one-way movement from the subject of being to the other. Yet, the prospect that "beyond being" nonviolence be apperceived as what would qualify as violence in terms of being, as anything undetermined, or as not determining in terms of being, gives rise to still other questions. Can such an apperception be legitimate? And if yes, is that legitimacy beyond being? Can one be legitimate beyond being in the first place? And if yes, is this really so beyond being? The circle closes, indeed in terms of being. But if the Lévinasian ethical has its own nonviolent or least violent affirmation from somewhere else (that is, from beyond being), it will remain to be seen whether it can dispel the alleged violence of being, as well as whether it itself can remain nonviolent beyond being. For an insightful discussion of Lévinas' view on violence, see Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Lévinas' in *Writing and Difference*, trans. by Alan Bass, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1978), especially 118ff; cf. *L"écriture et la différence* (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1967), 173ff.

formation, as brought up first in his *Totality and Infinity* and later on in *Otherwise than Being*.[2] In the end, I shall also put it in the perspective of some contemporary research on the political significance of justice, which has been inspired by Levinas' ethics and which is likewise indicative of its unfixed transposition between ethics and politics.

Justice beyond the straight line of the law

It becomes clear already in *Totality and Infinity* that by dispensing with any foundational ontology Lévinas cannot treat of justice in the manner of his prominent predecessors and will not settle for any previously known social theory in the tradition from Plato to Marx and after. For, in his view, these theories rely – with some variations – on the limited capacity of a self-positing and thus self-privileging and self-centered knowing subject. Instead, Lévinas will apperceive justice as unjustified, yet legitimate interference in the relationship of the *Self* and the *Other*, a relationship which he regards as primordially ethical from its outset and as preceding any determination in terms of the logos of Being. In this sense, Lévinas also regards the traditional categories of thought, among which "truth" and "essence" have a definitive role for all others, as well as for all cultural achievements of the West, as incapable of conveying this primordial ethical sense which is the first endorsement of the relation of the *same* and the *other*. For Lévinas, the philosophical importance of this sense is in that it prevents the indifferent, or violent reduction of exteriority to pure interiority, of the other to the same; that is, of the other to the self, or of the rest of the world to the knowing subject. From where we could get a sense of his famous claim that "ethics is first philosophy" and of his objective to reinstate this primordial ethical sense within all cultural achievements, which he attempts to accomplish via his notion of "justice".

As Lévinas' discussion of justice takes place always in the context of his discussion of the ethical relationship with its unconditional precedence, it aims to evade dependence on the logos of tradition and thus to ordain jus-

[2] Emmanuel Lévinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1999); *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence*, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1978).

tice otherwise; that is, as justice of another kind, and in a sense without "kind", since in its ethical aspect at least justice would not fit in any generality of being. This is why for Lévinas justice begins with the recognition of the Other outside discourse, which is an ethical recognition that strips the Self out of its traditional law-giving privileges to the effect of its unconditional subjection to the Other. In this sense, Lévinas understands justice as overtaking the categories of tradition and employing them beyond any quest for truth, beyond any ontology. As he writes,

> Society does not proceed from the contemplation of the true; truth is made possible by relation with the Other our master. Truth is thus bound with the social relation, which is justice. Justice consists in recognizing in the Other my master. Equality among persons means nothing of itself; it has an economic meaning and presupposes money, and already rests on justice – which, when well-ordered, begins with the Other. Justice is the recognition of his privilege qua Other and his mastery, is access to the Other outside of rhetoric, which is ruse, emprise, and exploitation. And in this sense justice coincides with the overcoming of rhetoric.[3]

It is articulate here that for Lévinas the notion of truth gains sense only in terms of a societal structure in which any legitimacy can issue only from the primordial ethical relationship of the subject and the other. Not only does his vocabulary completely transfigure the traditional contemplative notion of truth along the "social relation", but it is also markedly societal ("master", "equality", "privilege", "money", "economic"). This speaks of the componential complexity of the "social relation" itself, as well as of justice, as equated to it, and of the truth, as bound with it. For Lévinas, justice here does not presuppose any categorically anticipated "equality" on which it is to be based; on the contrary, he sees any equality as having "economic meaning" and as already issuing from justice. But besides its apperception within societal vocabulary, justice is for Lévinas ultimately justice qua the "privilege" and "mastery" of the Other, and is thus justice beyond and inde-

[3] *Totality and Infinity*, 72; *Totalité et infini*, 68-69.

pendently from any "rhetoric" that is qualified as "ruse, emprise, and exploitation". We may associate "rhetoric" here with the philosophy of being, as well as with the other forms of culture and societal organization that are bound to it, such as theology, economics, political ideology, and perhaps with the juridical rhetoric in the institutional establishments of justice. But we need to keep in mind that Lévinas understands his own vocabulary (counting also his re-appropriation of that of the tradition), as necessarily bound with the primordial ethical relation, and that, in this sense, it is only within the aura of this relation that this vocabulary, as well as the entire logos of the Western metaphysics, can gain its proper meanings:

> Metaphysics is enacted in ethical relations. Without the signification that they draw from ethics theological concepts remain empty and formal frameworks. ... It is from moral relationships that every metaphysical affirmation takes on a "spiritual" meaning, is purified of everything with which an imagination captive of things and victim of participation charges our concepts.[4]

Justice is not an exception in this respect. It is a "concept" on a par with the likes of "God", "metaphysics", and "transcendent", which, as not dependent on any arche-foundation or on any other emanation of being, gain their "spiritual meaning" too in the "ethical relations". And yet, while justice is thus seen to operate throughout the entire societal structure independently from the logos being, it is not itself a foundation of that structure, nor is it one of itself, either. It cannot determine – within the terms of its sociality – the "ethical relations", any metaphysical concepts whatsoever, and not at all the primordial ethical relation. For justice does not convey the determinative privilege of the ethical along the societal structure by way of ontological necessity. Its bond with the ethical is not one in the traditional sense of a dependent "relation with the transcendent" but in the sense of "social relation"; that is, a relation reinvented in (being-independent) social exteriority, only thus conferred upon the metaphysical vocabulary, and only to disarm that vocabulary from the logos of being. Only in this way is justice understood as discursively opening access to the "transcendent as infinitely other":

[4] Ibid., 79; 77.

> A relation with the Transcendent free from all captivation by the Transcendent is a social relation. It is here that the Transcendent, infinitely other, solicits us and appeals to us.[5]

In Lévinas' view, this reinvention of the ethical in terms of its social complexity properly bears the name "justice". It is a reinvention in exteriority, not dependent on interiority, and so – not inaugurated by any ontology. It derives from the ethical and incorporates itself within it as its anticipated social ramifications and only in this way it spreads out through all forms of society and culture to imbue them with the ethical sense, of which it is the carrier. In this sense, justice sanctions not only the societal reinstatement of these forms but also their new ethical comprehension – outside any mediation of the inaugural logos of being but instead – as the truth of exteriority. For Lévinas, this comprehension, as issuing from the ethical, is no longer a comprehension of and through a direct relation, as anticipated by the subject of the philosophy of being; it is a "comprehension in justice", which now manifests itself as "the divine" in what is most immediate in the primordial relationship – "the human face":

> The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face. ... The comprehension of God taken as participation in his sacred life, an allegedly direct comprehension, is impossible, because participation is a denial of the divine, and because nothing is more direct than the face to face, which is straightforwardness itself. A God invisible means not only a God unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice. [6]

For Lévinas, "the comprehension of God" manifests itself as a reinvention of the other qua other; it is accomplished in "the face to face" by a knowing self that is subjected to the other, in its most basic, viz. ethical attitude towards the other. But the comprehension in question cannot be entirely attained within the primordial ethical relation; it demands something other than the other and the same. It demands the condition of justice; it is a comprehension in justice. By contrast, a "direct comprehension of God" by

[5] Ibid., 78; 76.
[6] Ibid., 78; 76.

way of "participation in his sacred life is impossible" because such a "participation is a denial of the divine", in the sense in which a metaphysical subject would reduce it to the same. Further, a "direct comprehension" would be the annihilation of "the face", (than which "nothing is more direct"), and would be also the loss of the otherness of the other, as availed by the primordial ethical differentiation, from which, in Lévinas' view, any metaphysics and theology must properly issue. In this sense, any comprehension of the divine can start only with dissolving the theological problem of God's invisibility via the visibility of what is most direct in "the face to face", namely, "the human face", which thus marks the beginning of a socially achievable justice.

Within these lines of thought, the ethical, ordained along its societal components and embodiments as "justice", may seem to appear in a more or less structured way. But this is *not* to mislead us to suppose that via the concept of justice we can reconstruct something like "the system" of Lévinas' philosophy, with the proper place of all its terms in it. For, he so earnestly opposes the systematicity anticipated in traditional ontological philosophy. Rather, it seems more suitable to think that, though systematic features can be detected in Lévinas' thought, they cannot – on that account – be unconditionally translated within a philosophical framework that is more or less traditional. For, in Lévinas' view, "justice" is primarily and most of all an ethical term, in the specific sense of "social relation" apperceived as exteriority, and its meaning might appear distorted within the terms of any attempted systematicity; that is, within the terms of an ontological interiority. This can also be said of all the concepts that he entertains alongside "justice", including "social", "master", "equality," "privilege", "money", "economic", "God", which, as already indicated, attain their sense as dimensions of the ethical, as the visible in the invisible or as the invisible in the visible, and *not* as systematic ontological components.

Nevertheless, it is important to see the interconnectedness of the terms in Lévinas' philosophy, which is still detectable within the perspective of an apperceived exteriority and which is to be sought principally and again in the primordial ethical sense of the relationship between the other and the same. And, while this generic sense remains indiscernible in the primordial invisibil-

ity of the ethical "beyond being"; that is, beyond all light and openness, it is only "justice", as what shows itself in the face of the other, as what is socially concrete and visible, that can ensure genuine ethical understanding, as well as the interconnection of terms as truth, metaphysics, and God:

> The work of justice – the uprightness of the face to face – is necessary in order that the breach that leads to God be produced – and "vision" here coincides with this work of justice. Hence, metaphysics is enacted where the social relation is enacted – in our relations with men. There can be no "knowledge" of God separated from the relationship with men. The Other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, and is indispensable for my relation with God.[7]

As a socio-cultural transfiguration of the ethical, justice manifests itself in the institutional organization of the society. Traditionally, the vocabulary for justification of this organization (as well as the vocabulary for any justification whatsoever), has been transposed within the horizon of time, be it historical or subjective, as a transcendental ontological condition for all knowledge. Yet, in the philosophy of Lévinas the concept of time does not occupy its traditional place.[8] For him, neither the objective "evidence" and "judgment of history", nor the self-evident "interiority" of the free self-isolated subject can articulate the ethical sense that is availed to the self as responding to the other.[9] The subject and its freedom, as well as history, are surely important for Lévinas, but they gain their importance only within the transfigured epistemic horizon of the primacy of the ethical over ontological. Within this horizon, the ethical, as originating in response to the other, manifests itself – beyond the time of being – in such terms as "apology" or "fecundity of the subject".[10] Whereas justice ordains it in the realm of society outside the judgment of subjectivity and history, (which would overtake the free will either from within or from without), and instead reinstates freedom as realizable in the visible concretion of the societal institu-

[7] Ibid., 78; 77.
[8] Ibid., see "The Ethical Relation and Time", 220-247; 242-277.
[9] Ibid., 240-247; 268-277.
[10] Ibid., 240ff, as well as Section IV. "Beyond the Face", 250-307; 268ff, 281-318.

tions, textuality, and legislation:

> This dialectical situation of the search for and the denial of justice has a concrete meaning…. Freedom is not realized outside of social and political institutions…. Apolitical freedom is to be explained as an illusion due to the fact that its partisans or its beneficiaries belong to an advanced stage of political evolution. ...
>
> … Freedom is engraved on the stone of the tables on which laws are inscribed – it exists by virtue of this inscription of an institutional existence. Freedom depends on a written text, destructible to be sure, but durable, on which freedom is conserved for man outside man.[11]

It is to be noted that while denouncing the roles of the free will and of history in the traditional ethical justification, Lévinas still cannot dispense with the subject. He still requires and reasserts the subject in his own ethical justification, insisting that the subject is what is nonetheless necessary for "the search for and denial of justice". And yet, his subject is not just "interiority" striving for "universality" driven by the speculative "illusion" of an analysis of "apolitical freedom". Nor is it an "inner life … guided by the evidence of history".[12] Instead, it is a subject left to the "risk" of its own "moral creation", its own reinvention of itself within "horizons more vast than history, in which history itself is judged".[13] It is a subject reappropriated through the primordial ethical, outside the realm of ontological necessity, and so – a subject that has renounced any judgmental universality. Now Lévinas reinstates it as "singularity"; that is, as (being) undeniably ethical, as (being) right there within the socio-cultural environment to become precisely the warrant for justice:

> Justice would not be possible without the singularity, the unicity of subjectivity. In this justice subjectivity does not figure as formal reason, but as individuality...[14]

[11] Ibid., 241; 269-270.
[12] Ibid., 246; 276.
[13] Ibid., 246; 276.
[14] Ibid., 246; 275-276.

In this way, for Lévinas, the subjectivity, judging beyond its "formal reason" and "history", reinvents itself in the face of the other without its traditional subject-to-object attitude, without its "apolitical freedom", and without its claims to universality. It becomes "individuality", a "singularity", a necessary "unicity", which recognizes the mastery of the other, its own responsibility and state of apology.

From such a position, its judgment can be only "anarchic", as it is a judgment beyond any principle, beyond any foundation; it is a judgment against the horizon of infinite time, beyond any subjective and historical time. It is a judgment that asserts the subject as necessary and apologetic, as judging and being judged, as judging by being judged; that is, as subject of justice that is itself subject to justice. For Lévinas, this subjection of the subject's judgment to the other means "placing oneself under the judgment of God", but without annihilating the subject in this placement, which instead "confirms" the subject as a necessary condition for receiving God's epiphany in the face of the other:

> To place oneself under the judgment of God is to exalt the subjectivity.... The judgment of God that judges me at the same time confirms me. But it confirms me precisely in my interiority, whose justice is more severe than the judgment of history.[15]

For Lévinas, "the judgment of God confirms" the self's subjectivity neither formally rationally nor historically. It confirms it by "exaltation"; that is, by relegation of the self to the jurisdiction of God, and yet – by bringing down this jurisdiction, in the self's subjection to the other in the face to face, in the self as "interiority whose justice is more severe than the judgment of history", because subject's interiority is now invested with infinity, indeed with its infinite responsibility for the other.

Amidst the sense of this its responsibility, subjectivity, so rediscovered, also rediscovers its capacity to traverse the limits of societal finalities. Now it traverses them in "justice", in conceiving "justice", in establishing "justice", in their "anarchic" reinvention, in their reappropriation through infinity, in responding as "singularity" to the "singularity" of the other. The

[15] Ibid., 246; 276.

subjectivity thus rediscovers its own necessity as necessity for justice, and for truth in justice, but this necessity is apperceived beyond universality and beyond objectivity:

> In reality, justice does not include me in the equilibrium of its universality; justice summons me to go beyond the straight line of justice, and henceforth nothing can mark the end of this march; behind the straight line of the law the land of goodness extends infinite and unexplored, necessitating all resources of a singular presence. I am therefore necessary for justice, as responsible beyond every limit fixed by an objective law. The I is a privilege and election. The sole possibility in being of going beyond the straight line of the law, that is, of finding a place beyond the universal, is to be I.[16]

I afford myself to suppose that these are not only the most beautiful but also the most telling lines that have ever had pertinence to any legal discourse. In the first place, they tell us that, for Lévinas, self is not only "necessary for justice" but is necessary *specifically* "as responsible beyond every limit fixed by an objective law". For, it is the subject that "goes beyond the straight line of the law", and does so not by theorizing in terms of being, but by acting in the proximity of the other; that is, by being properly itself, viz. ethical, by distributing justice, by "finding a place beyond the universal". The ethical subject does confer "justice" and "truth", but these are understood as neither objective nor subjective, neither absolute nor relative in a traditional sense. Instead, in Lévinas' view, the subject discovers them and asserts them in its own infinite responsibility to the other; that is, by reinventing itself through God's epiphany in the face of the other. It discovers them in justice, in its being summoned by justice, in being a subject of justice, that is, a subject before and beyond any invention of the logos of being.

Justice as the third in the primordial ethical relationship

Throughout *Totality and Infinity*, justice remains a concept that is still very abstract in content, even though its social dimension and dependence

[16] Ibid., 245; 274.

on ethical subjectivity have been articulated. In *Otherwise than Being*, the concept is detailed further to the effect that justice now reappears as incarnating the complex proximity of the other as "third party" (*le tiers*), as the most sensible presence of the ethical, as subordinating the notion of truth once again but now reinventing it in due course as aprophetically reinstated socio-cultural reality. And again, Lévinas treats justice within its complex relation with the other and the same, the sides of the primordial ethical relation, along the other's decisive appearance to the same in the face to face as and through infinity.

The role of infinity in Lévinas' philosophy is indeed fundamental (though again not in the sense in which ontology is fundamental for Heidegger but) in the sense of a non-thematizable substitution of the want of epistemic foundation in traditional philosophy of being. In his view, this substitution is inspiration, a glorification of its own, which is accessible to the subject "in accusative" in its subjection to the other.[17] The subject, which is thus ethical, gets a hold of the infinite signification in the face of the other and so proceeds from infinity, to profess out of infinity, whereas the Infinite manifests itself in this prophecy. As Lévinas puts it, "Prophecy would thus be the very psyche in the soul: the other in the same, and all of man's spirituality would be prophetic".[18] In this sense, it is ultimately "prophecy" – as the other in the same, as what is claimed and invoked by the other in and as the same – that nominates the same and places it "in accusative". It is also this prophecy that makes the same renounce its reductive violence and ap-

[17] In *Otherwise than Being*, Lévinas has compared the position of the subject in the ethical relation with the grammatical form of "accusative", a position in which the subject could answer to the command of the other only with the passive "Here I am" (*me voici*). But, as Lévinas emphasized, the characteristic of "accusative" is not to be confused with its grammatical reversibility in declension, for the subject here is "declined before any declension". (142) Instead, the "self" is "subjected to an absolute accusative", which is non-grammatical in nature and in this sense can be understood as "new undeclinability" (121). Still however, the grammatical metaphor is suggestive of the Lévinasian sense of "accusative" as in the "Latin grammars" in which "the pronoun Self" (*ce*) has "no nominative form", and is therefore declensionally irreversible (112); cf. *Autrement qu'être*, 222, 193, 177. See also *Outside the Subject* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 44; cf. *Hors sujet* (Saint Clément: Fata Morgana, 1987), 61.

[18] Ibid., 149; 233.

perceive the divine epiphany in the face of the other. In the same way, Lévinas insists,

> It is in prophecy that the Infinite escapes the objectification of thematization and of dialogue, and signifies as *illeity*, in the third person. This "thirdness" is different from that of the third man, it is the third party that interrupts the face to face of a welcome of the other man, interrupts the proximity or approach of a neighbor, it is the third man with which justice begins.[19]

Very characteristically, Lévinas speaks here of justice as a "third party" entering the primordial bipolar relationship of the other and the same. However, this "third party" is not meant as a "third man" in the sense that the other and the same would be the first two ones, as it is not just another "other". Instead, it is the "third man" as the "thirdness" of "the Infinite". And, "this thirdness … interrupts the face to face of a welcome of the other man, interrupts the proximity or approach of a neighbor", only to put the beginning of justice. Justice thus appears in the primordial ethical relationship – in an interruptive fashion – from beyond any thematization, any actualization, or presentation in terms of being. That is, it appears not by way of true knowledge – the way of being, but "in prophecy" where it "signifies as illeity in third person" and signifies precisely "the Infinite", which is thus the third proper in the primordial ethical relationship.

In this fashion, justice enters the face to face as an interruption that is not determined within the smooth constitutions of a phenomenological subject but – prophetically; that is, ethically, or in terms of otherwise-than-being, by a subject placed in the proximity of the other, a subject in accusative, subjected to the other. In Lévinas' own words,

> This way for the order to come from I know not where, this coming that is not a recalling, is not the return of a present modified or aged into a past, this non-phenomenality of the order which, beyond representation affects me unbeknownst to myself, "slipping into me like a thief", we have called *illeity*. It is the

[19] Ibid., 150; 234.

> coming of the order to which I am subjected before hearing it, or which I hear in my own saying. It is an august command, but one that does not constrain or dominate and leaves me outside of any correlation with its source.[20]

The "order" that Lévinas has in mind comes from the Infinite. It is the order of justice that evades any foundation and universality, any subjective and historical time. It is an order that enters the proximity of the other "beyond representation", beyond the Socratic "recalling", beyond being and without explanation. That is, it is an order that "affects me unbeknownst to myself" and that comes to me – prior to any intentionality and in terms of "non-phenomenality" – as the *illeity* of the third. For Lévinas, this is an "order to which I am subjected before hearing it", an order that is "an august command", which takes me up as subject in the accusative, but which nonetheless "does not constrain or dominate and leaves me outside of any correlation with its source". In short, justice here appears as an order that creates, maintains, and guarantees the *ethical* sovereignty of the other, as well as of the same, outside the traditional subject-object relation and its logos, and indeed as "the third" in the ethical relation.

Lévinas' concepts of "illeity" and the "third" are closely interwoven and are the keys for understanding his notion of justice. As already pointed, the "third" appears in the relationship between the other and the same not as a mere reproduction of this relationship, which in itself appears to be completely self-sufficient,[21] but as another presence in it. For Lévinas, this "third" presence that comes to and signifies in the primordial relationship – beyond all phenomenality, beyond all thematization and intentionality, beyond all "recalling" – as "illeity" is precisely the presence of justice, indeed justice which – in defiance of any metaphysical subject-object determination – is an order that is directly inspired by infinity. In this relation, Jacques Derrida has rightly pointed that "the illeity of the third [which] is … nothing less, for Lévinas, than the beginning of justice appears at once as law and

[20] Ibid., 150; 234-235.
[21] Ibid., 157; 245.

beyond the law, in law beyond the law".[22] That is, this "order" inspired by the glory of infinity, and not from the "finitude of being", is an order-out-of-order, it is the very characteristic way of appearing and presencing of the third, and of justice as ordained by the third, through the "prophetic" psyche of the same in the ethical relation.

For Lévinas, this order beyond being, which, speaking metaphysically, "comes from I know not where", is nonetheless accessible for the subject, which finds it in its own "response" and "saying" to the other. And there is no mysticism here. For the order to which I am subjected is an order that speaks through me, that is, an order that after all makes of me, the passive hearer, an active subject, even if I can speak it out only because it speaks through me. The mysticism is a subjective arbitration that is indicative of a deficiency in the logos of being, while Lévinas' active/passive/prophetic subject aspires for beyond being, by being inspired from infinity. It identifies itself as the receiving "here I am"; that is, as a subject in the accusative, witnessing "the glory of the Infinite" and inspired by its justice. It is also socially available, responsible, and responding to the neighbor:

> The Infinite orders to me the neighbor as a face, without being exposed to me, and does so the more imperiously that proximity narrows. The order has not been the cause of my response, nor even a question that would have preceded it in a dialogue. I find the order in my response itself, which, as sign given to the neighbor, as a "here I am", brings me out of invisibility, out of the shadow in which my responsibility could have been evaded. This saying belongs to the very glory to which it bears witness.[23]

For Lévinas, there is no metaphysical causality in the "order" of the Infinite to justify "my response" of its acceptance, as there is not "even a question", nor anything like a prior "dialogue" in which I have become logically entangled, viz. expecting a solution in terms of being. Beyond being,

[22] Jacques Derrida, *Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas*, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), 29; cf. *Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas* (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1997), 61.

[23] *Otherwise than Being*, 150; *Autrement qu'être*, 234.

the subject finds the order in itself in the "proximity of the other". It finds it as an order that dispels all "invisibility" and "shadow", in a "sign given to the neighbor", a sign of illumination bestowed by "the glory of the Infinite", the sign of "here I am", of availability, of response, and of responsibility.

The reappearance of the third party in the face to face as justice, Infinite, third man, order, eyes of the other, etc., speaks of its plurality and complexity. Early on, in *Totality and Infinity*, Lévinas had already identified the presence of the "third party" as a coincidence of "language" and "justice" in defiance of the traditional notion of temporality, again "in the proximity of the other" and again invoked by the other:

> The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other – language is justice. It is not that there would be first the face, and then the being it manifests or expresses would concern himself with justice; the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity.[24]

Here, the "epiphany of the face qua face" is taken to properly underlie all language and signification as "justice", and precisely as "justice" anticipating and realizing its socio-cultural omnipresence and institutional incarnation. In the same way, the "third party", as present in the primordial relationship, and present there from-no-where, is taken also to pervade and be absorbed by the face to face itself. In *Otherwise than Being*, Lévinas further elaborates on the importance of the third for the same in the primordial ethical relationship. Despite the originary self-sufficiency of this relationship, the subject now appears in it disturbed by the very presence of the third. This disturbance is expressed in questions like "What then are the other and the third party for one another? What they have done to one another? Which passes before the other?"[25] For Lévinas, these are questions which arise in and appear to the same in its facing the other, in its responsibility for the other, as an amphibology in that responsibility. For, he writes, "the third party is other than the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and not simply his fellow".[26] The "third" here is un-

[24] *Totality and Infinity*, 213; *Totalité et infini*, 234.
[25] *Otherwise than Being*, 157; *Autrement qu'être*, 245.
[26] Ibid., 157; 245.

derstood not simply as a "third man" but as a conglomerate of questions which can always also be asked and which, while interrupting the self-sufficient relationship of the same and the other, put forward the enigma of there being a "third", and not simply "one other": How am I responsible for the other if there is a third? Is there a limit in my responsibility? Are the other and the third in the same relation as I and the other? Who is then the other? Who is then the third? Perhaps I can answer only for the other, and not entirely for the third whose presence and eventual responsibility for the other appear bizarre to me? But so does now also my own responsibility for the other!

As it appears, this enigma for Lévinas consists in that "the other stands in a relationship with the third party, for whom I cannot entirely answer, even if I alone answer, before any question, for my neighbor".[27] But since the subject in the accusative has already denied itself its traditional privilege to provide universal metaphysical answers, now it can only register this enigma – with all its compelling questions – as something that simply interferes with its primordial ethical comfort. Hence, we can understand the importance of the third for the same, whose basic harmony with the other has been in this manner interrupted, as an importance stemming from third's emerging out-of-synchrony, that is, as a disturbance, as a "leap without transition, a rupturing mutation".[28]

Indeed, if we are to contrast the emergence of the Lévinasian third in the primordial ethical relationship with Husserl's smooth constitution of intersubjectivity, the third will appear as a rupture, interruption, scandal, offense, etc. Most certainly, Lévinas' "constitution", if we can call it that, although it ultimately reappears as a phenomenological venture, is organically opposed to the foundationalist transitions of Husserlian phenomenology, as it issues from a different mode of knowing – the ethical proximity of the other, which claims legitimacy in its own way. On Lévinas' view, this disturbing rupture, which for him is the very presence of justice, is the way in which the subject in the accusative appropriates – beyond being, through an inspiration from infinity – any thirdness within the primordial ethical rela-

[27] Ibid., 157; 245.
[28] *Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas*, 31; *Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas*, 64.

tionship. This becomes plain in a very indicative and powerful discussion in which Lévinas takes up the issue of justice as pervading the proximity of the other, involving all thirdness, and – in due course – reaching out to the rest of culture:

> The other and the third party, my neighbors, contemporaries of one another, put distance between me and the other and the third party. … The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification before the other until then went in one direction. It is of itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, comparison, coexistance, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and thence also a copresence on equal footing as before a court of justice.[29]

The very entering of the third in the relationship between the other and the same, which produced a profound enigmatic confusion for the same, produces also a substantial re-consideration of the terminology of being. This terminology which Lévinas was so persistently dismissing from the outset now became "necessary". But how?

Quite indicatively, the necessity of justice appears precisely as an upshot of this scandalous interruption, this "contradiction in the saying" of the self-sufficient ethical relation; that is, it is not a foundational necessity. For Lévinas, this interruption marks precisely "the limit of responsibility" of the same for the other, a responsibility which was originally infinite but now appears inhibited, and indeed – ethically inhibited. Hence, "the birth to the question: What do I have to do with justice?" is an ethical response that calls for reflection over the "contradiction in the saying" of the originally self-sufficient ethical. Apparently, Lévinas' point here is that such a question can be asked only by a conscious subject, and since this makes of it a "question of consciousness", justice itself too becomes *necessary* in the necessity of all questions of consciousness, a necessity which now and *only thus* can be

[29] *Otherwise than Being*, 157; *Autrement qu'être*, 245.

reintroduced in the society and culture. Indeed, in this way even the proximity as mode of knowing can be taken as "a question of consciousness" and "thematization" among others that are thus "necessary" for the perpetuation of "justice".

Nevertheless, the necessity of justice as a matter of consciousness can gain legitimacy only within – and is therefore only complementary to – its ethical necessity as a matter of "social relation" that disrupts the proximity of the other. That is, it does not issue from the putative primordiality of the metaphysical question of being, even though now its relation to the latter appears equally necessary. For Lévinas, it remains an ethical necessity, a necessity of response, and of responsibility, which in the fashion of responding expands the primordial relationship along the plurality of the third party. To be sure, this expansion of the initially unproblematic ethico-epistemic proximity of the other, which is nothing less than the spreading out of justice, carries with itself and reintroduces the traditional quest for being. But this reintroduction does not diminish the vitality of the primordial relationship, viz. the primacy of the ethical; it rather broadens its prospects, by positioning the vocabulary of being still as a response to the other.

> Thus one would understand, in proximity, in saying without problems, in responsibility, the reason for the intelligibility of systems. The entry of the third party is the very act of consciousness, assembling into being, and at the same time, in a being, the hour of the suspension of being in possibility, the finitude of essence accessible to the abstraction of concepts, to the memory that assembles in presence, the reduction of a being to the possible and the reckoning of possibles, the comparison of incomparables.[30]

Again, this reintroduction of the "necessity of consciousness" becomes actually an introduction of the ethical as appropriating "in responsibility" beyond the primordial relation of the same and the other. The ethical thus spreads out its own necessity to "the reduction of a being", to "the comparison of incomparables", and indeed to the entire epistemic instrumentarium

[30] Ibid., 157-8; 246.

of the logos of being. This, however, is *not* a smooth intentionally apperceived phenomenological introduction within the necessity of the time horizon of a self-isolated transcendental ego. It is an un-timely, interruptive, non-linear reintroduction of the epistemic significance of being within a necessity which is beyond all time, or as Derrida has put it, "from before the time before":

> Lévinas does not shrink from analyzing the consequences of this "is necessary". It reintroduces us, as if by force, into places ethics should exceed: the visibility of the face, thematization, comparison, synchrony, system, co-presence "before a court of justice". In truth, it does not re-introduces us in a secondary way into these places but calls us back to them from before the time before. For the third does not wait; it is there, from the "first" epiphany of the face in the face to face.[31]

For Derrida, Lévinas' "third" is interruptive and does not wait; it is not introduced out of the necessity of the logos of being, it itself introduces necessity and introduces it "as if by force". But this "is necessary" is ethical, not ontological, as it does not unfold along an intentional constitution but manifests itself as an imposition, a kind of enforcement that counters the logos of being by bringing it – indeed il-logically and yet – ethically, "as before a court of justice". Thus Lévinas' "is necessary", which is the prophetic "third", affirms the transgressive character of "justice" within all being and consciousness, and affirms it from beyond being and consciousness. It affirms it as consciousness that is a consciousness of transgression, a consciousness in transgression, a consciousness conscious of its own inaugural, or, in Derrida's words, "quasi-transcendental or originary, indeed, pre-originary perjury":

> Like the third who does not wait, the proceedings that open both ethics and justice are in the process of committing quasi-transcendental or originary, indeed, pre-originary perjury. One might even call it *ontological*, once ethics is joined to everything that exceeds and betrays it (ontology, precisely, synchrony, total-

[31] *Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas*, 30-31; *Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas*, 63.

> ity, the State, the political, etc.). One might even see here an irrepressible evil or radical perversion, were it not that bad intentions or bad will might be absent here, and were its possibility, at least the haunting of its possibility, a sort of pervertability, not also the condition of the Good, of Justice, Love, Faith, etc. And of perfectibility.[32]

Thereby, Lévinas' radical criticism of the philosophy of consciousness and being amounted to a promotion of a mode of knowing based on the relationship of the other and the same with the third party. By reinstating and instituting the language of being, justice reappears as the carrier of this mode of knowing that inaugurates the ethical in discourse, and thus makes all knowledge and co-existence ethically possible. Yet, in this its role, "justice" is in no way "a limitation of the anarchic responsibility" of the self for the other, nor is it "a neutralization of the glory of the Infinite."[33] On the contrary, it issues from them and cannot dispense with them, even after it has already made the society, state, and the rest of culture possible.

A question of politics

Lévinas' non-traditional ethical approach to justice has been deservedly invoked in the contemporary debates on this issue. Particularly, its political significance has become a promising venue for exploration. Lévinas himself has not fallen short of underscoring this significance, even if it appears to be only marginally addressed in the works discussed above. In *Outside the Subject*, for instance, he writes that "the passage from ethical inequality… to 'equality between persons' comes from political order of citizens in a state" and that "it is the responsibility for the other that determines the legitimacy of the state, that is, its justice".[34] In our context, it will be important to note that the work of contemporary writers who have elaborated on the "passage" in question is largely indicative of the unfixed status of justice in Lévinas' philosophy.

Among these writers, Simon Critchley is perhaps the most ardent pro-

[32] Ibid., 34; 68-69.
[33] *Otherwise than Being*, 159; *Autrement qu'être*, 248.
[34] *Outside the Subject*, 45; cf. *Hors sujet*, 62.

ponent of the idea of politics inspired by Lévinasian ethics. Lévinas' concept of justice too features high in Critcley's project and precisely as the locus for the ethical situating of politics. Critchley admits that "*le tiers* has always already entered into the ethical relation, troubling and doubling it into a political discourse", which also means that "the immediacy of the ethical is always already mediated politically".[35] In this sense, politics becomes an inevitable factor for Lévinas' ethics and Critchley finds it necessary to elaborate on it in terms of the realities of the state organization of the society. Specifically, he associates the possibility for such passage from the ethical to the political, for which justice can provide, with societies of *democratic* type. For Critchley, "democracy [is] an ethically grounded form of political life which is continually being called into question by asking of its legitimacy and the legitimacy of its practices and institutions: what is justice?"[36] He has further described democracy as "a fragile, agnostic, doxic form of political life", as "politics of difficulty … and … of the fact that the social is not complete, transparent *œuvre*", and as "a permanent risk, a risk that is well worth running".[37]

As far as I can see it, the Lévinasian point that Critchley makes with his project of ethically apperceived political democracy is in that he regards the latter as an unfinished project and in this sense retains the place of justice unfixed. Critchley maintains that in a certain sense "*democracy does not exist*" and that in this sense it permanently demands from its political subjects "a responsibility to invent democracy" and "to extend" its "franchise to all areas of public and private life".[38] Ultimately, he sees the task of politics via his own blend of Lévinasian and Derridean philosophies which presents "*democracy as the future of deconstruction*".[39]

Critchley has been indeed quite straightforward in his apperception of the political significance of Lévinas' ethics. As he writes: "On my view, ethics is ethics for the sake of politics. Better stated perhaps, ethics is the metapolitical

[35] Simon Critchley, *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Lévinas* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007), 231.
[36] Ibid., 239.
[37] Ibid., 239-240.
[38] Ibid., 240.
[39] Ibid., 241.

disturbance of politics for the sake of politics…."[40] In his view, this ethical disturbance of "politics" is to prevent the latter from "closing over in itself"; that is, from "becoming what Lévinas would call totality" and ultimately from "becoming tyrannical".[41] Instead, Critchley insists, "politics … can … be thought of as *the art of a response to the singular demand of the other*, a demand that arises in a particular context … and calls for political invention, for creation".[42]

Critchley's ambition to transpose the candor of Lévinas' ethics via politics in all areas of life and culture is indeed to be commended. The question remains, however, to what extent such a project can be realized in a cultural environment (even if democratic) in which its realization will depend on the capacity of the political subjects to live up to its high demands. In my view, the realization of political democracy apperceived along a sophisticated philosophical conception of ethics presupposes political subjects possessing a kind of *philosophical competence*, which cannot be guaranteed even if its necessity is comprehended.[43] Whereas the status of humanistic knowledge (which will have to include also knowledge of the philosophy of Lévinas) in the contemporary democratic societies has experienced serious setbacks in recent decades, thus posing obstacles to its wider reception beyond the tiny social group of academic readers.[44]

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[40] Simon Critchley, "Five Problems in Lévinas's View of Politics and the Sketch of a Solution to Them ", *Political Theory*, April 2004, 182.

[41] Ibid., 182.

[42] Ibid., 178.

[43] On the notion of "philosophical competence" see my "Philosophy and the Transition from Theory to Practice: A Response to Recent Concerns for Critical Thinking", *Telos*, Vol. 148, Fall 2009, 86-110. For my first discussion of this notion see my *Philosophy and the Structure of Modernity*: *Fragments of Actualization*. Sofia, Bulgaria: East West Publishers, 2005 (in Bulgarian).

[44] On the status of humanistic knowledge and its relation to philosophical competence see my article "Philosophy and the Transition from Theory to Practice" (see the previous note). The same article also contains references to the enormous amount of research on the status of humanities in our contemporary societies. On the philosophical apperception of the issue, see Jacques Derrida, "University without Condition" in *Without Alibi*, trans. and with introduction by Peggy Kamuff, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); cf. Jacques Derrida, *L"Université sans condition*, (Paris: Editions Galilée, 2001), as well as Jacques Derrida, *Ethics, Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy*, tr. by P. P. Triffonas, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

Other research on the political significance of Lévinas' concept of justice has exposed other aspects of its unfixed transposition between ethics and the rest of culture and practice. For instance, Patricia H. Werhane has apperceived "justice" as "normative term" which, however, does not put any "metaethical constraints" in the "exposure to the other who is neithen merely an ego nor a radically separated self".[45] And indeed, justice is a re-introduction of normativity in the face to face, and since its semantics is bound to the ethical, its normative aspect must have already renounced the normativity of being, thus becoming a normativity "without metaethical constraints". In this peculiar way, justice appears within the ethical without being-present in it; that is, without having a fixed place in ti, and so-without in any way undermining the exclusive authority of the other in it.

For her part, Rebecca Comay maintains that without the "corrective" of the third "the ethical bond would in any case betray itself (by lapsing into hierarchy, egology, conciliatory speculiarity), but without the means to elaborate such self-betrayal as both necessary and insufficient".[46] The third is surely a powerful means in the ethical relation, but it does not seem that for Lévinas the ethical stops being ethical at one moment or another, so that to demand the third for its maintenance of itself. Instead, the ethical is ethical in a time-less fashion, inaugurated by a non-ego-istic, non-ego-logical just-ification, which in its primordiality is prior to, and so independent from, "justice".

Inathird example, edith Wyschogrod has insightfully compared "Kierkegaard's ethical stage … to what Lévinas calls justice, the juridical plane that allows for the settling of actual disputes in social existence" while paralleling Lévinas' ethics with "religion and faith in Kierkegaard".[47] In-

[45] Patricia H. Werhane, "Levinas's Ethics: A Normative Perspective without Metaethical Constraints" in *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion*, edited by Adriaan T. Peperzak, Routledge: New York and London, 1995, 65-66.

[46] Rebecca Comay, "Facies Hippocratica" in *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion*, edited by Adriaan T. Peperzak, Routledge: New York and London, 1995, 231.

[47] Edith Wyschogrod, "The Art in Ethics: Aesthetics, Objectivity, and Alterity in the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas" in *Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion*, edited by Adriaan T. Peperzak, Routledge: New York and London, 1995, 139.

deed, Kierkegaard's ethical stage is indicative of an individual's existential acceptance of universal social norms along with their institutional incarnation, whereas he regards religion and faith as giving the highest worth of one's existence. In my view, this transposition of terminology only exposes the unfixed place of Lévinas' justice between ethics and politics, as well as between the rest of culture and practice.

I shall lastly draw attention to a discussion between Ernst Wolf and Maria Dimitrova, which very indicatively exposes the unfixed status of Lévinas' notion of justice by pointing to the possibility for its different apperception in political and ethical perspectives. Wolf has focused on the relation of Lévinas' notion of justice to the concept of human rights. One problem he identifies from the viewpoint of politics is the impossibility for getting "any advice on how to go about in my demanding task" to respond to the other, "since the originally ethical appeal is an-archical"; that is, without "rules, principles or guidelines directly derivable from the original imperative".[48] For Wolf, this opens the possibility for multiple realizations of justice from the viewpoints of "people who are ready to sacrifice themselves in order to actualize their specific notion of justice that they consider to be truer to the appeal of the other and superior to or more urgent than the form of justice institutionalized where they are".[49] In this sense, he notices that the other appears to be unable to rely on politically institutionalized human rights, as they can be sidelined by the same – and indeed in a multiple fashion – in its effort to respond to the other. "Nothing," Wolf writes, "not even institutionalized human rights – protects the other against my idea of how to safeguard and maintain the right of the other."[50] Consequently, Wolf has expressed the concern that with the possibility for multiple realizations of justice along the suspension of "institutionalized human rights", "Lévinas's politics … carries in it the danger of being a politics of the war of every citizen's notion of justice against that of the others".[51]

I think Wolf is making a point here. Depriving the other of institutional-

[48] Ernst Wolf, "The Quest for Justice versus the Rights of the Other?" *Sofia Philosophical Review*, Vol. III, No. 2, 77.
[49] Ibid., 77.
[50] Ibid., 78.
[51] Ibid., 78.

ized human rights for the sake of responding to the other hides a "danger" of misunderstanding the justice of my own response to the other. Surely, one can reply that the question for the institutionalized human rights can in no way be problematic for the other with respect to the same, since the same can *only* respond to the other's demands. But this will make sense only if the other is understood as presumably concerned also with itself and not self-sacrificing on its own. If the other is not concerned with itself, my response can pose a danger to the other. This "danger" is indeed a political danger; that is, a danger concerning the actual political freedoms and obligations of the other, one which makes political rights necessary for my "safeguarding" the other. In my view, this danger will always be present when a discourse, however sophisticated, is transferred to practice, including political practice, and it can be optimally mitigated only by a peculiar type of competence, which I described above as being philosophical in character, though indeed never self-sufficient.

In her response to Wolf's discussion of the status of human rights in the Lévinasian perspective of justice, Dimitrova has pointed to the different senses of justice in that perspective. She has emphasized that for Lévinas "justice can be understood ontologically as already institutionalized social order, carried by the third" but also "in the ethical perspective as still non-institutionalized justice".[52] Certainly, in the later perspective, justice will pose no danger to the rights of the other, as the subject that carries it is inaugurated as such precisely in its ethical response to the other and cannot indeed be "dangerous", so to speak, by definition. But what appears to be unproblematic in ethical perspective reappears as questionable in political perspective, and so the problem posed by Wolf does remain there to be solved. It is a problem of the transition from discourse to practice, a transition which Lévinas apperceived as possible via justice. But again "justice" here is understood as multiply transposable within the primordial ethical relation and beyond it; that is, as lacking a fixed position there, and so also as allowing for multiple perspectives on itself as an issue of discourse.

[52] Maria Dimitrova, "There is Justice and Justice: In Response to Ernst Wolf", *Sofia Philosophical Review*, Vol. III, No. 2, 82.

In conclusion

I shall return once again to the status of justice in Lévinas' philosophy in more general terms to single out three of its defining features. First, Lévinas regards justice as an emanation of the ethical, which on his view is the most primordial and undeniable aspect of the relationship between the other and the same, and which justice reinstates as substantiating all forms of society and culture. Second, justice for Lévinas manifests itself as what is visible in the invisible ethical, as what is sensible in the proximity of the other, as what is present beyond representation, as what is there without "being" there, and without being-there (*Dasein*), without "constitution" but "in response", invoked in the subject in the accusative in its subjection to the other. Finally, and this is what I think we always need to keep in mind, Lévinas' "viewpoint beyond being" takes up justice not only as underlying all forms of society and culture, but also – as being "betrayed" by them, which would be the case when justice is a little too inertly taken to coincide with them, and which also means that justice has no fixated place among them to substantiate anything like a foundationalist deployment of being.

All the same, the topic of "justice" in the philosophy of Lévinas is as challenging as it is enormous, and I can hope here to have touched on it only exegetically. Still less can I hope to summarize it in a concluding paragraph, which nonetheless would have been in dissonance with, and so would not do justice to, Lévinas' own philosophical position. I hope only to have emphasized enough that in his view justice manifests itself in a substantive bond with the primordial ethical relationship, whose self-sufficiency it enters in the role of "necessary" condition for all forms of society and culture, and that in this its role, the notion of justice in Lévinas' philosophy does not attain the traditional status of an apodictic epistemic "foundation".

The Theme of the Other in the Post-Soviet Context

Viktor Malakhov
(H. S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of NAS of Ukraine)

It just so happened that for a number of post-Soviet philosophers who approached Levinas' work, their encounter with his philosophy had turned into something bigger than a mere introduction to the ideas of one of the venerable Western thinkers. Due to certain peculiarities of previous development, Emmanuel Levinas could have been approached as a participant of internal discussions, or, in other words, as an "acting persona" of the drama of philosophy's self-consciousness. In my article, I would like to concentrate on these peculiarities of the reception of Levinas' philosophy in the post-Soviet context. The following points must be examined with regard to this:

1. The discovery and comprehension of the theme of the Other in Soviet philosophy in the 70s and 80s of the 20th century.

2. Typological comparison of Levinas' views with the views of G. S. Batyshchev, who represents the above-mentioned period in the Soviet philosophy, and in whose works the theme of the Other seems to have found its utmost realization.

3. Certain peculiarities of comprehension of Levinas are thought within the context of contemporary post-Soviet and, more particularly, Ukrainian philosophy.

1. The history of Soviet "philosophy of humanity" between the 1960s to 1980s includes a certain intrigue. In general, this philosophy was developing on the grounds of Marxism. However, this Marxist current very often was not just the result of enforcement, but rather it was a part of a common tradition that still had creative potential. In this respect, it's important to note a considerable level of originality peculiar to a number of philosophical ideas that appeared at that time in Moscow,

Kiev, Leningrad, and Tbilisi. It was not about a dispute between the hardcore Marxists on one hand, and passionate dissidents following the Western examples on the other. Perhaps one of the most interesting goals in the study of Soviet philosophy is to discover those distinctive ideas and views that originated then.

One of the most important changes that appeared in our philosophical environment at that time was precisely the tendency to move away from a monologue-paradigm that was typical of late-Soviet Marxism. Perhaps, the main methodological foundation of a monologue-paradigm was the late Marxist's concept of human activity that bound together the subject-object dichotomy, as well as the pathos of a self-asserting subject, and also a reduction of inter-subjective relations to totalizing (as Levinas would've put it) forms of social activity. It is only natural that any alternative to this approach could appear in such marginalized areas as history and semiotics of culture, science, logic, psychology, and ethics. It could also arise in the form of an open or hidden polemics with the above-mentioned Marxist concept of activity. It is worth mentioning that the author of one of most consistent versions of the theory of the activist essence of humans, Genrikh Batyshchev,[1] became an original thinker of a dialogical nature after his disappointment in Marxist activism. I shall return to him shortly.

What was the reason that caused late-Soviet philosophical thought and culture to turn to the Other? Certain things should not be underestimated. Those are the publication of Bakhtin's earlier texts[2] (his idea of "polyphony" etc.), the letters of Alexey Ukhtomskiy[3] and his notions of "the dominant on the face of the Other" and of "the merited interlocutor"; also the diaries of famous Russian writer Mikhail Prishvin[4] with his understanding of artistic creation as *raz-licheniye*, or "distinguishing" even between non-human creatures. There was also, of course, a concealed influence of twenti-

[1] See: Батищев, Г. С., Деятельностная сущность человека как философский принцип in Проблема человека в современной философии (М., 1969), 73-144.

[2] See: Бахтин, М. М., *Проблемы поэтики Достоевского*, М., 1972, 470.

[3] See: Ухтомский, А. А., *Письма* in *Новый мир* (1973, № 1), 251-266.

[4] See: Пришвин, М. М., *Записи о творчестве* in *Контекст'1974: Литературно-теоретические исследования* (М., 1975), 312-359.

eth century West-European thought that was making its way to our thinkers, becoming intertwined with their own ideas. However, I think it is important to emphasize that the dialogic paradigm of the late-Soviet period also had its own sources of inspiration. During the Thaw, a romantic spirit had been awaken and opened new expanses for young people, as it happens in the beginning of the spring time, when one realizes anew how far the outlook can reach. This spirit instilled in these young people a longing for something different in all possible meanings: a longing for tourism and traveling, for cultural and spiritual history that they were discovering zealously. The oxygen that was coming from free communication was gradually enriching the Soviet humanities, including philosophy. Step by step, such themes as culture, freedom, and love were losing their exclusive character for Soviet readers. Gradually, philosophical discourse was acquiring more and more ethical and pedagogical features. And that made it different from its previous era when epistemology, aesthetics, and theory of activity were more dominant.

The above-mentioned changes were not strong enough from a methodological view, and our philosophical vocabulary was quite poor when compared to that of the West. However, the key points of real philosophical thinking did exist. Young philosophers were especially interested in the changes that occurred on philosophy's way from the Marxist cultivation of so called "dialectical unity" to the acceptance of *otherness* of the Other. Gradually, all these changes would result in the inevitable shift from the monologue understanding of human activity, as well as from the Marxist's in its Soviet interpretation of human reality in general.

Among those scholars who made a contribution to the affirmation of a dialogical paradigm and the discovery of the theme of the Other were such people as Vladimir Bibler, who was working on the idea of a "mindful dialogue" as a foundation of creative thinking.[5] Renaissance historian Leonid Batkin defined that period as "the culture of communication of cultures". Yuriy Lotman, a well-known semiotics and literary studies scholar, introduced the concept of culture's poly-linguistics, as well as an opposing

[5] See: Библер, В. С., *Мышление как творчество. (Введение в логику мысленного диалога)*, М., 1975, 399.

"auto-communication" and "message", "aesthetics of identity", and "aesthetics of difference".[6] However, the most representative in this respect is the work of the philosopher from Moscow Genrikh Stepanovych Batyshchev (1932-1990).

All of his adult life Genrikh Batyshchev worked at the Institute of Philosophy in Volkhonka, where he experienced a difficult yet dynamic professional development. In his spiritual development he went from following typical Marxist atheism to becoming interested in Eastern spiritual practices and later in Orthodox Christianity. As a philosopher, he initially was working on the concept of active essence, but later developed his own original concept of "deeper communication". It is worth noting, however, that during his evolution, Batyshchev had always possessed strength and an originality of philosophical thinking. Those were quite unusual qualities in his environment at the time.

All this made Batyshchev's position as an employee of a Soviet institution very vulnerable and he could not often publish in the capital's publishing house. His main work was published seven years after his death.[7] Moreover, Batyshchev belonged to the type of philosophers whose nature of reflection always compels them to battle with language. His numerous neologisms are not easily deciphered. They are difficult even for a Russian-speaking reader. Hence the difficulties with translation. So it is not a surprise that Batyshchev is less known in the West, unlike Merab Mamardashvili or Evald Il'yenkov. That too is a valid reason for drawing our attention to this philosopher of the late Soviet era.

So the question is: what are the similarities between Batyshchev and Levinas, these two philosophers whose ideas and destinies differ so much?

2. It is impossible for me to assert that Batyshchev was absolutely unfamiliar with Levinas. However, even if he were to a certain degree informed of Levinas, that fact did not influence his theory of communication. His main sources were Marx, Bakhtin, along with the canonical classics of world literature, and Soviet psychology and pedagogy. That's why it is truly

[6] Cf.: Каган, М. С., Мир общения: Проблема межсубъектных отношений, М., 1988, 319.
[7] Батищев, Г. С., Введение в диалектику творчества, СПб., Изд-во РХГИ, 1997, 464.

remarkable how close Batyshchev and Levinas are in their treatment of one key moment: their assertion of the asymmetric nature of inter-subjective relations and the priority of the Other, regarded as the beginning of the ethics.

According to a Moscow philosopher, prior to all reciprocity, a subject faces a moral alternative: either to reach self-assertion at the expense of the Others (the beginning of so-called self-centrism (cf. *conatus essendi* in Levinas' interpretation); or to admit the Other's dominance over oneself (*drugodominantnist'*; cf. Levinas' "height dimension" peculiar to the Other).[8] According to Batyshchev, it is only in the latter's case that there is a possibility of spiritual and moral awakening in a human being.

> Batyshchev develops his teaching of *druhodominantnist'* in polemics with his philosophical teacher Mikhail Bakhtin.[9] According to Batyshchev, Bakhtin's concept of a dialogue does not include all the necessary warnings against a possible reduction of a dialogue to a formal agreement about equality of all possible positions.[10] In order to avoid this danger, a philosophy of dialogue needs to connect pluralistic ideas and "the vertical of values" beyond which any dialogue loses its spiritual sense. It becomes possible just by giving the priority to the Other; or, in other words, by employing the idea of *druhodominantnist'* which unites both the inter-subjective communication and its value direction. In this respect, Batyshchev's *druhodominantnist'* strongly resembles Levinas' asymmetric address to the Other. So, it is quite remarkable that these two thinkers share the same understanding of this aspect of "the thought on the Other". Based on this shared understanding, we can speak of other similarities between Levinas and Batyshchev. These are:

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[8] Левинас, Э., *Тотальность и Бесконечное* in Левинас, Э., *Избранное : Тотальность и Бесконечное* (М.; СПб., 2000), 217.

[9] See: Батищев, Г. С., *Диалогизм или полифонизм? (Антитетика в идейном наследии М. М. Бахтина)* in *М. М. Бахтин как философ* (М., 1992), 133.

[10] Ibid., 137.

- Their rejection of the idea of the subject's self-assertion (Levinas' *conatus essendi* and Batyshchev's model of "atomized subject of activity").
- For both thinkers, philosophy of the Other is rooted in a religious foundation. For Levinas it is a Judaic tradition[11] and for Batyshchev it is Orthodox tradition with significant elements of Russian cosmism. A few years ago, a Cambridge scholar Phillip Blond published a collection of essays dedicated to the most prominent philosophers of the past few centuries and titled *Post-Secular Philosophy*.[12] It narrates about the type of philosophy which stemmed from secular rationalism and yet sought its own way to God. Among the book's chapters is one on Levinas: "God and phenomenology". Had Blond known about Batyshchev, I believe there would've been an essay on him as well. It seems important that the Russian version of the newest philosophy of the Other, philosophy of communication, has a tendency to become post-secular. Obviously, this tendency rests on a metaphysical foundation, for both Levinas and Batyshchev believed that the Other makes us look up.
- Persistent resistance to the System's tendencies to swallow human individuality and the latter's world of communication. Resistance to the attempts of Sameness to swallow the Difference. This motif is characteristic for Levinas, for whom Sameness, or *le Même,* is an ontological structure that not only conquers difference but also subjugates it to power. Therefore, to know something as "the same" means to deprive it of true originality, to step closer to owning it. In a fashion similar to Levinas, Batyshchev warns of the danger to "freeze

[11] See: Левинас, Э., *Трудная свобода. Очерки по иудаизму* in Левинас, Э., *Избранное: Трудная свобода* (М., 2004), 329-341.

[12] See: Post-Secular Philosophy / Between Philosophy and Theology, ed. by Phillip Blond, London; N.Y., 1998, 365.

in self-sameness"[13] meaning that it is crucial to preserve one's ability to listen to the Others' voices and to protect them from "self-measurement". However, contrary to the author of *Totality and Infinity*, Batyshchev does not include in his warnings against the System the entire Totality. Because of Batyshschev's tense ontology, his understanding of Totality acquires positive features of Harmony and World-Order. Batyshchev strives to preserve this positive existential-cosmic perspective.

- Both thinkers are strongly ethically oriented. It is well-known that Levinas perceives ethics as primary philosophy, *philosophia prima*, calling it metaphysics' star path.[14] With regard to Batyshchev, we can say that he also envisages the theme of the Other as being both an ethical and metaphysical category, adding the pedagogical aspect to it, as well. He was among the most popular philosophers in the pedagogical milieu: his articles published in *Uchitelskaya Gazeta* (teachers' newspaper) were quite popular in intelligent circles of the USSR.
- Philosophical interest oriented towards the future, towards new generations. It is evident in Levinas' concept of *la fecondité*;[15] also in his analytics of temporality; in his demand for comprehension that excludes maieutics.[16] The common ground of all of this is his insistence on the primacy of the Other, as opposed to "the Same". Batyshchev, in this respect, was entirely oriented toward the future, which is evident from his anthropology of childhood. He understood childhood as a "poorly discovered country".[17]

[13] Батищев, Г. С., *Введение в диалектику творчества*, 36, 325.
[14] Левинас, Э., *Тотальность и Бесконечное* in Левинас, Э., *Избранное: Тотальность и Бесконечное*, 72.
[15] Ibid., 258-260.
[16] Ibid., 103, 106.
[17] Батищев, Г. С., *Введение в диалектику творчества*, 38.

His analysis of the "unchangeable values of childhood" still remains quite remarkable.[18]

It is only natural that despite all of these similarities, there were striking differences between Batyshchev and Levinas. Among the most important ones, I would name the following:

- Batyshchev's cosmologoly versus Levinas' anthropology. We know that according to Levinas the Other entails the other person. Batyshchev, on the other hand, is focused on the endless Universe with all of its known and unknown manifestations of life and spirituality. In this respect, we can say that Batyshchev is a follower of Russian cosmism. He was one of the earliest opponents of anthropocentrism in Soviet philosophical scholarship.[19] According to Batyshchev, interpersonal relations remain imperfect and finite, unless they are oriented towards the meta-personal and non-human Others. Therefore we can emphasize Batyshchev's ecological dimension, contrary to Levinas' "humanism of the other person".
- The differentiation between ontology and ethics. Levinas reduces ontology to egology of the present, characterizing ethics as a rupture with the order of Being. Contrary to that, Batyshchev is an ontological thinker. His ethics remains a part of the world-order. It emphasized one more time Batyshchev's proximity to the Russian philosophical tradition, which predominant ontological character has been noted by many scholars.[20]

[18] Ibid., 38 - 44.

[19] See: Батищев, Г. С., *Нравственный смысл диалектики. (К критике антропоцентризма),* in *Диалектика и этика* (Алма-Ата, 1983), 104 -114.

[20] See, e.g.: Франк, С. Л., *Русское мировоззрение*, in Франк, С. Л., *Духовные основы общества* (М., 1992), 478 - 485, 490.

These are the lines along which we can compare Levinas and Batyshchev.

To the question whether there were attempts to address the theme of the Other in late- Soviet Ukrainian philosophy, I would only answer that I myself do not know of any that took place prior to the middle 1970s. A younger generation of our philosophers of that time looked for inspiration to the above-mentioned Russian thinkers: Batyshchev, Bibler, Bakhtin, Ukhtomskiy and others.

3. As we have seen, the tendency of addressing the Other that had yet formed during the Soviet period embodied essential trends of our native philosophical thought and culture. Levinas, in this respect, turned out to be an expected author. And I must say at once, it could be even dangerous. Apparent proximity might hide for us a deeper originality to Levinas' thought, its specific sources and intentions. Well, the respect to *otherness* of the Other is demanded in that case by the real presence of Levinas' philosophy as it is.

The next reasons that have led to Levinas' significance in our philosophical discourse are intertwined with the realities of our time.

First of all, post-Soviet space is, paraphrasing Borges, a garden of cultures that are drifting apart. When compared to the Soviet times, we are now going through a painful experience of getting to know what alienation means. We encounter alien individuals, religions, and cultures. This experience either provokes hatred towards the Other, or results in a nostalgic feeling over the time when everyone was of your own kind. Levinas and the philosophy of the Other in general help us to understand an important thing: how to respect the otherness of the Other and the distance that separates us. And justly due to it, to build positive and meaningful relations with the Others.

Secondly, it is evident that we are moving now in a direction that is quite opposite to our past. In contemporary Ukraine we can observe a surge in egoistic moods, closeness, and intolerance. Those trends have a

clear sociological confirmation.[21] The current motto of our days is hard pragmatism and cupidity. In this situation, Levinas reminds us about human generosity and kindness. And by doing that, he brings us back to the best cultural traditions. Perhaps, this aspect of our addressing Levinas is the most crucial now.

[21] See, e.g.: Магун, В., Руднев, М., Жизненные ориентации населения: сравнение Украины с другими европейскими странами in Украинское общество в европейском пространстве / Ed. by Е. Головаха, С. Макеев, Киев, 2007, 236-237, 247, 258, 271; Паниотто, В., Динамика ксенофобии и антисемитизма в Украине (1994–2007), in Социология: теория, методы, маркетинг (2008, № 1), 197-213.

V. BOOK REVIEW

Review: Jeffrey E. Mirel, *Patriotic Pluralism: Americanization Education and European Immigrants*. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010. 378 pp. $45.

Elena Tzenkova (Sofia University)

The intention of this book is clearly stated at the beginning – to examine the role that education played in the Americanization of immigrants and their children who arrived in the United States between the 1890s and the early 1950s. It deals with the impact that these over twenty-two million immigrants had on the politics, culture, economics, and demography of their adopted country and the modes and means of their assimilation/integration into their new "great society," one not unmixed with the problem of the immigrants' group identity and political allegiance in times of national crisis. It is not surprising that Americanization education should have provoked such a passionate nationwide debate and remained a question long after: it is well-known that, of all the developed countries, the United States has had the longest experience with immigration and its consequences.

Mirel's study belongs to the fields of the history and philosophy of education. It focuses on the period 1890-1925 when, as a result of the "changing urban context" of the biggest cities in the United States (especially Chicago, Cleveland and Detroit) and the great American belief in the power of education to solve social problems, a vast array of institutions devoted time and energy through Americanization education to accommodate the "flood" of immigrants into society.[1] Prominent intellectuals, educators,

[1] Jeffrey Mirel, *Patriotic Pluralism: Americanization Education and European Immigrants* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2010), 16-18.

and political leaders tried to reform the public school system in major American cities along progressive lines, bringing some new elements into the curricula of both the K-12 and adult education levels. The book deals primarily with the two main institutions involved in civic and citizenship education: the public schools and the foreign language newspapers. It scrutinizes a lot of facts and written materials about the economic, educational, and political activities carried out on the federal level, but it primarily concentrates on local developments and describes case studies which acquired national importance.

The author claims that historians of education have missed some of the most interesting and important trends leading to the shift toward a more culturally inclusive approach to Americanization, in general, and to the teaching of American history, culture, and citizenship, in particular. He is convinced that negative views of Americanization – considered as a unilateral, compulsive process of assimilation – are based on historical accounts that are inconsistent or at least incomplete. This book challenges the dominant interpretation of Americanization education and upholds an alternative view of Americanization called patriotic pluralism.

In his study Mirel holds his ground while approaching the object from various angles: through a definition of the key elements of Americanization education;[2] in the context of the struggle between ethnic and civic nationalism;[3] by giving examples from local practices in immigrant communities; and, most of all, through the account of immigrants' response to Americanization education. The latter was reached through a detailed description and analysis of the editorials and articles of the foreign-language newspapers, considered as a powerful educational institution.

Chapter I, entirtled "The Single Greatest Factor in the Americanization of Immigrants," examines "the conflict between ethnic and civic as it relates to education," which takes central place in the study. Mirel argues that "the most important debate about Americanization was *not*, as many scholars have maintained, between restrictionists, assimilationists, and amalgamationists, who advocated Anglo-Saxon racial and cultural supremacy, on the

[2] A catch-all term that includes a wide variety of goals.
[3] People's ethnic characteristics vs. the nation's political creed.

one hand, and cultural pluralists, who espoused cultural and racial equality, on the other." Rather, he sees "the great debate of this era as being between people who believed that education could play a major role in Americanizing the immigrants (i.e. assimilationists, cultural pluralists, and amalgamationists) and those who believed that race alone was the crucial factor in determining who could become an American (i.e. racial restrictionists)."[4] While the former were united in their respect for a civic nationalist creed that remained at the core of Americanization education, the latter did not believe that education could transform "inferior races" into Americans.

The author compares historically the character, content, and intensity of Americanization education undertakings and their results, in relation to the changing socio-political, economic, demographic, cultural and educational context. The facts speak for themselves. In the period from the early 1890s to the mid-1920s there were no quotas and few restrictions on immigration. As a consequence, the lowest and most illiterate members of "alien" races came to the shores of America. The assimilation of such people – with little in common with American modes of thought, customs, and traditions – was almost impossible. But 'Word War I' boosted "patriotism" (more precisely, fear of dual loyalty) and provoked "a zealous nationwide movement to Americanize adult immigrants from all backgrounds," especially those ten million people (of the thirty two million immigrants) who came from families with close ties to the Central Powers.[5] The study reveals that although there was a "mess," no consensus about the goals, content and methods of Americanization, activities in public schools and on the political scene sought to build a "*Pluribus Unum*" by transforming immigrants into "good" Americans.

Struggling against the supporters of racial restriction who regarded the new immigrants as a dangerous demographic and cultural threat, progressive educational reformers succeeded in changing the educational governance structure of every major American city and, by 1920, every school system with large numbers of immigrant children had woven aspects of Americanization into all areas of the curriculum at the K-12 level and in programs for adults. Inspired by Dewey's progressive ideas, school reformers argued that

[4] Ibid., 15.
[5] Ibid., 21.

the great genius of the United States was its ability to combine numerous cultural traditions in the creation of the national "spirit of America" and that curricula, like cultures, should change in response to interaction with the environment.[6]

The book examines how Americanization education was implemented on the K-12 and adult levels and how immigrants responded to and reinterpreted these efforts. It provides evidence that despite the feelings of failure, Americanization in public schools and the socialization of the newcomers and their children had worked successfully across the country (cf. Chapter II, "Americanization and the Public Schools, 1890-1930"). Despite huge disagreements between assimilationists and cultural pluralists about the degree to which immigrants should abandon or assert their previous cultures in the process of becoming Americans, education contributed to social unity and maintaining a common language, common ideals, and a uniform interpretation of citizenship. The conclusion is that between 1890 and 1930 the view of Americanization as a strengthening of Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony dominated over the one of national unity and social mobility that acknowledged the contributions of cultural diversity.

The study reveals how the confluence of economic, political, and educational factors in the major cities of the United States made the free public schools attended by immigrant children, because of the innovative pedagogical programs, methods, and learning materials they used, some of the best educational institutions in the world. In school, the children of immigrants sought to identify with their classmates, whose parents had merged into this social and political milieu at an earlier stage – evidence that instead of coercive and aggressive forms of assimilation (the "100 per cent Americanism" in World War I and the immediate postwar years), Americanization education should rather "provide these students with the knowledge and skills that would enable them not merely to survive, but to thrive in the New World." But in pursuing the goal to unite the nation through rapid Americanization, common public schools were "undermining traditional relationships between parents and children."[7] Intense Anglo-American cultural im-

[6] Ibid., 18-20.
[7] Ibid., 57-58.

mersion (teaching English and patriotism) disregarded the cultural backgrounds of the foreign-born. The history and traditions of immigrants' native lands did not find a place in classrooms until a new vision of American identity – not uniform, but based on the composite character of the United States – came about. American identity – based on common democratic ideals – changed from a fixed standard to which the immigrant must adapt to a dynamic, evolving process to which immigrants could contribute.[8]

As a result of these developments, most of the school leaders in Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit sought to balance the competing demands of teaching disciplinary knowledge and civic citizenship education. Educators responded to the need for more engaging methods in the "teaching of citizenship" and introduced new units and lessons that fit the social studies framework. While focusing on topics of immediate interest to the students, they emphasized cooperation, loyalty, and group consciousness – the key components of citizenship. Developing effective, age-appropriate teaching methods and creating more relevant class materials was especially important in the evening public-school programs – the best providers of Americanization education for adult immigrants with day jobs. One of the most popular courses was the *Citizenship course* developed in 1913-1914 in Cleveland, which helped immigrants to prepare for naturalization. The rapid growth of night school attendance was stirring a new social, political, and educational dynamic and presented the problems of finding qualified teachers, changing curricula, and maintaining attendance. Mirel presents very intriguing facts regarding these issues. In the great industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest, Americanizers established coordinated educational and social networks linking schools and major corporations (the Detroit Board of Commerce, for example). In order to boost enrollment for the school year 1915-1916, the *English first* campaign made every company employing more than one hundred workers encourage non-English speakers to register for night school programs in English and citizenship. Bringing classes into the factories became one of the most important innovations in Americanization education, not only in Detroit but across the nation as well. But employers quickly realized that they could not simultaneously satisfy the demand for increased war production and

[8] Ibid., 63-68.

the demand for Americanizing workers.[9]

The move toward a more culturally inclusive form of Americanization in public schools (multicultural education) based on recognition of the substantial contributions (the "cultural gifts") that diverse people and races made in building the nation had a profound impact on how foreign- and native-born Americans viewed themselves and their country. Due to growing political power and the constant effort to maintain their home languages and cultures, immigrant communities succeed where native-born educators failed.

In Chapter III, "Americanization and the Foreign Language Press, 1890-1930," Mirel examines the foreign-language press as one of the most powerful agents of Americanization. Instead of opposition, editors and writers from immigrant communities demonstrated strong support for the Americanization education movement and the Anglo-centric public school curriculum. They recognized that knowing English was vital to success in the United States and "intelligent" citizenship. Mirel aligns the journalists with the best progressive educators. Because they knew their communities well and literally spoke their language, they could easily focus on issues of immediate interest and employ culturally relevant examples. The foreign-language newspapers co-constructed the Americanization curriculum and taught its key elements to their readers. From a patriotic-pluralistic stance that combined deep devotion to the United States with a commitment to the native lands and cultures, they educated immigrants on how to become good Americans. The foreign-language press survey shows the major immigrant groups as equally proud of their cultural and linguistic backgrounds, yet eager to play an important role in American life. They walked a fine line between assimilation and cultural pluralism and accused coercive Americanization programs of being un-American. The foreign-language newspapers upheld patriotic pluralism as representing the true essence of American democracy. They sought to revise American history in a way that legitimated their presence in the United States. The combination of idealism and instrumentalism was characteristic of the foreign-language newspapers. They inspired immigrants to utilize the schools to acquire the skills, knowledge and linguistic competence for successful integration. At the same time, they re-

[9] Ibid., 86-91.

defined the term "Americanization" and promoted a new, more inclusive vision of the United States. To adapt, yet to preserve the best was their motto.

The special value of Mirel's book consists in its challenging but ultimately successful project of revealing the true nature of Americanism as simultaneously patriotic and pluralistic and of elevating an idea of the inclusiveness and universalism of cosmopolitan Americanism. The American nation was "born" out of the fragile balance between the demands for naturalization (and allegiance) and the desire to keep the cultural distinctiveness of its constituents. The "story" of the United States is the reconciliation of the patriotic pride of being the citizen of a free, democratic country and the recognition of the fact that people from diverse races and cultures had stood shoulder to shoulder with native-born Americans to secure and expand freedom and, by participating in the nation's democratic processes and institutions, had imported valuable contributions to its civilization. A cosmopolitan country had been created and enriched by people from diverse backgrounds.

The Chicago foreign-language press survey gives an account of the immigrants' response to Americanization and Americanization education. It reveals that most of the newspapers sought to discredit "cultural imperialism" inculcating "white supremacy," for this stance considered immigrants as mere "victims." Alongside the integration of East and South European immigrants into the broader national culture, a process of reciprocal influence was going on. Due to the collective communities' efforts, especially those of the editors and writers of the foreign-language press, the dominant interpretations of Americanization changed over time. In contrast to the coercive Americanization during World War I and the immediate postwar years, Americanization education in the period between the 1930s and 1940s was a remarkable success. The attempts of European immigrants and their native-born allies to rediscover American history, culture, and identity in a more inclusive perspective engendered a new, cosmopolitan vision of the United States – as a country composed of different ethnic, religious, and racial groups, united in their commitment to their home country and its democratic ideas. Mirel argues that "[s]uccessful Americanization involved more than merely integrating into American society; it also involved chang-

ing the way Americans in general conceived of this country."[10]

By articulating a commitment to patriotic patriotism, the book proves that, nowadays, no single nationality constitutes a majority in the United States and that American cosmopolitanism is a historically grounded reality. A new and distinct conglomerate American identity and nationality was slowly but surely being formed. Being American is to appreciate the principles of personal and spiritual liberty bequeathed by the great founders of the nation, to recognize the contributions and progressiveness of people from different racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds. It was not the homogenizing "melting pot" that made Americans, but rather the multicultural "spirit of America": the love of liberty and honor of traditions; the fundamental ideas of equality, tolerance and minority rights, which make some people better Americans than others, even if they cannot trace their lineage to the Mayflower. Successful Americanization education proved to be a negotiated exchange. By teaching a new version of American history and culture to both the majority and minorities the Americanizers engendered a distinctly different vision of the nation's growth and development and made the Americanization of immigrants a great privilege and a great honor. But in the process of becoming Americans, the newcomers changed the way America understands itself.

[10] Ibid., p.160

Review: Ching-Yu Lin & John McSweeney (eds), *Representation and Contestation: Cultural Politics in a Political Century*. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2010. 255 pp. $80.

Ben Garner (University of Manchester, UK)

This book, part of the *At the Interface/Probing the Boundaries* series developed by the dynamic InterDisciplinary.net, presents a collection of eleven pieces of original work examining the contemporary relationship between culture and politics. It is framed by the editors in their introduction as occupying and exploring "the critical space between the apparently enduring political vitality of cultural representation and contestation into the twenty-first century, on the one hand, and the possible limits of a 'cultural' politics, on the other." This focus is explained in reference to two key recent developments: first, the ongoing evolution of information and communication technologies and media of representation that continue to present analysis with questions familiar to the established modes of enquiry associated with the "cultural turn" and second the political limitations of this "cultural turn" that have become increasingly apparent in the wake of economic crises and the critical work of theorists such as Badiou or Žižek. In taking up such issues the book therefore offers a timely contribution. The contributions cut across disciplines and touch on disparate topics, from detailed explorations of cultural phenomena (examples include explorations of the negotiation of political ideology amongst Taiwanese youth and the political implications of an internet-based public sphere) to more methodological-theoretical discussions of the contemporary intersections between culture and politics (addressing issues raised by the work of Nietzsche, Foucault, Rancière and post-Marxist currents of thought). To the credit of the editors, the introduction and conclusion to the book somehow manage to thread all this together, particularly through the inclusion of a "living conclusion" between two of the contributors in the final chapter, where overarching themes and further questions are skillfully brought out and addressed in the context of contem-

porary debates. By exchanging ideas on questions such as "when is culture political?", the nature of the relationship between the global and local, the place of ethics in the culture-politics nexus, and the emancipatory potential of new media, the reader is given access to a dialogue that touches on some of the dilemmas of contemporary theory and practice.

Unsurprisingly perhaps the book's aim to grasp the nature of "the nexus of twenty–first century culture and politics" ultimately proves to be elusive, and the reader is also left with the feeling that this theme has been stretched over what is after all a disparate collection of empirical and theoretical studies. To raise the question of the nature of the relation between culture and politics today requires some broader exploration of the historical specificity of the way that culture is conceived and experienced in the first place as related to the sphere of political contestation. There is little attention within the book, to recall Tony Bennett's *Culture: A Reformer's Science* (1998), to the historically mutable nature of the imbrication between the cultural and political spheres and the limitations and opportunities that the constitution of the "cultural" creates for theoretical intervention and political action. Yúdice's *The Expediency of Culture: Uses of Culture in the Global Era* (2003) offers one example of a more sustained thematic investigation into how the culture-politics nexus is coming to be defined under neoliberal globalization, examining how cultural politics is being transformed not only through developments in media and information communications technologies, but also in their shifting relation to international technologies of development, policy, trade, democratization and human rights. Despite such limitations, it should be remembered that the book's strength lies in its interweaving of a collection of interdisciplinary exchanges and conversations and this will undoubtedly offer nuggets of interest and sparks of inspiration to those working in this field.

VI. ANNOUNCEMENT

Master's and Doctoral Studies in Philosophy Taught in English at Sofia University

Sofia University was founded in 1888 following the best patterns of the European higher education. Sofia is the capital city of the Republic of Bulgaria. Bulgaria is a Member of the European Union (EU).

MASTER'S PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY TAUGHT IN ENGLISH

The MA Program in Philosophy taught in English provides instruction in all major areas of Western Philosophy; besides, the master's thesis can be written on a topic from Eastern Philosophy as well - an expert in this field will be appointed as the supervisor. This program secures guidelines by faculty and leaves enough room for student's own preferences. The degree is recognized worldwide including the EU/EEA and Switzerland, the US, Canada, Russia, Turkey, China, Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Courses offered: Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics, Axiology, Philosophical Method, Truth and Meaning, Philosophy of Intercultural Relations, Social Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Philosophy for Children, Philosophy of Culture, Logic in the Continental Tradition, Theories of Truth, Existential Dialectics, Philosophy of the Subjective Action, Phenomenology, Renaissance Philosophy

Faculty Members: All faculty teaching at the program are approved by the Bulgarian State Highest Assessment Commission. They feature successful teaching experience in this country and abroad and are well published in Bulgarian and English.

Duration of Studies: two semesters of course attendance plus a third semester for writing the master's thesis; opportunities for distance learning.

Admission Requirements: Bachelor's degree in any field of humanities, social science, science, or professional disciplines. No tests or applica-

tion fee are required (for citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland applying for a state scholarship 16 € fee is charged and an interview is held). It is not required for applicants to possess a previous degree in philosophy.

Tuition fee:

1) citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland – 500 € per school year
2) international students - 3 850 € per school year

Financial aid:

A) ***The citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland*** are eligible for state scholarships carrying 60% tuition waiver plus a monthly stipend beginning from the second semester.

B) The Fulbright Graduate Grants are offered to ***American citizens*** as a form of a very competitive financial aid; for more information see www.fulbright.bg. Furthermore, the American applicants are eligible for Federal Loans; please check for more details at the Education Department web site, http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DirectLoan/index.html; at Sallie Mae, http://www.salliemae.com/, and at Student Loan Network, http://www.privatestudentloans.com and https://www.discoverstudentloans.com. It is possible to use some other sources of government financial assistance by the American citizens (please contact the Program Director for details).

C) Financial aid to ***Canadian nationals*** is provided in the form of Government Student Loans by the Province where they permanently reside.

D) ***The Western Balkans citizens*** are welcome to apply for Erasmus Mundus/BASELEUS Project scholarship carrying full tuition waiver and monthly stipend, http://www.basileus.ugent.be/index.asp?p=111&a=111.

E) ***Students from Turkey*** can receive financial aid within the Erasmus Student Exchange Program.

F) Financial aid for ***Chinese students*** is available within the bilateral Chinese-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Chinese Ministry of Education for more information.

H) ***Students from Russia*** (Financial aid for ***Russian students*** is available within the bilateral Russian-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Russian Ministry of Education for more information), ***Ukraine, Belarus, and the other CIS countries, Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East*** receive financial aid in the form of inexpensive dormi-

tory accommodation (about 50 € per month including most of the utilities) plus a discount on public transportation and at the University cafeterias. The same type of financial aid is available for ***the citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland, American citizens, Canadian nationals, Western Balkans citizens, students from Turkey,*** and ***Chinese students.***

Application deadline: September 30, to start in October; January 31, to start in March.

Student Visa Matters: The Sofia University in cooperation with the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science provides the necessary documents for student visa application to all **eligible** candidates outside the ***EU/EEA and Switzerland.***

Cultural Life and Recreation: Being the capital of Bulgaria, Sofia features a rich cultural life. In most of the cinemas, English language films can be seen. There are a number of concert halls, dozens of art galleries, and many national and international cultural centers. Streets of Sofia are populated by cozy cafés and high quality inexpensive restaurants offering Bulgarian, European, and international cuisine. Sofia is a favorable place for summer and winter sports including skiing in the nearby mountain of Vitosha. More about Sofia and can be found at http://www.sofia-life.com/culture/culture.php. You can follow Sofia and Bulgarian news at http://www.novinite.com/lastx.php.

Contact person:

Dr. Alexander L. Gungov, Program Director
E-mail: gungov@sclg.uni-sofia.bg**,** agungov@yahoo.com
Phone: (+3592) 9308-414
(Bulgaria is within the Eastern European Time Zone)
Mailing address: Department of Philosophy, Sofia University,
15 Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd., Sofia 1504, BULGARIA.

DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY TAUGHT IN ENGLISH

The Ph.D. Program in Philosophy taught in English, besides studies in residence, offers an opportunity for extramural studies (extramural studies is a Bulgarian version of distance learning). This Program provides instruction in all major areas of Western Philosophy; besides, the doctoral dissertation can be written on a topic from Eastern Philosophy as well - an expert in this

field will be appointed as the supervisor. This program secures guidelines by faculty and leaves enough room for students' own preferences. The degree is recognized worldwide including the EU/EEA and Switzerland, the US, Canada, Russia, Turkey, China, Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Courses offered: Psychoanalysis and Philosophy, Philosophical Anthropology, Applied Ethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Social Philosophy, Philosophy of Intercultural Relations, Philosophical Method, Continental Philosophy, Philosophy for Children, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Culture, Time and History.

Eligibility Requirement: Master's degree in any field. It is not required for applicants to possess a previous degree in philosophy.

Checklist: CV, two letters of recommendation, standardized tests scores are NOT required. No application fee (for citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland a 32 € fee is charged and an entrance exam is held).

Tuition fee:

1) citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland – in residence: 940 € per school year; extramural: 600 € per school year

2) international students - in residence: 6 500 € per school year; extramural: 3 300 € per school year

Dissertation defense fee: 1 400 €

Duration of studies: in residence – 3 years; extramural – 4 years; opportunities for distance learning.

Financial aid:

A) ***The citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland*** studying in residence are eligible for state scholarships carrying full tuition waiver and waiver of the dissertation defense fee plus a significant (for the Bulgarian standard) monthly stipend. For extramural studies only tuition waiver and the dissertation defense fee waiver are available.

B) The Fulbright Graduate Grants are offered to ***American citizens*** as a form of a very competitive financial aid; for more information see www.fulbright.bg. Furthermore, they are eligible for Federal Loans; please check for more details at the Education Department web site, http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DirectLoan/index.html; at Sallie Mae,

http://www.salliemae.com/, and at Student Loan Network, http://www.privatestudentloans.com and https://www.discoverstudentloans.com. It is possible to use some other sources of government financial assistance by the American citizens (please contact the Program Director for details).

C) Financial aid to ***Canadian nationals*** is provided in the form of Government Student Loans by the Province where they permanently reside. This type of aid is usually unavailable for extramural studies.

D) ***The Western Balkans citizens*** are welcome to apply for Erasmus Mundus/BASELEUS Project scholarship carrying full tuition waiver and monthly stipend, http://www.basileus.ugent.be/index.asp?p=111&a=111.

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Contact person:
Dr. Alexander L. Gungov, Program Director
E-mail: gungov@sclg.uni-sofia.bg**,** agungov@yahoo.com
Phone: (+3592) 9308-414
(Bulgaria is within the Eastern European Time Zone)
Mailing address: Department of Philosophy, Sofia University,
15 Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd., Sofia 1504, BULGARIA.

VII. Information about the Authors and Editors

Dr. Donald Phillip Verene is Candler Professor of Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy at the Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, USA.

Dr. Haralambi Panicidis is Associate Professor of Histroy of Philosophy at the University of Sofia, Bulgaria, EU.

Dr. Roussen Russev is Assoc. Professor at the Kyungpook National University, REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

Dr. Viktor Malakhov is Professor at the H. S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of NAS of UKRAINE.

Dr. Peter Borkowski is Lecturer at the Department of Rhetoric and Academic Writing, the American University in Cairo, EGYPT.

Mr. Karim Mamdani is Independent Scholar residing in Toronto, Ontario, CANADA.

Dr. Kristina Stöckl is Marie Curie Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Department of Philosophical Research, the University of Rome Tor Vergata, Italy, EU.

Dr. Alexander Gungov is Associate Professor at the School of Philosophy and Director of the Graduate Program in Philosophy Taught in English, the University of Sofia, Bulgaria, EU.

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Alexander L. Gungov, the University of Sofia, Editor
Peter S. Borkowski, the American University in Egypt, Associate Editor
Karim Mamdani, Toronto, Canada, Book Review Editor
Kristina Stöckl, the University of Rome Tor Vergata, International Editor
Aglika A. Gungova, Artist

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