II. ETHICS AND WRITING

Tolerance: an Attempt to Overcome Character (An ethical point of view)

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"In a word, my dear, I am an amphibious creature; I love everything, everyone, whatever it is, it amuses me, I should like to combine every species;…"

Marquis de Sade *Philosophy in the Bedroom*

We know from the historical array of manners, that after the late Middle Ages in France—from the 14th-15th century up to the 16th or even the 19th century—the *word* tolerance (lat. *tolerantia*), apart from its other functions, participates delicately in the designation of the place of vice, of the public use of the desire for the sake of desire. At issue are the notorious houses of tolerance (*Les maisons de tolérance*), which sustain the tradition of mastering sexual manners, via the disciplining of prostitution—in a movement from Hetera's freedom to the organized brothel; hovel. Similarly to every disciplinary technique, the one of these houses of tolerance also lives according to formula: systematically turning wrong into right. According to Johann Bloch the historical typology of sexual manners convincingly shows, "that in the West brothel prostitution was dominant, while in the East—the free one. For the West the whorehouse is typical, and for the East—hetaerism." (see Bloch 1996: p.341-354).

We recall this fact because it is linked to an early phase of the turning of the idea and the sense of tolerance, as a patient endurance and

condescending attitude, almost into a normative discourse. The process of the rapid increase in the number of brothel statutes in towns such as Nuremberg, Strasbourg, Munich, Nimes, Avignon, Ulm and others, quickly formed the external framework of this movement. Or more precisely, it constituted a historical transformation of a negative into a positive: from a negative tolerance of desire and an infrastructure of vice, into a positive institutionalization of patience. Some of the explicitly regulated *bans*—which, by the way, form the clumsy skeleton of every heavy *state* (lat. `*gravitas*`, the burdening good; *the very burdening dignity* at the places of a certain behavior)—resonate with a notable historical persistence up to the present day. These restrictions included: strict control over the access of family members, prostitutes or clients; a ban on the admission of clergymen, non-Christians and children, and so on. What's more—from the statute of Ulm for example—we can also indirectly infer about an ethics of care, written between the lines as a result of the methodical hygienizaton of bad habits. Here is what we read there:

> Every woman from the house gets lunch from the keeper…If the lunch had meat, then there were two meals: meat soup and meat with carrots and lettuce…When people don't eat meat, during Lent for example, every woman has for lunch herring with two garnishes...If a woman doesn't want to have lunch, then the keeper will give her something else—of equal value to the price of the food. Apart from this he buys her as much wine as she wants, with her money. If a woman becomes pregnant, the keeper has to drum her out of the house…
>
> (citing of Bloch 1996: p.347)

In the well known research of Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* and the related extensive commentary "On the *Genealogy of Ethics,"* the author, describing the diet techniques and regimes in the ancient *care for oneself*, conveys explicitly in the so-called history of morality, the differentiation between acts (*conduites*) and moral codes (*prescriptions*) (see Foucault 1994). The tension around *the act* and *the*

code makes for the hidden agenda of the ethics. Between the everyday realism of behavior on the one hand and the moral maximalism of duty on the other, between the act and the norm of the good, having for its devoted guard the ideology of the code, there are discernible steps. Steps of hesitation; retreat; admissibility and tolerance;…of *I* and *We* for *him* and *them*; of the right to wrong; of wealth to squandering; of the correct move to deviating behavior. The ideology which stands behind this hesitation is called tolerance. The initial and final statement will be that tolerance is something like a delaying veto, which the ethics of character exercises on the firm determination of the will to be attached permanently to morality. Tolerance temporarily delays the actions of reinforcement of the identity in a cultural environment with a relatively high degree of exchange. The high coefficient of reversibility of products and objects, of faces and characters, of tastes and styles, of worldviews and confessions, makes intolerance inadmissible.

Let's hear one more short retort about the pre-Victorian history of our (I don't know why I say "our") *self*:

> It is claimed, that in the beginning of the XVII century there was still a certain sincerity. Sexual practices didn't aim at discovering a particular secret; words were spoken with no special inhibitions, and things—done with not much hiding; there was a *tolerant familiarity* with the forbidden…Direct gestures, statements deprived of shame, visible transgressions, anatomic parts exhibited and united with no embarrassment: bodies "complacently were boasting".
>
> After this bright light soon dusk would follow—until the monotonous nights of the Victorian bourgeoisie.
>
> (Foucault 1993: p.7)

* * *

In Hume's language, in his reasoning about causality, we can foresee in the dynamic inequality between *an action* and *a norm*, the old contradiction, characteristic for Modernity between "is" and "ought."

Ethics in any case *is*, while morality *ought*; the latter is always compulsively necessary, unreachably high—in the figure of the categorical imperative, with a strong grip in an impossible embrace—the open arms of the so-called will's autonomy.

The interaction of the exclusion of ethics *or* morality, characteristic for French reflection after the 1970's (Foucault, Deleuze), has not lost its strength at all. On the contrary, this is a regime of thinking (see Charles 2003.), whose actuality is constantly increasing. This is especially the case as almost every day a theater is played out which concerns the global moralization of the world through regular "amelioration" of the normative base and through *technologically increasing dependence* of the ethical subject on the moral doer. This dependence expands not just outside/globally—on the paths of the wide world, which is everywhere the same (technically compatible and globally arranged), but also inside/universally—in the borders of the individual, i.e. on an atomic level, in the inner infinity of the souls, where inequality and *non*-identity still dominate, despite the despotism of unifying norms of behavior. An episodic example, which displays this statement even though on a macro-level is the notorious right of interference, laconically and perspicaciously analyzed by Tsvetan Todorov (see Todorov 2000: p.332-349). Todorov's thesis is that the citing of the right of interference as an argument (in a large violation of rights—a key example concerns Kosovo) has some sense only in those cases in which it is enlarged—let's say, for example, dominated by an obligation for help.

If *our* (and "my") morality with all its insolence of the singular excludes your wishes (the ethics of the Other), then this morality, no matter how much it will cite what's good—the democratic order and the so-called "international community" which is always regarded as an exponent of good—is not worth enough to be legitimized into a text of law. What's more with the passing of time it develops a dangerous suspicion towards the "wrong" actions in the others' character. The *better* a morality, the *less* nice, the *less* acceptable and the *less* bearable, in other words—the more intolerable it is. Here the point is not at all

about an empty word game, neither it is about mannered tautology. The scale of the good in a particular cultural context and the "recruitment of virtues" describing the context as legitimate, responsible for the persistence in behavior and building the historical requisite of the character's roles (see McIntyre 1999: p.41-43), is a quantity inversely proportional to its tolerance—of the morally good.

The arrows of a certain possible *project* of an impossible *world ethos* of authors like Hans Küng aim at nothing—at global manhood, in the universal norms of the unconditional morality (*and* ethics?). Universal magnitudes of a non-existing global character, magnitudes, for which we sincerely hope to exist within the borders of the specific individual (the atom of "manhood") is at least very, very disputable. "But what is the world order—with the whole conditioning by the epoch—without the connecting and obligating ethos for the aggregate humanity, without the world ethos?" (see Küng 2003: p.52). This is an insolent question, no doubt, which has its *non*-rhetorical answer: the world order is an illusion with a misleading depth of worldview, persistently sustained on a macro-level by all sources in hand—mostly those of the market and "protective" ones (a timid euphemism for "military")—by agents, which are seriously busy with the *re*production of the available world. The agents in question are the "good" subjects of the world, the "guardians" of order, the monopoly "key rings" of some kind of power—financial-economical, military-technical. The world order is a macro-illusion of a comprehensive and monopolizing accomplished arrangement of the world, which on a micro-level, from a tolerant point of view, we have to distract with a methodical patience. The world has been formed and continues to be formed as an unspecified sum of worlds in zones of minimal agreement—within the borders of the possible dialogue, no matter how distant it seems.

The project, to put it mildly, is not serious, even though it pursues the growth of universal tolerance indirectly by reducing the extent of religious totalizing of the world. It is not ethically serious exactly in its normative seriousness in which it declares itself especially in the form of a *DECLARATION* of a *world ethos*. Every universal declaration, except when stating, often general, properties of "human nature"

imagined with hollow pathos (?), is also a timid form of juridical literacy, prolonging the life of the Categorical imperative in Kant's uncompromising formulation. The normative inclination to write universal declaration texts exercises the character in the abilities of calligraphy and literacy, which is bound to legitimate the universal act regarding adherence to the principles, due to the fact that such an act does not exist. The same is valid, of course, regarding the *DECLARATION of the principles of tolerance*, accepted in 1995 by UNESCO. Identity radically fortressed within itself, including "citizenship of the world," is a dangerous attempt to admit the modern "past of the good" in a game on the uneven pitch of the present. The times in which it used to be modern to keep up with modernity, even though we were once longing for them, have stopped existing since a long time ago. Maybe.

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The idea of the common belonging of man to humanity, to "human nature" has its origins as long ago as the Old Testament tradition, but finds in Augustine's face a determined and firm ideological supporter: "God created mankind from one man (Adam), to show people that in the middle of the multitude He likes unity" (*City of God, book XII., ch.22)*. The first germs of humanism of the antique type can be found—before Augustine—even in the demand of stoicism for a common, united "humility in front of fate," the notorious "*apàtheia*." They also find their expression accomplished as late as in the culture of Modernity and especially in the English and French political context of the Enlightenment.

People are united in a community and live in the world, coming from an enforced neighborhood, rather than thanks to the fact that they are principally the same; because they are not the same. The differences are obvious, especially: regarding sex—female and male; regarding the body shell—the color of the skin, in the domain of the cultural stereotypes—East/West, regarding religious commitment—all kinds or religious communities…There is no point in carrying on with this tiring

list of indications of "unity" which the more it is filled in, the more it starts to resemble what mathematicians mean by "countable infinity." Taken seriously, tolerance recommends not making the obvious into the glaring. The great geographical discoveries from the end of the 15th century confirm, once and for all, the empirical fact of huge human diversity, the accounting and the admitting of which will become a problem for the classical humanism of the western type (see Todorov: 2002). The geographical consolidation of the human commonwealth and the progress in transport in overcoming of distances transform historical tolerance from an idea into a task.

The formulation of the principle of tolerance is linked to the name of the English philosopher John Locke from the 17th century. At first the principle concerns religious tolerance: "Tolerance is for those who are different from others because of religious questions…" (Toleration Letter). Tolerance is a political characteristic (a civil virtue) of the church as an outer organization of faith in the arrangement of the relations with this world and not with Him, i.e. in its interaction with other voluntary organizations of faith—the other churches. Faith itself is busy keeping the fire of pity and hope for salvation in an inner plan—the abyss of the soul. If we go away from Locke's historical specifics, but stay in the same logical order of following, we can frivolously conclude that: man is "jealous in faith" at the expense of his soul—no matter what the faith is; but he tolerates, i.e. bears and recommends, with his spirit, as far as he's inclined to doubt in the depth of faith and in the importance of infidelity, respectively.

Faith comes to the soul from within and digs deeply; tolerance stays outside and looks from above. The formula `the soul *binds*—the spirit *relates*` is valid conditionally, of course, as far as the two constants are separable at all within the bodily delineations of human existence. In any case, the more tolerant a person is, the more capable he is of exchanging well-being and welfare, sense and nonsense (like sense of humor, grace and numerous other "useless" notions of the soul); the more he is inclined to participate in *relations* of matching and partial overlap in the zones with mild climate of the character and with average temperature values of the cultural context. The tolerant spirit doesn't

charge itself with optimism from the abstract abundance of licensing regimes and regulating rules. He isn't intoxicated by the ability, at any cost, to create permanent structural units (blocks, alliances, institutions), to bind only the so-called "tough *binds,*" locking the soul's personal life in the hygienic homes of the "healthy body." The arsenal of techniques of concentration and incorporation draws the corpus of character's inner core—its features are, on the whole, *in*tolerant, or at least organically cultivate a worldview which serves hard uncompromising identity, moving in the narrow cleft between loyalty and loyal subjectivity, between fidelity and servility. Intolerance therefore is primal, inwardly inherent and compulsory, without being, however, wanted till the end. "This makes us assume that in its base tolerance is a negation of a negation, it is anti-tolerance and this seems to have a decisive importance" (Marcel 2002: p.126).

In Latin "*tolerantia*"—tolerance, *endurance*—is a word closely synonymous to indifference (Lat. `*indiferentia*` means *indifference*). In classical culture and philology, the Latin word couple *tolerantia*/*indiferentia*, in a broader historical sense, is equivalent in content to the etymologically older Greek terminological couple *ataraksia*/*adiaforia*. The first `*ataraxía*` means *imperturbability* and is linked to valuing of the "even" motion of the soul in the ancient Greek philosophical school of Epicurus; i.e. said in a cliché "mental peace" ("imperturbability of the spirit"). The use of the second notion `*adiaforía*` is linked to the philosophical direction of stoicism and means literally *in-difference*; bearing—"fate's blows"—with the necessary dose of firmness, which means "a threshold of tolerance" for the things which we cannot change and which do not depend on us.

The terminological tours, except for an inclination to etymology as an end in itself, show mostly the deep historical roots of the notion of tolerance and the tolerant attitude which keep, even today, the basic set of meanings of the term and functions of the action. A tolerant disposition towards the world is directly bound to an emotional attitude of *equalization* under fate. The point is about something as a principle of *high* and *even* in-difference to those circumstances in life which do not

disturb us and to which we ourselves also mustn't impede. What is the difference "between me—the master and you—the slave, as we are both slaves of fate" asks the emperor-stoic Marcus Aurelius, thinking magnanimously that the difference is minor.

The religious disposition towards this world (*civitas terrena*) through the other world (*civitas Dei*) as interpreted by Augustine makes useful the whole capacity of the relevant holy plot, which supports the tradition for a final salvation in a model type. It still doesn't have any competition, as long as it offers a radical version of a monolithic being in the world, despite all of its current and allegedly only temporary failures. And this is valid not only for religious identity. The scientifically directed doctrine of the Enlightenment in the face of Condorcet counts on the proceeding progress, which civilizes the human being by turning it into a citizenship unit of the world humanity. Even Wolter's ironic charm is pronounced radically on diversity: "Morality is one, Mr. Le Beau, as is geometry." (*Philosophical dictionary,* ch. Morality), without remorse, claims one of the big advocates of tolerance. Tolerance of the past is due to a great extent to the fact that we assume that history is a sum of oddities—accidents of truth which fortunately no longer exist.

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Tolerance is admissible thanks to the circumstance that the *results* of the production of *T*ruth with a capital letter (the *knowledge* of the world and the human) are uncertain and unstable investments in the domain of the ethos. In the "production of tolerance" in the infrastructure of a character, a significant premise is not to allow at any cost the so-called love for the truth to reach the end. Paradoxically said, the *truthful* attitude—the *over*-evaluation of authenticity—*is unacceptable*, as far as it intimately excludes diversity. As the French author André Compte-Sponville mentions: "When truth is recognized for certain, tolerance becomes useless" (Compte-Sponville 1999: p.255). So the constant scarcity of truth (and thank God) in human relations (in "the things of life") is compensated by constant redaction, with which

the principle of tolerance corrects every serious and incomplete character. In order not to sound with pathos, we can formulate this principle in our everyday routine as *current tolerance*. The question is about some constant coefficient of necessary and minimal tolerance to the diversity in the whole, or almost whole specter of possible images: races and diverse ethnical belonging; marginal communities and diverse sexuality into groups—for example homosexuality, transvestism; "maniac interests clubs" and whatnot. In general "things of life" are always more impossible to tolerate and more difficult to explain than we are prone to imagine in the well-ordered and truthful theory.

If morality is a one-member multitude, then this is better for the different types of ethics which, in order to soften normative pressure, produce a plentitude of micro-ideologies of wishes, partially neutralizing the principle's power and leaving moral pressure aside. The tolerant disposition is a care for the preservation of difference with the least harm possible. At the starting point from which we try to follow, and which is of a moderate difference between ethics and morality, tolerance is mostly and a lot more an outer definer of the ethos, than an inner element of the integration of the moral doer. In a more literal sense tolerance protects from an action and is not an active characteristic of one or another cultural type—open or closed, social or communal, of the well being or of the survival.

Public macro-ideologies, applying to power-participation, especially in politics, legitimate themselves through a direct citing of morality's principles, of the common wellbeing and the common interest, i.e. they are accomplished on the slippery ground of the common. Since the common wellbeing is realized tactically through a tacit exclusion of numerous private welfares, then the mentioning of political tolerance (while the mandate lasts) becomes extremely difficult; so difficult, that it's best to keep quiet while we talk about it. Most often tolerance serves as an immunity shield to *micro*-ideologies, describing and preserving wishes mostly on the level of *individual* subjectivity, in a reality in which we shouldn't doubt even hypothetically. Tolerance ensures the necessary aesthetic broadness for

"spread" of the "I" through a bearable refusal of a radical identity.

Ethics and aesthetics are synonymous. In any case, not in the domain of high art, which is often an extension of morality, through the decisive participation of the genius. Outside of the places established for the consuming of the masterpieces of the world, Spirit—the arch of the temple, the illuminated walls of the museum, the awesome inaccessibility of the professional scene—ethics and aesthetics play the same game within the borders of that stylization of living, which with Foucault's help, is thinkable hand in hand with the formula *aesthetics of existence:*

> I'm stunned by the fact that in our society art has become something linked only to objects, but not individuals, life; that art is something specialized, that it is created only by specialists who are artists?
>
> (Foucault 1994: p.392)

On aesthetic surfaces, tolerance is a specification of the form and not a mark of the contents. Through its participation the benevolence of the eyes is measured (the senses in a broader sense), with which they relate themselves to the everydayness of the forms—drawing, figuration, silhouette. With their help the heavy elements from the contents of the character move "invisibly"—merit and *honor*; dignity and *majesty*; religious *taboo*; the numerous repressions and *self-repressions* upon the wishes which we come across while we walk in the street. Do I have reasons to like the ritual head-cloth, which wrapped thickly the face of a young girl and crowned with a religious "success" the figure of a slender body? Is the covered face a subject of liking? Yes. It is completely possible that I like this view, as long as the symbol of the head-cloth doesn't exceed the meaning of an outer teaser of curiosity, without referring explicitly to details of the cult practice with which I am not linked in any way. It would be enough that the religious impetus remains invisible for me and all those, who catch a glimpse of the face under the head-cloths and don't care about faith during a walk.

The first physiognomic contact with tolerance happens by means

of the kind and tractable face, in a meeting with the so-called open (sincere) character—minimum hypocrisy and maximum readiness for agreement. The principle of universal sympathy is that which is legitimated precisely by tolerance as a dialogue sense in the ethical subject, contrary to *principium individuationis*, legitimating itself in its extreme version of the cognitive "I", which though, is not fit as a building material in the construction of a community, of the moderate tolerable small "*we*". The date with tolerance is described as a process of aesthetical enhancement of the first sight sympathy. The regular searching for a compromising, consensus personality is not accidental at all—especially when there is a collapse of a certain segment in social life. The first condition to tolerate someone (and not something; things are not due toleration) is to underestimate yourself without, however, overestimating the other.

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As already mentioned, the idea of tolerance is inapplicable to imposing a common frame on a global worldview, which as it cannot happen, is at least right to be fixed. We shouldn't expect that the value hierarchy of priorities and the putting of them into a list of tasks will find a happy end in the ideological framework of humanity, which we conveniently have accepted exists, despite all suspicions to the contrary. Tolerance is not specific for one or another worldview type. The main occupation of every worldview is to overestimate morality—to moralize character, moving "good behavior's" habits from the distant past forward to the future. Worldview historically is a model of closure into cultural samples, forming a suitable atmosphere precisely for its *own ones*. This, on the one hand, is a certain obstacle to the development of tolerance—the paradox of the closed community whose sincere intolerance successfully attacks with its longevity the model of the "open society". On the other hand, to ensure—not only in terms of the market, of course—its growing needs of broadening society progressively "becomes sclerotic" into firm worldview palpabilities—that "progress has no alternative," that "one does not negotiate with

terrorists“ and many others.

Extremities in the hidden usage of tolerance are also dangerous. Behind the enormous everyday production of legal and refined violence in postmodern communities, hypocritically is lurking what Marcuse called *Repressive tolerance*. “Violence which turns the commonly accepted citing of tolerance into a purely theatrical attribute, in a handy camouflage…” (cited by Todorov 2002: p.217). Hypocrisy comes from the fact that the idea of tolerance—which has no doubt a western genealogy, understood as a citizen and a political “sovereignty” of the character in the solving of a crisis of an ethnic and religious kind—is gradually replaced by the idea of null tolerance. The nil increases with the approach of the threats. For this purpose the cases of “radicalizing Islam” (what a suitable cliché) serve as a magnifying glass in reference to the “Evil” and are a motive for action of “offensive tolerance” of the American type whose basic task threatens to become the radical improvement.

Tolerance is in general an inclination for the realization of patience, a desire of the will to be liked and to be pushed above the level of the nil, to spend energy in the positive emotional diapason of human relations. It, however, is not present in the database of whatever organic character. The discourse about tolerance is something of a *complementary* theory of relations which otherwise in a natural environment is self-regulated mainly by the extreme values of tension, fluctuating between recognition–suspicion, acceptance–rejection, wealth–poverty, love–hate. Tolerance can be compared to a transformer of electricity which controls and keeps at relatively constant values the electric voltage that comes into the grid. I.e. tolerance is a safety fuse, preventing the human *relations'* net (only the relations, not the relationships) from a short circuit, from the cessation of communication when souls' “fuel” has run out.

With the predicate “tolerant” are designated those subjects to which a character has already been prescribed, *ethos*—a stable form of reaction and the taking of decisions with desire's participation. And if for domains such as politics the usage of the characteristic “tolerant” is inexcusable, then for the political ethos—in the spirit of Max Weber for

example—and for the individuals that temporarily embody it, this is already acceptable. Tolerance's borders are the "I's" borders in the domain of the desires whose surplus serves for nothing but exchange, sharing and playing. The most common, trivial reason for people to break up, not to get along, to quarrel and not to talk to each other is the circumstance that they have already stopped playing and have firmly decided to "tell the truth in the eyes."

Regarding tolerance, "truth" is therefore possible within the frames of ethics of the (non)identity, wherein the individuals' security doesn't directly depend on measures for protection—an obligation for defense hypocritically combined with the right to attack. Parting with a part of one's own self becomes necessary because of the easiness of the motion, the communication, the dialogue; the longing which to a great extent makes unnecessary the salvation in the deceptive security of a firm integrity of the type of a moral person, religious community, the best democratic citizenship and whatnot phantoms of happiness, deprived of joy. The communities, on their behalf, don't die, not because they are fit to survive in the presence of a rescue plan, but just because they don't cease to co-exist, to *tolerate* each other literally, to stand each other physically—both at an inter-individual and at an inter-communal level. The tolerant response to the question of the soul's immortality, independently of the phase of ''modernity'', in which it stays, is that it lives until the source of tolerance runs out. The ethics of the subject puts to the test the skills of a current reformulation of patience: from a depressive state into a desire for a date, from tension into a game, from suffering to joy.

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"People are born for each other," Marcus Aurelius intones. "Then either teach them this, or tolerate them" (*Meditations, book.VIII., 5).* A confession which sounds with pathos in Roman and erotically in Greek; a confession which evenly involves us in the cosmic spectacle and urges us to treat *ourselves* from a long distance and the *world* from a short one. The hesitant fluctuation of character, consistently named

tolerance—in the form of an *idea* (Marcus Aurelius, Montaigne), as well as shaped into a *discourse* with a clear beginning, set by Locke—is found not endlessly far, but still aside from the discourse practices which define the attitude of the subject to truth and the attitude of the man to salvation. This is so obvious…for us that we can directly repeat it with Montaigne's expressive calmness: "I content myself with enjoying the world without bustle" (*Essays*, v.III., 9. *Of vanity*).

Let's go back to the topic given in the beginning by Sade's *motto*: the motive of *entertainment*: the liking and the trying, the walking through and the mixing…of *all genres*. Tolerance, this currently necessary and minimal lenity to the diversity in the broadening specter of different images and formations, also relies on the mixing of genres: faith with conviction, opinion with truth, asceticism with secularism etc. The tolerant view cultivates a subversive sharpness of the eyesight in the meeting of clear globalizing discourses, behind which, except from the world of global economics, remains a range of **"**worlds,**"** from the globalization of which nothing must prevent us from treating it lightly. Apart from the deep, sincere and deliberate lightness towards the forced consolidation of territory, it is also necessary that we open our eyes wide with disapproval to the offensive amelioration of the world (as if there is only one), behind which the argument of "the most profitable" (let's say, of the petrol) remains undisguised. The most profitable, as well as the best today are not even synonymous; they are only seemingly two different ways of talking wisely and frowning about the only necessity—the economic one. "The modern name of necessity, as it is known, is 'economics'" (Badiou 2004: p.30). Who profits from the best prices then? Why ask?! The best ones!

The view of the ethical individual through the prism of tolerance helps man to understand in a non-literary way the significance of the question: *How important is it to be earnest?*—Even without liking Oscar Wilde, which is practically impossible. The careful and caring seriousness, with which we relate to the "immediate" reality of human desires, allows us to maintain the differences in the broader frames of the beautiful and not within the narrower frames of the good. The appearance of the good looks like an army dressed in full armor,

presented in all its glory of a pompous military parade. The military orchestra plays thundering marches, the ranks are stretched in exemplary fashion, as a norm befits and the soldiers cheerfully stamp their legs. In the midst of war, in the scenes of the "theatre of the battlefield," the glitter of armor darkens and the sun cannot shine on all sides of the armed clash. The losing participants in the conflict melt in the shade of the winner, who has already ceased to make a good impression. Good looks bad, it has gone ugly.

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The participants in the normative discourse are never equal, despite that this seems obvious, if we cite the rules. At least, because clear rational argumentation is required from all, but why? It is not clear from the point of view of Desire. The skill, adopted by the ethical rhetoric of desires is not at all a pretentious quirk of an aesthetic intuition. In addition to beautifying—including of the things, unfit for improvement, which they implicitly pursue—these abilities protects us in such a way, that we don't directly affect desires, which haven't possessed us up to this moment. Desires are movable property of an owner (*homo ethicus*) with no right of property. The figure of *homo ethicus* serves as an alibi for violation of uniformity and expansion of diversity. It still stays as a guarantee, that the right of diversity must be complemented by an *obligation* of tolerance. The virtue taken into consideration will certainly be disliked or at least unexpected for *homo moralis*; together with his whole nutrition environment, which overfeeds him with normative discourses, tending to bad declarative infinity.

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