


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Editor
Sofia Philosophical Review
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COMING BACK TO PERSON – CENTERED MEDICINE AND EDUCATION

Gadamer and the Enigma of Health

Jean Buttigieg (University of Malta)

Abstract

The article analyses Gadamer's text, "On The Enigma Character of Health," in the context of modern society's penchant for seeing the patient as a case-study rather than a person. Although it may appear that this text is discontinuous with the rest of Gadamer's work, there are themes which are to be found in his *Truth and Method*, including the critique of the supremacy of the scientific method and the retrieval of the notion of nature and its correlation with the artful or non-technical. In this essay, Gadamer avoids the extreme of Luddism and technophilia but tries to recover the fundamental notions that have always underlined the art of medical care as a service of well-being for the patient. Biotechnology is one of the emerging technologies, together with robotics and nanotechnology that, together with information technology, pose a very serious threat to our humanness. These are ubiquitous technologies that are taking over many of the responsibilities that hitherto were the prerogative of the human condition. In the area of information technology we are approaching a situation where 'connecting' is becoming more important than 'communicating.' We should strive to prevent a similar situation in the area of medical care where 'dispensing' is taking priority over 'consulting.'

Introduction

A student of Heidegger's, Hans-Georg Gadamer has focused his attention on the way medical science is perceived by modern society, which has itself been transformed by modern science. In his view, which he shares with Martin Heidegger and Jürgen Habermas among others, modern society's outlook on the phenomena of sickness and health has been greatly influenced by man's incessant drive to objectify the world with the ultimate

aim of achieving complete technological mastery over nature.¹ The great advances in medical technology that have happened over the past couple of decades have changed the thinking behind the way medical treatment is administered to patients. The human body has come to be seen as “little more than physicality that is calculable, predictable, and thus programmable to some extent.”² The same kind of thinking has reduced the human genome to a ‘DNA repository’ of around 3 billion chemical base pairs whose identification is believed to be capable of revealing the secret of our humanness, which will also become programmable in the future, through the marvels of biotechnological manipulation. This is a goal that, Gadamer remarks, contrasts sharply with the natural philosophy of antiquity that looked upon nature as a self-maintaining and self-restoring totality. Gadamer continually refers to Platos’ *Phaedrus* with its holistic understanding of the human being as an essential part of the totality that is the world. In the dialogue, Socrates speaks of the need to ‘know’ the soul in order to ‘heal’ the body and the impossibility of healing the body and soul without knowing something about the ‘unity of being itself’ that can be interpreted as Heidegger’s *Dasein*.³ For Gadamer, the practice of medical science is closely connected to a person’s being and sense of life, as it was with the Greeks, with the focus of the art of healing on the restoration and maintenance of health. As modern medicine is primarily geared towards the understanding of disease and fighting illness, we tend to forget that our ultimate goal always remains the restoration of health:

But the healing arts involve not only the successful struggle against illness but also the process of reconvalescence and, ultimately, care for health in the broadest sense.⁴

But it is from the perspective of modern science that Gadamer chooses to look upon the phenomena of sickness and health. He begins

¹ Fred Dallmayr, “The Enigma of Health: Hans-Georg Gadamer at 100,” *The Review of Politics* 62 (2000): 327-50, at 327.

² Hilde M. Zitzelsberger, “Concerning Technology: Thinking with Heidegger,” *Nursing Philosophy* 5.3 (2004): 242- 50.

³ Dallmayr, “The Enigma of Health,” 327-50.

⁴ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Enigma of Health: The Art of Healing in a Scientific Age* (California: Stanford University Press, 1996), 108.

by distinguishing between the field of scientific medicine that is concerned with the knowledge of things in general and the art of healing that demands the concrete application of the knowledge of scientific medicine to particular cases. For Gadamer, it is only the first kind of knowledge that can be taught and learnt whereas the art of healing is something that is not learnt from books but instead acquired through experience and the development of one's power of judgement.⁵

Michael Polanyi expressed similar views to Gadamer's on this issue when he spoke about "tacit knowledge" as the personal element involved in a doctor's responsibility towards his patient. Whereas the rules of scientific detachment require that we limit ourselves only to physical and chemical observations, such a stance does not allow us to get involved personally in the scientific endeavour.⁶ Polanyi believes that any scientific research pursued in such a detached and impersonal and materialistic way isolates itself from a human's higher faculties and thereby restricts its power of discernment and understanding. On the other hand, a science which incorporates a personal component and which is open to other branches of knowing allows us not only to understand the true function of science but also our true function and purpose as persons.⁷

When a doctor is about to perform a patient's diagnosis, 'tacit knowledge' is that unaccountable and inarticulate component of knowledge that makes him seem to know more than he actually does!⁸ Like the child of ten, who is able to ride a bicycle without being able to express the physical rules governing turning, balance, speed and the angle of disequilibrium, tacit knowing is the fundamental power of the mind that not only creates and lends meaning to explicit knowing but also controls it. Gestalt psychology explains this phenomenon by demonstrating how we recognize a face by integrating its particulars impressed in our brain into a comprehensive entity.⁹ While integration occurs as we shift our attention from the parts to the whole, the whole is not sim-

⁵ Ibid., 102-03.

⁶ Michael Polanyi, *Knowing and Being*, (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1969), 123.

⁷ Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1967), 24-25.

⁸ Ibid., 4.

⁹ Ibid., 6.

ply a sum of parts because the parts take on a different meaning in the whole. When we see a whole, we see the individual parts differently from the way we see them in isolation. There is an active shaping of experience that happens within us, that transforms the parts themselves even as it transforms the parts into a comprehensive entity. The same happens when we attend only subsidiarily to the two-dimensional words in a text in order to permit tacit integration and understand the multidimensional meanings that are conveyed through the text.¹⁰ So tacit knowing is a dynamic process that grows increasingly meaningful with time and experience.

It is maybe for this reason, because a purely objective position does not allow a doctor to participate personally in his rapport with a patient, that it has proved necessary to coin the phrase ‘quality of life’ in the field of medical care.¹¹ This was done, Gadamer believes, with the purpose of ensuring that the patient’s needs and desires remain at the heart of professional medical care and that he or she is not reduced to a machine requiring only technical assistance to resume its proper functions. And one of the skills acquired in the art of healing, through lived human experience, is the ability to judge the ways and means by which medical science can be made to contribute to a patient’s ‘quality of life.’ This expression, for Gadamer, reveals,

fundamental and immemorial human recognition that each of us has to ‘lead’ our own lives and that we must decide for ourselves how we are going to live.¹²

But the issue that Gadamer raises is whether medical science can be more appropriately defined as the ‘science of illness’ or the ‘science of health.’ On the one hand, it is illness that ‘objectifies’ itself, presenting itself as something opposed to us and forcing itself upon us. So when we are sick we talk of our illness as a ‘case of illness.’ Gadamer refers to the German word for ‘case’ that is *Fall* which is a word that originates from the game of dice and refers to the role which ‘falls’ to a noun within a sentence. Likewise, an illness is something that ‘befalls’

¹⁰ Mark T. Mitchell, *Michael Polanyi* (Delaware: ISI Books, 2006), 73-74.

¹¹ Gadamer, *Enigma of Health*, 104.

¹² *Ibid.*

or ‘falls’ to us. The Greek word for ‘symptom’ has a very close meaning to the German word for ‘fall’ as it is used to refer to the conspicuous features that become manifest when an illness ‘befalls’ us.¹³ On the other hand health, unlike illness, escapes objectification because it does not really actually present itself to us, argues Gadamer.¹⁴ There is a real mystery in the hidden character of health that makes it absurd to ask someone, ‘Are you healthy?’ According to Gadamer, it is because health is a condition of inner accord and of harmony with oneself that it defies measurement and standardization.¹⁵ He challenges the notion that health can be technically engineered or made, because it defies the project of mastery over nature that is the goal of modern medical science.¹⁶

For Gadamer, contrary to what medical science may aspire to achieve, health will never be the product of manipulation or forceful intervention as epitomized in Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World*.¹⁷ In his book, Huxley depicts human life seven centuries from now when with genetic manipulation, psychoactive drugs, hypnopaedia and high-tech amusements, disease is totally eliminated together with aggression, war, anxiety, suffering, guilt and grief.¹⁸ *Brave New World* anticipates the bio-medical project of medical science to preserve and prolong bodily life at the expense of stripping human life of much of its dignity. Aldous Huxley managed to portray in a brilliant way how progress can become tragedy when one individual, the ‘Savage,’ who is a human being bred by natural means, dares confront the ‘Controller,’ Mustapha Mond:

‘But I don’t want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness, I want sin’.

‘In fact’, said the Savage defiantly, ‘I’m claiming the right to be unhappy’.

‘Not to mention the right to grow old and ugly, and impotent; the right to have syphilis and cancer; the right to have too little to eat; the right to be lousy; the right to live in constant apprehension of what may happen to-

¹³ Ibid., 107.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 107-8.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World* (London: Flamingo, 1994).

¹⁸ Leon R. Kass, *Life, Liberty and the Defence of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002), 5.

morrow; the right to catch typhoid; the right to be tortured by unspeakable pains of every kind'.¹⁹

This is a confrontation between, on the one hand, the drug 'soma'²⁰ that is a single-chemical combination of many of today's drugs' effects and a symbol for the powerful influence of science and technology on society and, on the other hand, the humanness of the Savage that symbolizes Gadamer's understanding of health as something that each and every one of us must take care of through the way we choose to lead our lives:

What is important is to recognize the other in their otherness, as opposed, for example, to the tendency towards standardization promoted by modern technology, the autocratic control of education by school authorities or the blind insistence on authority by a teacher or a father. Only by means of such recognition can we hope to provide genuine guidance which helps the other to find their own independent way. Treatment always involves also a certain granting of freedom.²¹

The confrontation is also between those who believe that biology alone can explain illness and health and those who believe that biology cannot ignore metaphysical considerations about life and reality. In a sense it is a confrontation between biotechnological humanism that rejects any form of human genomic metaphysics and transcendental humanism that looks upon the human genome as being the true essence of human nature with external influences considered to be mere accidental occasions. *Brave New World* is obviously a work of science fiction but the likeness between Huxley's fictional world and our own are frankly unnerving when we consider the great advances that have been made in the past years in the area of biotechnology²² and its application to many of the external influences upon human nature rather than its true essential nature.

Biotechnological humanism is a product of modern technology and it will lead to human debasement rather than fulfilment. By reflecting

¹⁹ Huxley, *Brave New World*, 219.

²⁰ In Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, soma is a drug that provides an easy escape from the hassles of daily life and is used by the government as a method of control through pleasure.

²¹ Gadamer, *Enigma of Health*, 109.

²² Kass, *Defence of Dignity*, 6.

on the special role that the doctor has with his patient, Gadamer paves the way for a road that will put biotechnology at the service of compassionate humanness that will not allow the achievement of perfected bodies at the price of flattened souls.²³ He proceeds on this path by reflecting on that “inner proportion or inner correspondence that cannot be measured and yet must always be taken into account.”²⁴

First he explains that the role of the doctor that must be one of caring for the patient in such a manner that he can verify the patient’s own subjective localization or experience of pain. He refers to the German word, *Behandeln*, which is equivalent to the Latin word *palpare*, meaning ‘with the hand’ or *palpus*.²⁵ He then proceeds to explain that the living use of the term *Behandeln* goes beyond the specific domain of medicine because everyone, irrespective of his profession in life, is called to treat others correctly by not forcing himself on them or compelling them to accept things or do things against their own will. According to Gadamer, such things will cease only when we choose to recognize “the other in their otherness.”²⁶ In the doctor-patient relationship, the doctor will choose not to impose himself on his patient when he responsibly undertakes to use his medical expertise to help the patient recover from his illness, but at the same time recognizing in the patient the freedom to find his own, independent way. This requires that the doctor’s skill to cure illness must not only prove effective in relieving the patient of the symptoms of his illness but, more importantly, must be accepted by the patient who is ill. So it is not a question of simply filling out a prescription and handing it to the patient, nor is it a question of “getting rid of it” as, comments Gadamer, surgeons are wont to say to a patient who is about to undergo surgery.²⁷ This way of talking tends to look upon the illness of a patient as having a separate existence from him and which the doctor must destroy. But this is not the real task of the doctor, according to Gadamer. To him, doctors should not really be expected to ‘make’ or ‘do’ anything—rather they should humbly contribute towards

²³ Ibid., 134.

²⁴ Gadamer, *Enigma of Health*, 108.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., 109.

²⁷ Ibid., 110.

guiding health in a certain manner so as to help the patient get better.²⁸ Health, to Gadamer is a general feeling of well-being and,

it shows itself above all where such a feeling of well-being means we are open to new things, ready to embark on new enterprises and, forgetful of ourselves, scarcely notice the demands and strains which are put on us.²⁹

Given that the disruption of health that normally necessitates treatment of a patient by a doctor puts the patient in an unequal relationship with the doctor, it is vital that the patient is free to discuss his or her illness with the doctor. Dialogue and discussion serve to humanize the inequality of the doctor-patient relationship which, according to Gadamer, remains one of the most difficult challenges that confront human beings. The disruption of health brings with it a disturbance in one's equilibrium that must perforce be redressed by applying a counterforce which can easily cause a new loss of equilibrium. Medical treatment will act as this counterforce in the disruption of health but care must be taken so as not to induce a new imbalance through, for example, unnecessary prescriptions. Gadamer explains the delicate balance that must be maintained by the medical practitioner in dialogue with his patient by referring to the words of Rilke who in the *Duino Elegies* speaks of how, "The permanently too little springs over into the empty too much."³⁰ So every effort must be made for the doctor to discern exactly the right moment and the right dosage when treating a patient.³¹ The same concerns have been expressed by Daniel Callahan, one of the founders of bioethics, who has argued in favour of a healthcare system that helps the patient cope with the failings of the body rather than one that is unilaterally focussed on the conquering of disease and the extension of life at all costs.³²

And, according to Gadamer, here lies the enigmatic character of health for it is none other than "the rhythm of life, a permanent process

²⁸ Ibid., 109.

²⁹ Ibid., 112.

³⁰ Ibid., 114.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Daniel Callahan, as quoted by Ronald M. Green in *Babies by Design: The Ethics of Genetic Choice* (New Haven: Yale University, 2007), 3-4.

in which equilibrium re-establishes itself.” He speaks of the three processes of breathing, digesting and sleeping which are three rhythmic phenomena that help to produce vitality, refreshment and the restoration of energy.³³ Although these rhythmic functions are not under our control, they constitute an integral part of ourselves and, in fact, sustain us. But these phenomena have little to do with the consumption of medicines or the conscious effort to control them.³⁴

Gadamer quotes a famous saying of Heraclitus: “the harmony which is hidden is always stronger than that which is revealed.” He takes this to refer to the harmonious balance of the ‘humours’ in ancient medicine, explaining that,

The harmony of health only displays its real strength where it does not leave us numbed and deadened, that disturbing effect revealed or produced by persisting pain or the debilitating rush of intoxication.³⁵

To Gadamer, therefore, medical treatment must be related to the ‘totality’ of the human person and its methods and goals should be concerned with the hidden harmony that must be constantly recovered and in which is discovered both the miracle of convalescence and the mystery of health. Gadamer reminds us that we are part of nature and it is in fact this nature within us that, together with the self-sustaining organic defence mechanism of our bodies, is able to sustain our ‘inner’ equilibrium, which is what constitutes life. It follows that we should constantly remind ourselves that we can only oppose nature through being part of nature ourselves and through being sustained by nature, lest we forget that both the doctor and patient must together acknowledge the role of nature if successful recovery is to be accomplished.³⁶

Medical practice must make definitive decisions about life and death based on current scientific knowledge that, by its very nature, remains incomplete and temporary. And modernity has systematically tended to restrict what counts as real knowledge to only that which can be known by scientific experiment. As a direct result of this reductive

³³ Gadamer, *Enigma of Health*, 114.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 115.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 115-16.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 116.

approach to knowledge, medical practice is forced to treat current scientific knowledge as if it had the final word on everything.

Gadamer blames the metaphysical agnosticism of modernity for the current situation that insists on explaining illness and health in purely physiological or neurophysiologic terms. But according to Gadamer, metaphysics is essential for reflecting on the meaning of health and such a need is made manifest when doctors refuse to subsume their patients under general scientific schemata and persist in maintaining a 'special relationship' with their patients, believing, as the Greek physicians of antiquity did, that one cannot treat the body without concomitantly treating the soul. The *manner* in which doctors practice the art of healing today has changed significantly from the way it was practiced in classical times but the *matter* that concerns medical practice, namely the patient's whole being has not changed and medical science on its own is simply inadequate to deal with questions of life and reality that pertain more to metaphysics.

Gadamer's conclusion is that in order to understand the question of health, what is needed is metaphysics rather than biology. It is imperative that metaphysical considerations about life and reality are not ignored because they do not fit into the general schemata of medical science. Progress must not be achieved at the expense of flattened and soulless bodies that will result in human debasement rather than fulfillment. This is the challenge of modern bioethical thinking that it brings back into the field of biotechnology metaphysical considerations that are at the heart of our self-understanding as a species.

Hearing the University

Zoran Dimić (University of Niš)

Abstract

The article examines the extent to which we can still insist on all three of Humboldt's principles of the idea of the university. The question of whether the idea of the university still has the force of legitimization of the institution, coincides today with an attempt at “awakening” the professors and students. The place where the idea of university resides must be sought in a community of the scientific and educational We of university professors and students. Opening the horizon before the idea of the university is only possible if we again begin to understand education and knowledge as the affirmation of hearing.

“...wer in seiner Wissenschaft nur wie in einem fremden Eigentume lebt, wer sie nicht persönlich besitzt, sich ein sicheres und lebendiges Organ für sie erworben hat, sie nicht in jedem Augenblick neu aus sich zu erzeugen anfangen könnte, ist ein Unwürdigen, der schon in dem Versuch, die Gedanken der Vorwelt oder Gegenwart bloss historisch zu überliefern, über seine Grenze geht und etwas übernimmt, das er nicht leisten kann.”¹

Is there still a point in being interested today in the original Humboldtian idea of university? Can anything new be expected from it? What is the point of discussing the idea today if we know that almost all of the three well-known Humboldtian principles of the idea of the uni-

¹ “he who lives in his science only as in a sort of another man’s property, who does not possess it personally, who has not provided a safe and living organ for it, who could not start again creating it within himself at every moment, is not worthy of the science itself and with the very attempt to transfer the thoughts of the earlier or today’s world in a mere historical way, he crosses his limit and undertakes what cannot be done.” (F.W. Schelling, *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums*, in *Die Idee der Deutschen Universitäts* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956), 20. My translation.

versity,² which represent its foundations, are actually not applied anymore? Therefore is the idea of the university still any good?

The defenders of such a view could be emboldened by citing the facts of contemporary university practice, that is, by adducing the image of modern universities. Through an intensive functionalization of knowledge, today's institutions of higher education first of all seek to impart the necessary professional skills and competencies which society, the state and modern supranational corporations need. Never before has there been more research conducted, and so it seems, more results and discoveries at university faculties and institutes than today. On the other hand, the number of students has increased many times since the Second World War.³

It seems that humankind and universities do quite well without an idea of university! What does the authentic, enlightening character of the idea of the university, i.e. the emancipatory role of knowledge, mean at all to a modern student who wants to gain by studying his/her place in society and a comfortable, easy-going life? Philosophers' discourse on the crisis of the idea of the university, the crisis of the notion of knowledge and the crisis of educational institutions themselves during the 20th

² Here we speak of: 1. the unity of science; 2. the unity of teaching and research; 3. the academic freedom of teachers and students. For more details see: W. von Humboldt, "Über die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin," in *Die Idee der Deutschen Universität* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956), 377-386.

³ For example, by the mid-fifties there were around 50 universities with approximately 150,000 students in Germany. Under the influence of the tertiary sector expansion, this number increased four times during the 60s. However, by the end of the 80s there were about a million students in 94 universities. The UNESCO data also shows that, in the period between 1950 and 1980, the percentage of the enrolled at universities in industrial countries rose from 4% to 30%. For more details, see H. Koehler and J. Naumann, "Trends der Hochschulenentwicklung 1970 bis 2000," in *Recht der Jugend und des Bildungswesens* 6.32 (1984): 419. In the USA, at the end of the 60s, the number of those who entered higher education after secondary education was higher than 50%, which is unmatched in the history of education. Based on this and, of course, many other observations, T. Parsons speaks of an *educational revolution* in the 20th century. For more details, see: T. Parsons and G. Platt, *The American University* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973), 3-6.

century have had no significant response outside the boundaries of philosophy. So we wonder: does the crisis of the idea of the university and the crisis of the university as an institution exist outside philosophy?

Nevertheless even a superficial insight into texts by philosophers, who dealt with this question during the 20th century, sheds a different light on the problem of the crisis of the idea of the university. Indeed, it turns out that the reasons for the crisis of the idea of the university do not only have an external nature, namely, they are not just exclusively related to social and economic modernization, but they are equally of an essential nature i.e. they are connected with the inner difficulties of the idea itself. For example, in their texts from the second half of the 20th century,⁴ Habermas, Lyotard and Derrida point to the fact that something was wrong with the idea of the university from the beginning.

Together with a great outburst of enthusiasm, the founding of the first free and modern university in Berlin in 1810 (Humboldt University) was also followed by great expectations. We can openly say that never before in the history of humankind had such a large number of people placed their deepest hopes and beliefs in the foundation of an educational institution. Most of the European universities educated children mainly belonging to the aristocracy or upper classes, which was a symbol of status and a matter of social prestige. But the modern university, established by the foundation of Berlin University, sparked a stormy intellectual and educational revolution by opening its doors to a concerted and apparent promotion of the new, enlightened middle class. Believing that it completely broke with tradition, that is, with privileges and laws

⁴ Habermas dealt with the idea of the university on two occasions. First, in the 60s at the time of a general discussion about educational reforms in Germany. All his works from that period are collected in the book *Protestbewegung und Hochschulreform* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969). However, his attitude considerably evolved some twenty years later in the text “Die Idee der Universität—Lernprozesse,” from the book J. Habermas, *Eine Art Schadensabwicklung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987). Lyotard studied the problems of the idea of the university in his most famous book *La condition postmoderne* (Paris: Les Éditiones de Minuit, 1979). Derrida was also occupied with this idea several times during the 80s. Here we shall take up the ideas from the text “Les pupilles de l’Université: Le principe de raison et l’Idée de l’Université” in the book *Du droit à la philosophie*, (Paris : Galilée, 1990).

of inheritance, the new class looked for a better place in society mainly through the idea of education.⁵ Together with the promotion of the new idea of the university and thus the new idea of education, the modern and free university also promoted a new class—“educated citizens” (*Bildungsbürgertum*). The philosophers of German idealism themselves also had high hopes that, for instance, the whole culture and complete spiritual life of the nation were going to concentrate in the university institutions (Humboldt) or that the university would be the birthplace of an emancipated society of the future, i.e. the place of the nation’s education (Fichte).

But, the initial high expectations from the new modern university were soon betrayed. Actually the idealized understanding of the institution of the university within an over-all concept of a philosophy of reconciliation that would see the university as a gathering force, which should unite scientific and educational processes of learning with modern societal ways, required too much from this idea from the very start. The idea of the university was thus destined to be burdened with that utopian concept at its own source. In addition, the growing specialization which produced an infinite splitting of science into individual sciences⁶ very soon questioned the Humboldtian postulate of the unity of science. The same goes for the second Humboldtian unity: the unity of teaching and research. Changes in the outer and inner structure of universities and faculties brought a sudden increase in the number of institutes and vocational schools, which resulted in breaking up the desired

⁵ For more details see: A. Assmann, *Arbeit am nationalen Gedächtnis* (Frankfurt/NY: Campus Verlag, 1993), 33.

⁶ As can be seen from the previous course of this paper, the term *science* is used when we think of what German idealists marked by the term *die Wissenschaft*—science in the strongest sense of the word, as the philosophy of what knowledge is, namely, as individual sciences plus the problem of knowledge i.e. the problem of their establishing foundation. We use the term individual science in order to prevent an eventual confusion in understanding by the terminological separation. So, the term individual science would be appropriate for what idealists most often mark as *eine Wissenschaft*. For more details about the problems of translating and an impossibility to find a suitable language equivalent for this German notion in, for example, the English language, see: F. Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.1969), 102-106.

unity between teaching and research. Still more, the greater proportion of today's research is most frequently presented in public apart from teaching, because the research was not produced in unity with teaching. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the third unity—the academic freedom of teachers and students. Humboldt's strong desire to protect science and higher education from political interventions and socially conditioned imperatives remained just an illusion. Very soon after the foundation of Berlin University, Germany was faced with an extreme influence of the State on education, which led to the loss of the university's outward autonomy. The academic freedom of teachers and students was reduced to the inner autonomy of science protected by the walls of the university institutions. The growing number of teachers and students led to a wider bureaucratization of university work.⁷ Additionally, with the strengthening of the Mandarin doctrine in Germany as early as the end of 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, it increasingly became clear that university education gained a firm class character and acquired a bourgeois sign. Academic education became the education of a new class. Accordingly, the key epochal ideal of enlightenment, the ideal of man as the general norm of a supra-class, supranational and supra-confessional society contained in the very core of the idea of the university, was betrayed. At the same time its universalistic substance as well as the initial promise of an emancipated society as a whole disappeared completely when the Romantic Movement plummeted from cosmopolitanism into nationalism. The idea of the university quickly turned into the ideology of the university.

⁷ See: H. Schlesky, *Einsamkeit und Freiheit* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1963), 274. The very title of Schlesky's book, *Loneliness and Freedom*, intriguingly alludes to the above-mentioned contradiction between outer and inner academic freedom. To compare the same theme, see Habermas, *Protestbewegung und Hochschulreform*, 56, or Habermas, "Die Idee der Universität—Lernprozesse", 81-87. It could be said that Habermas takes the most radical stand in the criticism of the idealistic idea of university. For example, on page 85 of the latter text, while speaking about conditions for the realization of the idea of the university, he says: "These preconditions for the implementation of the fundamental idea of the German university (*Gründungsidee der deutschen Universität*) either did not exist from the start or declined to be fulfilled until the end of the 19th century."

In the preface of his programmatic essay from 1945, *Idee der Universität*, and after all the commotion at the German university since his first book on this idea in 1923, Karl Jaspers comes to the following conclusion: “The future of universities, if given a chance, rests upon the restoration of their original spirit.”⁸ In 1947, Werner Jaeger speaks about the idea of the university in a similar way: “If our universities want to become what they should be - the moving force of the rebirth of Man, then they must bring the ideal of contemplative life back to its rightful place.”⁹ With slightly different terms Jaeger actualizes what Jaspers calls the spiritual life of the university. Both of them assure us that the two basic tasks of the university, to seek truth and transfer it—that is, research and teaching—are not possible unless their final purpose is the bringing-up and education of man i.e. shaping of a specific way of life. Some twenty years later, in a new edition of his book, Jaspers tries to make himself even clearer: “Only he who carries the idea of the university with him can think and work in its favor in an appropriate manner.” However, today, none of us as university members demands the idea of the university. The university has turned into a gigantic organization with tasks and functions falling far from the personal motives and ideal norms of university members. On the contrary the good functioning of university necessarily requires a separation from what is personal. The university is obliged to serve social, economic and state purposes. The university which would truly confirm the original idea of university would serve a non-existing, imaginary society, not a real one. As early as the sixties, it became clear that the organizational structure of contemporary universities did not embody the very idea anymore. Since knowledge became a commodity, the university has been put on the market and now it is subject to the laws of supply and demand. Its destiny is determined by the market and profit, not by the relationship to science and truth. The university has structurally lost its idea. Lyotard’s words resound in our ears: “L’idée de *franchise universitaire* est aujourd’hui d’un autre âge.”¹⁰ So, in the eighties of the 20th century, Haber-

⁸ K. Jaspers, *Idee der Universität* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1946), 5.

⁹ W. Jaeger, “Stellung und Aufgaben der Universität in der Gegenwart,” in *Humanistische Reden und Vorträge*, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1960), 239.

¹⁰ J. F. Lyotard, “The idea of an independent university belongs to bygone times,” in *La condition postmoderne* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1979), 83.

mas could do nothing else but conclude: “*der Idee der Universität könne nur noch extra muros neues Leben eingehaucht werden.*”¹¹

But, how should we understand *extra muros* (beyond the walls)? Can we have the idea of the university outside the institution itself? How can we today, if it still makes any sense, bring the ideal of contemplative life back to its rightful place at the university? Can any member of a university, professor or student, live a certain theoretical way of life (*bios theoretikos*)?

What will happen if we begin our search following Habermas's suggestion. In fact, he says that today “the integrative self-comprehension of the university's corporate body” can be based only on “communication,” that is, “in the very scientific process which keeps differentiating” and in “the communicative forms of scientific argumentation” (*die kommunikativen Formen der wissenschaftlichen Argumentation*). Following Schleiermacher's model, Habermas actualizes again what the Greeks promoted in their first schools long ago—the fact that the pursuit of truth and learning always implicates an organized mutual work, i.e. “a publicly communicating community of researchers” or, in other words, “a cooperative pursuit of truth.” Thus, the fellowship of teachers and students which, after all, is one of the basic postulates of Humboldtian university, still lives and according to Habermas, even represents one of the pillars of the contemporary university, perhaps in a slightly changed way which obviously does not stop Habermas from placing his greatest hopes for the future of higher education institutions exactly there. Citing Humboldt's description of the teacher-student relationship, he claims that the old idea of the university is still a sound frame for knowledge and learning. He refuses to declare that “the communicative university community” should be a model for the whole society, as German idealists did. Finally, Habermas concludes that for the future's sake it is necessary that university life and work should keep some form of mutual community life and work devoted to knowledge, learning and research, and that is exactly what ancient Greeks called *bios theoretikos* and what subsequent Christian tradition and the first medieval universities founded in the 12th century marked as *vita con-*

¹¹ “The only way to breathe in a new life into the idea of the university is from the outside” (in J. Habermas, “Die Idee der Universitaet—Lernprozesse,” in *Eine Art Schadensabwicklung* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987), 80.

templativa—of course, in a theological sense.

Well how should we think about the idea of the university in this context? Together with Derrida¹² we could formulate the question like this: how is it possible that the university exists without having its own idea of what it should be? Could it, for example, be a communicative community of teachers and students who cherish the *bios theoretikos* (which I want to support here)? To say that the university does not have its own idea or that it lost its idea would mean the same as to say that the university does not have its essence, its purpose or its reason to exist anymore. Heidegger and Derrida would say that university does not have its principle of reason any longer (*der Satz vom Grund*; *Le principe de raison*). But how can we think that the university has its meaning, its purpose, its *principle of reason* if we ourselves do not look for it, that is, if we ourselves do not give it, or create and offer it?¹³ So what is the manner in which we speak of the university having its idea? Can the university have its idea, its purpose independently of university subjects, independently of teachers and students? Can, therefore, the idea of the university, i.e. *the principle of reason* of the university itself be found in the very institution, university buildings, walls, libraries or archives? In that case, we would have to assume that each of us would come to a university building to get the idea of the university, and that the meaning, the purpose of the university, its *principle of reason* would “wait” somewhere in the corridors and amphitheatres of the university! In that situation the idea of the university could be put on in the same way as a university coat-of-arms or a university flag—like a pendant, a brooch, a

¹² Being just aware of the strong imperative which commands us to think about this idea, Derrida gives his many times mentioned text *Les pupilles de l'Université : Le principe de raison et l'Idée de l'Université* a sub-title: *Comment ne pas parler, aujourd'hui, de l'Université?* (How not to speak today about the university?). For more details on why he put such a sub-title, see J. Derrida, “Les pupilles de l'Université : Le principe de raison et l'Idée de l'Université,” in the book *Du droit à la philosophie* (Paris : Galilée, 1990), 461-462.

¹³ Analyzing Leibniz's definition of the principle of the reason, Heidegger insists that the key to its understanding is this *giving, returning, doing* i.e. *creating of the reason* (*reddendae rationis*). Indeed, the term *reddere* allows all these meanings. For more details, see: Heidegger, 2006: 44-49. Also compare with: J. Derrida, “Les pupilles de l'Université”, 470-474.

badge or even an ear-ring.

Nevertheless, inspired by Schelling's idea that one must develop a special organ for education, knowledge and science, I would rather want to develop excellent hearing, attentive to the idea of the university instead of wearing it as an ear-ring. To have excellent hearing¹⁴ attentive to the idea of the university – that could be my concept of the idea. How have we got into such an awkward situation to be hard of hearing—to have the idea of the university i.e. *bios theoretikos* and corporative communication beyond our hearing range? Has the history of educational problems, namely, the history of academic and university institutions ever recognized the importance of hearing? I begin this research with faith that the affirmation of hearing can open new horizons upon the idea of the university.

One of the most interesting views on Pythagoras and his teaching comes from Plato's *Republic*. He says there that "Pythagoras was dearly-loved" because "he passed over to his followers a particular way of life (*'odós tis bíou*) which is even today called "Pythagorean" and which, in their own opinion, distinguishes them from the rest of people." (*Politeia* 600b)¹⁵ It is general known that Plato and Aristotle, alongside their interest in the Pythagoreans,¹⁶ showed a strange reserve towards Pythagoras himself.¹⁷ The quotation above is the only sentence in all the preserved works of Plato where he directly mentions Pythagoras by name. As for many of today's experts on Pythagoras and Pythagorean teaching, this remark by Plato may seem quite trivial. It seems especially odd that

¹⁴ As it is well-known the term *hearing* has many meanings in English language and all of them are important to me in this paper: ability to hear, distance within one can hear, opportunity to be heard, trial of a case in a low court, the action of actively giving ear, i.e. listening to a lecture, play, etc. (*Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary*)

¹⁵ Also compare: Plato, *Phaedo*, 66b.

¹⁶ Plato's dialogue *Phaedo* was evidently written under the influence of the Pythagorean teaching, because it discusses the question of the immortal soul. Aristotle even wrote an essay on Pythagoreans which was consequently quoted a lot, but, unfortunately was not preserved. For more details see: H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1974), Pythagoras (7).

¹⁷ For more reasons for such an attitude, see J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (New York: Meridian library, 1959), 84-87.

Plato's attention was drawn to an almost banal fact, a mere legend. The full sense and significance of Plato's view can be grasped only by a wider insight into its apparent context. Thus with Plato's help, we acquire two important insights on Pythagoras and Pythagoreans, as well as on the Greek view of upbringing and education. If we bear the entire ancient culture in mind, this is the first case of an association or school which directly connects learning and the acquisition of knowledge with a "way of life" (*'odós tis bíou*). Pythagoreans were the first in the ancient world to realize that upbringing, education and teaching unavoidably imply a particular way of life. Therefore the one who wants to acquire essential upbringing and education must accept a specific way of life. Hence, such a life appears to be more important for his education than technical training in writing and reading or playing certain instruments. This is the second insight we obtain from Plato's remark. A well brought up and educated man is holistically shaped through a particular way of life devoted to clearly projected goals, and not through a periodic practice or training such as, say, writing or reading.

How should this "Pythagorean way of life" be understood? Its core lies in purification (*katharmoi*), which means a constant self-restraint from eating and drinking, as well as from various other things in order to avoid "the wheel of birth," that is, an infinite changing of different bodies—keep away from broad beans, do not pick up what has fallen, do not touch a white rooster, do not break bread, do not walk on main roads, and so on.

Based on Iamblichus's citing of parts of Aristoxenus's essays on Pythagorean principles, we get a more complete impression of the deeper sense that the notion of purification has. I would like to draw your attention to the following testimony: "According to Aristoxenus, Pythagoreans used medicine for the purification of the body and music for the purification of the soul."¹⁸ Naturally this interest of theirs also corresponds with the general Pythagorean obsession with numbers and harmony. Different cultures in the West and especially in the East have always known about the healing effect of music on the human psyche. The Pythagorean insight into the power of music as a means of purification of the soul is surely based on similar findings. However in the con-

¹⁸ H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 58, D.1.

text of upbringing and education i.e. the origin of the first school institutions, this insight of music hides something else which will prove extremely important here. At the beginning of the afore-cited paragraph Aristoxenus says: “If they (Pythagoreans) were silent and used to hearing; and if they praised the one who could hear.”¹⁹

A legend says that Pythagoreans were obliged to just keep silent and listen for the first five years of their training. That being the case, they did not even have a chance of seeing Pythagoras because he allegedly gave night lectures. But let us put aside the mysterious layers of this legend and focus on its didactic aspect. Let our guiding thought be Isocrates’s surprising comment on the Pythagorean custom of silence (*ēhēddemosúne*). Isocrates, one of the greatest Greek orators, says that “even now people admire those who are silent and say they are Pythagoras’s disciples more than those who achieved great fame with their oratorical skill.”²⁰ Is this pointing to the importance of hearing in an educational process as well as in a teaching and didactic process, more significant when expressed by someone like Isocrates who can speak in a beautiful and convincing manner, but not be silent and listen? Here we feel a deeper sense of the act of purification, namely, of its aspects related to science and scientific, educational associations. The meaning of a disciple’s long silence and listening should not be explained by an attempt to keep the teaching secret, but by maintaining a specific discipline necessary for the *Pythagorean way of life*. The long process of hearing and being silent, deprived of the possibility to speak or to comment and ask questions during a teacher’s lecture improves and intensifies disciples’ inner contemplative work. Unable to “empty” his thoughts and dilemmas on the outside, a disciple is obliged to ask himself new questions and to keep testing those previously put. The strict contemplative discipline directed towards observation (*theoria*), that is, the generating of questions and their subsequent reshaping is here much intensified by the fact that thinking is not simultaneously “wasted” on its manifestation—on asking questions out loud, their rhetorical shaping and later discussion. In addition, every verbal manifestation “tries,” more or less, to leave a good impression. Since that is so, a disciple is

¹⁹ About the importance of hearing among Pythagoreans, also compare with: J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 93-96.

²⁰ A quote from: J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 95.

also “spared” from the devastating influence of a deeply rooted need to have a point, to “win,” to defeat an opponent in a conversation. The purpose of the stay in an association or school is to initiate and start the creation of one’s own inner theoretical life, that is, to prepare the soil for one’s own road to learning. Exactly this could be the deeper meaning of purification, the right content of the *Pythagorean way of life*. Since Pythagoras and his disciples were devoted to hearing, silence, theory and research in a complete way which occupied their entire life, we can say that they understood their own association or, if you wish, their own school as a place where you live in the manner of hearing, discussion and research.

That they developed the ancient awareness of the importance of hearing for the process of upbringing and education can also be confirmed by the role a slave-pedagogue had in the life of a child. Completely devoted to children by serving them and by making an effort to hear their inner being, Greek slave-pedagogues pointed out with their own activity the key organ of the teaching profession—the ear. The importance of hearing can be seen indirectly even through the most important concept of Socrates’ philosophy, *I know that I know nothing*, which definitely determines the supremacy of hearing over speaking.

The proof that the scientists and philosophers of Antiquity had a ‘hearing’ for hearing can be clearly seen in the choice of the site where the first philosophical school—Plato’s Academy—was founded. Under the pressure of an increasing need for self-education, that is, under the pressure of the growing number of people who lived a theoretical way of life, the founding of the first true school took place only when they found a quiet, silent and shady place where free theoretical science could be practiced. We could say quite simply that the first school appeared only when they were able to find a place (*tópos*) for *bios theoretikos*. But what is the significance of hearing in all this?

From the Dipylon gates which led to Eleusis, through the north-west part of Athens, you could reach Plato’s Academy in half an hour’s stroll. Plato’s school inherited the name from the mystic hero Academos, as well as the very place of his shrine. Hipparchus, Pisistratus’s son put up walls around the grove and statues and temples in the park. In time, many gods were given their sacrificial altars there: Athena, Hermes, Eros and others. According to Plutarch’s testimony, Cimon changed the course of the river Kifissós and planted plane- and olive-

trees, thus turning a dry and waterless grove of Academos into a pleasant garden with enough water, a lot of green and many shady paths for physical activities and long walks. At the same time he put up here one of the three most famous gymnasiums in Athens, where Athenian citizens gathered for athletic exercises. Since there was no other fixed place for philosophers to meet, the gymnasium became an ideal spot for regular meetings of the people from Athenian intellectual circles.

The teaching at the Academy ran in the form of a lecture and a kind of seminar, which actually took the form of a dialogue or a discussion with a cited text as its starting-point. The lectures and seminars took place around an *exedra*, a semi-circled stone bench. It was the place for discourses, but you could also have discussions while having a walk.²¹ Nevertheless, without any disregard for the importance of the school's curriculums (taken conditionally) and the acquired level of their systematization, i.e. the number and diversity of the studied subjects, we have to notice here that the foundation of the scientific and educational phenomenon of Plato's Academy is not found in its curriculum or subjects, but in its method of work. Naturally, Plato himself could not deal with all the fields of knowledge, and the organization of school work had to be adapted for new needs. In the course of time, many students and teachers began taking part in research, that is, they began to carry out their own. Gradually, they became more and more aware of *méthodos*, i.e. research as a common, general issue through which a member of the Academy acquires his identity. Thus an Academy member is someone who offers sacrifices to the Muses and someone who performs all other organizational functions within the school but, above all, he is someone who does research on a certain problem. A member of the Academy is, therefore, a researcher in the first place, no matter whether he is a *mathetês* (a student) or a *sholarh* (a principal).²² That being the case, the Academy students were not just passive recipients of knowledge, nor was knowledge a subject of one-directional

²¹ H. Herter, *Platons Akademie* (Bonn, 1944), 7.

²² In contrast to Herter and Usener who have no dilemma that the Academy had scientific and research work in action, Howald disagrees and connects Plato and the Academy with mysticism. For more details see: E. Howald, *Die platonische Akademie und die moderne Universitas literarum* (Zürich: 1921), 16ff. Compare with: H. Herter, *Platons Akademie*, 25.

transfer from the teacher toward them, but the method of working put them in a very active situation. In due course, the students themselves would come to a completely equal position with their teachers, precisely because they turned into a type of co-researcher. As may be inferred, this specific *méthodos* of finding one's own path to knowledge through research with the help of a teacher, of course, established the essence of Academy work, i.e. the essence of the way of life at the school. The real educational purpose of the work is fulfilled when a *mathetês* builds up and shapes his *méthodos*, which makes him a true member of the Academy's scientific community. Understood in this way, *bios theoretikos* represents the basis of the Academy as a scientific and educational institution. In that sense it is *bios theoretikos* that constitutes the very hub of the biggest and most famous school in the ancient world—not curricula, nor teaching staff or school buildings. That is why the Academy was for centuries a perfect model, a pattern for all other schools throughout the Mediterranean—both for the classical ones (Aristotle's Lyceum, the Stoic school, the Epicurean school, etc.) and the subsequent ones (the famous Mouseion at Alexandria and later Hellenistic schools, which represented a kind of institutional germ of the future medieval universities). Regarding everything previously said, we can conclude that *méthodos* is the fundamental content of *bios theoretikos* at the Academy. *Méthodos* is the way in which an Academy member lives his theoretical life. He, actually, lives in the way of research. Such a pattern became compulsory for all subsequent “academics,” i.e. all later disciples, students and teachers who wanted to educate themselves and build their own road to philosophy and science.

Anyway in our attempt to understand the real content of scientific and educational work at the Academy, there are problems yet to come. With respect to the universal professionalization and ubiquitous technical transformation of the epoch we live in, we all have an obvious tendency to understand *méthodos* i.e. research in a simplified and superficial way. But we cannot properly comprehend the way into research, which *méthodos* essentially is, without resistance to the cultural inertia of our epoch. Since *méthodos* is not something traced and trodden in advance or something known beforehand, it cannot have the form of an ordinary practice or a mere repetition of previously determined procedures and rules in order to reach a particular goal. If the object of comprehension is not something previously determined, something well-

known, the research path to knowledge becomes a painstaking business in which very little is certain, except a possible determination to follow that path. As the *sholarch* himself was a researcher, that is, he kept on building and shaping his *méthodos*, his *sholē* (lecture, lesson, instruction) could not be too authoritative. He lived so close to his students and other Academy members that they could not see him as somebody too distant and strange. Even when delivering his *sholē*, the *sholarch* and other teachers were right by their listeners, around *exsedra* or at another similar place. During discussions and feasts the atmosphere was even more informal—as it is usual among close friends. Since they all knew each other very well, such a life of togetherness did not leave much space for formal and reserved behavior. The *sholarch* and other senior philosophers built their authority in a completely different way.

The best way to illustrate what we want to say here is an extract from Plato's dialogue *Protagoras* (320a). In the context of a criticism of the sophistic attitude to virtue, Plato praises Pericles' upbringing and educational abilities and says that he,

gave young people a nice and good upbringing and education²³ in everything that depended upon the teacher, but even he cannot give them his own wisdom, nor he lets them be brought up and educated by other people, so they wander alone as a released herd hopeful to stumble

²³ The term Plato uses, *paideúo*, is translated here as 'to bring up and educate.' We think it is incorrect to translate this verb only as 'to bring up' as it stands in some translations. German translator Klaus Schöpsdau also chooses only the verb *erziehen*: Platon, *Werke*, Übersetzung und Kommentar, Band VI /2./ im Auftr. der Kommission für Klassische Philologie der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur zu Mainz, hrsg. von Ernst Heitsch, (Göttingen: 2003), 25. English translator B. Jowet completely changes the essence of the Greek verb and offers a totally different meaning of training and instruction: "gave them excellent instruction" (*The Portable Plato, Protagoras, Symposium*,..., (NY: Penguin, 1977). While another English translator, W.R.M. Lamb uses the phrase "gave them a first-rate training" (Plato. *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Volume 3 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1967), which is, of course, even further from the meaning Plato intended to give to the sentence. As previously suggested, the meaning of this verb includes what we now call upbringing, both physical and moral, as well as what we call education i.e. the spiritual modeling of man. The noun *paideia* partly includes even the meaning of the term *culture* as seen today.

upon virtue by accident.

In the sequel, besides all his faith in the power of *paideia*, Plato reconcilably admits its helplessness before the key question of how to acquire virtue. There are many examples of a good man full of virtues who could not make better people out of those closest to him or his students.²⁴ This picture of a teacher-student relationship can be used as a paradigm for the prevalent teacher-student relationship at the Academy. Although it may seem to us very harsh and, we may say, even irresponsible, Plato's understanding of upbringing, education and teaching did not include much "care" for students and, generally, those being educated. The ancient Greeks generally showed almost complete indifference to children's or adolescent psychology. All phases of growing up: early childhood, boyhood and youth were exclusively understood as the phases of a man's development, to wit the phases in the modeling of a mature person. That being the case, we can better understand the cruelty they treated children with, the strict discipline of their upbringing. The fact that children were an object of interest only as "potential people" explains why the whole ancient culture does not possess a single study, not a single text on something which could resemble children's and adolescent psychology. Having in mind contemporary teachings in this field, we also assume that modern psychologists and pedagogues are dumbfounded by Plato's comparison of students with a *released herd*. Today's defenders of ever-popular, progressive, interactive didactic methods would probably be shocked if they happened to supervise the ancient pedagogic practice. In the same way a child tends to transcend himself as soon as possible and develop into a mature person, a *mathetês* tends to start his journey into his *mêthodos*. Opposite to a child's instinct to cling to elders or *mathetês*'s instinct to be with his teacher, Plato obviously finds it more useful for them to be *released as a herd on pasture*.

In order to understand exactly what Plato actually wants to express with this metaphor, we must take a quick look at the original text. The sentence "*hôsper aphetoî, ean pou automatoî perituchôsin têi aretêi*" could really be quite properly translated as "so they wander alone as a

²⁴ This is not the only example from Plato's dialogues in which he speaks of virtuous fathers who could not make their children that way. Compare with: *Meno*, 93d.

released herd hopeful to stumble upon virtue by accident.” The adjectival form *aphetéos* (3.adj.verb of *afīemi*) is indeed used mostly in the context of a herd put to pasture.²⁵ However, the meaning of the verb *afīemi* is a good introduction to what Plato wants to say. Its basic meaning is contained in the verbs *let go* and *disband*, but it can also be used for a ship setting out to the open sea,²⁶ or horse's reins let loose, or even releasing—in a wider context. Hence, someone who is *aphetéos* is someone on a meadow/clearing/open space/open sea, released and free, as well as someone who is *herrenlose*—without a master, therefore, someone not bothered by anyone's leadership or will. It is someone left to himself and his own will in this vast open space. The open space or clearing where students go hither and thither, ramble and wander is the only context in which they can find virtue. There are no roads in this open space. Just like animals on pasture, students move all by themselves—*automatoi*. It is this seemingly meaningless moving in which they follow their own will instead of the will of their master-teacher that guarantees success, because it is the only way they can reach true knowledge.

Since that is so, students must be *aphetoi* from teachers, that is, released, “set to the open sea” and left to themselves in order to get true upbringing and education. Thus a teacher does not have many reasons to be too much concerned with the soul of a student, child or young man. His task is just to help his student transcend the state of his slave nature i.e. his attachment to the teacher as soon as possible. Paradoxically, the teacher's task of all tasks is to be left, i.e. to make his student leave him. Only then does he accomplish his purpose as a teacher. Being *aphetéos* is also a desirable state for the teacher himself. Here is the similarity between the teacher and the student—they both become what they are by being left, i.e. by returning to the open. The teacher too keeps moving between the state of being attached to his student and the state of being left by him. Then, the modern surplus of interest in children's and ado-

²⁵ The afore-mentioned German translator, Klaus Schöpsdau follows the same logic, too. He translates it as: “sondern sie gehen auf sich gestellt hierhin und dorthin, wie herrenlose Tiere auf der Weide...”, (Ibid., 25).

²⁶ The legendary Argonauts started their quest of the *Golden Fleece* from a small port in Magnesia (in the area of Mount Pilio). The port has been known as Afetai ever since.

lescent psychology could be understood as a wish to keep young people under control, close by, “in a peaceful and safe harbor” in a sophisticated way. Nonetheless, that infinitely postpones their maturation and also consolidates the “slave” side of a teacher i.e. his dependence on students’ adherence. These are different aspects of a modern strategy which combines the pseudo-scientific legitimization of power or the possessive need to govern the young generations and, at the same time, an instinctive and unconscious wish of the young to remain juveniles as long as possible.

Contrary to the sophistic disciples who are constantly around their teachers, the Academy’s *mathetês* is supposed to be *aphetêos*. He does spend much time at school beside his teacher, but he is basically alone in his *mêthodos*. That is why the clearing, the open space, the openness of groves and parks provide the context in which he naturally feels best. All this alludes to the previous statement that the Academy is the first school which, in a very pronounced sense, has its ‘place’ (*tópos*). Now we can easily understand Plato’s choice of the site for the school. It is not an urban part of bustling Athens, neither the squares in which Sophists gather, nor the noisy and crowded city streets—but ample green groves, the shade of olive-trees, peace and silence. Voices must quiet down, the city hum must stop and silence must spread so that one can hear at all. And where can one listen and hear better than in the quiet of the openness and silence? Here, human soul can freely, *automatoi*, go hither and thither, ramble and wander. The very character of the Academy’s site indirectly speaks about the ancient culture of hearing at its height. It began with slave pedagogues, went through *heteria*, the Pythagorean association and the first concept of Socratic philosophy, and reached its climax with the development of the first real schools with a very organized institution of teaching. It is clear why teaching in a pronounced sense of the word did not exist before the Academy and the Lyceum. Teaching was established only when they understood that a *mathetês* must be *aphetêos*, i.e. when they gained an insight into the fundamental importance of the being in openness, purity and silence in order to be able to theorize, observe, listen and hear, that is, in order to cognize. Openness and open space are the frame for the *bios theoretikos* and the realization of *mêthodos*. Although we are not quite certain what the purpose of contemporary universities and high schools is, the parks and green spaces of their *campuses* are the silent testimonies of the be-

ginnings of school and university when their architectural complex still stood firmly united with the ultimate purpose of education and teaching. In a more or less developed form of a scientific community with people who share a common passion for knowledge and truth, the cultivation of the ability of hearing is *conditio sine qua non* of the educational and teaching process. In the wide-spread hysteria of the glorification of the “democratic principles,” the modern age has an inclination to put an emphasis on the teaching process which should create conditions for everyone to speak freely and give their own opinion. But the ancient experience in upbringing and education points to the ear as the key organ of the teaching practice. The crowning evidence of this is the greatest expression of thought of the entire ancient culture—*Gnōthi seautón* (Know thyself). Finally, I must notice that the time we live in has lost the awareness of how important the aforementioned is, and we are today less inclined to focus our attention on “hearing” and “trying to hear” silently and peacefully. That is why we cannot loudly support “democracy” and “reforms” at modern universities all over the world without also pleading for the affirmation of “hearing” and “silence.”

MARX'S LEGACY REINTERPRETED

Karl Heinrich Marx and Political Philosophy

Bora Erdağı (Kocaeli University)

Abstract

Karl Heinrich Marx (1818–1881) is one of the most important reference thinkers for contemporary political theory, contemporary political philosophy and contemporary political history. The bases for this view are manifold. The ideas and criticisms presented by Marx are inclined to create friends and foes from the aspect of political praxis; and the most profound elements of his critique on capitalism are, I wish to argue, still valid. These also reflect the potentiality of Marx's ideas to create alternative perspectives for study of the contemporary world. This ensures the recall and the discussion of Marx's political ideas by alternative political agents in terms of both scientific concern and the contemporary world. Another reason for Marx being a reference thinker of the history of political philosophy—depending on the first two reasons—is that his ideas have been perceptibly “realized” in political practices albeit partially. Thus, whenever the Marxist tradition and its political practices are remembered, the agents of the political arena are obliged to reconsider Marx. In this article, the fact that Marx is considered as a reference thinker in the history of political philosophy will be analyzed in more detail. The basic concepts of his theory will be presented, related to each other with regard to philosophical, real and concrete moments. As conclusion, a short commentary on Marx's political theory will be provided.

Introduction

From the end of the nineteenth century to the present, Marx has inspired many theoretical successors (Marxologists, Marxist thinkers and critics),¹ followers (communist, socialist, syndicalist, anarchist militants),² as

¹ These are some thinkers and movements which have specified their intellectual positions related with Marx and Marxism: Georg Lukacs, Karl Korsch

well as other political thoughts (liberal and egalitarian social democratic policies) and alternative thinking circles (ecologists, utopists and egalitarian society activists, feminists and the agents of gender politics, the struggle of oppressed people and subaltern politics, the criticism of youth and the cultural criticisms of everyday life)³ in terms of their political criticisms and political goals. He has supplied a particular political positioning point to each one of them. This process also continues in the present. However, it is necessary to remember and show how the contemporaneity

(Hegelian Marxism); Antonio Gramsci (European Communism); Rudolf Hilferding, Otto Bauer, Max Adler (Austrian Marxism); Louis Althusser (Structural Marxism); many representatives of the Frankfurt School, Ernst Bloch, Henri Lefebvre (Critical-Cultural Marxism); Harry Cleaver, Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt (Autonomist Marxism); Clara Zetkin, Alexandra Kollontai (Feminist Marxism); Raya Duneyevskaya, Teodor Shanin (Humanist Marxism); Eric Fromm, Jean Paul Sartre (Existentialist Marxism), David Miller, Gerald A. Cohen, John Roemer, Jon Elster, Erik Olin Wright, Philippe van Parijs (Analytical Marxism), Ernesto Screpanti, Göran Therbon, Gregory Meyerson, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe (Post-Marxism).

² These are some original movements and the representatives which have produced political practices in relation with Marx and Marxism: Rosa Luxemburg, Antonie Pannekoek, Paul Mattick (The Spartacists, Left Communists); Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Joseph Stalin (Bolshevik Party); Mao Zedung, Deng Xiaoping (The Communist Party of China); Enver Hoxha (The Communist Party of Albania); Ernesto Che Guevara, Fidel Castro (The Communist Party of Cuba); Syndicalists (Daniel de Leon, Georg Sorel vd.); Anarchists (P.J. Proudhon, M.A. Bakunin), Ecologists (Murray Bookchin, Joel Kovel); Anarcho-Syndicalists, Zapatistas, Council Communists, Libertarian Socialists, Socialism or Barbarism Circle, Situationism, Third Worldism, Colonial Post-Colonial Liberation Movements.

³ Marx and Marxists have also important for Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, Eric Voegelin, significant theorists of the right conservative circles; Karl Mannheim, Karl Polanyi, Jürgen Habermas, Frederick A. Hayek, Richard Sennett, Robert Nozick, significant liberals from the aspects of social welfare state and social democratic ideals; Dorothy Smith, Donna Haraway, Julia Kristeva, Mary Wollstonecraft, significant representatives of the feminist movement; Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Frantz Fanon, Dipesh Chakrabarty, theorists of the subaltern movement; Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Luce Irigaray, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Roland Barthes, structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers; and many other thinkers from many other movements of thought.

of the heritage inspired by Marx is continuous. Below, the article will specify the reasons for the aforementioned contemporaneity using the historical data and analyzing the traces of conceptual expressions.

The Marxist heritage is contemporaneous because: The success and the failure of Marx and internationalist class politics is a fact that must be remembered and recalled by contemporaries, as they produce concrete and realistic responses historically and socially. The first revolutionary realization of these indications is the “Bolshevik Revolution of 17th October.” The picture that occurred in the Bolshevik Revolution is to be a historical and social reference point of each participant who conducts a contemporary political discussion in the political arena one way or another, for the effects of the Bolshevik Revolution spread to the whole twentieth century. The course that Marxist politics followed through the agency of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1917-1991) and Warsaw Treaty Organization (1955-1991) has left a deep mark on the course of the development of world politics. Recognizing the existence of such a picture enables us to reconsider Marx’s political philosophy as a guiding spirit. Tracing back the cultural history of the twentieth century necessarily leads us to the impacts of the Bolshevik Revolution—not only for its achievements but also for its failures. The carrier of this inspiration is again Marx. It is a well known fact that the Bible (the New Testament) was translated into the highest number of language of any book and printed with one of the most important inventions of humankind, the printing press. After hundreds of years, the throne of the Bible was nearly taken by *The Communist Manifesto* which was written by Marx and his friend Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) in 1848. *The Communist Manifesto* became the second great work available in all of the languages of the world when the support of the USSR and its allies was included in the printing and publishing process. Considered in terms of appeal, the fame of *The Communist Manifesto* has a positive affect on Marx’s contemporaneity. The recognition creates a chance of invasiveness and intervention; as a matter of fact, the contemporaneity is directly related to invasiveness and the power of intervention.⁴

⁴ The year of 1998 refers to the 150th anniversary of the first publication of *The Communist Manifesto*. In that year special editions of the *Manifesto* were intro-

The criticism of capitalism is contemporary because: Although Marx is the chief theoretician of the hegemonical “defeated camp” against capitalism (anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist camp), his criticism of capitalism and class politics is still valid to a great extent. Furthermore, expression of this validity by the institutions and organizations that are the symbols of the capitalism leads to a repatriation of Marx’s theory—considering the relevancy of his criticism—as an “antidote” or “elixir of rescue” that can “cure” capitalism (with the words of the ancient Jewish doctrine, *tikkun olam*—healing and restoring the world). Of course, revolutionaries and capitalists assign different meanings to “cure,” “antidote” and “rescue,” etc. However, despite differences in interpretation, for both groups, Marx is the first referenced thinker who houses the sedative and curative policies explicitly in his theory and hence conserves the curative characteristics in himself. For capitalist powers, turning the whelming atmosphere in the capitalist crisis to good account, in a sense, being in need of Marx’s bitter remedy has a functional importance. Whereas, for revolutionaries the evilness of capitalism stems from capitalism itself also—as Marx states; thus, it is instructive to resort to the Marx’s bitter remedy in terms of eliminating the domination of the living labor over death labor.⁵

duced in different places around the world. These editions included all the forewords and/or afterwords prepared by Marx and Engels for the translations in different languages. In addition, many articles were included written by significant Marxist thinkers. In Turkey also, some new publications were introduced in compliance with the fame of the *Manifesto*. “In the century and a half since its publication, it has been judged not only as a uniquely influential document in the theory and practice of revolutionary movements throughout the world, but also as a work of history, as economic, political, and cultural analysis, and as prophecy. The *Manifesto* has been judged as an account of past, present, and future—not only the present and future of its authors but those of every generation since, up to and including our own.” Ellen Meiksins Wood, “The Communist Manifesto after 150 Years”, *Monthly Review*, <http://monthlyreview.org/1998/05/01/the-communist-manifesto-after-150-years>, 1998. Also see: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Komünist Manifesto ve Hakkında Yazılar*, trans. Nail Satlıgan et al. (Istanbul: Yordam, 2008).

⁵ In every crisis period it is usual to see articles that recall Marx (and motivate people to reconsider him) in the important journals and newspapers of the USA. This tradition was not broken by weekly magazines and daily newspa-

The motto of the tradition is contemporary because: Marx not only inspires the political practices or offers opportunity for the critical development of these practices in the sphere of political economy; but also, as a revolutionary thinker he does not trust a search for traditional philosophical truth and knowledge like the other fundamental thinkers of his era. He gives inspiration to the first representatives of contemporary philosophy and thinking which breaks with tradition. Marx's work does not reproduce the tradition that builds systems. Instead, he pursues concrete and realistic problems by building a consistent line of thought. He formulates this in the "Preface" of *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* as follows: "History does not raise unsolvable problems to any society." This *motto* reflects the spirit of the philosophical breakthrough made by Marx and his contemporaries "philosophy" or "philosophical systems" subrogated by the "realization of philosophy" or "questioning the meaning of human existence." The difference between Marx and his contemporaries lies in the discussions about contemporary epistemologies rather than studies on the history of political philosophy; thus, it is proper to limit the scope under the determination of Marx's philosophical approach. This is also a contribution that helps us to understand—in a different manner—why Marx is one of the reference thinkers of the contemporary politics.

The realization of philosophy is a contemporary political issue because: The main erectors of Marx's thought are "materialism," the "notion of history and the social" and "dialectic." Through these, existing

pers such as *Time*, *Newsweek*, *The New York Times*, *Financial Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*. Moreover, some representatives of significant financial institutions, such as the president of the Federal Reserve Bank, some great speculators of the global economy such as George Soros and many famous liberal economists do not neglect to keep harping on Marxism even in the middle of the crisis. It is possible to reach these explanations with a little search on the internet. (For example, see: Peter Gumbel, "Rethinking Marx," *Time Magazine* 2009, the last update, 26.07.2012, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1873191_1873190_1873188-1,00.html); and also for an interesting argument claiming that Soros has "communist ideals" with reference to some his explanations see: www.commieblaster.com). However, for a more comprehensive and more detailed explanation see: Terry Eagleton, *Why Marx Was Right* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011).

questions of humankind are analyzed and conceptualized. Materialistic philosophies generally lack some basic constituents which metaphysical, ontological or epistemological approaches in other philosophies base their arguments; these are *substance*, the first cause (*arkhe*), *a priori* knowledge, transcendence and transcendental. As a consequence of such lack, the materialist philosophies can not be regarded as philosophical systems, or have not adopted the method of mathematics, or pure logic in abstractness, in the name of the notion of system. They have not fallen back upon the linguistic and mystical games and have tried to be free from teleological intentions. This attitude brought about a heavy cost for materialist philosophies. From Plato up until now the traditional way of thinking has either philosophically ignored the existence of materialist philosophies or regarded them to be only slightly influential in the sphere of thinking. Marx's materialism has been doomed to a similar fate by traditional philosophy. It is easy to confirm this when the productions of traditional philosophy are analyzed. However, when the current problems of the day are handled, the crisis that is experienced by traditional philosophy points —as Martin Heidegger expressed it—to “an end” in the positive sense of a *new beginning*. A question arises: Why cannot Marx's criticism of traditional philosophy be a significant philosophical *new beginning*? For Marx's ideas on the realization of philosophy, the critical analysis and coherence created by historical materialism, remain contemporary as capitalist society survives.⁶

⁶ There is an approach introduced by Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin but entirely known with Henri Lefebvre: the phenomena that the everyday life in the modern world and the human mind getting into the rut of this life do not develop—contrary to what is believed—disjointedly from each other. In other words, the relationality between the mind and reality leads to a conditioning of one another and a renovation with mediation and repetition, as pointed out by Marx, but more severely than he estimates. As in the classical definitions of modernity, this gives the modern human the opportunity of both realizing himself/herself and social destruction. For the discussion on the realization of philosophy and its relations with the everyday life see: Henri Lefebvre, *Everyday Life in the Modern World* (London and New York: Continuum, 2002). Also for another study discussing the realization of philosophy from a historical aspect thoroughly with Marx and his contemporaries see: Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution of Nineteenth-*

Materialism is contemporary as a political issue because: Marx develops his materialism by discussing it with philosophers such as Democritus (460-370 B.C.), Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), Lucretius (99-55 B.C.), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) and the young-Hegelians. The conceptual richness of his materialism owes much to Aristotle, Hegel and young-Hegelians. His methodology is also in a sense Epicurean, which means that he is neither an empiricist materialist (like Democritus and the French materialists) searching after the certainty of knowledge nor, a metaphysical materialist (like the other young-Hegelians, especially Feuerbach) following the dogmatic *fait accompli*. His relationship with Epicurus is not unlimited; there are some serious differences and revisions within Marx's materialism. Epicurus's materialism led him to mechanism, chance and doubt to some extent. Epicurus looks into atoms as the objects of knowledge whereas Marx focuses on history and society. When Marx accepts history and society as the epitome of the object of knowledge, he not only makes "change," "relation" and "realization" imaginable but also facilitates the movements of a "concrete and realistic position" which enables "change," "relation" and "realization." Thus he starts his research from an appearance of history and society and moves forward by questioning the dialectic unity revealed by the different positioning points, variables and validities. Therefore, Marx goes entirely against traditional philosophical efforts and philosophical approaches that are in search of knowing before finding or introducing an authentic imagination about what should be before what is.

What differs in Marx's materialism from traditional philosophy and modern scientific efforts is not only the way to start knowing/questioning but also the characteristics of *relationality* which determines knowing. In this sense, Marx's thinking is neither merely reductionist nor merely deductive. It is rather a dialectic understanding based on the coherent explanation of the object of knowledge related with the relation that holds between a part and the whole. In a sense, both the deductive and the inductive approaches accept that there are some epistemic differences between "fact/act and concept," "subject and object,"

“signifier and signified;” yet they assert that they can transcend the mediations among the binaries by overcoming these binaries with a methodological or cognitive attitude. Marx looks for a way to rebuild the relation that holds between a part and the whole by making use of the dynamic structure of dialectic before transcending the aforementioned binaries. He acknowledges the epistemological rupture before fixing it, and tries to understand and analyze this situation in a humanistic reality. In other words, as Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) says, “I can know the table not the tree, because I made it,” so Marx starts off with the known (or given) and reaches to the whole that represents more than the sum of the parts with dialectic abstractions. This questioning continues until the moment when the solidity of the reached and the validity of the historical and social knowledge needs to be questioned and built again. By this way, a new path tending toward universality and tending to enrich life in the sphere of thinking is adopted rather than the traditional philosophies—based on absolutism and certainty—which narrows the richness of the life down. That is another reason why Marx remains contemporary within the history of political philosophy.

Dialectic materialism is contemporary as a political issue because: Considered with the impacts of Marx’s political orientation, the materialist innovation he brought to the thousands-of-years-old sphere of thinking is often not accepted both by his friends and foes. It is even possible to say, Marx has been so little understood that he is to be discovered again. First Engels and then the evolutionist-scientist thinkers [Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932), Karl Kautsky (1854-1932)] of the Second International (1889-1916) and the “Diamatist (those interested in the studies of dialectical materialism)” generations of the Soviet Academy of Sciences thought that materialist historicism had a systematic setup and consequently they produced a materialist-metaphysical approach that narrows down the richness of life from an attitude tending towards it. This materialist metaphysical approach has a typical name: “historical and dialectic materialism.” Joseph Dietzgen (1828-1888) synthesized Hegelian dialectic and Feuerbach’s materialism with reference to Marx and Engel’s works and used the concept of dialectic materialism in 1887. However the complete incarnation of the concept in practice was realized by Josef Vissaryonoviç Çuğuşvili Stalin (1878-1953). Stalin’s *Dialectic and Historical Materialism* (1938) is the Marxist classic that was published in the highest number of languages after

the *Communist Manifesto*. Dialectic materialism is a reflective theory which expresses that infrastructure (economic base) determines the superstructure (religion, legal system, philosophy, art...) and also relies on historical progress. The prestige added to the official status of dialectic and historical materialism, within these years, is comprehended as the essence of Marxism and Marx's materialist historicism by a large intelligentsia. However, when the mighty shadows of the prestigious times lifted, it was understood that something was going wrong. Marx's materialist historicism and dialectic understanding often does not coincide with the theoretical direction that is locked up by the reductionist/vulgar/progressive/positivist pathologies. Therefore the agents of class politics—at least the old Marxist intelligentsia—began to direct their attention to Marx's works in order to turn to Marx's ideas from the line of dialectic and historical materialism. This turn updated Marx's position in the history of political philosophy and continues updating.⁷

The Philosophical Moments of Revolutionary Politics

Marx is a revolutionary. He adopts all the conceptual notions of the revolution: change, break, dislocation, a different beginning, innovation, rupture, reorganization, discontinuity, progress, evolution, movement, sublation, abolishment, profanization, creation, establishment, radicalism, suspension, etc. The revolutionary kernel of Marx's ideas live upon a few bases in respect of their historical roots: i) his father and those around him were followers of the Enlightenment; ii) there was an active

⁷ The discussions of materialism and dialectic materialism are becoming clearer and clearer. This leads to the appearance of the scientific studies devoted to the reproduction of the Marx's theory (the job of the analytical Marxists and the Anglo-Saxon writers in particular) and the manifestations of the factors behind the illusions. For a detailed comparison see: Jacques Bidet and Eustache Kouvélakis, eds., *Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism* (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2008); Paul Paolucci, *Marx's Scientific Dialectics: A Methodological Treatise For A New Century* (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2007); Stanley Aronowitz, *The Crisis in Historical Materialism: Class, Politics and Culture in Marxist Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); Norman Levine, *Divergent Paths: Hegel in Marxism and Engelsism* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006); Gerald A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001).

tendency to radical democracy in the development of politics in his hometown Trier and Prussia in general; iii) Hegel's philosophy dominated his time when he studied law and was working on his doctorate, while he was also in discussions with young-Hegelians concerning how to realize philosophy.

This atmosphere which, relatively, organizes the early period of his intellectual character becomes one of the archaic elements of his maturing intellectual journey. He wants to stay in the university during his doctorate. However, his studies in philosophy are cut across by the hot agenda of politics and accordingly his interest begin to change—just as in his earlier experience, when his intention to study law is cut across by philosophical inquiries. A radical and notable journalist and an old-hand politician began to evolve from a man who formerly aimed for the academy. The distresses of the journalist Marx not only determine the relatively discursive element underlying his early works, but also build the basis for the progress lines that Marx's thinking would specify as a problematic in the future.

As he continues in his legal education, he witnesses the discussions which reference Hegel on a new constitution, civil society, political society and state. Similarly he witnesses German Idealism and especially the philosophical discussions influenced by Hegelianism, in other words the discussions among the young-Hegelians. He even gets involved in these discussions and starts to act together with them. The young-Hegelians are Hegel's successors and like any other successors they act according to the circumstances of their era. However Hegel's successors are not limited to this group. A statement in Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* manages to divide his successors: "All that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real."⁸ Some Hegelians (the right-Hegelians) adopt the first part of Hegel's statement ("all that is real is rational") and try to suggest the rationality of religion. The other camp, called young-Hegelians adopts the second part ("all that rational is real") and try to realize philosophy politically. That directs right-Hegelians toward discussions on religion and theology and the young-Hegelians

⁸ G.W.F. Hegel, *Hukuk Felsefesinin Prensipleri*, trans. Cenap Karakaya (Istanbul: Sosyal, 1991), 29. And also see Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm>

toward discussions on politics.

For young-Hegelians the fault of the right-Hegelians stems from their fidelity to Hegel's writings and the limits of his philosophy which prevents them from understanding Hegel's contribution to Christianity and—from the aspect of historical-social perception of freedom—philosophy. In other words, the right-Hegelians repeat Hegel pointlessly and for that very reason, they put limits upon his philosophy as well as deadening the methodological dynamics of it. However, young-Hegelians focus on Hegel's social-political approach and rather than repeating him they try to make a new explanation of the current situation in Germany with Hegelian ideals. Therefore, their arguments about freedom of the press, free citizenship or the qualities of the religious dogmas influence the public sphere.

The motive forcing Marx to act with young-Hegelians/left-Hegelians⁹ and continue his intellectual career via *Rheinische Zeitung* is nothing but a vitality and richness created by the radical claims for democracy. The social developments of the era and his background also make him act together with the left-Hegelians.¹⁰ However Marx's rela-

⁹ The young-Hegelians consisting of David Stratus, Ludwig Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer initially came to be called left-Hegelians, with the involvement of Edgar Bauer, Moses Hess, Arnold Ruge, Max Stirner coming later. Together with the new figures the left-Hegelians i) bring up the criticisms of religion and theology to the press by taking the advantage of freedom of press in that period, ii) develop the discussions of the free citizen in Germany with the influence of Enlightenment and French Revolution, iii) look for the ways to develop democracy. All these build connections between the conceptual references of their philosophical approaches and radical, utopist, libertarian and egalitarian ideals. It is the aforementioned connection that ensures the relationality between the studies of the left-Hegelians on society and politics and the demands for radical democracy. For a detailed explanation see: Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*; David McLellan, *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx* (Hampshire: Gregg Revivals Publishers, 1993); William J. Brazill, *The Young Hegelians* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Warren Breckman, *Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁰ "The subject of my professional studies was jurisprudence, which I pursued, however, in connection with and as secondary to the studies of philosophy and history. In 1842-43, as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, I found myself

tionship with the left-Hegelians does not continue for decades. This relationship ends in the mid-1840s.

The left-Hegelian philosophers argue about the problem of realizing philosophy. Therefore, the Hegelian concepts of “alienation” and “dialectic” are of key importance for them. With the influence of left-Hegelians and Hegel himself, Marx gives important roles to the concept of “alienation” in his early writings, and then the concepts of “commodity fetishism” and “reification” in his later analyses of capitalism. The notion of “alienation” is not limited to his early works. His stressing of the concept in *Grundrisse* and then in the first volume of *Capital* shows its importance.

Another important concept for Marx is the concept of “species-being.” This concept occupies a central position in Feuerbach’s ideas—a thinker Marx is most sympathetic to among left-Hegelians. With the argument on “species-being” Marx interrogates with arguments on human nature, transcendentalism and the progress of the individual. Hence he begins to raise concerns about history, anthropology and philosophy. Such an overall movement helps Marx to make some radical changes and discoveries in his understanding. For instance, Marx radically converts Hegel’s division of civil and political society and the question of

embarrassed at first when I had to take part in discussions concerning so-called material interests. The proceedings of the Rhine Diet in connection with forest thefts and the extreme subdivision of landed property; the official controversy about the condition of the Mosel peasants into which Herr von Schaper, at that time president of the Rhine Province, entered with the *Rheinische Zeitung*; finally, the debates on free trade and protection, gave me the first impulse to take up the study of economic questions. At the same time a weak, quasi-philosophic echo of French socialism and communism made itself heard in the *Rheinische Zeitung* in those days when the good intentions ‘to go ahead’ greatly outweighed knowledge of facts. I declared myself against such botching, but had to admit at once in a controversy with the *Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung* that my previous studies did not allow me to hazard an independent judgment as to the merits of the French schools. When, therefore, the publishers of the *Rheinische Zeitung* conceived the illusion that by a less aggressive policy the paper could be saved from the death sentence pronounced upon it, I was glad to grasp that opportunity to retire to my study room from public life.” Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. N. I. Stone (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1904), 10.

the state, in specifying his own “philosophical” position. The arguments with the left-Hegelian philosophers, of course, affected Marx much in specifying his characteristic position in this sense. However, the main role belongs to his attitude, assumed in these discussions (discussions about alienation, reification, commodity fetishism, species-being and individual, civil and political society and the state). Marx’s response to the representational gaps on the level of knowledge, which are thought to exist epistemologically between subject and object and to the ideological manipulations armed with hegemonic pressure and an insurmountable linearity between the “to be” and “should be,” benefits from this revolutionary political manner. In that case, in order to point out Marx’s characteristic position in the history of political philosophy again, it is useful to remember the philosophical moments of the revolutionary politics once more.

Alienation, Commodity Fetishism and Reification: Prior to Marx, some considered the concept of alienation; that it is possible to call them as the forerunners of the concept showed how to manifest alienation as a source of political problem. Leaving the disciples of Christianity aside, it is necessary to point out Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Hegel among the architects of the concept. For Rousseau alienation is an outcome of leaving the state of nature. The ground for the social contract is the epitome of this social/civilized state. The civilized state requires the emergence of some developments like the division of labor, greed for profit, settled life, competition and the birth of agricultural society, which are defined as the parts of historical-social progress and which, in fact, are not needed in the state of nature. All of these have helped property relations be an actual regulator in civilized society. The social contract is the demand for an agreement regulating the conflicts in such a civilized society growing away from the state of nature. Discretely from Rousseau’s, Hegel’s concept of alienation is based on ontology as in Christianity. Hegel thinks that the social forms of thinking (mythology, morality, religion, and philosophy), social stratum and the concrete unity of social relations (barbarism, emperorship, monarchy) progress as the realization of freedom in a dialectical contradiction, conflict, sublation and consensus. In other words, alienation, for Hegel, is one of the dialectical apprehensions of the politics of recognition, which is both indispensable and ontologically transcendable. As a materialist thinker Marx neither takes alienation as the basis of the historical narra-

tive that creates the social contract nor defines it as a tool that expresses the conceptual moments of an ontological system. Marx tries to explain alienation “now and here” with the “concrete analysis of the concrete circumstances” which necessarily motivates him to analyze modern capitalist society.

For Marx, alienation in the modern capitalist state is the gap between the action itself and its consequences (productions) which is experienced by the one carrying out the action; it is a kind of disintegration. Thus, the one carrying out the action becomes estranged and excluded from his/her action, from other people and also from his/her environment (productivity). As a result he/she becomes indurate and alienated from the capacities of his/her own original being (species-being). At this stage, overcoming alienation is not only necessary for the protection of one's own capacities of an individual; but also it is necessary for the protection and the sustenance of the human species, nature and human productions.¹¹ Thus, unlike the thinkers prior to him, it is impossible for Marx to understand alienation just as a given situation, or as a notion that is socially and historically explainable. For example, production is the possession of nature under a particular social form; however, it is impossible to claim that the possession/property should necessarily exist for the production to be carried out. And even asserting the necessity of private property is completely ridiculous. Marx comes to this judgment with regard to the historical data; that is to say, by discussing the com-

¹¹ Marx discusses the concept of alienation most clearly in the section of “The First Manuscript: Estranged Labor” in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. This discussion reaches to the peak in *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. However, in these later works the direction of the way that the concept is used changes thoroughly since Marx begins to use the concept under the influence of the critique of political economy. To compare with the analyses in the early periods see: Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (New York: International Publishers, 1964). “The material on which it works is alien material; the instrument is likewise an alien instrument; its labour appears as a mere accessory to their substance and hence objectifies itself in things not belonging to it. Indeed, living labour itself appears as alien vis-à-vis living labour capacity, whose labour it is, whose own life's expression [*Lebensäußerung*] it is, for it has been surrendered to capital in exchange for objectified labour, for the product of labour itself.” Marx, *Grundrisse*, 240.

munal form of ownership in Indian, Slavic and Celtic societies. He adopts the same attitude in the conceptualization of alienation.

Therefore, a revolutionary practice must destroy the material roots of alienation and must face the gap stemming from the dichotomies previously described by traditional philosophy and political economy. But, what is the way of realizing this? At this point, it is necessary to introduce two concepts important for Marx from the aspect of their relations with alienation and also to understand the power of alienation in political comprehension. These are commodity fetishism and reification.

Capitalism is a commodity production system. The commodity, in general terms, is the form of goods, acquired by people in exchange, as a result of the necessary production to sustain their existence at the social level. The commodity contains labor in different types and quality, and in terms of value, this containment enables the commodities to “live” in social relations specifying/assuming the equivalent qualities of them. In other words, when a commodity is put into relation with an equivalent commodity in the market by its owner, the exchange, the capitalist cycle, is realized and also the commodity continues to “live” as commodity. To Marx, the relation between one commodity and another equivalent to it begins to take a “mystical” position in the eyes of the producer after a certain point. It starts to be perceived that commodities have existence/life among themselves free from people/their owners/capitalist labor-value relation. However, the relation in the market among them which takes place in equivalence is nothing more than being a part of the social mediation of labor products. Marx associates this mediation/change gaining independence in the eyes of the producers to the fetishistic character of religion. The fetishistic character of religion makes religion free from the human and then decides what the human should be under the domination of religion. However, Marx states that “man makes religion, religion does not make man.” The commodity fetishism acts similarly. Commodities begin to adjust human relations. The commodity, however, is no more a necessary product of human needs, on the contrary being a part of the commodity system becomes a requirement of being human.

Undoubtedly, the commodity fetishism seems to be a specific conceptualization of alienation. It requires qualifications. Some commentators specify alienation to be, for Marx, a concept rather at the philosophical level and abandoned, at a certain point, with the growth/concentration of

Marx's social analysis. Therefore, the conceptual gap opened from alienation filled by commodity fetishism is a consequence of the concrete analysis of the concrete facts. Marx owes this change in emphasis to his materialist and historical approach. For Marx, at no other period of history do the class societies have the oppressor-oppressed relationship that capitalism has; for capitalism produces temporal-spatial compression and concentration. It develops the production of surplus value continuously by discovering wage labor. As the dispossessed masses cannot uncover the mystery of commodity production, capitalism ensures the protection of private property as well as ensuring the satisfaction and reproduction of the profit motive of capital. Capitalism homogenizes the world and puts its whole to an interaction. Thanks to the universal instruments of capitalism everything, including labor, becomes a component of the exchange as commodity. In other words, the commodities begin to be thought as the indivisible parts of the normative description of human nature, for capitalism is a commodity system and produces hegemony. Therefore, Marx thinks that the notion of commodities' gaining fetishistic characters is only possible in capitalism. Accordingly, Marx's choosing the conceptualization of commodity fetishism rather than alienation is a natural part of his criticism of political economy, which he developed as an outcome of his materialist historicism. The philosophical moment of revolutionary politics makes revolutionary politics comprehensible by moving to a contemporary basis like commodity fetishism from an abstract basis like alienation. A similar discussion continues, but with a more "blurry" concept: reification.

Reification is an activity in which a mediation of a particular act distinctively becomes the arbiter of the act itself. In a sense, just as the religion or commodity becomes something different from the product of human activity and specifies the human as the product of that act, reification refers to a holistic understanding used for all the acts and ideologies in general. Probably for this reason, Marx uses this concept only a few times in all three volumes of the *Capital*. Marx's sense of the drawback of the concept of reification probably stems from the fact that the concept is too "blurry and general" to become useful in revolutionary practice. Marx also uses the concept of objectification along with the concepts of alienation, commodity fetishism, and reification. Objectification is both a kind of alienation, externalization, separation and a kind of concretization, and limitation. Because of these meanings Marx uses the concept of objectifi-

cation in the negative meaning. For example, he defines commodity as objectivized labor. Extinguishing objectification and/or reification is not easily acceptable like alienation and commodity fetishism; breaking the mediation is also difficult for the former concepts.¹²

Civil and Political Society and the State: One of the most efficient discussions of the history of political philosophy is that on how to realize the regulation between the spheres of politics, the social and the historical. On one hand, the tactics and the strategies associated with political aims are actualized by the ruling political agents of the era. On the other hand, the positions and demands of the political agents depend on how the social forces are arranged attitudinally, leading to the construction of the lines for both the agents and those gaining the agent position. In the same way the apparatus represented by the institutional governors interfere in the civil and political spaces in order to develop the legitimacy of the hegemon continuously. Thus, the ties between the civil and political society in class societies is “strengthened.”

Marx accepts that the division of civil and political society, which is introduced rather differently in the history of political philosophy, is intrinsic to class-based societies. Therefore he associates the modern state to both of these social positions rather than only one of them. However, he does not disregard positioning civil society against political society and the state by sticking to the Hegelian conceptualization of civil society, for it does not represent the general/universal interests. Civil society refers to a social position of competitive individuals ready to split the whole society for their own interests. Hence, civil society is a social position in which the boundaries of both property relations and

¹² For a compact study discussing the relationships among the concepts like alienation, commodity fetishism, reification and some other concepts like commodification, externalization and decomposition overcoming the problems in the translation see: Önder Kulak, “Yabancılaşma, meta fetişizmi ve şeyleşme,” in *Marx’ın Halleri: Marksist Düşünce de Diyalektik Bir Yolculuk*, eds. Kurtul Gülenç and Önder Kulak (Istanbul: Kalkedon, 2012), 59-92. Also for the complete comprehension of the concepts of commodity fetishism and reification see: Timothy Bewes, *Reification or the Anxiety of Late Capitalism* (London and New York: Verso, 2002); and Wolfgang Fritz Haug, *Critique of Commodity Aesthetics*, trans. Stuart Hall (University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

the domain of state sovereignty are continuously renewed and redrawn.

Within the tradition of social contract, enlightenment and the modern state theory, "man" is thought as an universal individual. Man is the abstract individual, more clearly man is the citizen. This is the individual who is opposite to the one of civil society, the one occupied in competition and conflict and following his/her own self-interest. This is the individual of regulations; in other words, the individual of the political society who hands over his/her will to an authority one way or another and who acts under the monopoly of regulation and violence of this authority.

The factor which makes Marx's analysis of civil society differ from all others is based particularly on his new position contra the Hegelian roots of his thinking about civil society. Hegel defines the state as the representative of universal/general interests; and political society as the society of moral individuals understanding and living these universal interests. For Hegel, civil society is the society of those who pursue their self-interests. However, Marx sees Hegel's moral individual protecting and living the general/universal interests of both political society and the modern state as the manifestation of property relations at the heart of social relations in civil society. In a sense, all the bright analyses of the modern capitalist state and political society are actually statements serving the preservation of the class nature of property relations in civil society. In other words, the modern capitalist state, for Marx, is not only the embodiment of political institutions, definite geographical borders, territorial legitimacy and social wishes; it is also an apparatus of class struggles, alienated human relations, illusory class relations and the needs of the dominant ideology and dominant class. Thus, the state is not free from civil society; on the contrary it is related to it.

However, there are two special factors which need to be emphasized at this point: Does Marx explain the state only via the ruling class theory? What can be done against the "deceptive nature" of the state and political society? For the second question the answer is constituted by a single word: revolution. For Marx, the class nature of both the state and the civil-political societies must be completely eliminated. In other words, both social and political revolution must be realized. (This theme will be examined in further pages, now it is enough to give the emphasis. My main argument will be about the first question.)

Marx's early works, most of which bear the traces of a struggle with Hegel, appear to be a parricide and to be fruitful. They densely include

discussions on civil society. However, in later works this content fades. Therefore, the assertion that Marx explains the state only with the dominant-class theory is grounded by drawing attention to his leaving behind discussions on civil society and emphasizing political economy. However, some Marxist thinkers specify that Marx does not only express the struggle for property and conflicting self-interest in his analysis of civil society, by moving to a sphere of the savage/stranger political, he also emphasizes that the democratic envisagement can exist in civil society; especially while he is arguing with anarchist Max Stirner (1806-1856). In other words, the power produced by the savagery of the masses—those defined by the dominant ideology in civil society—does not necessarily tend towards conflict. The inclination toward the savagery of conflict and self-interest are realized by the specification of the modern capitalist state to some extent. Therefore, aforementioned Marxist thinkers state that Marx does understand the modern capitalist state not only in terms of the dominant class theory. He also see the modern capitalist state as an apparatus desiring to capture the mechanisms of democracy and even sabotaging this sociality with a liberal ideology in contrast to democracy.¹³

Human Nature and Species-Being: All the metaphysical and/or ontological approaches in traditional philosophy accept that the human being has a nature/essence. The existence of human nature constitutes the scale of the answers that can be given to the question of what is human. By this way a

¹³ Marx's writings on the state develop within the context of the criticism of Hegel's state theory, when it comes to his early writings; and develop within the context of the necessity for the disappearance of the state, when it comes to his later writings. For a general summary of these discussions see: W. Stanley Moore, *The Critique of Capitalist Democracy: An Introduction to the Theory of the State in Marx, Engels, and Lenin* (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969); Paul Thomas, *Alien Politics: Marxist State Theory Retrieved* (New York: Routledge, 1994); Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1990); Joachim Hirsch, *Materyalist Devlet Teorisi: Kapitalist Devletler Sisteminin Dönüşüm Süreçleri*, trans. Levent Bakaç (Istanbul: Alan, 2011). As Marx indicates capitalism/liberalism and democracy are contrary to each other. For this argument see: Paul Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* (London, Boston et al.: Routledge, 1990); and Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

theoretical and practical investigation and evaluation of the human become possible. However, in metaphysics, all investigations related with the question of “what is” experiences something which is also related with the question of what is human; in a sense, “what is not human nature” is manifested rather than defining human nature. A reduced or limited definition is put forward in harmony with philosophical consistency and common sense. However, all the definitions of human nature are ultimately a requirement for forming the wills of the agents in the political sphere.

For example, Plato (427 B.C.-347 B.C.) determines human nature strictly within an essentialist ontology in *Republic* and *Laws* and expresses that inborn features cannot be fixed with environmental conditions. The Platonist ideal state searches for the possibility of discovering and constituting human nature via education. Thus Plato, who cuts the human spirit into three sections—all are inborn—as wisdom, desirousness and courage, positions education as an instrument working for courage and desirousness to be brought to the service of wisdom. The wisdom here is authority, and even the wisdom represented in the philosopher king. Differently from Plato’s efforts, Aristotle, in *Politics*, defines human nature as a necessity for the formation of the political society. Man is *zoon politikon*, in other words, “the political animal,” free citizen of Athens in this sense. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) in *Leviathan* draws attention to the conflicting aspect of human nature with reference to the conceptualization of state of nature. He asserts that this nature should be restrained by an absolute authority. Rousseau’s *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality among Men* and *Social Contract* expresses that human nature is not malicious; the environmental conditions—called civilization—compels the human being to become distanced from his/her nature. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) points to the same danger that Hobbes does; however, he adds that, in order to restrain the excessiveness stemming from human nature, a universal understanding of peace and history and an ethics of duty are required.

It is possible to argue various approaches about human nature developed by other philosophers. However, there is something typical among them: human nature is a political concept. In terms of his contributions to the political philosophy Marx’s approach to human nature is rather important: the arguments made with Hegel or left-Hegelians leave their mark on all the points of Marx’s political philosophy. To put it another way the argument about human nature also bears this mark. Marx’s *Economic and*

Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, which is among his relatively early works, repeats Feuerbach's normative definition of human nature via the anthropological explanations and expresses man to be a social, creative and generative natural being. However, after a while he takes a more descriptive stance in both "Theses on Feuerbach" and *The German Ideology* and starts to emphasize the historicity and sociality of man. This is, in one sense, to say that the human does not have an unchanging nature/essence. Moreover, Marx understands the entirety of social relations from the concept of human nature at this stage.

In *The Poverty of Philosophy* and *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx explains human nature via historicity. Marx's later works like *Grundrisse* and *Capital* specifies human nature as a totality of the needs, requirements, wishes, instincts and powers of the human. Therefore, Marx thinks that human beings can make their history on their own; however, they cannot make it under the conditions that they desire, but the conditions they are already under. Hence, man as both making history and being the concrete individual specified by historicity and sociality has an unstable and diversifying nature rather than an essence and unchanging nature. However, at this point some Marxists¹⁴ assert that Marx seems not to abandon the concept of human nature especially giving reference to the sixth of "The Theses on Feuerbach."¹⁵ The tendency to consider human nature as a totality of relations within the historical and social era rather than trying to define it and also the

¹⁴ Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (London: Verso Press, 2005); Norman Geras, *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend* (London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1983); Sean Sayers, *Marxism and Human Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1998); Eric Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man* (London: Continuum Publishers, 2004); Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History*.

¹⁵ "Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled: 1. To abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment [*Gemüt*] as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract—isolated—human individual. 2. The human essence, therefore, can with him be comprehended only as a 'genus', as an internal, dumb generality which merely naturally unites the many individuals." Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach" in *Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), 29.

descriptive constituents created by this tendency are enough to reveal the substance of the human being. Thus, for these Marxists, even though Marx accepts that the human is a part of nature and sociality, whenever he separates the human from animal, he returns to that definition of human nature again. In other words, the human who satisfies his/her existential wills and needs by organizing his/her labor has a general entirety even though he/she has not an unchanging nature/essence.

As Marx does not disregard this general entirety in the sixth thesis, he tends towards accepting the concept of human nature/essence “at the most” as a species-being line first in terms of content and then—in accordance with his own materialism—in terms of name: species-being.¹⁶ This change is a conceptualization exactly opposite to the that of human nature in the traditional philosophy.

The Real Moments of Revolutionary Philosophy

So far, in relation to the philosophical moments of Marx’s revolutionary politics, this paper has put forth the roots of concepts such as “alienation, commodity fetishism and reification,” “civil and political

¹⁶ “The perfect political state is, by its nature, man’s species-life, as opposed to his material life. All the preconditions of this egoistic life continue to exist in civil society outside the sphere of the state, but as qualities of civil society. Where the political state has attained its true development, man—not only in thought, in consciousness, but in reality, in life—leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the political community, in which he considers himself a communal being, and life in civil society, in which he acts as a private individual, regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. The relation of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relations of heaven to earth. The political state stands in the same opposition to civil society, and it prevails over the latter in the same way as religion prevails over the narrowness of the secular world—*i.e.*, by likewise having always to acknowledge it, to restore it, and allow itself to be dominated by it. In his most immediate reality, in civil society, man is a secular being. Here, where he regards himself as a real individual, and is so regarded by others, he is a fictitious phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where man is regarded as a species-being, he is the imaginary member of an illusory sovereignty, is deprived of his real individual life and endowed with an unreal universality.” Karl Marx, *On the Jewish Question*, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/>.

society and the state,” “human nature and species-being” in the history of philosophy along with their general definitions and the way Marx makes these conceptual points part of his original thinking. Now it is possible to examine the real moments of Marx’s revolutionary politics more closely. In order to avoid repetition, it may be useful to read the concepts constituting the philosophical moments of revolutionary politics and those constituting the real moments of revolutionary politics symmetrically.

If politics is realized now and here by envisaging historically and socially a particular space, it must be contemporary. Contemporariness is one of the instruments leading to the organizing and developing of the connections that politics tends to create. For the analyses of political philosophy tend towards those that “should be actualized” rather than those that are “actual.” Thus, they both solve and reformulate the questions/problems. By this way, the reason are attempted to be specified as to how to structure and organize the relations established both in the political sphere and via social relations.

However, politics is concerned with “here and now” also in every sense. This is related, in the positive sense, with acts’ reference to the “actual” rather than what should be “actualized”. Moreover, it sometimes catches a level completely melting into daily events. Hence, the real moments of politics are nothing different from the political issues contemporary with Marx and criticisms and comments about these issues. The contemporary themes discussed above include both vivid historical references and more concrete arguments.

Human Rights, Radical Democracy and Communism: It is proper to begin consideration of Marx’s real moments of revolutionary politics with the influence of a heritage from Hegel and left-Hegelians: human rights and radical democracy. However this time there is a huge public body embracing this heritage together with Marx. The left-Hegelians and especially Marx’s near circle were influenced by the humanist, universal and egalitarian discourse of the French Enlightenment and Human Rights Declaration of the French Bourgeoisie Revolution. This influence gives rise to an important intellectual renaissance that integrates with the demands of most intellectuals in Prussia and Germany on social transformation. This influence also raised the ambition to realize the ideals of the Enlightenment and the French Bourgeoisie Revolution. Demands concerned equal citizenship, freedom of the press, freedom of

thought, loosening the excessive and despotic control mechanisms of the state, and related to issues they directly faced with and discussed via public journals. However the discussions are not limited to these issues. Some minorities and social groups are in a struggle to be freed from the discrimination, to which they exposed, and to achieve equality in the upcoming constitution by centralized power, while in the process of transforming to a nation state. Primeval Christian and German institutions and communities are in a struggle to keep their exclusive rights and opportunities as well. All these draw Marx's political theory to discussions on human rights and radical democracy.

Marx makes a particular contribution to discussions on human rights most directly while analyzing the relationship between civil society and the state in *The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, criticizing his doctoral advisor Bruno Bauer's claims in *On the Jewish Question* and also analyzing the left-Hegelians' claims in *The Holy Family*. The Hegelian state is a constitutional monarchy with which civil society and political society are in great harmony. This monarchic constitutional state which is in harmony with the human rights that realize bourgeoisie ideals is also one where the moral life (ethic Idea) is concretized. For Hegel, these characteristics give rise to an assumption that the conflicting structure of civil society, dependent on self-interest, has already been transcended. Marx specifies that Hegel runs into a contradiction with such an assumption.¹⁷ The modern state's and the bourgeoisie's perceptions of citizenship are abstract. Hence, the real individual can take part in political society and the state by making himself/herself free from his/her own concrete existence and in some ways displaying a schizoid behavior. Thus, he/she manages to secure the right to be a citizen by going through the phase that he/she is supposed to. Marx makes this problem clear while analyzing Bruno Bauer's response to the Jewish

¹⁷ As he suggests before *On the Jewish Question*, Marx specifies Hegel's assumption as a solution consulting to a kind of mystery: The members of the political state are religious owing to the dualism between individual life and species-life, between the life of civil society and political life. They are religious because men treat the political life of the state, an area beyond their real individuality, as if it were their true life on the Jewish question. Karl Marx, *On the Jewish Question*, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question>.

people's demand for political freedom.

The Jewish people demand political freedom within the scale of their power and their contributions to the state. Bauer thinks that this demand of Jews is not proper. He argues that political freedom should start from abolishing the state's Christian identity and, therefore, Jewish people should support freedom as citizens not as Jews. Marx sees a lot of problems in Bauer's approach: i) above all Bauer cannot see that a state accepting religion as a condition is not a real state yet; and therefore ii) cannot distinguish two types of freedom; one freedom frees from religion politically and the other is the freedom of the real individual from religion; iii) he is incapable of noticing the fact that "religion concerns the restoration of all the units of the private property and the civil society." Marx concludes that struggles for political freedom, of Jewish people and all the others, cannot conclude with the freedom of man, for the abolishment or readjustment of such kinds of rights may be in question when contradictions about the usage of human rights emerge. In this case, the practice remains as an exception and the theory as a rule. Therefore, Marx suggests a political position towards "personal freedom" rather than a rearranging of the demands for political freedom.¹⁸ That is valid for all other types of demands in relation to political freedom. In other words, if political freedom is purified of abstract characteristics and brings out the human, organizing the social powers against the egoist individual advocated by human rights, then it can take the road of humanistic freedom.

Marx's political attitude towards freedom turns him towards radical democracy. The individual of civil society in modern capitalist state is bourgeois, proletarian, the member of an atomized society. However, in this political society, existing as the "representative religion of private property," there is no room for all the members of civil society. Hence,

¹⁸ "Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a *species-being* in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his "own powers" as *social* powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of *political* power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished". Karl Marx, *On the Jewish Question*, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/>.

the demands for freedom in political society must transform into the demands (for freedom) of private property sooner or later. Marx justifies the promotion/crystallization of the demands for freedom of human as species-being (in a sense the majority of civil society) rather than an individual. This justification is based on radical democracy not representative democracy, the democracy of the capitalism.¹⁹ Radical democracy is a demand for democracy which prevents the alienation of atomized social relations and masses by the hegemony of the “representative religion of the private property.” Marx uses the demands for radical democracy and the politics of total human freedom as a conceptual moment on the way to communism.

Communism represents both the struggle for eliminating private property and the general name of the movement of the proletarian class to realize it. Communism refers to a society free from the classes and exploitation where humankind realizes itself as a social being. In such a society, individuals resolve control of material powers over themselves. Marx avoids giving a keen definition and formula for communism until *The Critique of the Gotha Program*. Even in *The Critique of Gotha Program* he only asserts an alternative for transition to communism. In other words, he introduces a reflexive summary of the appearing of communism which rises from the capitalist relations of production, first with the state (socialist) and then without it (communist).²⁰

¹⁹ Radical democracy has been brought on to the agenda especially by post-Marxist thinkers with the redevelopment of discussions on civil society. For details see: Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso, 1985).

²⁰ This letter by Engels can summarize the subject: “The free people’s state is transformed into the free state. Taken in its grammatical sense a free state is one where the state is free in relation to its citizens and is therefore a state with a despotic government. The whole talk about the state should be dropped, especially since the Commune, which was no longer a state in the proper sense of the word. The ‘people’s state’ has been thrown in our faces by the anarchists too long, although Marx’s book against Proudhon and later *The Communist Manifesto* directly declare that with the introduction of the socialist order of society the state will of itself dissolve and disappear. As, therefore, the ‘state’ is only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, in order to hold down [*niederzuhalten*] one’s adversaries by force, it is pure nonsense to talk of a ‘free people’s state’; so long as the proletariat still *uses* the

Ideology, Class, Class Struggle, Class Consciousness: Although the dynamics of Marx's criticism of capitalism are rather clear, because he avoids coming up with the kinds of explanation typically specified by traditional philosophy, the literature among his followers shows great variety from the aspect of explanations and commentaries. One of the concepts that Marx avoids explaining is undoubtedly the concept of ideology. The importance of this concept in the history of political philosophy is unquestionable.

The concept is first used by Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836). Tracy sees ideology as "a scientific discipline/science of ideas" and states that this discipline has two aspects: the positive aspect is the one pointing to necessity as "a social mode of consciousness" and enabling the distinction between right and wrong. The negative aspect is the one enabling the description of "the consciousness as right or wrong epistemologically." There is another figure that makes a contribution to the concept as much as Tracy: Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonaparte describes himself as an "ideologist" before coming to power and adopts Tracy's attitude corresponding to the ideals of the Bourgeois Revolution in France. However, he breaks off his relations with the ideologists after coming to power and uses ideology "as an instrument of hegemony" in order to legitimize his power.²¹

Marx adopts both Tracy's and Bonaparte's conceptualizations and uses the concept partially different from them, for he tries to posit ideology as a concept serving for the development of criticism of capitalism.

state, it does not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such ceases to exist. We would therefore propose to replace the word 'state' everywhere by the word *Gemeinwesen* [community], a good old German word, which can very well represent the French word *commune*." Friedrich Engels, "Friedrich Engels to August Bebel; London, March 18-28, 1875", in Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, (New York: International Publishers, 1989), 31. For the entire content of this discussion see: Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*.

²¹ Eagleton suggests that this distinction should be defined as "the sociological ideologies" and "the epistemological ideologies". He clearly specifies and discusses both the meanings of the concept of ideology, gained historically, and all the references in Marx's usage of the concept. For detailed information see: Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction* (London: Verso, 1991).

Although Marx uses this concept many times up to *The German Ideology*, basically he discusses it properly only in *The German Ideology*. There are several reasons for this. One of them is Marx's belief that he made "Hegel's philosophy stand on its feet" and another one is that "materialist historicism has begun to build epistemologically a consistent line of criticism against traditional philosophy."

Marx uses the concept of ideology basically in three different meanings in *The German Ideology*. i) To Marx, people deal with historical in an upside-down fashion, just like in *camera obscura*. The reason for that "in the narrowest sense" is the alienation of people from their activities; and "in the widest sense" the reason is their encountering wrong/false consciousness. In other words, the concept of ideology refers to the totality of real moments (of revolutionary politics) that needs to be discussed with concepts bearing alienation, human nature, reification and mystification. ii) Not only are the ideas of people upside down. Also, the relationship between their consciousness and practices dissolves in favor of consciousness. Marx objects to this situation as part of philosophical materialist thinking "Consciousness does not determine life; life determines consciousness." This approach, in the strict sense, serves as the vulgar materialist description of ideology, as a theory of reflection and in a broad sense it serves for the expression of a possibility: the dominant idea only belongs to the ruling class. iii) In that case, ideology should be seen as a critical instrument of hegemony revealing the forms of consciousness from the alienated and mystified state. Marx states that one must first focus on the criticism of religious essence for this reason. Marx's attitude which continues until *Grundrisse* and *Capital* is determined by the definitions of ideology in *The German Ideology*.²²

²² "i) Ideology is structured discourse. It is, directly or indirectly, based on or generated by a set of mutually interdependent categories... ii) The relation between reality and ideology (which produces 'inversion') is the cognitive relation... iii) Ideology arises from the opacity of reality." (John Mepham, "Theory of Ideology in Capital", in *Issues in Marxist Philosophy: Epistemology, Science, Ideology*, Volume 3, eds. John Mepham and David Hillel Ruben (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1979), 146-150.) For a similar classification on the same subject see: Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 55.

Marx's attempt at defining ideology in such a dynamic way relates to the powerful hegemony of capitalism itself. Marx does not limit himself to just a single definition of ideology in order to lift the blockade that this powerful hegemony creates. In other words, capitalism continues to develop itself as "the opium of the people" in order to preserve private property and the attendance of exploitation in the same way that religious essence's manner express itself as the entirety of social relations, in place of species-being. Marx accredits the power of undermining this attitude of capitalism to the proletariat since *The Communist Manifesto*. In a sense, he drives forward the proletarian class against the capitalist class since "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." Therefore, class struggles constitute the progression/development dynamo of the history; they tend towards the development of the self-interest and the satisfaction of the needs for all the people without exception. In this struggle there are two poles: One contains the property owners/hegemons/oppressors/bourgeoisie and the other contains dispossessed/oppressed people/people under domination/wage slaves. Between these poles it is only possible to see provisional consensuses. These consensuses come into question when there is a necessity to take the edge of the conflict or when one side becomes deprived of the instruments for expressing itself or one side feels itself weak for the struggle.

It is necessary to touch upon two more points here: class and class consciousness. Marx, contrary to what is believed, does not specify the classes only according to the codes of property relations. P. Y. Hayes arranges Marx's "categorization" of class as follows: i) from the aspect of property relations (*property owner classes*: bourgeoisie, big bourgeoisie, financial aristocracy, *the dispossessed*; proletariat, surplus population, lumpen proletariat), ii) from the aspect of productivity (*productive classes*: big bourgeoisie, bourgeoisie, proletariat, *unproductive classes*; surplus population, lumpen proletariat, financial aristocracy), iii) from the aspect of other culture codes (*degenerated classes*: big bourgeoisie, financial aristocracy, lumpen proletariat, *non-degenerated classes*; bourgeoisie, proletariat, surplus population).²³

²³ See: P. Hayes, "Marx's Analysis of the French Class Structure", in *Karl Marx's Social and Political Thought*, Volume 6, Bop Jessop and Russel Weathley eds. (London: Routledge Publishers 1999), 441-445. Table 1 shows the specification of Marx's class structure cyclically (Hayes, "Marx's Analy-

As a different standpoint, Hayes's classification is a small inventory of the social structures that Marx specifies as classes. Some Marxists make the "categorization" of the class with different components and categories. However, E. P. Thompson thinks that it is useful to separate class consciousness, as the sum of the class definitions that determine the class struggles, from the consciousness of class gained during the process of political struggle, which a specific class has, rather than this inventory of the class.²⁴ The reason is that, Marx in his trilogy analyzing the revolutionary, reformist and restorationist transformations of power and in his other historical analyses about some other great social movements, states that any historical and social effort adopting a strategy and tactic, which cannot create the consciousness of its class and accordingly cannot develop its own self-interest, has to sustain a defeat.

The Concrete Moments of the Revolutionary Politics

Up until now the philosophical and real moments of Marx's revolutionary politics have been specified, and via these moments Marx's importance in the history of political philosophy, at two different levels. This paper analyzes the revolutionary researches of Marx's revolutionary politics towards the capitalist state, which blesses private property and introduces class society as indispensable and eternal. Without leaving aside the conceptual moments that revolutionary politics philosophically justifies

sis of the French Class Structure", 313); and Table 2 shows the class positions of the degenerated workers among the other classes (Hayes, "Marx's Analysis of the French Class Structure", 326). Especially for the discussion of the position of the lumpen proletariat during the revolutionary periods and the specification of the basic question in creating class consciousness Table 2 can make an analytical contribution to the discussions of lumpen proletariat.

²⁴ For a compact study on Thompson's thoughts and critical studies about class see: William Sewell Jr., "How Classes are Made: Critical Reflections on E.P. Thompson's Theory of Working-Class Formation", in *E.P. Thompson: Critical Perspectives*, eds. Harvey J. Kaye and Keith McClelland (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990). Lukacs makes important analyses on this point and reformulates the philosophical grounds of class consciousness by applying Hegel's dialectic of master and slave to the class struggles. See: György Lukacs, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971).

and the actual political situations discussed in real terms (but free from simple notions of one class against another), “concreteness” refers to the formula/proposal of the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed.

Marx uses the notion of “criticism” in the subtitle of all his works. This is the approach that Kant adopts in order to specify the position of his own philosophy towards the philosophies prior to himself. Of course, there was criticism in philosophy before Kant. However, Kant, and then The German Idealism, adopts criticism as an attitude that takes the lead in the epistemologically-based development of its era. With the influence of German Idealism, Marx uses criticism to specify his position to show why the intellectual limits of the thinkers prior to him in philosophy and political economy are insufficient to overcome the class society of capitalism. This usage also offers him the opportunity to develop his own ideas. As Marx builds his own ideas and reorganizes them critically, he begins to detect materialist and revolutionary dynamics more precisely and posits himself to be for liberation, not only as a critical thinker but also as a revolutionary. He reveals this position by collaborating and cooperating with social allies that he believes to work together.

Revolution, Revolutionary Agent, Proletariat: When Marx specifies history as the “history of class struggles” he also specifies the role of the classes and class consciousness. In a sense, the revolution comes true while a historically specific social structure, a mode of production and the classes related to them encounter an antagonism that they cannot solve historically; or a social organization managing to organize the consciousness of its class voluntarily can capture the control of the forces of production and the social instruments of hegemony against the oppressors to specify this force in its own way. When the libertarian/revolutionary agents developing in the heart of existing social structures destroy the hegemony of the existing social structure, the real foot-steps of the revolution begin to be heard.

In his trilogy about France, Marx explains his notion of revolution by clearly discussing the Bourgeois Revolution and February Revolution in France as well as the Paris Commune. In *The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, he explains the revolutions of the nineteenth century as follows:

The social revolution of the nineteenth century cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future. It cannot begin with itself before it has stripped off all superstition about the past. Earlier revolutions required recollections of past world history in order to dull themselves to their own

content. *In order to arrive at its own content, the revolution of the nineteenth century must let the dead bury their dead. There the words went beyond the content; here the content goes beyond the words.*²⁵

In a sense, the revolution is not just a showdown or the issue of who shall be the new owner of the forces of production. The revolutionary quality of the necessarily dead ideas and a melancholic revenge desired to be brought back cannot live under the total hegemony of the capitalist state. An unprecedented universal class and the oppressed ones in it should obtain all its power not from past but from future. Marx explains these ideas in *The Class Struggles in France*, a research covering the years of 1848-1850, as follows:

With the exception of only a few chapters, every more important part of the annals of the revolution from 1848 to 1849 carries the heading: *Defeat of the Revolution!* What succumbed in these defeats was not the revolution. It was the pre-revolutionary traditional appendages, results of social relationships which had not yet come to the point of sharp class antagonisms—persons, illusions, conceptions, projects from which the revolutionary party before the February Revolution was not free, from which it could be freed not by the *victory of February*, but only by a series of *defeats*. In a word, the revolution made progress, forged ahead, not by its immediate tragicomic achievements, but, on the contrary, by the creation of a powerful, united counter-revolution, by the creation of an opponent in combat with whom, only, the party of revolt ripened into a really revolutionary party.²⁶

For the Marx, the revolution cannot be realized only with the rebellion of the oppressed classes. The objectives of the revolution cannot be strengthened by protecting the government of revolutionary power. Not the agents of the revolutionary party but the agents of the revolution should be protected. A class struggle, dealing class-based society with the deadly blows developing the gains of the revolution for the good of

²⁵ Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Moscow and London: Progress Publishers and, Lawrence and Wishart, 1984), 13 (italics mine).

²⁶ Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France*, in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books Doubleday and Company, Inc.,) 281.

freedoms and at the same time realizing all the missions of the revolution through the agency of revolutionary agents and the revolutionary/destructive parties, will succeed. Otherwise, as in the decision given by the French government on 10th March 1850, it will begin making excuses: “Our dictatorship has hitherto existed by the will of the people; it must now be consolidated against the will of the people.” And, consistently, it seeks its props no longer within *France*, but without, in foreign countries, in *invasion*.²⁷

The most concrete moment of revolutionary politics, and probably the one that makes Marx most happy, is the Paris Commune; since the commune puts forward the social structure of the future without being busy with burying the dead. The commune is a self-governing urban community, does not have a problem of representation that excludes the oppressed and is ready to act together with other communes intending to unite the nation. In addition, there is no disunity between the members and the representatives of the commune. Tasking and deposal are dependent on the decisions of the members. First and foremost, there is an election system based upon common suffrage and both the wages and missions of the representatives are limited. The Paris Commune, in which women, children and elders are not socially ignored, is at a point where “the content goes beyond the words” as Marx states. In this sense, the Paris Commune manifests a structure serving as a model for all the revolutionary initiatives, achieving what is unachievable and caring, demolishing class society. For Marx, this structure—as the proletarian state—should be understood correctly.

While specifying the proletariat as the agent of the revolution in the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx does not only think about the universal quality of this class; but also he assumes that “the proletarians that have nothing to lose but their chains” will sustain the revolutionary struggle against the capitalist dispossession as in Paris Commune. Peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and lumpens do not have such a necessity at the end of the day.

The National Problem, Internationalism and Communist Organizations: Similarly to how the commune has united the masses against the common enemy without disintegrating the nations and the people, as

²⁷ Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France*. <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/class-struggles-france/ch03.html>.

Marx states, it is important for the communist revolution carried out by the proletariat to unite under the flag of internationalism. Although he adopts an attitude close to national chauvinism for a while during the 1848 revolutions developing in France and Germany (issues of Poland, Ireland, and Balkan states) he thinks that it is impossible for the exploited people to be free until “they have nothing to lose but their chains” (as stated in *Communist Manifesto*) or until the time that the dispossession of the dispossessed (as stated in *Capital*) comes true. Therefore, without refusing the principle of national self-determination, he is sometimes indecisive concerning the claims for national freedom that cannot prove themselves before the development of proletarian revolution. At all the points that Marx stays indecisive in relation to the national problem, since precisely during the 1848 revolutions, the international unions have integration problems. The most characteristic example of this is the Communist Union.

Marx accepts that Communist Union made a series of tactical mistakes during and after the German Revolution as a member of the central committee of *Communist Manifesto*. For example, it abandons decentralization in decision-making mechanisms and causes the disintegration of the organization. In a period when the proletariat has a weak organization and class consciousness, it urges the proletariat to force the political structure with the tactic of permanent revolution. However this results in exhaustion and power loss in organized power. All of these factors, as also the experiences of defeat in the 1848 Revolutions, influence Marx’s revolutionary perspective. Marx begins to broaden his perspective from Europe to the world and relies on the necessity of a proletarian mass party. Marx addresses himself to the organization of one of the new concrete moments of revolutionary politics again in order for the establishment and development of the International in 1860. This time he is softer in style and more serious in action. He shows this manner firstly in the opening speech of the International by emphasizing that it is insufficient to change capitalism just economically. Capitalism should also be forced to confront political change. However, the aforementioned softening in his style flies away with the harsh criticism he writes for the Gotha Program.²⁸

²⁸ In order to follow the historical process above see: David Fernbach, *Siyasal*

Conclusion

Up until now, this paper has touched upon the philosophical, real and concrete moments of Marx's revolutionary politics in order to specify his position in the history of political philosophy. Via these moments the article has also touched upon the concepts and instruments that Marx used in the political sphere. Thus, as the occasion arose, the paper has constituted reciprocity between the contemporariness of his revolutionary politics and the reasons for this. It is appropriate to add some discussion items here as an attempt to make some critical contributions or to enable Marx's political position to be understood correctly.

- 1) Is aiming at building Marx's materialist historicism as a scientific construct— even if there are these reference points within his work to materialist historicism— not to ask it to be like a bourgeois science; sociology, economy, traditional philosophy?
- 2) If, rather than relying on Marx's criticism and seeking an end to the dominance of the dead labor over living labor in order to overcome exploitation in (wage) labor, we demand the continuation of wage labor under more humanistic conditions, is this not to reproduce the bourgeois civil-society movement?
- 3) Marx cares about a line of struggle—as well as its forms of representation—on which the social and historical interests of the class in its class consciousness coincide with interests of the class members. Is limiting the political sphere merely to the party/union struggle—even though these parties/unions have a class perspective—under the name of democratic struggle, not to reduce everything to the parliamentary struggle focusing on the representation problem central to bourgeois public politics?
- 4) While Marx starts criticizing capitalism and its religious essence, via the criticism of political economy and criticizing the political economy with the analysis of commodity, does he manifest the essence of both civil and political society captured by capitalist commodification, with its historical and social context, or does he reduce everything to an economic essence?

Marx, trans. Murat Akad (Istanbul: Daktylos, 2008); Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists*; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Critique of Gotha and Erfurt Programmes*; Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin and Vladimir Lenin, *Writings on the Paris Commune* (St. Petersburg and Florida: Red and Black Publishers, 2008).

5) How with the production of general approaches by the social sciences and, without specifying the existence of the surplus value introduced in the labor theory of value, can the protection of nature in the world capitalist system, and the production of socialness and the securitizing of history come true?

These questions and the other ones in connection with them are being reconsidered now by the theorists of political philosophy, in general, and by Marx's friends and enemies, particularly. All of these make Marx's revolutionary politics indispensable from the aspect of the history of political philosophy.

Living Dialectically: an Examination of Negative Subjectivity in Light of the Idea of Revolt in Theory and Praxis

Stephen Bourque (Temple University)

Abstract

Adorno, writing after the revolting catastrophe of the holocaust, acknowledged the failure of Marxist thinking and practice to achieve a successful revolution. In his meditation on the failure of the revolution and the disaster that occurred under the banner of fascism, Adorno implores that we philosophically reexamine the events that took place in the twentieth century. Adorno elaborated his methodology by reexamining Hegel and Marx and thereby completing the theoretical dialectical process as expounded and examined in *Negative Dialectics*. Adorno's idea of subjectivity relies on the conceptual notion of reflection and as a result requests that the peoples of this society live dialectically. In the wake of the specter of a revolution that may never be fully achieved, what hope is there for the dialectically lived subject? Is there a possibility of revolt and change in theory as well as practice? Adorno's critique of society and theory provide the theoretical framework to examine these questions in order to pave a road for the conception of Adorno's idea of subjectivity and what it is to live dialectically.

Rain falls from the sky. It washes over the waste of our age. However, the rain has become poisonous, it permeates our very being, and yet reminds us of the way things are and the way they are supposed to be. Its dreariness can help sway the brain to realize its melancholic content, yet when the clouds clear, we are again swept away by rays of sunshine, which restore to us our loss and in the end allow us to suffer silently.

As the tides of history continue to turn in the midst of far-capitalism and in the wake of one of the most devastating atrocities ever committed by society (the Holocaust), humanity has never been more subjected to its unfreedoms than at the dawn of the twenty-first century. What once seemed to be a world at the brink of revolution has instead

become a collection of societies so comfortable with the exploitation of their own people that they have rendered themselves utterly class unconscious. Modern day capitalism petrifies the proletariat in a stagnant enclosure, ensuring that they will now become defensive of the current modes of production if the infrastructure and ideological state apparatuses of society are challenged. The act of thinking *other* (which means negatively and reflexively) in society has become as foreign to its peoples as the idea of freedom from the nine to five workday. One of the most prominent members of the Frankfurt School for Social Research, Theodor W. Adorno, wrote in his magnum opus *Negative Dialectics*, "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed."¹ Adorno, writing after the revolting catastrophe of the Holocaust, acknowledged the failure of Marxist thinking and practice to achieve a successful revolution. In his meditation on the failure of the revolution and the disaster that occurred under the banner of fascism, Adorno implores that we philosophically reexamine the events that took place in the twentieth century. Adorno elaborated his methodology by reexamining Hegel and Marx and thereby completing the theoretical dialectical process as expounded and examined in *Negative Dialectics*. In Adorno's arguably greatest work (and the series of lectures leading up to *Negative Dialectics*) he challenges what it means to be an individual caught in between the contradictions and tensions of modern society. Adorno's idea of subjectivity relies on the conceptual notion of reflection and as a result requests that the peoples of this society *live dialectically*. In the wake of the specter of a revolution that may never be fully achieved, what hope is there for the dialectically lived subject? Is there a possibility of revolt and change in theory as well as practice? Adorno's critique of society and theory provide the theoretical framework to examine these questions in order to pave a road for the conception of Adorno's idea of subjectivity and what it is to live dialectically.

Adorno's conception and further evaluation of his idea of subjectivity relies on the relationship between the conception of theory versus practice in an individual's life and the dialectical relationship in history between the *time* for theory and for practice. In today's world, "No theory escapes the marketplace. Each one is offered as a possibility among

¹ Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (London: Routledge, 1973), 3.

competing opinions; all are put up for choice; all are swallowed.”² Adorno’s relationship to practical action relies heavily on his own historic existence in conjuncture with Marxist philosophical theories (i.e. the consumption of theory as a commodity in practical living). In his lecture series, *Problems of Moral Philosophy*,³ Adorno addresses the current historical situation and the relationship in his own theory to praxis:

The situation may well demand instead that we resist the call of practicality with all our might in order ruthlessly to follow through an idea and its logical implications so as to see where it may lead. I would even say that this ruthlessness, the power of resistance that is inherent in the idea itself and that prevents it from letting itself be directly manipulated for any instrumental purposes whatsoever, this theoretical ruthlessness contains – if you will allow me this paradox – a practical element within itself. Today, practice – and I do not hesitate to express this in an extreme way – has made great inroads into theory, in other words, into the realm of new thought in which right behavior can be reformulated.⁴

In the wake of the holocaust, here, Adorno is suggesting that we attempt to resist *unreflective* practical action. In this relationship, an individual is called forth to present, in arms, a theoretical elaboration of the process between theory and practice. Adorno is insisting that in the historical situation of his own time, much practical action has been taken (specifically keeping in mind the communist revolutions of Russia and Italy, as well as the fascist domination in his own country of Germany) and the consequences have been severe for the witnesses of these revolutions. Adorno’s main thesis in abstaining from direct practical action lies in a contradictory relationship (without resolution) between the time for theory and the time for action. As is obvious, when Marx was writing his theoretical works, the time for practical action was in the air shortly after his demise in 1883. However, witnessing the result of these practical actions, Adorno believes his historical situation is now a decisive time for acting through theory (what the quote above is suggesting).

² Ibid., 4.

³ Theodor W. Adorno, *Problems of Moral Philosophy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

⁴ Ibid., 4.

It may seem contradictory for a thinker heavily influenced by Marxist theory to simply rely on theory when it would seem every period of time is a time for action. However, a deeper suggestion inherent in Adorno's presentation of this call for theory, is the idea of the dialectical individual and reflexivity. Using moral philosophy as the judgment in practical action, Adorno is suggesting a *negative* morality:

Moral philosophy in this sense means making a sustained effort—without anxieties or reservations—to achieve a true, conscious understanding of the categories of morality and of the questions that relate to the good life and practice in that higher sense, instead of continuing to imagine that this entire complex of issues must be excluded from the realm of theory on the grounds that it is practical.⁵

Therefore, moral philosophy provides a mediating element in the relationship between practical action and theory. Adorno is suggesting a negative morality in the sense that every action that is taken by an individual allows the individual to mediate himself between theory and his own practical action. This happens in expression through the reflection and mediation of the dialectics the individual is caught up in through his everyday living. This subject is no longer the *pure* subject of Heideggarian thinking, but rather, a subject who is in midst of the flow of dialectics (freedom and unfreedom, society and the individual, etc.). The process of reflection in the individual is to be attained in order to prevent certain catastrophes and past suffering that were experienced by people; Adorno wants us to remember those who have suffered in the past in order to prevent the same type of suffering for individuals in the future. Thus,

anything that we can call morality today merges into the question of the organization of the world. We might even say that the quest for the good life is the quest for the right form of politics, if indeed such a right form of politics lay within the realm of what can be achieved today.⁶

The relationship between theory and practice in Adorno is to construct a reflexively mediated subjectivity that when given a certain prac-

⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁶ Ibid., 176.

tical situation, acknowledges his relationship to the universalities in concepts inherent in ideology and his own individualistic situation and the bound-ness of the relationship between both of them to mediate and navigate his own way through the dialectical world.

Adorno elaborates on his methodology of the dialectic throughout his entire work, *Negative Dialectics*. The relationship between the practical and theoretical is only the first step in understanding Adorno's dialectics. It is therefore useful to elaborate the whole of the conceptual methodology in order to further illuminate Adorno's theory of subjectivity and the possibility of revolt as well as dialectical subjectivity given these certain constraints. In order to clarify these themes, it must be noted that the methodology of negative dialectics begins first and foremost with one specific thinker: Hegel. Adorno's criticism of Hegel lies in his idea of identity thinking and the specific identity of the Hegelian concept of Geist (or Spirit). According to Adorno on Hegel:

The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy. Contradiction is not what Hegel's absolute idealism was bound to transfigure it into: it is not of the essence in a Heraclitean sense. *It indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived.*⁷

Adorno is stating above that the Hegelian dialectic falls victim to the 'negation of the negation' and therefore all of the contradictions present in the Hegelian dialectic are subsumed under the ultimate concept of Geist (Spirit) to include every contradiction of history in a positive sense. In the Hegelian system, each contradiction and negative aspect of a concept (the concepts relation to its unidenticality in relation to the thing the concept is identifying), where the concept is always in relationship with the fleeting factor of its 'non-identity,' does not correctly perform the 'true' dialectical method. This relationship is the non-identity of the concept, which never fully grasps that concept (its object). The Hegelian principle of Geist posits these concepts under an overruling positive thinking (the negation is performed for the eventual

⁷ Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 5. Italics mine.

realization of Geist in the subject [the negation of the negation]). Therefore dialectics, in Adorno's sense, becomes shaped to exclude this positive identity through contradiction:

Contradiction is nonidentity under the aspect of identity; the dialectical primary of the principle of contradiction makes the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity. As the heterogeneous collides with its limit it exceeds itself. Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity.⁸

Adorno's new *negative* dialectics carries through the first intention of dialectics from Hegel, however, consistently mediates the concepts between the universal and particular and never subsumes them under the banner of positivity and identity, "Dialectics serves the end of reconciliation. It dismantles the coercive logical character of its own course."⁹ It appreciates the aspect of non-identity as well as the negative aspect of every concept in its inability to ever fully reach the object the concept describes.

The methodology of negative dialectics is influenced extensively by Adorno's Marxist materialism: dialectics is mediated in a society and the history of the people (and economic relations between them). The Hegelian concept of history is inverted in the way Marx intended and Adorno's anti-system rests in the dialectic of history, which acknowledges negativity and the mediation of the subject between the universal and the particular caught up in the midst of universality (obviously these are the forces of production among other forces that limit the individual). Adorno is also critical of the way the current cultural industry treats the relationship between man and nature; the concept is formed in correspondence with the domination of nature (under the current modes of production): "all concepts, even the philosophical ones, refer to non-conceptualities, because concepts on their part are moments of the reality that requires their formation, primarily the control of nature."¹⁰ The modes of production serve in the dialectical relationship of history and man to manufacture and promote concepts in order for humanity to control nature. For Adorno, these concepts always relate back to the non-

⁸ Ibid., 5.

⁹ Ibid., 6.

¹⁰ Ibid., 11.

conceptual and non-identity of their objects. In this way, the concept is ‘disenchanted’ from its original essentialist thinking. Reflection, in a dialectical sense, on any concept and situation allows an individual to encounter the non-identical aspect inherent in identity thinking and consequently to mediate that concept of reflection in the individual, “Reflection upon its own meaning [the concept] is the way out of the concept’s seeming being-in-itself as a unit of meaning.”¹¹ The negating process of negative dialectics is a realizing of the non-conceptual in the concept in order to transcend the concept (negatively). It is this aspect, given by reflection, which allows an individual and philosopher to create movement in relationship to a dialectical process (i.e. no synthesis, rather, an oscillation and tension between the concept and the non-concept or identity and non-identity in order to mediate and encourage a reflexive process in the individual and in the philosopher). Adorno’s methodology of negative dialectics therefore becomes a useful tool in examining the subject’s realm and activity of freedom (negative subjective freedom).

The idea of negative freedom as elaborated in the book, *Negative Dialectics*,¹² is initially explored in Adorno’s lecture series, *History and Freedom*.¹³ Adorno’s conception of freedom rests heavily upon the relationship between freedom and history (here Adorno’s Marxist background becomes explicitly illuminated through these texts). This relationship is further elaborated by the contingency between the particular (singular being; individual) and the universal (society, unfreedom, etc). It is this dialectic dynamic that defines Adorno’s conception of both history and freedom,

I believe that if we are able to appreciate the particularity of the universal, in this instance of progressive rationality, we shall understand a little about the dialectics of the universal and particular as a structure of history.¹⁴

¹¹ Ibid., 12.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Theodor W. Adorno, *History and Freedom* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).

¹⁴ Ibid., 13.

Adorno then goes on to suggest that this conception of the universal in history is an attempt of humanity's "rationality" to further the cause of the domination of nature. "This domination of nature was not self-reflective but asserted its control over its so-called materials by subsuming, classifying, subordinating and otherwise cutting them short."¹⁵ This system of the domination of nature extends to manifest in forms of control and unfreedom in human "rationality" thereby limiting human freedom,

antagonism, conflict, is in fact postulated in this principle of dominant universality, of unreflecting rationality, in precisely the same way as antagonism to a subservient group is postulated in a system of rule.¹⁶

This system of rule progresses in history through "rationality" and, "in its unreflective form [rationality] is at bottom nothing other than the exploitation of nature transferred to men and continuing to work in them."¹⁷ This universality of rationality to overcome nature and subdue it is one of the working practices in the dialectic between the powers of the universal over the particular in history. The domination of nature thereby is used as an example of the working of history to *weigh down* the individual freedom of the particular being. This dynamic between the universal and the particular is fully realized in modern sciences. Adorno further explores the relationship between the universal forces inherent in history and the particular's freedom in relationship to those forces. Adorno comes to the conclusion: "In this pre-critical consciousness the dominant, prevailing universality can no longer be equated with the *meaning* of history or indeed with any *positive* value."¹⁸ Thereby we reach a negative history and therefore a *negative* freedom.

This negative freedom and negative history are further related in an individual through Adorno's idea of 'identity thinking.' It is in correlation to an individual's freedom in *history* (the main category of the individual) that dialectical philosophy clarifies certain aspects of our limited freedom. The discontinuity of history and the idea of a universal history

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 16.

¹⁸ Ibid., 17.

are both at work in the limiting factors of an individual being; history is caught in a dialectical relationship between a seemingly continuous sense of history and a discontinuity which establishes again, a further relationship between the particular and the universal. The role of identity in Adorno corresponds with this notion of the particular and the universal. In relationship to history, and therefore freedom, it is historical practices which subsume and submit the individual to a power relationship of thinking in line with the universal and which do not mediate these overwhelming universal powers between the individual and the universal. This relationship is dialectically examined through identity and non-identity (in history and freedom):

The position is not that an identity rules which also contains non-identity, but non-identity is a non-identity of the identical and the non-identical. Thus non-identity includes what gives history its unity, what enables it to accommodate itself to the concept as well as what doesn't. For the very things that subjugate and submit, these very acts of subjugation and submission in which identity is torn apart, forge the identity of history of which we speak and which we must describe as a negative identity.¹⁹

Thus, recognizing the power relationships (that the universal carries over to the particular individual in not only the reconstruction of history but also of the freedom, which an individual can invoke) becomes a dialectical manifestation between individual acts and the power structures (universals) that bombard and attempt to subsume the individual (particular). It is ideological and identity practices that create a web of dialectical unfreedoms imposed as a category of the universal over the particular individual in his particular action. Ideology is portrayed as if it were in a state of peace attempting to set individuals toward the projected blissfulness of a universal history and *progress* while dominating not only nature and the full dialectical nature of the human individual, but also restricting and limiting the individual's freedom in the universal unfreedoms in which he is caught up: "This is then represented as if it were a state of reconciliation in which people lived together in harmony while in reality society is full of power struggles."²⁰

¹⁹ Ibid., 92.

²⁰ Ibid., 95.

Therefore, the individual in relationship to identity thinking is led to believe that these universal powers (represented in history by the modes of production and the infrastructure of the economy) bind the individual to a set of unfreedoms in which their freedoms are restricted just by existing in the world of production and the world of culture. It is when an individual defines himself by these power relationships that he steps inside and seeps himself in the deluded relations of the universal domination principle thereby giving up his own reflexive dialectical relationship to these unfreedoms and subsuming himself in the midst of the great lie of the universal. It is in this way that the philosopher becomes a mystic and gives himself up to *myth*.

This conception of history and freedom are (as mentioned above) an explicitly *negative* history and freedom: a freedom that is always in the dialectical relationship between the universal powers that be and the particular individuality of the person involved in these power structures. The question for the subjective individual in Adorno's philosophical methodology then becomes: what *is* freedom (aside from being 'negative'), if it is always in a dialectical relationship, in the individual, between its unfreedom and the freedom that is supposedly allowed to enable itself? In the subjective dialectical individual, freedom then becomes more limiting but also more spontaneous and empowering once this freedom is exercised to its full potentiality. Adorno redefines his idea of subjectivity again in the lectures on freedom and history:

freedom appears to us as a subjective quality, as if the judgment about whether freedom exists is one that falls exclusively to the subjective mind, this insight enables us to see how dependent freedom is on objective realities and to gauge the extent to which we are capable of influencing the real world with its overpowering, structured institutions by what we do as formally free subjective agents.²¹

Therefore the subjective, dialectical being is always caught in these power structures, however, through reflection these power structures can be realized in the individual consciousness. Thus Adorno remarks on the dialectically subjective being in relationship to morality (what it means to exercise and invoke our freedom is set about by the morality of the

²¹ Ibid., 204.

dialectical subject) more extensively:

It is a product of history [morality] in the sense that the categories of freedom and unfreedom are themselves the products of history; and in the sense that the entire sphere of morality only came into being historically together with the human subject. If we consider the amorality of the world of myth, we can see that what matters is not the idea that people used to have different ideals about morality –that is the kind of claim made by trivial popular psychology and the like – but that at that time, thanks to the global situation of the human species and the stage of development reached by human society, the entire sphere of a stable, self-contained and responsible subjectivity had not yet emerged...we cannot simply deny the existence of a separation of individual and society, which ultimately led to the problem of individual freedom.²²

In this quote we see Adorno's idea of subjectivity start to refine itself through the development of his ideas of history and freedom. The 'self-contained and responsible' subjectivity Adorno wishes to aim for is the existence of a dialectical self, awakened to the process of his own freedom in the schema of his unfreedom and the dialectical relationship between the individual (particular) and the structured forces (universals). Adorno pushes his idea further by addressing the link between history and freedom,

and in this way the link between history and the question of freedom must be seen to be more than a matter simply of an ever-changing content. The link between the two must lie instead in the constitution of the problem of freedom itself.²³

The nature of history is not a stagnant process, it is a dialectical process and it is the idea of Adorno's subjectivity that calls for a dialectical, self examined individual who is caught up in the dynamic of freedom and history. This dynamic is also in relationship to what Adorno defines as the universal and particular situation of an individual. This situation of the dialectical relationship of self that has the inherent ability to maximize our potentiality of freedom through *spontaneous* acts of

²² Ibid., 207.

²³ Ibid., 208.

history which redefine, restructure, and redistribute the course of history (universal) on a macrocosmic level and redistribute and refine the individual (particular) on a microcosmic level.

The dialectical conception of freedom becomes constituted in the act or redistribution of activity theoretically as well as practically, by mediation and spontaneity. Adorno first defines spontaneity in *History and Freedom* suggesting that spontaneous actions are in fact involuntary and non-thoughtful:

The actual conceptual achievements, by which I mean the achievements thanks to which the world becomes for me the world in which our experience has its being, these achievements are not so much my acts, in other words, conscious activities, but are more like objective, involuntary functions that occur even before any particular mental activities have taken place within the world as constituted.²⁴

Adorno is suggesting that the spontaneous act is an act in which the individual does not consciously pursue this theoretical or practical action: it is an act that is completely involuntary and unconscious. However, using Adorno's first introduction of spontaneity, it can be determined that the spontaneous act can be directed unconsciously. However, Adorno, leaving out the possibility of the hopefulness of the spontaneous act, considers it more of a drive rather than a consciously directed act in contradiction to the universality of the powers of the structures of society and concepts. He, however, goes on to say,

The concept of spontaneity, which might be described as the organ or medium of freedom, refuses to obey the logic of non-contradiction, and is instead a unity of mutually contradictory elements. It points, therefore, to a strict conception of dialectic.²⁵

Adorno is suggesting first and foremost that spontaneous action and thinking is an activation of the dialectic and therefore the key component in living dialectically. Although not inherently promoting (and at first) the mediated spontaneous act, an act, which is induced, predicted,

²⁴ Ibid., 214.

²⁵ Ibid., 217.

and predicated by the dialectical subjectivity, Adorno remarks:

As the human subject separates itself off and becomes a single being, and defines itself as a single being, it must of course, if it is to defend its individuality against others that crowd in on it, insulate itself against the consciousness of its own entanglement in general.²⁶

The conclusion Adorno leads this thinking to is the “monadological veil” in which an individual attempts to salvage his relationship to himself as a neurological ‘obsession’ of sorts in order to retain his individuality in light of the unfreedom and universalities that bear down upon this individual. However, as Adorno remarks (in the quote above), a consciousness attempts to fight off these universalities which leads the subjective individual to the conclusion that a subject is “simultaneously both free and unfree.”²⁷ Therefore, Adorno’s idea of subjectivity in relation to spontaneity remains inadequately unexamined.

It is this notion of spontaneity that is the key to examining how it is to live dialectically. Applying the methodology of negative dialectics, Adorno’s examination of the subject leads to a dialectical relationship between every aspect of an individual’s being in the world. His ethic is a *negative* ethics, his history is a *negative* history, his freedom is a *negative* freedom, but what do all of these *negative* reflections mean for the revolutionary individual in his exercise of revolt? What do these relationships mean for the freedom of the individual? It is again Adorno’s notion of spontaneity and mediation that will further develop the progression of the dialectical life. When Adorno attempted to complete the Hegelian dialectic in a negative sense, he repositioned the dialectic to be a process much like an oscillating circle of reflexivity in relationship to the concepts and situations a being finds himself in, in the world and in theory. This constellation and spiraling notion of dialectical activity, naturally leads to the conclusion that we are caught up in a restricted relationship to everything. Where there is a concept there is always a lack, where there is freedom there is always a lack, etc., and these spiraled constitutions of the world (dialectic constitutions) catch the individual in history in a profound way. The structures of power in a given society

²⁶ Ibid., 217.

²⁷ Ibid., 218.

always weight down upon the individual and produce and reserve our relationship to our own being. Adorno acknowledges these structures as inherently dialectic and presents the individual with a dialectical being in the world. Although Adorno does not take his theory this far, it seems he may even be suggesting that a person who realizes his dialectical subsumption in the constitution of these structures of power, is given a unique opportunity, or even by the realization of these structures and the individuals relationship to them can develop a revolutionary consciousness or the ability to ascertain and make better decisions in the real world as a result of the awakening of his consciousness. Therefore, the initial act of negative dialectics, and the theoretical constitution of the methodology of living by negative dialectics, first starts with this notion of theoretical and therefore practical ‘awakening.’

The study of Adorno’s methodology is attempting to not only complete the Hegelian dialectic, but also pointing out certain conceptions of power and the structures of these powers in the given world and through the culture industry. The conception of freedom in *Negative Dialectics*²⁸ (as explicated and commented on above) leads, again, to a dialectical conception of our being in the world as constituted between the dialectic of freedom and unfreedom. This relationship becomes a *circle* first and foremost because Adorno’s idea of subjectivity is constituted in the concept of mediation or reflection. This conception involves, rather than a synthesis of the antithesis and thesis, an oscillation between the thesis and antithesis, therefore providing Adorno with the key to his dialectical process. This *negativity* is always the realization of the negative aspects of the universal and the particular reflecting back on each other and constantly being mediated by each other in the given situation of the world. It is in this way no longer a positive movement through history and being, but rather a *true* dialectic movement, with the concept of universality always falling back upon the concept of particularity and the concept of non-identity and the non-conceptual always mediating the concept and identity without subsuming these things under a positive notion or a *meaning* such as Hegel’s Geist or Heidegger’s *pure* subject. This *reflexive circle* (dialectic) in the particular individual allows the realization through reflection of the potential for freedom.

²⁸Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*.

Adorno's examination of freedom (as described above) leads the individual subject to hope in freedom as a refusal, or a structural reexamination and reflection in the dialectic of being (being in the world, not in the Heideggerian sense). As an individual caught up in the dialectic (this includes the dialectic between universal and particular and other specific notions of the dialectic examined above) of the world, the first step in exercising one's freedom in the wake of unfreedom lies in the ability to consciously act spontaneous. Adorno promotes the idea of spontaneity as an unconscious ability to redirect power structures in the course of history (and therefore individual acts of spontaneity in the individual's life are acts which redistribute the dialectics of everyday living in a new way). However, Adorno fails to complete his method of freedom by remaining quiet on the ability of a person to be revolutionary or to even consider the notion of revolt in one's own consciousness. This lack of address on Adorno's part may have played a particular role in his own life and history, however, it can be seen that what may be aimed for in negative dialectics in relation to living dialectically is the conscious ability of spontaneity and the resulting awakening of the revolutionary being as a product of realizing the dialectics of everyday life, theory, and practice. Through the realization of the structures of a society, what is an individual to do with his dialectical contingency of living? The structures of the *circular* dialectic correspond to a certain conception of being and it is through the reflexive structure of oscillating between the particular and universal and self-examining one's own relationship that true moments of spontaneity occur. Therefore, spontaneity relies heavily on the notion of realizing these structures of power; it is in this way, that Adorno himself performed an intellectual task of spontaneity when he wrote *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*²⁹ with his friend and colleague Max Horkheimer.

Both of these thinkers engaged in a critical evaluation of the situation in the world, of the modes of production and capitalism through the unveiling of structures of power of the culture industry as a whole. Therefore, this text, which serves to illuminate a consciousness about the modes of production it is caught up in, in a given culture, reflects

²⁹ Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic Of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments* (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 2004).

back onto the reader the ability Adorno had for *awakening* the consciousness to its unfreedoms. It is this process of criticality examining the relationships of unfreedom and structures of society (especially in the far-capitalistic world), or what Horkheimer termed, *critical theory* (which is itself a practical application especially in the writing and distributing of texts), that was an act of intellectual spontaneity which also provides the key to what Adorno's own theory should lead in the subjectivity of an individual awakened to his own dialectical being in the world. Using *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*³⁰ as an example, it can be seen that the restructuring through the conscious act of spontaneity and reflection redistributes the dialectic dynamic that the powers of control have over the individual in hope for the actualization of freedom against these powers, through revolt. Although Adorno himself seems rather without much hope for a real Marxist revolution which will distribute the powers and allow for the eventual realization of freedom in every being, with no immanent practical revolution on the rise, the individual is left with spontaneous acts of awakened revolutionary consciousness which redistribute and examine the actual dialectical structure of being in the world and of the ideas which present themselves as theory in the world. Revolutionary consciousness consists in this dialectical realization of the linear-circular dialectic (negative dialectics). It is in this restructuring of the individual dialectical situation to the social dialectical dimension that enables the maximization of the potentiality for freedom through revolt against dominating practices.

Another aspect of Adorno's concept of subjectivity rests heavily upon the concepts of utopia and suffering. These two concepts pave the way for what Adorno wanted to be eventually a negative moral philosophy following the methodology of negative dialectics. These two concepts play a key role in determining the type of subjectivity Adorno felt may not be possible yet, but which, in the future, could attain some sort of further being if we prevent the past suffering in history and remember those who have suffered in order to determine what exactly humanity lacks; to determine the qualities of humanity that are not quite human (through past suffering) negatively, in order to discuss what we *could* be someday. It is here that Adorno is suggesting the conception of human-

³⁰ Ibid.

ity as still in ‘pre-history’ (a term borrowed from Marx). We must become more human by reaching out and aiming for utopia in a negative sense. Adorno states,

What I am describing to you is philosophical depth regarded subjectively—namely, not as the justification or amelioration of suffering, but as the expression of suffering, something which understands the necessity of suffering in the very act of expression.³¹

Thus, Adorno wants suffering to be expressed in subjectivity and in a specific way. He calls for suffering as expression in and through *history*. Since the dialectical being is always caught in the midst of his history, this suffering must be a remembrance of the past atrocities as well as the expression through a negative morality that aims for the concept of humanity. Humanity the idea, for Adorno, is the concept of utopia that we must strive for to reach our full ‘human-ness.’ Learning from past suffering dictates the categories of things that still make us “not yet human” (for example we realize through wars that it seems we should not kill other human beings) and teach us what it could mean to actually become human. This not-yet of Adorno’s philosophy is a key in thinking about how it is we are to live dialectically and what this hope of living dialectically may achieve from Adorno’s negative morality and negative dialectics.

Now the question remains as to whether or not living dialectically is possible in other ways rather than the direct awakened consciousness of the individual being. In the first instance, following Adorno’s own theory, the unconscious spontaneous project (which still does occur in the course of history and in individual subjectivities—however, the aim of the ‘awakened’ process is to *consciously* redistribute and realize the dialectic relationship of the structures of society) is obviously one that occurs in history without the direct awakening of the consciousness of the individual subject (those peoples in history who have never read revolutionary material still contribute to the restructuring of society—for example, Oskar Schindler’s anti-identity thinking during the second world war in contraposition to the Nazi regime). However, beside the unconscious act of spontaneity and the conscious disrupting social spon-

³¹ Theodor W. Adorno, *Lectures on Negative Dialectics* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 108.

taneity, there remains, as it seems an outlet for redistributing the dynamic of the dialectical situation. The outlet for this dialectic redirection is inherent in the conception of the work of art.

The aesthetic dimension of reality presents itself as an outlet for the revolutionary individual in a society that doesn't seem able to release itself from the bonds of capitalism and engage in an actual political revolution. In his lecture course, *Lectures on Negative Dialectics*, Adorno addresses this issue of aesthetics (as well in his posthumous work, *Aesthetic Theory*)³² and the methodology of negative dialectics by stating:

Music theory really teaches only how a movement begins and ends, nothing about the movement itself or its development. By analogy, instead of reducing philosophy to categories, the task in a sense is to compose it.³³

This remark is crucial in understanding what role aesthetics plays in the development and analogy of the methodology of negative dialectics to encourage revolt. Adorno is using the example of music theory here to suggest that philosophy and thinking should encourage and engage with how a movement takes place thereby much like a musician or artisan uses the rules of music theory or artistic training to, in a sense, create the movement of the production of the painting or song. In this way the artist mimics what Adorno wants from philosophy: to reject the concept of stagnant categories and in turn use the methodology of dialectics to explain, describe, and carry forth history. It is in this sense, the artisan and art, as process, encourages an individual to engage in a dialectical artistic endeavor which in turn plays a heavy role in the redistribution of structures and reassessing the dialectic, therefore producing revolutionary movements and moments of revolt by the very process of artistic creation itself. Thus, art engages directly in a moment of dialectic living and can also awaken those exploring artistic realms of life to engage in this same dialectical process thereby reinforcing itself as a form of resistance and nay-saying to engagement with categories and static thinking. Through the aesthetic moment an individual contributes

³² Adorno, Theodor W. *Aesthetic Theory* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997)

³³ Adorno, *Lectures on Negative Dialectics*, 148.

directly to redistributing the structures of power and engages in a free act of creation despite these powers that attempt to subsume the individual. Art then becomes a weapon in which to resist the complete domination (absent mediation) of the universal over the particular. Although an art piece may not, by itself contribute to a practical revolution, the act of engaging in the artistic process is an important experience (along with spontaneous action, as described above) of an individual's engagement with an act of revolt and revolutionary consciousness.

Adorno wants philosophy to get back on track and he argues that in order to do this one must practice and be aware of the methodology of negative dialectics. Negative dialectics is, in fact, a philosophy of interpretation and Adorno wants interpretation (non-stagnant) to insert itself back into philosophical discourse by thinking *other*: to use concepts to think through concepts, while at the same time identifying the non-conceptual and moving philosophically in order to de-mystify myth. Adorno calls us to move forward through the concept of utopia of humanity, which is what does not exist but remains an idea *outside* the current reality. Negative dialectics offers philosophers the ability to judge concepts, aim for something that negates the current reality and idea of concepts, take into play the idea of the non-conceptual, and overall gives us a methodology to think *other* and bring philosophy back towards movement to allow hope for the possibility of a different moral world with less suffering and more freedom (in the dialectical sense). Therefore, Adorno's methodology of negative dialectics (again, the 'completion' of the Hegelian dialectic) constitutes, in its actualization in relation to subjectivity, a means and a hope for the individual to awaken his consciousness and to play the game of resistance in the wake of past suffering. Although this resistance may not lead to any practical, overall revolution, living dialectically is an important component in the search for freedom in the midst of overwhelming power structures that attempt to assert defining practices and their different ideological unfreedoms upon us. Thus, living dialectically is a source of hope for a future that could possibly lead us all to freedom, for as Walter Benjamin once astutely put, "It is only for the sake of those without hope, that hope is given to us."³⁴

³⁴ Cited in Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*. 2nd Edition (New York: Routledge, 1991), 257.

BOOK REVIEW

*Jean-Pierre Cléro, Essai sur les Fictions,
Hermann, Paris, 2014, 570 p.
Arab Kennouche (Paris, France)*

In this pertinent ambition to expand his theoretical concerns, Jean-Pierre Cléro notes first that there has traditionally been very little epistemological investigation into the very notion of fiction without falling into a sort of general fictionalism, a position subject to harsh criticism in the field of the sciences. Cléro's concern essentially relates to the need for a sound trans-disciplinary theory of fictions, one which would overcome the too classical opposition between object-depicting language and objectless fictions, the latter being characterized by the absence of objects in discourse. Another interest expressed by Cléro relates to the link fictions erroneously establish with truth and error. As a matter of fact, any fiction is bound to be perceived through the lenses of truth and falsehood but without ever absolutely making one prevail over the other, as fiction itself partakes of some elements of reality while simultaneously conveying the idea of a fictitious presence. As a bolt-notion, fiction, notes Cléro, may account for a certain part of reality without compulsorily engaging in a truth-condition relationship. It seems that for him fiction entails other ideas like constructability and utility, which incline towards the acceptance of fictions outside the scope of a truth/falsehood relation. This in turn makes it possible to think about fictions on the level of values, which also have to be determined. Acceptance without belief seems to open the way for an ethical approach in theorizing fictions. Throughout his book, Cléro articulates his attempt to discuss the possibility of a theory of fiction through the works of Jeremy Bentham, pointing to the relevance of the notion of utility in extirpating the vagaries of fictions perceived from the realm of truth. Far from trying to extract logical elements in mathematical, literary and scientific fictions, Cléro claims that fictions are liminal beings in ambiguous relations with truth and falsehood, as their fictitious traits do not necessarily lead to a fallacious meaning. Cléro thus explains how the notion of truth can be analyzed through the prism of Bentham's utility.

Apart from the few attempts to theorize fiction started by C. K.Ogden in 1932 (through the etymological heritage of the Latin *Fin-*

gere, opposed to *Facere*, as well as the failed contribution of John Stuart Mill who mistakenly transformed Bentham's theory of fallacies into a theory of judgment), the project of a contemporary and well-founded theory of fiction has lagged behind other developments. Or, as it seems, the very idea of fiction harbors in itself all the obstacles that such a project would encounter. A definition of fiction is at first sight full of difficulties. Cléro explains how the social contract in political philosophy, despite being fictitious, serves the purposes of legitimate government for the governed people who act "as if" it was true. Such an unreal contract operates on the level of reality when it provides some kind of utility. The problem raised by Cléro is related to the nature of these efficient fictions. Do they cease to be fictitious because they are efficient? This recalls another efficient fiction, Hume's continuity of objects, where the impressions released by such objects are always discontinuous. Our discontinuous perception of objectivity allows us (through fiction) to perceive objects as having a continuous substratum. Another example of efficient fiction is the idea of a unified "I," or the illusion of a substantial self, which is believed to be true, although fallacious. When Leibniz constructed a coherent space, it was also through a fiction, the useful idea that space is inherently the substratum for any object. In mathematics, rectifications, corrections are made possible through the use of fictions, as in the case of infinitesimal fragments of space that are deemed to function as zeroes. Apart from being useful, Cléro argues that fictions produce their own rationality. The notion of probability, another fiction since it deals with nonexistent objects, can produce a highly rational calculus, as well as a whole system of values with an efficient influence on human activity. Therefore, as Cléro remarks, an object's ontological status has no necessary relation to its efficient and productive effects within the human sphere of activity. An intermediate state of existence does not preclude *per se* the possibility of an effective perception of reality. Even in the field of experience, fiction becomes unavoidable in order to describe an "as if" existing item for the perception of movement. The ontological perception of movement is realized through its fictional construction. Cléro also ascribes to such a fictional existence of movement a capacity of substantification applied to a mere ratio between two objects. This in-between may be called movement, a term that is understood on the ontological level, and from which any further rationality or mathematics can take its point of departure. As a matter of

fact, Cléro wishes to survey the objective links that such fictions as the question of the indivisible in mathematics, or physical movement, or the fictitious social contract in political philosophy, or even the fictitious psychological self-identical “I,” have in common. Bentham discarded in his classification of fictions what he named fabulous entities, whereas Cléro is ready to accept such tales as Robinson Crusoe as pure fictions on account of the “as if” criteria encountered in the life of the hero. Defoe acts or writes as if he was himself told about the details of his character’s life. Likewise, Diderot’s nun did not exist but the book invites the reader to ponder her real existence in a way that may make him consider her life as “true.” Beyond the Benthamian tool of substantification, Cléro lists several other procedures for the construction of fictions. Building a set of contradictions will have the effect of releasing useful truths. There is another way of obtaining truthful effects by simply putting forward an absurd judgment based on false assumptions, expecting that the latter will bring forth some truths. Montesquieu would build up ideal constitutions in order to examine their possible effects on society. With the Galilean-Cartesian approach to fiction, Cléro argues, only a few elements are retained to account for the possible actualization of a fiction. A line is never perfectly straight, a thread is never fully extended, but they are artificially perceived as such for the sake of explanation. Abstraction may also be efficient in eliminating all the fuzzy parts of an idea to build a fiction out of stable elements. Generalization would remove every peculiarity through the use of language in view of constructing a total fiction. The totalizing effect of generalization leaves no space for analysis since contradictions are left unresolved. Singular entities must not, however, be taken as real because they would escape the fictional effects of generalization. Peculiarities or individual entities can only be apprehended by a fiction which is a general idea. Cléro also determines how ideologies may be efficient in transforming reality. Here again, the erroneous aspect that we can perceive in them is insufficient to thwart their effects. Error is productive even if it is unconscious in the ideologically formed person.

Cléro also points to the role of language in the theory of fiction. The grammatical form of language makes it possible to construct fictions “as if” they existed. Language’s ability to build fictitious entities upon the prerequisite of real entities gives the author of fiction the ability to take for real things that have no existence. The intrinsic relations

of meaning between the real and the fictional entity maintain the fiction in the vicinity of truth and reality. The entity's fictitious character depends on the nature of the relation it holds with the real one. Cléro, following a Benthamite argument, explains how a fictional entity can further develop into new fictions, like the movement of movement. However, language alone cannot be the focus of fiction without considering its users and their intentionality. The intention to abuse or deceive someone introduces a clear difference between error and falsehood. As regards the role of language, Cléro aptly asks whether the intention of the language-user is completely disconnected from the essence of fictional discourse, or whether there are intrinsic elements of fiction within language. He can then perceive the dialectical relation that fictions have in themselves. Is Descartes' new world of principles and laws, or of hurricanes, a world of fictions when confronted with the real one, or is the real world a mere fiction, being unable to explain unknown phenomena, when faced with the world to come? Besides, Cléro has it that fictions enable man to overcome contradictions. In the aporetic delimitation of selfhood and otherness, given that it is impossible to feel something on the level of absolute otherness without involving the self, the fiction of sympathy allows for a temporary overcoming of these contradictory entities. Sympathy is a fiction which allows for reciprocal understanding of selves outside the grip of a critical theory attempting to define the possible limits of selfhood and otherness. But is Sympathy real as Hume supposed, or is it fictional as Bentham argued? Is Sympathy an acceptable fiction or not? What is to be retained in a theory of fiction? Imagination, affects, symbolic language? Fiction represents a means for stabilizing contradictory relations, as the fiction of identification, to take one instance, overcomes the problem of a given or constituted human nature. Fiction is a third term which gathers into a single construction the contradictory elements of two possible entities. Whether human nature is merely given or, conversely, only constituted, identification enables us to explain one aspect of human nature.

Another aspect of the theory of fictions lies in the relation between the symbolic and the affective, Bentham having drawn attention to the symbolic forces concealed behind perceptions. Once again fictions capture the entanglement of affects and symbols, maintaining them or dissolving them to the detriment of an acceptable theory of fiction. However, even if rational utilitarianism may vanish under the spell of sym-

bolism, since it is not conceivable to account for a society merely in terms of pleasure and pain, it is still the expression of defective control, as Lacan asserts, and this allows Cléro to pin a possible theory of fiction to the very concept of Authority. Cléro, echoing Hume, comes to question the notion of pure analysis, as most concepts are intermingled with or rooted in others. These congeneric concepts may lead to another kind of intertwining of values. Pascal's problem of shares cannot be solved except with the help of close notions like justice and equity. As a structure, a fiction can be theoretically set forth in the double perspective of values syntonized with affects. Therefore, a mind is inclined to accept a fiction not on account of its objectivity but rather on the relations it bears to kindred values and affects introjected into it. But how then does authority make some fictions more acceptable and less fallacious than others? On which value does a fiction establish its ability to be accepted by the mind confronted with concurrent values such as pleasure, utility, truth...? Is there any hierarchy of values or a value of value? Would authority be the one prominent figure among all the other values? Bentham explained how authority was the exemplar of fiction in opposition to the use of reason. Authority opposes the idea of causality and may enslave reason to impose a noun or even a representation. Being self-constituted, authority can enter into language and make the mind obey a sign more successfully than physical force could do. In the field of concurrent values, authority plays a decisive role. As a dynamic process, a theory of fiction based on authority is characterized by the pretension to truth while at the same time deriding the idea of truth, as one value among other concurrent ones. How to escape the dogmatism of truth? Does authority really prevail over other values such as utility and interest?

Cléro seems compelled to distinguish between force and authority. Even ill-grounded fictions may prevail over more established ones if their power of authority is greater. Force may destroy any kind of superior authority to which it is not related. The paradoxical relation of authority with force perceived as a unique and prominent value capable of determining other values casts light on the acceptance and predominance of some fictions over others. Authority is at the core of the acceptance of a given fiction and force can provide more authoritative power than authority itself, since authority in its essence would not require force. Cléro's aim is to avoid the critique of fiction that Kant would have advocated so as to establish an *a priori* analytical chart of fiction.

He would rather plead for a more cultural and introjective stance based on the acquaintance of the mind with all the dimensions of fiction. The principle of mirroring perspectives in a game of productive values and affects would be the condition for a cultural approach to fiction.

Bentham's theory of fiction can be summarized in three main ideas. Fictions are first opposed to real entities, which they presuppose. Secondly, fictions are the product of language, which allows for the construction of different perspectives. Lastly, fictions do not relate to the question of truth insofar as their existence is due to the play of many internal and external contradictions. However, it seems, argues Cléro, that a first difficulty arises from the perception of reality as *opposed* to fiction, and at the same time, of a *complete gradation* between the purely real and the purely fictional. Whether as oppositional or gradually perceived fictions, Bentham's theory also fails to recognize that although a product of language, it is hard to show which entities within language are fictional or real by referring only to the features of language. A linguistic proposition is not the right place to demonstrate the presence of a fiction; only the speaker's intention may do so. A third difficulty lies in the fact that fictions are always somewhat false: what makes us believe that some would be less false than others? Cléro points to a movement of values to assert the acceptability of some fictions as truer. Still, is not such a distinction another fiction? Bentham's response seems clear: truth itself is a fictional entity. Bentham thus resorts to utility to overcome the fallacy of truth so as to explain the fundamental existence of fictions despite their obviously false character. Cléro very aptly remarks that utility along with truth, becomes problematic as we do not know if fictions impose themselves naturally or if they are imposed from the outside. Both values, truth and utility, could be interpreted as either self-imposing or prescriptive.

Cléro's project becomes clearer: a theory of fiction can be extracted from John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, a text which he considers to be a false interpretation of Bentham's theory of fiction. Mill's logical reorganization of Bentham's fallacies is indeed based on the rehabilitation of induction. Three main difficulties emerge in an attempt to build a theoretical discourse on fictions. Language does not tell *per se* which one is a fictional entity among all the entities it creates. Secondly, it is difficult to replace the idea of truth with the principle of utility without raising the question of justification. Is utility by itself sufficient

to justify the acceptance of a fiction, or is it still entangled in a specific relation with truth? If it is not, the philosophy of utility in Benthamite terms appears to hinge on the symbolic force of authority. Cléro argues that there is no transcendental point from which we could decide which fiction is acceptable or less fallacious. Therefore, can the logic of induction, as Mill employed it, be useful in dealing with such difficulties? Mill does not necessarily question the implication of linguistic schemes in our perceptions, as he stresses that a cultivated man would be able to extricate himself from the verbal substratum against the inductive effects present in language to ascertain knowledge, that is, for Mill, to be able to pass from individualization to generalization. Induction would allow for the linking of singularities, as well as for a rational generalization. Cléro explains that inductions may well produce fallacies, but warns that all fallacies do not necessarily originate from erroneous inductions. A theory of fiction based on false inductions would be insufficient to account for all types of fictions. This is also true for judgments from which logicians and Kantian philosophers tend to remove forms from contents, another fictional procedure aimed at attaining truth. Cléro, however, retains from the characteristics of language its ability to represent and express ideas within itself, immanently, without any need for imitation. Reality and fiction are internal to language and only depend on a specific syntactical use. Reality and fiction are brought about by the use of grammatical or syntactical rules which themselves develop into a particular rationality. The logic of signs and relations that arises from this interplay makes up the fiction. Through the richness and multiple features released by a fiction, it is hard to tell where the limit of reality lies since what is at stake is not the degree of resemblance with a would-be real entity but rather the connotations it creates, for instance, with literary works. Cléro asserts that even though language is not directly linked to a transcendent reality, it has the capacity to establish a mode of transcendence by means of codes and even simply the way in which it uses these codes, as in, for instance, the allusion to the literary work of Cervantes in an etching of Don Quixote. Cléro would point to the illusion of conformity and truth in language. Truth is not exterior to language. It is a self-construction, a *verum ipsum factum*. Furthermore, such a construction is not deprived of sensations, as some would argue. Reality is not therefore the only locus where sensations emerge as fictions too may stir a kind of sensation without having to refer to tran-

scendent objects. A theory of fiction would therefore, says Cléro, be articulated according to three postulates. Reality is not a transcendent realm dwelling beyond linguistic signs. Secondly, using the symbolic power of language implies reality itself, which is then constructed within language. Truth, therefore, is internal to that construction and not the result of an outside operation. Language not being a tool for the imitation of reality, there cannot be only fallacious fictions. A fiction will always posit a kind of reality. This can also be a critique of Mill's way of implementing inductively the construction of an anthropological fiction, a "human nature" which provides little insight for theory. Indeed, as a construct which is said to be external and able to explain fallacies from the point of view of false representations of oneself, so-called human nature would be fallaciously stable enough for forecasting and predictions. The fiction of a stable human nature has led to considering the future knowledge of objects as stable but, nonetheless, fictional.

Far from considering fiction as only a median or intermediate figure between certainty and the inadmissible, Diderot can boast of having delved into self-defining fictions, a sort of prosopopoeia. In Diderot's view, utility is similarly only one prominent value covering other more important values. Cléro indicates three major points in Diderot's prosopopoeia. First of all, the French author manages to eschew the question of assumptions which tend to entail the obligation of invalid or valid observable experience. Fictions would be the negation of hypothetical discourse because they simply presuppose virtual experiences which do not have to be tested. Fictions are nurtured through the thread of narration or testimony. In Diderot's *Letter to the Blind*, experience is always bracketed since there is no need for anything related to science to be recounted in details and subject to scientific evaluation. Diderot does not focus on the recovery of sight itself but rather on its effects. Furthermore, he turns very cautious and lets the cure be related by an "intelligent" character. In fact, fiction works out the relations brought out by terms that suddenly cease to be so important. The relation to verifiability turns out to be more important than experience itself. Diderot also resorts to the conversion of attributes into substances. An attribute can be turned into a substance, which then may create a new referent. Conversions allow Diderot to give predominance to relations over terms, ascribing to the former a kind of thinghood. Language therefore becomes crucial in making new transcendent objects, pretending that they are

real. Diderot, thirdly, was inspired by Descartes' *dioptrics*, in a way pointing to a possible theory of fiction. Language possesses this capacity to create screening effects aiming at bringing about a resemblance among non-parallel sets of causes. An infinite set of visual objects could give rise to the same impression. We are never too far from making one object resemble another, thanks to the words in use, so much so that from different perspectives we may achieve the same impressions. Indeed, language is a creator of infinite possible worlds which allow us to see the same object. Deriving conditional or possible worlds from one visual object, language enlightens the multiple and plural sides that vision fails to grasp. The linguistic screens can be compared to optical tools. Suzanne proceeds to such a screening of reality in her letters to the Marquis of Croismare. The reader is forced to abstain from an interpretation of reality, facing instead the way that Suzanne manages to create a screened reality by cutting out some aspects, which themselves bring about new possible worlds. She does not straightforwardly assert that she is innocent but invents representations destined to prove that she is. Cléro believes that such a procedure is similar to the prior circulation of a currency: fiction needs creation and above all circulation as a new focus prevailing over what circulates.

Cléro believes with Diderot that there is an advantage in making fictions without resorting to assumptions. In two of Diderot's letters, events can only be considered from a fictional point of view. Fiction enables the reader to elaborate a rationality that would be impossible on the basis of mere hypotheses, like for instance the fondness of the blind for arithmetic. The use of arithmetic in blindness does not create a new mathematical theory but helps to build a new fiction of the perception of space and time. Another fiction which avoids scientific evaluation is the possibility of synesthesia or displacement of a sense, tasting the sound of music or deliberately looking at a painting with a blind eye. A "blind" eye turned on a picture forces the spectators to look at things they could not see. Lastly, with fictions, it is possible to extend the relations of equivocal meanings, and maintain this equivocal construction as if in metaphysics. The fictional impression can never be subdued by a scientific verification through assumptions. Fiction is also bred with connotation and denotation, offered by language as an ideological power, turning any singular point of view into a universal one. Language is never quite exterior to itself, as a meta-language, but rather develops exteri-

ority within its own internal structure.

Cléro says that Bentham never departed from the idea that truth is a “fictitious entity.” Is truth a determination of utility? What is the reason behind the fact that one fiction is considered to be true while another is just said to be useful without ceasing to be less true? Diderot’s critique of religion is where such a question might find an answer. Hume’s natural religion is enhanced by applicable experience whereas theology presents dilemmas and one’s obligation to make choices. Opposing Hume’s critical views on theism, deism, and atheism with Suzanne’s neurotic circle, another fictional form of circulation, Cléro believes that Diderot’s in *The Nun* reaches the apex of fiction. Far from being thetic, the nun’s tales are produced outside an assertive discourse and point Suzanne to the deliberate construction of hidden shelters from where an innocent kind of truth could emerge. Diderot creates deeper and deeper layers of fictional elements in the structure of his text, elements which have the effect to distance it from an unlikely entity. Besides, Croismare is believed to be the sole reader of her letters, leaving other readers in the uncomfortable position of feeling interlopers. There is thus no test for true events, as nothing can be plainly asserted in religion, truth melting in the circular movement of multiple and fictional truths. The hyperbolic hubris that emerges from Suzanne’s letters, through the ever-complicated system of fictional layers of truths, gives expression to a specific interpretation of religion. Diderot succeeded in overcoming Hume’s experiential sensualism in that he could deconstruct the criteria implemented in the acceptance or rejection of fictions. Besides, truth is not ontologized in fictions, since, as Cléro argues, effects of truth are just necessary to maintain fiction in a state of veracity, as with the struggle of neurotic and psychotic characters depicted in *The Nun*. The whirling neurotic fits of passion place religion beyond the scope for the need of an ontological truth. Diderot also manages to postpone the search for a definite truth since assessment then continues to evolve beyond a stabilized and all-encompassing value like utility. Diderot’s semi or three-fourths openings lead to a kind of knowledge which does not pretend to disclose truth. Cléro concludes that even if both fictions and utilitarianism are mere constructions, it would be wrong to see in utility the essence of fiction. Likewise, fictions could be subsumed under the category of concepts in the empirical sciences, to recall Van Fraassen’s interpretation, but then the clear distinction between real and fictitious en-

tities ceases to be valid.

Bentham also declared that fallacies were not all necessarily sophistic judgments and that fictions precisely need to be disconnected from a truth relation. Vaihinger described how a philosophy based on “as if” pervades Kant’s critique of pure reason, implying fictions without any dogmatic attitude. Concepts are developed throughout the book without exterior justification other than *sensus communis*. Before the tribunal of reason, such fictions were, however, not limited to the proper use of reason itself. Cléro believes fictions cannot be limited, like the use of reason, since, unlike concepts, they ignore the principle of the excluded middle. A fiction can be a quantity and an absence of quantity. A fiction is also nurtured by exaggeration or hubris, as noted by MarmonTEL. It is also self-evading. Cléro would be content to see some structuring features within fictions according to the Humean principle of “to be or ought to be.” Is there any intrinsic distinction between a real and a fictive entity or is this just posited by a subject? Cléro would also like to see if fictions do indeed belong to a world, or if worlds are completely alien to them. The question of limits seems inconsistent since a genuine fiction is always self-dissolving, and must have a birth and a disappearing phase both. Descartes’ evil genius will come up fictitiously but with just enough time to allow one to presuppose a *res cogitans*. Fictions are reversible, so there is never a need for maintaining the negation of the negation, or the resolution of negative effects through dissolution and conservation. A fiction is reversible but not dialectical. In mathematics, Platonism decrees the existence of objects out of sheer nominalism. From many different signified types of circle, for instance, we infer the existence of an object, a circle, an absurdity if not a fiction. Fiction penetrates the deepest “realist” texts in mathematics. The multiplication of fiction in mathematical discourse led H. Field to assimilate concepts with objects in a kind of fictionalism destructive for a theory of fiction. It is easy to skeptically glide on the meaning of fiction and endow the absence of any real object with a nominalist or so to say fictionalist existence. Shall we stop thinking that we listen to or read the same thing because intersubjectivity is a mere fiction?

Cléro also warns that even real entities are subject to the same decidable existence as fictions. In Burgess and Rosen’s book, *A Subject With No Object*, a proposition could be interpreted hermeneutically, that is, with the intention to disclose a hidden sense, or revolutionarily,

namely, with the aim of reconstructing and substituting a new meaning for the deconstructed one. In the latter approach, new elements of meaning emerge to release novelty and initiate a new discourse. Whether revolutionary or just hermeneutical truth, Cléro believes that behind any perception of truth there can only be some prescriptive attitude deriding the simple idea of a descriptive stance. With prescription, a fiction ceases to be true, or believed to be true, since it simply has to be accepted. Acceptance strikes in the middle of contradictory truths and errors giving expression to a *status quo* within the fiction. Kant would elaborate such an ultimate accepted fiction, the synthetic unity of apperception to ascertain all his theoretical concepts and judgments. The “I think” is posited assertively, or apodictically, as the *sine qua non* condition of knowledge. The Kantian decision to posit the “I” as a fictitious core of all his theoretical considerations sounds like an ought-to-be rather than a descriptive fact. However, argues Cléro, substantive Being can be uncovered and release some deontological aspects. Glimpses of decision would inhabit the most profound layers of fictitious beings. Cléro also asserts that Bentham’s reflections on fiction are always derived from a single world. For instance, if acceleration is inherent to movement, it does not belong to another world with completely different laws. Fictions thus can refer to the real entity or to the second-order fiction to which it is related, something that is impossible in the opposite direction, at least in some scientific domains. Literature would, however, allow some kind of interpenetration, pointing to a sort of deregulation unseen elsewhere. In *Madame Bovary*, Flaubert creates a world with its own reality, one completely alien to external reality. The fictitious effects do not emerge from a so-called genuine external world. Fiction in literature creates a set of different worlds thanks to the interplay of signs evolving sometimes in empty spaces. The rules in play emerge from the frame of the text itself and are never depleted, as new possible rules, new world conceptions appear in the course of time and bring about a new reading of the text. For instance, Kepler’s laws of 1615 changed the reading of Cervantes’ *Don Quixote*, which had been published ten years previously. The relation between fictitious and real entities itself is thus submitted to change; secondly, within a set of fictitious entities, change is perceptible according to the ability to evoke new worlds, or to presuppose possible worlds, or simply by being a series of substantive entities. If fictions are just possible interconnected worlds,

these can be either actualized or possible, as P. McCormick once theorized. The possibilist theory explains that possible worlds have a certain reality competing with actual worlds. The actualist theorists believe that fictitious worlds can only be accounted for within reality, of which they are imaginative modifications based on reorganized characteristics. In fact literature, through the fictitious power of language, cannot be opposed to a so-called sensory reality. Reality is derived from the function of language. Reality pertains to the essence of language, as words, sentences and propositions are more inclined to circumscribe reality. It remains to ascertain how the use of words can do this.

Cléro argues from a logicist stance, that for a fiction to produce real effects, it has to be expressed with facts. A sentence like “*Sherlock Holmes lives in Baker Street, London*” inserts the reader into a realist interpretation of the fact. Here, fiction is highly efficient as all notions of authorship, the awareness of characters set in a literary world, vanish to leave the reader in a state of simple strong belief in a real fact. The act of literary creation is bracketed, leaving the object alone to produce a kind of truth which has nothing to do with a truth derived from a constructed world. The “belief” effect diffuses over the other characters, when, for instance, it is said that “*Sherlock Holmes had a cup of tea with Gladstone*”; whereas the inverse would produce a counter-effect of deep skepticism, despite the same linguistic meaning. Fiction can tell more than reality itself. The infinite worlds of fiction can overcome the strained perception of infinity as it is experienced in reality, and a character may thus appear to be more profound than a real individual. Empirical interferences, edges, cuttings, ruptures, antinomies, like death and life, are somewhat dissolved in the frame of fiction or grow less perceptible. Otherness becomes the hinge on which language thrives, as it nurtures itself on the unsayable. Cléro believes that reality cannot be opposed to fiction. With the possible worlds of literature, it becomes obvious that reality is penetrated by fiction, and vice versa. Fictional characters are commensurate with our perceptions, sensations, and memories. Cléro argues that Lubomir Doležel was wrong in stating that literary worlds were incomplete, lacking homogeneity, and merely textual fabrications. Any signifying structure like a text is bound to have some effects outside its own framework, affecting what we call reality.

Cléro also argues against Mark Eli Kalderon (*Moral Fictionalism*) that reality itself does not have to be invested with a belief or a judgment

to produce effects. Man behaves as if reality existed without any superposition of beliefs. Men and women have eternal being, they are separated not out of conviction or belief, but on the principle of acceptance. Some fictions just require acceptance to be sensed as real. Calderon distinguishes between a factual perception of language, namely, words that would be simply representational, and a non-factualist approach, which would imply that words do not express facts at all, something that Cléro believes to be a new form of fictionalism. But here again, belief is called forth, as a voluntary act. One can remove all credence in a constructed object while behaving as if it had some links with a real object. The role of acceptance, so to say, is to eliminate the need for belief (hermeneutic fictionalism). In doing so, fictionalism would be the hypocritical attitude of those who refuse to confuse acceptance with belief, a lack of sincerity or, to be less harsh, a Lacanian quasi-assertion. Between pretending to give existence, or believing in the representational existence of an object, and refraining from taking a position on acceptance there are several forms of fictionalism depending on the axiological intention of the creator. However, Cléro, citing Lacan, believes that knowledge is never linked to the critical finding of truth. A fiction is thus always a reconstruction, whether limited or not, proliferating, more *being* than *having-to-be*, more possible plural worlds than substantive entities. Cléro concludes that real entities and fictions are entangled, creating sequential tensions between each other, and having immediately disruptive effects on truth and reality.

Cléro would also like to know if a theory of fiction would be useful for a new understanding of perception. A theatrical stage would allow one to ask what the spectator sees on a stage, and what the actor receives from this perception. Cléro believes that a theatrical stage has an oval form constituting one focus while the other would be the spectator himself. These express a tension, one focal point being present as long as the other is also perceived as an absence. Their interdependency does not however constitute, claims Cléro, a subject/object relation, as the objects on stage are rather signs than “objects.” The characters’ bodies are also signs evolving in a definite composition. Cléro argues that a subject/object perception is itself a mere fiction. He would replace such a relation with a fictitious/real entity one. Berkeley had already foreseen the power of language to build transcendent beings across the perceptual series given to the human eye. Language, as a symbolic activity, per-

forms perception beyond the subject/object relation. The illusion of transcendence and autonomy ascribed to objects originates in the symbolic power of language and its effects on reality. On stage, this power is very effective, claims Cléro. The question is not one of a superior degree of reality but of the deliberate and conscious use of symbolic language. The symbolic structure of language is thus much deeper and more meaningful than the fictitious subject/object relation. Perception, understood as a fiction/real tension, finds support in Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, an ontological stance that puts perception at the core level of signifiers, of which the corresponding affects would stand for the signified. A grammar of affects can be read in the more fundamental percepts. On stage, signs are more vivid, to the point of giving expression to a sort of *Stimmung*. In Merleau-Ponty's text about the cruelty of World War II, the stage is set by a German soldier, in agony, lying over steel barriers, with his blond hair flowing in the wind, begging to be killed. The affect of horror is perceptual. Cléro asserts that all words are abstractions in a way, and do not belong to the "I" or to the "object" but to a "we." The word's perceptual existence makes it possible to use it for a shaping of reality or, as Cléro calls it, an explosive movement of reality. Symbolic language is interpreted in Cléro's words as a constructive power as well as a separating force having effects on reality. On stage, the actor has the power to affect reality and to stir emotions in the audience. He makes us see things that the naked eye could not perceive. This requires the stage to have boundaries, as a microscope or a telescope would to make us see the invisible. This delimitation seems to work on the principle of fiction. The edge delimiting the outside is a threshold where imagination plays with perception, as Descartes himself pointed out. Cléro also uses the metaphor of pictorial perspective. In the perception of a painting the rules of perspective seem to change: we do not see the trees' vertical trunks fusing in the horizon into a single point as we do the borders of roads or river banks. In a painting, the rules of perspective are used to separate remarkable objects and give them autonomy and reciprocity. Cléro argues that in such a setting the object's edges seem to be more real than the center with which they are placed in an idealized relation. This power of reversal applies in the relation between fiction and reality, since what is at stake are not substances but modes of being producing effects of reality or fiction. Cléro believes that the internal and external dialectic perceived in a painting

describes a movement of fiction with effects of reality. All the vertical and horizontal lines, as well as the internal dimensions of the painting, are in interplay for the perceiving eye which selects a certain interpretation, deciding which line is more real, and which more fictitious. Like language, these lines, oblique or vertical, are cuttings and selective processes to make us see a certain kind of reality which reality itself would not present. Cléro warns that this process aims not only at depicting and representing the real world but also at establishing a return to reality itself. The idea of a horizon involving mathematical points ascribed to definite objects is fictitious. A new horizon can be attributed to any object by simply moving forward. The same applies for any kind of line supposed to represent a sensory reality. The sensory objects from which lines are said to originate disappear and call forth new ones as they move.

Cléro asserts that the reciprocal relation between fiction and reality is like that of a spiral. Reality appears through a fiction precisely when an infringement of the rules of reality occurs. Reality never appears as it is but rather on a de-centered point of view. Paradoxically enough, perceptual reality appears to be more real when it is distorted by fiction in a spiral movement. The violation of rules will have the effect of producing an unseen reality without having to conform to reality. The affective evaluation of reality does not impede the production of a super-reality which is not less real for all that. Based on dissociation and dismantlement, fictions do not require the imitation of forms, but rather depend on violent disjunctions having a creative effect. Theater, as well as literature, is not less real or more fictitious than what happens in everyday life. It is rather what works as real and what is said to be fictitious that delineate a new perception of reality through fiction, which is cast in a new light. Cléro, on the basis of a comparison of the mind with the theatrical stage, develops an interpretation of the logos of feeling and impressions that are both introjections and projections. Of course, such a mind becomes an illusion when it is placed on the axis of real and fictitious entities.

Cléro now wishes to articulate perception with affectivity within his reflections on fiction. Affectivity, perhaps too evanescent, as passion was for Bentham, because of its masking of the real and the utilitarian play of pleasure and pain, has to be analyzed outside of this reductive conception. The essential relation that fictions have with affects can

be seen in Michel Henry's critique of a structuralist view of the passions. Henry believes that a sentiment, a feeling, is not only a "structure" but also bears a tonality, a tone, or *Stimmung*, which is often neglected in the structuralist approach. Henry says that no structure ever quite coincides with what is being felt. Can philosophy really grasp this quality of what is being felt? Henry argues that the feeling itself is not the situation where and through which it arises. Neither is feeling the seizure of a situation. A feeling is completely disconnected from the set of relations that otherness manifests. Feelings have a special flavor which is perceptible without any outside context or relations. Jealousy, love evoke something without the persons who would inspire them. We tend to relate the context to the feeling itself in necessary terms. In his critique of Sartre's confusion of a feeling of failure with its context, Henry states that it is not only the context that is irreducible to the feeling, but the tonality of the feeling itself. A logic of modality thus imposes itself on a simple logic of the context of communication, or a logic of structures. Cléro warns us against a mere linguistic analysis which would end in circularity (one word would be used to account for another and vice versa) preventing any structure from emerging logically. If some terms are not implemented logically, and not merely linguistically, it is quite impossible to create the intended structure. To this principle of limitism, Cléro adds the need to maintain necessary disjunctions between the elements of the structures: subject, object, causes... Cléro believes that such relations are transcendental, which is not necessarily sufficient to apply directly to the field of affectivity. Ricoeur, Sartre, Heidegger, Scheler all treated the question of affectivity as transcendental. Henry, against this transcendental approach, would take into account something that is irreducible to transcendental schemes and which never creates or discovers feelings. The tone or flavor of feelings is the focus of Henry's critique. For him, hatred has no object, it is objectless. On the other hand, Scheler would see in feelings special objects endowed with values or affective qualities and sentiments themselves as specific perceptions. Affective perception, says Scheler, is intentional. Affectivity is not a disorder and has its own structure, which is different from that of perception or imagination. Perhaps a sentiment as a value must be seized (*fordert*) as Scheler argues. Is this a seizing of "hatred" from a behavior or from a person related to the very hatred I am experiencing? To what extent can we assert that the "I" is implied affectively in the

seizing of what stirs hatred? Sentiments tend to be without objects. Pain is comprehensible without an object. Is there an essence of pain perceptible and seized without an intention? Henry criticizes the Schelerian welding of the perception of hatred in its essence and the being affected by this perception itself, as a mould consciousness more presupposed than observed. If the sentiment is ascribable to the feeling person and not to its source, it becomes a cognitive act meant to be true or false. If not, it would be a mere fact without any justification. In the act of seizing, Cléro believes that a feeling is not a representation. But it is not necessarily real when it is merely incipient and taking form in given circumstances. If it is seen as a being opposed to its should-be or ought-to-be, then the question of truth is posed in the vicinity of reality as a valuation, which restores the necessity of a subject. Henry seems to disrupt this regressive circle by assuming that affects have a power of self-revelation without the need for a truth-valuation. For him, there are no false pleasures or false feelings as these describe a bad understanding of their surrounding circumstances. It could also be that our affects were poorly identified. Henry's conception of truth regarding affects reduces to an *index sui*, a *pointing to*, discarding the idea of error. For Henry, a feeling can never be the feeling of something else. Cléro retains from Henry's critique his insightful attempt to avoid mixing a logic of affects with the logic of representations of his antecedents. Henry's isolation of tonality from any dimension of seizing or grasping seems less obvious for Cléro. This exclusion needs another perspective to criticize the synthetic links between tonality, *Stimmung*, structure and their seizing.

It is true that an act of judgment is generally separated from its affective counterpart, as Husserl had earlier claimed. The act of knowledge must seize the purity of the essence without the intervention of affects. But Henry believes that conceptual essences are not less arbitrary than affective ones. For him, any act of understanding is affective but it is not an *a priori* synthetic act between ideas and affects, echoing the Kantian difficulty of producing a schematic representation of pleasure on the model of the other faculties of representation. Henry *identifies* the affective tonality with the act of presentification itself in judgment. Every act of understanding is affective and every affection is an understanding. Affective tonalities constitute the reality of the acts of representation (imagination, perception, intellection....) and shape their modalities. Affectivity becomes then more fundamental than representa-

tion. Henry's rejection of all kinds of articulations (like the wide separation between joy and pain) with transcendental acts is questionable for Cléro. Another difficulty arises when the sentiment is the same, or self-identical, whatever the circumstances around it. How to think then about the differences among feelings? Seen as positive signs, and not linguistic differentiating ones, affects are self-differentiating, as joy is irreducible to pain. An affect, unlike a linguistic sign, is plainly meaningful. There is no system of feelings, and an affect is understandable in its mere appearance and not in its differences from other feelings. A difference is never being felt, it can only be represented. In addition, Henry argues that the objectification of an affect through the work of consciousness, when it attempts to put it in a frame of representation, is impossible. This troublesome mixture of cognition and affectivity indeed creates another real feeling.

Cléro criticizes this kind of discontinuous presentation of feelings by a debilitating representational consciousness and would wish to rehabilitate the work of difference among affects. In fact, if a sentiment is only what is felt, there is no space for intermediate or transitional feelings perceived in the difference between "feeling oneself falling in love" and "feeling oneself in love." The idea of becoming is then completely evaded by such a Zenonian atomic juxtaposition of feelings. This leads Cléro to a new interrogation: what is the absolute character of a positive tonality? Affectivity would not be the manifestation of something but its own self-disclosure. Indeed, Henry believes that the feeling being felt demonstrates another idea, the impossibility for the Self to remove itself from itself. Affectivity is both passivity and activity. It is both suffering and the burst of suffering and the difference between the two is not an opposition but an act of identification that the self cannot escape. Lastly, because the affect always escapes representation, it is never unreal. Will such a sentiment be unreal when for instance it is lived in the mode of "we"? Sartre showed that a common feeling seems to be less real than one experienced individually. But are these "we" affects so very unreal? It is time for Cléro to return to the rehabilitation of the capacity of seizing an affect in the degree of its tonality, a dialectic already at work in Scheler's writings. Michel Henry's reduction of affectivity to tonality becomes problematic when analysis or synthesis is implemented. Cléro prefers a dynamic conception of affectivity, bearing in mind all the forces in presence. A dynamic stance would overcome the representa-

tional features often encountered in a reflection on the psyche. It would have the advantage of presenting the mind as a dynamic space (and not a *res extensa*), and of allowing one to ponder affects as both fictitious and illusory.

Cléro believes that Henry prepared the way for an assimilation of affectivity to a high-degree fiction. Henry also showed that an affect is not real and true like a judgment. It depends on circumstances, is absolute and insists on its own existence. It is a relation of the subject to it self, and being absolute it does not function like the signs of language. The synthetic and analytic approach of affectivity can be replaced by the use of fiction itself, which would situate contradictory affects and their opposite relations in a more suitable locus. Feelings, although sometimes opposed to each other, have common features which are measurable to a degree. Common features are arrived at through a fictional approach to affects. This time, affects are not ontologized when they are considered as fictions. They become practical and are subject to deeper analysis thanks to the impossible ideas that they evoke. Cléro's deontological stance aims to reduce their contingent and empirical aspect. Henry himself attempted to differentiate feelings from affects, the former being rooted into the latter. But then the objective part of the feeling is eliminated and the self just feels itself reflexively. Affectivity would be the source of paralogism, since we are not sure if it is the same self that is affected. Besides, subjectivity is not concerned with the same pattern for every sentiment. To establish the identity of the self, as a substance, is a fiction in its own right. Affective experiences are turned into "affectivity," a substantive fiction able to maintain and create the existence of contradictory affects. Cléro questions this method of subsuming many diverse affective experiences under the same linguistic noun, for then the question of how such affects arise becomes pointless. A singular affect is swallowed by the self confronting itself. Cléro engages in a discussion about linguistic reality and existential reality. Unreality, when it is experienced in a feeling or a sentiment, can be very real. Unreality is not linked to fiction, and reality itself can be a matter of fiction. A real feeling of love for a woman can be treated in the mode of fiction, that is, by the use of language. Besides, Henry, says Cléro, uses affectivity to create the category of "possibility" of affects and their ontological existence. With affectivity, every affect becomes relative and absolute, singular and universal. Deprived of its eventual character, a "bad" feeling

can be considered in its deepest forms as a manifestation of Joy, being itself the essence of eventality. With "sympathy," Cléro succeeds in reducing the immense imagined space of possible experiences of affects into a more Leibnizian one where connectedness subsumes absolute-ness. The interconnected affects are now a useful fiction. Any affective situation is thus a comprehensive act grasping many different stand-points, while others are abandoned.

Cléro believes that a dynamic approach to affects could be more productive than a merely phenomenological one. This requires a sort of schematism to be applied to affectivity. How does the logic of affect corroborate the logic of situations? Schematism aims at resolving a problem: how do tones, *Stimmungen*, correlate with the structures in which they appear? The identity and the unity of a subject being unreal, how does the subject relate (if it is the same) to its context? Schematism does not aim at building a system of fixed and non-temporal essences of affects, as in a linguistic code of signifiers. Affects have their own logic, which is not linguistic, although we need contingent events and thus another logic to grasp them. Cléro's schematism is a hidden art based on different faculties, aiming at quantifying the affect, delimiting it, at seeing its various relations and modalities. Hence the question of space becomes utterly crucial in a theory of fiction, as space is used to identify types of psychism. A topical approach to affects also demonstrates that any exteriority is purely fictional, as in the transcendental relation between a fictitious entity and a real one. Kant explained that *Verstand*, or the understanding, does not by itself apply rules of judgment in a given situation. For that, we need an act of judgment, which is not "ruled" but intuited in a given situation. The accuracy of judgment is based on *a priori* links which allow for a conceptual approach to an intuitive context. Cléro claims that we can likewise find some kind of adequacy between a singular affect and its context, a conformity which is not a representation. The seizing of a rule is carried out without any prior rule, and accuracy emerges simultaneously in the activity of judgment.

Cléro also believes that schematism also makes it possible to understand the relation between tonality and inner sense, or temporality. Any affect has its own temporal bearing: love, for instance, would be eternal. But does this really mean that love is "eternal" in its essence? According to Henry, affects being absolute, they determine other attributes like time. Cléro would concede that feelings belong to existence as

well as being rooted in the radical and immanent sphere of affects. Language thus cannot account for all the affects, not being reducible to them, although affects themselves have their own language, which, for Henry, is “feeling” itself. It seems, according to Husserl, that the logic of affectivity is a logic of modality, which itself implies probabilities, as for instance when joy succeeds to pain. Cléro believes that a fictional approach to affects allows for a better grasp of their intensity and orientation. A dynamic approach also entails a conception of truth which is not static, but based on successive bursts of illusory truths, constituting points of reference for further research. The intimate relationship between affectivity and language would also be capable of locating affects in the structure of language beyond the mere individual’s own psychism and use of words. Affects are also intersubjective in essence and language produces affects within itself. Cléro is not content with Henry’s salient *Stimmungen* in his attempt to theorize affects. He would rather focus on “affective experience” to be able to analyze their differential aspects, and not merely the substantive forms representing fallacious fictions. Singularity should be the new focus for such an enterprise oriented toward the understanding of their historicity.

Cléro would also concur with Dessanti’s opinion that mathematics has to do with experience in general and especially experience in thought. Indeed, experience always entails a kind of exteriority whereby thought or discourse is confronted to something heterogeneous. The thing experienced is also believed to be returning or introjected into the mind. Cléro speaks of a specular effect when our acts of judgment are reflected as objects in our mind. These are not external things but just the mirroring of our own acts. Thus, it is important to know whether *mathemata* could be just *ficta*, that is, fictional objects fabricated with a view to understanding a problem. Does a mathematician feign perceiving them as true objects? Cléro asserts that it is easy to see in the demonstration of Pythagoras’ theorem that a right triangle is presupposed and given ontological existence. The generalization and universalization of one singular object lead to its transcendence. Such an object would be introjected into the mind and then projected outside. Such a process would be interpreted as making an experiment. Cléro also claims that Pascal’s calculus of expectations is based on the infringement of a rule which allows for the appearance of new objects. Ethical values ensure a new ruling which gives transcendence to the experienced objects outside

the scope of any mathematical consideration. In Pascal's example, it is justice itself which gives its reason to the mathematical object. Still, such a value has to vanish quickly so that an impression of rational calculus remains as the main result. Cléro asserts that one aspect of fiction relates to its reversibility and to the effect of the emergence of the "mathematical" object. The individual also poses himself as a subject who can create effective rules in a new world deemed to be "impossible." Incongruous *mathemata*, like Borromean rings, can give expression to productive effects if they are believed to be sufficiently consistent. Impossibility dovetails with possibility. The effect of reality is nurtured by the dovetailing of incongruity with congruity. But what is really experienced? Is a mathematical object really resisting the mind in thought, is it really striving toward its autonomous objectivity, or is this separateness and resistance just fictional? Cléro believes that the materiality of the object is more often than not obtained through deeper moral procedures like command, authority, agreement. Will and consent determine the final calculus against the view that the latter could be understood as a retrieval of some remembered truth. The substitution of the rule by the winner in Pascal's game will make consent emerge as the best solution. Cléro believes that such mathematical solutions are only grasped temporarily, so as to serve the purposes of demonstration. Field was therefore right when he asserted that *mathemata are just ficta*, the mere expression of a *fingere* by the mathematician. The question remains: why does the mind pose an object or a being through which it can supersede itself? Is it not strange that the mind will attempt to know and study an object which it alone created?

Cléro warns us against any form of subjectivism as mathematics is above all noncommittal, namely, neither subjective nor objective, as proof and refutation are intersubjective. Still, mathematical demonstration is also dependent on the use of language with the latter's own affective features. Demonstration has to retain the unavoidable traces of the signified/signifying which have some bearing on the process of demonstration, creating a new system of comprehension, one calling for intersubjective community. Mathematical objects are thus not simply ascribable to internal mental experience, but also result from shared affects and passions, observable in structured spirals. The illusion of given data, epitomized in Van Fraassen's *Scientific Image*, becomes the focus of Cléro's interrogation about the nature of experiment: it is just a piece of

argumentative discourse aiming at confirming a judgment without any connection to what the thing really is. When physicists use mathematical language, they do not reach any teleological truth at the end of their experiments but are just encoding their observations in written language. For instance, Gauss was able to demonstrate that the fictitious theory “*In a triangle, the sum of three angles equals that of two right angles*” was deduced from a false conception of pure and normative geometry, and that such a sum could be superior or inferior to 180° . Empirical measures defy the notion of purity that geometers join to the idea of truth. Experiments, says Cléro, are just “in” thought, and mathematics is not so different from literary creation since neither in fact enjoys the presence of an external real world. There is a free circulation between affectivity, passion, imagination and the power of logic.

Cléro insists on the fact that experience never originates in absolute pure data, but is rather fashioned in the way that theory is. Hugo’s vision of the surface of the moon is dictated by his own comprehension of what he can see. As Cléro asserts, Hugo started to see what he understood he was seeing. Experience is a selection of parameters, based on loose concepts which give an impression of truths. Some formulas are indeed impossible to translate into real experience, like the mathematical correspondence of the velocity of a body in free fall with the surface of a triangle. The surface of the triangle is supposed to account for the real fall of the body but it is imaginary. The imagination of a formula which would take into account every single point of the trajectory of a fall is just fictional and does not correspond to an experience in reality. A few observed positions are held as representing a thoroughly imagined formal movement. Even in physics, despite its material pretence, objects do not really account for the things they are aiming at. The discourse of physics aims at a superstructure, which itself prevents any kind of contact with the things studied. The sum of inner angles in a triangle will never equal exactly that of two right angles. In mathematics, objects are constructed so that they correspond to a theory. Cléro believes in his perspective of building a theory of fictions, that the more the constructed objects are kept at a distance from their material counterpart, the more they are embedded in a structure whose fictitious character becomes obvious. Besides, when the degree of sophistication becomes high, objects tend to manifest a better adequation to any experiment to which they would be submitted. The mathematician, and likewise the physicist, is

able to create effects of necessity without having to verify how things really work. Furthermore, a mathematician can start to build an impossible object which intuition would reject quite abruptly. How does intelligence succeed in explaining mathematically what it cannot conceive with the the human mind alone? It seems that the creation of a physical or mathematical law opens up a new field for the intelligence, one which it could not penetrate beforehand. Such laws, however, are applicable in determined conditions and never report the other side of the object being treated. The impression of regularity or stability is supported just by the transitivity of belief across things said to be close in appearance.

In Descartes' *Philosophical Principles of Nature*, physical laws are never put in equations, because their applicability is just confined to singular moments. Besides, such laws would be valid only if there were empty spaces as well as full ones, a conception rejected by Descartes' *res extensa*. Cléro claims that Descartes' laws based on the absence of void cannot be verified in reality. Moving and a plenum, Descartes' conception of matter also entails its constant fragmentation, while barring the emergence of empty spaces. Cléro's critique of the Cartesian conception of space goes so far as to consider it as a fabulous tale. Instead of being explained by laws, Descartes would lay out his whirls in the middle of his theory as a cornerstone destined to justify the coherence of all his physical considerations. As matter is constantly moving in a sort of whirling movement, fragmentation is bound to operate without leaving any empty space, that is, in perfect adequate cutting, contradicting the idea of constant movement itself. The Cartesian fantasy leaves no doubt, Cléro believes, as to the fictional imposition of geometry onto phenomenal reality. The French philosopher resorts to all kinds of objects, balls, to account for the necessary gaps he invented to support the theory of simple moving matter. Cléro believes that a fiction which is too inflated or not limited becomes an object of delirium. Descartes' need for connecting bodies without interstitial space brings him into the world of fantasy. He indeed invents some imaginary mathematics which will justify his conception of space. His filling of interstices is carried out by fictitious objects to maintain the coherence of his whole theory. When a mathematical theory fails to explain some isolated phenomenon, a "new" world is created made of *ficta*, which, despite being erroneous, can give rise to truths. But science proves to be something else than a mere representation of things or an adequation to things. Sci-

ence builds on fictional substitutions, a logic which rejects the necessity of saying the truth about reality. The use of a metaphorical discourse within scientific discourse seems to overlap with the logical elements and creates a new order of discourse. Cléro believes that Descartes' physics is not without such a metaphorical use of images. Fiction also possesses an argumentative function that helps with the refutation of a thesis more than with getting knowledge from it. Imagination, says Cléro, can start deconstructing an idea into several parameters, which will be used in a new configuration. He assimilates fictions to "thought experiments," a procedure aimed at surveying every single element encountered in a given situation (as in ethics) in order to focus on the main ones. When this is repeated by several individuals, a center of gravity is reached, allowing for consent among scientists. However, it seems that any law (even mathematical ones) barely touches the complex structure of matter, and does not say so much about reality. Physicists speak to physicists outside the range of matter and Cléro demonstrates that a law inevitably returns to the realm of thinghood despite its pretensions to rule over things. The process of abstracting from laws is itself submitted to the very laws it is trying to explain. Besides, such laws have to take into account the relativity of their parameters as sub-laws, as in Heisenberg's physics. The physics of effects will not, however, describe the totality of natural phenomena, but only deliver regional or fragmentary explanations, which some mathematicians, like Villani, will attempt to gather into a single theory. The links between completely alien ontological regions would be hard to find were it not for the strong power of the imagination, defying a nature which never gives itself out. Nature is not made up of regular movements but is expressed by a community of scientists through the construction of problems disconnected from "experiences." Most of the time, what we could not conceive as possible in reality becomes feasible in mathematics. Fictionalism helps build in imagination the equivalent of our sensations in symbolic terms, but with no representational warrant. The gap between the instrument and the object of investigation is also illusory, as the former is also part of the final result.

Cléro sees in Descartes and Pascal perfect examples of the adaptation of fiction to metaphysics. Fiction has to be introduced and retrieved at the right time so that it does not create problems. Descartes' implementation of a deceitful God or of an evil genius must be instantaneous

and have the capacity to overcome a true difficulty. In a given metaphysical situation, a fiction is created so that an effect is perceived for which a cause must be found. Such a fiction would be composed of a few select elements. In the fiction of the deceitful but powerful God, one single feature is hypertrophied, His omnipotence, so as to assert that, even in such a situation, where God could deceive human thought, it would be impossible to deny the being and certainty of thought despite the false beliefs created by God. The implementation of God's omnipotence is then instantaneously removed to establish the *cogito ergo sum*. Descartes acts as if the dissolution of the fiction itself is not incidental to his final conclusions. With the fiction of the evil genius, the same dissolution appears to give expression to the certainty of the thinking substance. Whatever the deceitful intentions of the evil genius, they cannot dismantle the certainty that I am thinking. But how comes it that a fiction is created and then swiftly removed to allow a definite result, losing its plausible aspect? It is still very doubtful, as Hobbes asserted, that such a cogito could be dematerialized. Besides, certainty is not foundational in that it can establish the essence of thinking. To be aware that we are thinking does not give knowledge to what is a *res cogitans*, to recall Mersenne's famous critique. The substantification of the process of thinking is based on a linguistic strategy which itself causes a new distribution of things. A thinking thing becomes problematic as we do not know if it is material or not except through the fiction of a separation from a pure *res extensa*. Hobbes spotted in Descartes' use of words a fictional and useful attitude aimed at reaching the core of things. Pascal would be more cautious about the fact that language is the focus of fiction, while Descartes believed imagination was merely the act of actualizing ideas. Pascal, argues Cléro, saw how the symbolic use of one rule can collapse into a new order of regulation. Cléro believes that the same scheme pervades Pascal's thought. Reversibility can, for instance, help in harmonizing two notions, which in the beginning were thwarting each other. As it is impossible to be fair in obeying fairness, it is feasible to be fair in obeying a coercive force. Force is feigned as the equivalent of justice. In the scheme of wagers, hence of the bet on life, Pascal describes a calculus of probable gains and losses, as if we were to live on earth forever. Pascal also makes use of fictitious dialogues whose nature is to stage experiences. The reader is not given a rhetorical demonstration but feels sympathetic to the scene described. Fiction opens a place

for the observation of determined principles. The fictitious orders produced in Pascal's fragments have profound effects of resolution. He would also create figures, not for their character, but in order to put forward a problematic situation, in which the negation of error would suffice for constructing a truth. Cléro claims that *per absurdum* reasoning is inherent to fiction.

Pascal also uses the classical French "*Il faut que*" (it is necessary that) to pin down the necessary commensurable notions of justice present in both Man and God. Cléro surveys the notion of necessity in Pascal's perception of the infinite attributes of God, of which some are more intelligible to humans. For instance, it is not necessary to understand the immensity of God's mercy, even for those who do not deserve it, as it is sufficient to enjoy it. By nature, mercy is bound to be endless while condemnation, to a much lesser degree, is bound to limit its action to the establishment of justice. Cléro's analysis, of necessity through the Pascalian *Il faut que*, goes so far as to reject God's absolute transparency, and to advance man's attempt to scrutinize His intentions. These are assumed through a fictional conception. Man is invited to assume that God has intentions, in which justice is great but always less than his mercy. *It is necessary that* stands for an induction which by the same token starts a process of reconstruction. Justice is also intimated in a series of deontological grievances. Cléro argues that the Pascalian *it is necessary that* is a mixture of theoretical necessity and deontological prescription. Human nature is thus both revealed by Holy Scripture's rules and the figure of Christ (deontological), and the rules themselves are justified only through the human condition (ontological). The deontological rule is both the act of creation of human nature and the remedy for its pains. Man is entirely free to act sinfully but it is inevitable that he should never do so. Religion is both *ratio cognoscendi* and *ratio essendi*. Cléro believes that this is a fiction, in that for religion to be acceptable, the human condition has to have some characteristics, like the existence of a miserable condition from which will arise our felicity. The condensation of both the deontological and ontological orders is achieved through the fictional effects of the locution "*It is necessary that*." For instance, a witness is all the more credible in religion as his miserable condition is salient. The listener is all more justified to believe a testimony as innocence and poverty are its stressed features. The duplication of truth maintains the fiction of a middle with its uncertainties

(or probable certainties) as it is and is not removed, as in Descartes' justification for the *res cogitans*. The Pascalian building of probable worlds eschews the difficulties of self-dissolution and gives rise to discernment in the mind between contradictory principles which have to be articulated and not opposed. Cléro believes that in biblical discourse fiction refers to the conceptual when the latter is no longer able to sustain intelligibility. Reality is more comprehensible through images. Therefore, fictions, like religious figures, are not so much extinguishable tools for the understanding of a concept but replace it to tell more about the real human condition.

In the ethical relation to fiction, Cléro would examine the ethics of care especially. After recalling that ethics suffers from a lack of conceptualization and thus requires the use of fictions, Cléro warns that, in ethics, there is a profusion of multiple and entangled principles. This led to the establishment of a poor distinction between some values based on the autonomy of the subject and others ascribed to a heteronomic pole. Care would require the use of predominant heteronomic values. The heteronomic pole lay in the shadow of the autonomy of the will (creating the great political and juridical values) and the philosophy of care, despite its new attempts, seems to follow the same path, at least on the level of political claims. Cléro begins an analysis of the notion of person on which most moral values are centered, in such a way that the Other is inevitably introduced, as in Sartre, by positing the Other before the "I." Such a focus will put an individual before other individuals, making of the person the target of multiple rights. In the ethics of care, a person will inevitably be split between an empirical self and a transcendental "I" obliging the person to act according to what one owes to oneself. The defense of the person against the individual would, in Kantian terms, justify the death penalty. The person is preserved in a fictional indictment aimed at protecting a community through the punishment of a mere individual. The notion of person is very useful to build fictional *scenari* for prospective deliberations on a body already ailing and without consciousness. Cléro asks if the fiction of person indeed masks the real truths that we can extract from an ethical problem. The use of fiction to create a deliberating mind out of a truly ailing patient also serves for implementing personal values against individual interests. Cléro asks if the Kantian unconditional duty to help the Other, based on the autonomy of the will could be reversed to the heteronomic pole, especially in

the ethics of care where the Other is likewise unconditionally called to receive attention and care by the physician. There could even be a political principle in so doing, which would escape a contractualist explanation. The foundation of society and politics is linked to the prior appearance of heteronomic care before the creation of laws. The society of reciprocal care takes precedence over the contractualist one, although, remarks Cléro, individuals are believed to have first developed interdependent and asymmetrical relations. In Worms' *Moment of Care*, care creates the subject before it is vested with a juridical garment, and equality results from the interplay of caring attitudes. In the philosophy of care, values do not originate in the autonomy of the subject but from the heteronomic pole, made of efficient cultural gestures which give rise to feelings. Care is not the expression of feelings, but they appear culturally to release a symbolic subjectivity. Cléro asks if such gestures would be more incidental than mere speech in the manner of democracy. They presuppose the absence of explanation of what is public, which democracy would not accept. The attempt to root politics in asymmetrical care seems perilous for the families in need of external development and societal concretization. Worms would reduce the essence of politics to parental care, a state of family dependency questioning the autonomy of will in politics.

Cléro also asserts that in the ethics of care, dozens of intertwined principles can be recovered, like, for instance, the donation of organs. Which ones would be more relevant? According to which principle of hierarchical organization? Is the principle of individual freedom the most important one? But any classification is bound to reflect a prior selection based on age, critical medical state, essentially based on intuition. The fiction of a human nature capable of intuiting an order in the principles used seems ridiculous for Cléro. Now, Rawls' society itself would provide for the hierarchy of principles without any justification other than its being liberal. Lastly, deliberation would be used to justify a given order of principles, but, still, who would have the right to discuss the principle of selection of principles? Principles must have some negativity within themselves to be able to be articulated with new ones. In Pierre Le Coz's article on the principle of precaution, we can find all these difficulties: for the protection of society, measures are taken to avoid risks but these actions also feed fear instead of alleviating the dangers of innovation. Collective fear is nurtured by exaggerating pre-

caution and protection. Paradoxically, the principle of precaution could hinder action. The detection of principles and their implementation require both a geometrical and refined mind, as Pascal maintained. In ethics, the refined mind based on intuition perfectly accords with the need for the search of principles directly inspired by reality. Then all kinds of logical deductions are possible.

In the definition of care, we find vulnerability and, in an oblique way, the need to recover pleasure. Care is often divided into two processes, one being curative and the other palliative. In the curative phase, the patient has to be active, while in the second phase, the sick person is simply accompanied until the end of life. Such a division is problematic and hinders the unity of care. Care should be an overall process even in the last moments of life. Is cure deliberately stopped in the last moments of palliative medication? Is suffering less obvious in the first phase of curative treatment? Therapeutic overmedication could be called palliative, a means of preventing suffering. Some aspects of the palliative, like sympathy, could be applied to the curative phase. To meet the need of a continuous process of cure, technology is used to compensate for the lack of staff. The patient is put in a discontinuous process of treatment in the curative phase, while, in the last moments of life, humanistic values take charge, establishing a kind of continuity. Cléro perceives in the curative and palliative phases the same continuity and discontinuity that characterizes the Pascalian tree of possible games. The rule can be interrupted at any time and instruct what the player must do in a given situation. The physician is put in the same place as the gambler in a discontinuous time of choices that are taken to represent continuous care. The fiction of continuous care, considered to be more ethical, should be thought in different terms, especially those of the individual's life project. Continuity stops being the contrary of discontinuity; it is interpreted as modality. In the example of a lady treated for cancer, and to whom two solutions are presented, one destined to sponsor research and society in general beyond her own treatment, the other to the benefit of the ill patient herself, Cléro explains how decision is often based on probable asymmetrical elements, namely, on the context of known things whose reality is historical. Ethics must consider the knowledge we have in a given time and context, and the use of fictions is necessary to facilitate the work of probability for the examination of future situations. Perhaps, it is through this interplay of fictitious situations that a

true subjective consciousness can arise in the individual without the burden of affectivity.

In the last chapter, Cléro attempts to survey the links between religion and fiction. Ethics seems to differ from morality and justice. An ethical situation does not involve moral responsibility, nor does it imply juridical condemnation. An ethical decision involves many different individuals in the construction of a symbolic solution, whereas morality would only call forth our innermost convictions. In ethics, rules are collective and do not necessarily refer to one's beliefs. Ethics requires a progressive construction based on a reshuffling of moral values which is not without affects. Cléro feels compelled to see in liberalism, through the works of John Stuart Mill, the artifact of a substantial self which is also very efficient in religious discourse. Liberalism did not agree with the idea of a solid self, instead proposing a compound of perceptions to account for it. It is a fiction made of myriads of other fictional elements aimed at producing social, juridical, economic effects. The person is created to feign autonomy, like the Kantian deontological subject, which has to obey a moral imperative of care deemed personal which only results from external factors. Cléro believes liberalism is clearly a fictional attempt to ascribe to one's own freedom of decision obligations that we would not have accepted in other conditions. Rules are not imposed from the outside but originate in our own power of approval. Mill, remarks Cléro, succeeds in promoting the idea of personal interests of the individual striving for life. The individual has therefore no substantial existence apart from the set of multiple relations constituting society. Hume would see in the symbolic concept of the subject a constellation of passions. Social organization is an expression of passions, like pride or humility whose expression in society enables members to imagine the subject who felt them. Values come from the external and collective manifestation of individual passions. An individual passion would inevitably end in a social expression, becoming a value, as authors like Mandeville and Adam Smith noted in their analyses of the complicity of values with vices. Passions can be twisted into the expression of simple social values. Bentham goes further into the transformations of passions, which, for him, are complete fictions. They are the products of language more than affects. With Hume, the apology of dialogue, however, seems to try to uncover in a very Socratic manner some transcendental values, where it is believed that values can only be constructed through dis-

course. Liberalism was able to set values without the additional need for belief. Values are fictions which can be useful, as, for instance, religious values which, in Hayek's opinion, despite his own agnosticism, have the beneficial effect of maintaining and protecting civilization. Cléro questions Hayek's rationalism with regard to religion, which for the latter is not true but necessary. Bentham held the same attitude and concluded that it was noxious. Religious discourse, Anglicanism, is a discourse of power for Bentham. In the Book of Common Prayer, language is a tool of power aimed to enslave the believers, especially at the level of the proposition. In his political interpretation of religion, Bentham casts light on the effects of power through biblical narrative. In *Not Paul but Jesus*, the return to a so-called primordial speech is considered fictional and subversive as it impedes a reappropriation of discourse, and a possible rationale of pleasures and pains. Paul's testimony differs from the tales of the apostles in that it is no longer visual but spiritual. Paul succeeded in regaining power and instilling it without having to resort to some demand for approval. He could speak in the place and time of Jesus Christ himself, a fiction which Cléro describes as more performative than Matthew's testimonial gospel. Cléro also concludes that symbolic discourse in religion seems to refer to another world, an effect of transcendence which is only feigned by the truths it apparently try to seize in the outside while they are just present in the reverse side of language. Hence, religion is not so much a question of background belief, just as it is not in science or physics.

Jean-Pierre Cléro's *Essai sur les fictions* is certainly a rare and precious exploration of the philosophical notion of fiction and will remain such for years and decades to come. It would be no exaggeration to claim that no one before him, for whatever historical, epistemological or ideological reasons, was able to deal with the tricky question of fiction with such depth of investigation. Cléro's achievement can be in part explained by his broad exemplary dealing with the problem, comprising extensive and expert study of literature, art (especially the perception of painting), theater, classical ethics, applied ethics, mathematics, physics, the philosophy of care and medical treatment, phenomenology, Cartesianism, and so on, from which he astonishingly recovered a variety of stable features convincing the reader of his view of the notion. First of all, Cléro demonstrates that it would be pointless to attempt primordially to draw a paradigmatic chart of fiction as the very nature of the notion

escapes any determined fixed identity. His methodological approach seems to avoid a kind of Aristotelian *Horismos*, engaging the reader in a sensitive perception of the notion in a large variety of given situations, originating from multiple fields of creation or from scientific disciplines. In the convergent reading of these situations, the reader is progressively brought into the realm of fiction without having to chart the essential features of the notion, as these are seen in different perspectives.

It is true that Bentham's fallacies appear in Cléro's query for a better understanding of fiction, but only for the purposes of raising questions which have a transdisciplinary impact. The relation to real entities seems important as it brings about all the necessary intricacies between an ontological existence of objects and their fictional existence in expectation of actualization. Secondly, Cléro articulates his investigations in a critique of the relation between truth and falsehood outside of the classical law of logical exclusion. He finally attempts to rehabilitate the symbolic functions of language in the design of fiction whatever its scientific or literary implementations. As a matter of fact, we could ascribe to fictions positive functions. First of all, they allow for the construction of worlds in literary or philosophical works whose plausible nature makes it possible to open the way for a new interrogation of the present confronted with the future. Secondly, fictions are able to capture or concretize (especially in the sciences) a state of ignorance or bewilderment as they can symbolically interpret a state of incompleteness without resorting to a truth/error parameter. Thirdly, fictions are prodigious tools for encircling reality as the latter is most of the time reluctant to reveal itself in plainly visible surfaces. Cléro also explains that man's intention is always implied in one way or another in the design of fictions. We will now insist on these three points to clarify the importance of Cléro's work.

In the relationship between reality and fiction, we are compelled to observe that the former does not compulsorily repel the latter. Cléro explains that a structure of perception is never quite transcendental, as in a pure phenomenological perspective, and can be explained by a dynamic approach, closer to our perceptual world, where reality does not *logically* exclude fiction. The notion of variance and modality seems crucial to understand this problematic relation, provided it is not understood in terms of a Husserlian eidetic research, but rather as a Kantian or Piagetian schematism. An interpretation of Cléro's investigation has led us

to believe that reality is set in a dynamic inclusion or exclusion movement with fiction, one being able to include the other and vice versa in infinite sets. Let us take an example from our everyday consumerist society. The development of technology moved us to search for better high-resolution images in view of the possibility of seeing the world in a more real or realistic way. The transformation of our screen-images from movie pictures of the 50s into UHD (ultra high-definition) images evokes the same pattern of inclusion and exclusion of reality. The image is pitched in a varying movement of concretization, which certainly does not function on the principle of the removal of fictitious or blurred features, as we have the impression that the more the image is made to match reality, the more pixels it has and the more surreal it becomes. The desire for plain reality is transformed in an impression of hyperreality, a pointillism which itself becomes disturbing and utterly fictional. It seems that the human mind is so made that it cannot bear a strong vision of real things. To a certain degree, the mind has to come back to its fictional or imaginative nature, being unable to support simple visible reality. Vico would not be surprised at such hyperreal fantastic images, as reality for him would inevitably be better expressed through imagination, a necessary return to the Fantastic Universals. Cléro's insightful considerations of fiction also describe this liminal aspect of the mind which tends to demonstrate that the need for a full actualization or the need for a comprehensive vision of reality is only claimed and not justified by a true psychological investigation of the human mind. A dynamic understanding of fiction entails a variation whereby hyperreality, a would-be anti-fictional process, thoroughly becomes the expression of hyper-fiction. Throughout his book, Cléro is intent to explain directly or indirectly such a dynamic movement observed in the relation between reality and fiction, discarding the idea of their mutual and logical exclusion. The dosage of these two substances must be carefully measured because sometimes, or so it seems, fiction is more able to produce effects of truth or reality than reality itself. And reality itself is more inclined at times to release effects of fiction. Cléro defines the elixir of fiction as a liminal situation where reality is balanced with unreality in a way that the equilibrium may be reversed, expressing a prominent reality or a salient fiction, but always on the basis of one another. Thus, an acceptable fiction would be one whose nature is to represent symbolically the real through the unreal, while never falling into a hyperreality.

The question of dosage is thus fundamental in striking a balance which, apart from casting light on a new anthropological conception of the mind, has to do with a certain vision of truth. Let us recall for the sake of greater clarity, that, in the Gospels, the resurrection of Lazarus by Jesus was an unacceptable truth because just a few days before, he was buried and his tomb was visible to a large crowd. The vision of a resuscitated body was unacceptable for the mind. Reality being unacceptable, only the fiction of resurrection understood as witchcraft could alleviate the crowd's bewilderment. Sometimes truth and reality seems to be unacceptable to the mind which by nature cannot support strong evidence.

Recalling Bentham, Cléro insists on the fact that truth itself could be a fictitious entity. The adequation of the mind to the things perceived is based on the fiction of a self-identical subject, as well as purporting the existence of a noumenal truth within the fiction of a self-existing thing. First of all, we realize that fictions should not be related or incorporate truth values, as they are themselves just instruments aimed at gaining partial and not complete truths. It would be incongruous to ask in the sciences, for instance, whether a fiction is intrinsically true or not since most of the time they are used to gain knowledge of remote areas outside their grasp. Cléro insists largely on the heuristic value of fictions and sometimes derides their underlying scientific gloss. But we should at least acknowledge that in front of man's desire to explain, if not the totality, at least a large amount of natural phenomena, fictions are necessary (beyond the already known hypotheses) to fill in the interval between the already known and the unknown. The intention to play with fictions is not bad since, *it is necessary that* (if the fiction is reasonably well balanced) it will retrieve some truth or error to change the state of a theory. If there are fictions aimed at inducing some badly intentioned behaviors, there are others which have a profound heuristic value, whether in partial error or truths, and nobody can deny the value of fictional thinking beyond the limits of hypotheses and experience. If, in literature, a fiction already holds some truths to be discovered by the reader in the background of a convergent reality, in science, on the other hand, fictions do not harbor truths within themselves. They are just nets thrown into the oceans of ignorance from which we expect some prodigious golden fish to emerge as a new object of knowledge. Here, Cléro is right, we have to distinguish between scholars who misuse fictions in order to justify a so-called theory and those scientists who recognize

their ignorance before a phenomenon and resort to fictions in a hopeless attempt to know more. If a writer already holds the truth he wants to deliver to the public, most of the time the scientist lacks the truth and has to await the time when it will appear as such for a large community of scientists. Cléro gave us lots of examples where intention is either bad or good, even in Descartes' metaphysics, where we could suppose that the French philosopher practices a bad intention in absolutely trying to convince us of the substantial existence of the *res cogitans* to a fictional evil genius. Still, in any scientific or literary case, fictions appear to be the result of a poesis, a construction of causes and effects to be felt in any compartment of the human mind, from the most fantastic operations to the most rational ones. It is up to the writer to choose from the blend of fictional and realistic signs, interconnecting, including or excluding each other, capsizing into one another, which will be in the end the most fundamental in delivering the final truth (or the one perceived as such). The practice of literary fiction hinges on the author's intention to promote a kind of truth out of the vast set of connotations and denotations he holds with the power of language. Still, his intention could be bad also, as he may use fantastic worlds, or possible ones, to derive ideas or thoughts that he perfectly knows would be unacceptable in the world of possible experiences, to recall Husserl's *Lebenswelt*. Cléro also showed that in the most scientific disciplines, whole theories were merely grasping a thin thread of fictional simplifications, which mathematicians, out of a bad intention, were not ready to discard. However, we should be careful not to misunderstand the adjective "bad." In such an attitude, the heuristic element is still present in the mind of the researcher but, whether out of pride or profound humility (Perelman's refusal of the Fields Medal is symptomatic of a certain atmosphere within the community of internationally renowned mathematicians), it is better to delay the acceptance (or better the acknowledgement) of ignorance in a kind of general consensus than express it publicly. The need for coherence or comprehensive explanation can be the product of a bad intention even if most of the time it is simply a conception of science based on a totalizing truth that explains such useful implementations of fictions to ensure the comprehensiveness of a theory. But, as Cléro remarkably explains, it is easy to build a fictional system of truths from already known, fragmentary but real elements, than to deconstruct it after some parts prove to be false. Hegel was able to depart from the poor state of a Conscious-

ness engaged in a battle with objectivity and construct a highly fictional Spirit deprived of intentional objectivity even in its self-knowledge, but never succeeded in seeing through reality, at least on the historical stage of his time. Perhaps it was high time for Marx to uncover the illusions of a fictional *Geist* and reverse the course of History on the premise, not of a *bad* consciousness, but a false one which could not see reality as dialectical materialism.

Between heuristic fictions and non-heuristic ones, the paradigm of intention seems to delimit a field of investigation that only language can capture. Cléro understands the profound nature of fiction and the features it shares with language. Even though signs are limited in a given language, their combination is unlimited, as is meaning. A fiction is a construction of meaning out of the substratum of language. A referent could be used as a signifier to point to another signified. This mirroring of signs through their Saussurian substructure is boundless and fits the nature of fiction understood as a possible world. Above all, the work of interpretation never ceases and is bound to supersede the diegetic intention of the author. A writer is considered to master his relation to the truth that his words convey. But whatever the prior intention of the writer, there is always this hermeneutic feature in language that may displace or remove such an intention in a tragic and sometimes completely alien way from the world the writer was trying to create. It is in the nature of language, despite being a closed system of signs, to open myriads of possible interpretations through the infinite network of signification. Even if the writer seems to control this network, it soon appears that his own intentions are transgressed or extended because he never quite knows where the process of signification stops. It could also be the intention of the writer to leave the reader in a state of limbo with the obligation to exercise his own powers of interpretation. Cléro explains, through Diderot's *The Nun*, how such problematic subjects as religious matters, most of the time embedded in an unresolved Manichean dilemma, are perceived differently within the substratum of language. Within the texture of language, religion becomes the object of multiple fictional and realistic upsurges of meaning which end in the neurotic psychological interpretation of the main character. Dogmatic truths melt into Suzanne's own psychological character and release other effects of reality through the letters she produces. Her letters are fictional, not in opposition to a real world, but because they manage to express indirectly

a state of affairs that a realistic style of writing would not have been able to do. Fictions can encircle reality and grasp unseen sides to reveal others. A talented writer of fictions would know how to proceed in the labyrinth of meaning and which way to follow, even very indirectly, in order to reach his final point. It is in the nature of a fiction to be revealed in a set of meaningful propositions (a Benthamite prerequisite) so as to express a cluster of notions and problems, or better, to capture a state of unclarity. It was also in the nature of the Pessoaan *fingimento* to circumvent the outburst of natural sensations in order to express in a stylized poetic manner his real feelings of pains. In the first verses of his famous *Autopsicografia*, Pessoa declared that it was almost impossible to be realistic in expressing one's profound pain except through simple feigning. His feigning or *fingimento* would not express a bad intention but the necessary extension of reality, to pastiche Clausewitz, by other means, namely, poetry. The poet would not understand his real pain or even feel it were it not by a poetical detour. The poetic and fictional use of language is necessary to enlighten a pain that becomes plainly visible only through poetic work. The incomplete reality is then subsumed under the spell of fiction, since only the latter can start the process of understanding and revealing the pain which reality, in its roughness, conceals. Pessoa's verses confirm Cléro's interpretation of fiction as the tension between reality and language. Poetic words are the necessary path to join real pain with the fictitious movement of pain. The completion of *fingimento* results in a true and realistic pain. It is extraordinary to see how both Cléro and Pessoa were able to express in different historical contexts the effective power of fiction on reality.

ANNOUNCEMENT

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Contact person: Dr. Alexander L. Gungov, Program Director
E-mail: agungov@phls.uni-sofia.bg, agungov@yahoo.com
Phone: (+3592) 9308-414 (Bulgaria is within the Eastern European Time Zone)

Mailing address: Department of Philosophy, Sofia University, 15 Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd., Sofia 1504, BULGARIA.

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E-mail: agungov@phls.uni-sofia.bg, agungov@yahoo.com
Phone: (+3592) 9308-414 (Bulgaria is within the Eastern European Time Zone)

Mailing address: Department of Philosophy, Sofia University, 15 Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd., Sofia 1504, BULGARIA.

INFORMATION ABOUT AUTHORS AND EDITORS

Dr. Alexander L. Gungov is Professor of Logic and Continental Philosophy at the School of Philosophy and Director of the Graduate Program in Philosophy Taught in English, University of Sofia, Bulgaria, EU.

Dr. Arab Kennouche is Independent Scholar Living in Paris, France, EU.

Dr. Bora Erdağı is associated with Kocaeli University, Turkey.

Dr. Jean Buttigieg is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Malta, Malta, EU.

Mr. Stephen Bourque is a graduate students at Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.

Dr. John McSweeney is Independent Scholar residing in Cork, Ireland, EU.

Mr. Karim Mamdani is Independent Scholar residing in North America and Europe.

Dr. Kristina Stöckl is Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Political Sciences, University of Vienna, Austria, EU.

Dr. Zoran Dimić is Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Niš, Serbia.

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Alexander L. Gungov, Sofia University, Editor
John McSweeney, Cork, Ireland, Associate Editor
Karim Mamdani, Toronto, Canada, Book Review Editor
Kristina Stöckl, University of Vienna, International Editor
Aglika A. Gungova, Cover Design

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