


Sofia Philosophical Review

Alexander L. Gungov, Sofia University, Editor
John McSweeney, Cork, Ireland, Associate Editor
Karim Mamdani, Toronto, Canada, Book Review Editor
Kristina Stöckl, University of Vienna,
International Editor

Vol. IX, No. 1
2016
Academic Community in
Civil Society



This issue is printed with the kind support by the School of Philosophy at the University of Sofia National Rating System funding.



Sofia Philosophical Review is a peer reviewed journal indexed by The Philosopher's Index and the MLA International Bibliography.

Sofia Philosophical Review accepts papers in the fields of Social, Political, and Moral Philosophy from a Continental Perspective; Continental Philosophy in general; and Philosophy of Medicine. Please send an electronic version of the manuscript accompanied with a 100 word abstract to:

Editor

Sofia Philosophical Review

E-mail: agungov@phls.uni-sofia.bg

Web site: www.sphr-bg.org

All prospective contributions should follow

The Chicago Manual of Style.

Review materials should be sent to the Book Review Editor at:

Sofia Philosophical Review

Faculty of Philosophy

Sofia University

15 Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd.

Sofia 1504

BULGARIA

ISSN 1313-275X

© Aglika Gungova, cover design

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. SOME NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LITERARY HERITAGE	5
Dostoevsky's Ontopoetics	5
Emil Dimitrov (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)	
Is Hegelianism one of Genocide's Victims?	16
Dan Corjescu (University of Sofia)	
II. CONTRIBUTION TO STUDIES IN MEDICAL PHILOSOPHY ..	28
Wishful Thinking, Hope, and Placebo. Exploring the Connections between Religion and Medicine Beyond Illusion, Delusion, and Ideation.....	28
David Tomasi (University of Vermont)	
III. SOCIALITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN PERSPECTIVE	40
Music as Social Practice: Communitarian and Liberal Values in String-Quartet Playing	40
Geoffrey Dean (University of Utah)	
Towards a Phenomenological Foundation of the Human Sciences: Ricoeur's Reinterpretation of Husserl's Phenomenological Intersubjectivity	66
Man-to TANG (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)	
IV. BOOK REVIEWS.....	80
Slavoj Žižek and Srećko Horvat, editors, What Does Europe Want? - The Union and its Discontents (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 240pp.	80
Reviewed by Eleftherios Sarantis (University of Sofia)	
Jason M. Wirth, Commiserating With the Devastated Things: Milan Kundera and the Entitlements of Thinking (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 227 pp.	83
Reviewed by Ilona Valcheva (University of Sofia)	

**Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, Hermeneutic Communism:
From Heidegger to Marx
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 264 pp. 86**

Reviewed by Hans Krauch (University of Sofia)

**Yanis Varoufakis, The Global Minotaur: America, The True
Origins of the Financial Crisis and the Future of the World
Economy (Zed Books, second edition, 2013), 296 pp..... 90**

Reviewed by Eleftherios Sarantis (University of Sofia)

**Arab Kennouche, The Hegelian Return to The Barbarism
of Reflection in the Light of the Vichian Imagination of Power
(Berlin: Mensch und Buch Verlag, 2015), 275 pp. 94**

Reviewed by Blagoja Petrovski (University of Sofia)

V. ANNOUNCEMENT 97

VI. INFORMATION ABOUT AUTHORS AND EDITORS..... 103

SOME NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND LITERARY HERITAGE

Dostoevsky's Ontopoetics

Emil Dimitrov (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

This article aims to introduce a new term, ontopoetics, and to demonstrate the need for a new type of poetics. The issue of ontopoetics is raised due to border issues of culture emerging at the cross-section of literature and philosophy (Plato, Dante, Dostoevsky, etc). Ontopoetics aims at grasping both the philosophical and artistic layer of a given work, which requires elaboration of a specific terminology. Dostoevsky's novel is viewed as a novel-icon because it is built on the same principles as are icons: 1. reverse perspective; 2. objectivity of representation; 3. inclusion of the reader.

1. What is “ontopoetics”?

“Ontopoetics” is a completely new term, coined by this author,¹ to

¹ I formulated and used the term “ontopoetics” for the first time in my reports on “Old Russian Readings” in 1989 and 1990. Respectively, it is encountered for the first time in my first publications about Dostoevsky in Russia: *Димитров Э. Безмолвие у Достоевского // Достоевский и современность. Тезисы выступлений на “Старорусских чтениях”. Ч. I. Новгород, 1991, с. 48–52* [Emil Dimitrov, “The Silence in Dostoevsky's Works. // Dostoevsky and the Modern World. Part I (Novgorod, 1991), 48-52]; *Димитров Э. Демонология Достоевского (К проблеме зла у Достоевского) // Там же. Ч. II. Новгород, 1991, с. 40–47* [Dimitrov, E. “Dostoevsky's Demonology (About the Problem of Evil in Dostoevsky's Works)” // Ibid. Part II (Novgorod, 1991), 40-7]. Of course, the issue of the further existence of the term and its use in the work of other scientists is a separate issue.

designate the unity of ontology and poetics. In the purely philosophical sense, “ontology” is understood as theory of existence and its levels, while “poetics” is a system of working principles of the writer, and also (in the spirit of Aristotle) a theory for the structure and form of a literary work.²

Ontopoetics is not metapoetics, which explains poetics, but *inopoetics* having a “common section” with traditional poetics. Different authors may have different onto-poetics and vice versa—they may have similar onto-poetics but different poetics.

The problem of onto-poetics is raised exclusively due to the description and analysis of border phenomena in culture, which seem to stand at the dividing line between literature and philosophy, literature and religion, etc. (in this context, the first names that come to mind are Plato, Dante, Dostoevsky, etc.). Such phenomena cannot be understood and perceived either purely ideologically and philosophically (in philosophical-religious terms) or poetologically. The rich experience gathered from their study shows that the world of the quoted authors and the like can be “fully” confined, neither to their ideological/philosophical nor to their purely artistic aspects. Yet, we will go even further: the act of understanding the border phenomena of culture may not entail simple addition of the two, i.e. outlook on life (philosophy) + poetics, the thinking, based on the scheme, “on the one hand” and “on the other hand.” In order to create the *new* discipline, “onto-poetics,” we should find *new* coordinates and, for the purposes of cognition and understanding, we should develop a specific terminology.

In order to differentiate the field of onto-poetics from the traditional poetics, we may say that what matters for the latter is what has been *expressed*, while the area of onto-poetics entails the inexpressible; poetics is static, while onto-poetics is rather dynamic.

I will try to express my thoughts more simply and clearly. In my “Neapolitan Lecture” (19 May 2011) I explained these abstract concepts to the students of the *L’Orientale* University with the help of an example: I asked them a seemingly very simple question: *What is Vesuvius?* In Naples, Vesuvius can be seen from any point—it is obvious. How-

² Comp.: Аверинцев С.С. Поэтика ранневизантийской литературы. М.: Coda, 1997, с. 3. [Averintsev, S. S. “The Poetics of the Early Byzantine Literature”. (M.: Coda, 1997), 3.]

ever, it turned out that it is not so simple to answer this question for several reasons. *First*, Vesuvius is a mountain, which is in immediate proximity to the Neapolitan Gulf (1,277 m) and outlines the unique silhouette of the city. *Second*, yes, Vesuvius is a volcano but now it is not seen (at least from a distance) as a volcano; we rather *remember* it as such because we know the history of the volcano, namely, that on 24 August 79 A.D. there was a grand eruption, which destroyed Pompeii and Herculaneum. *Third*, Vesuvius is undoubtedly a danger, which is *beside* us. It is a visible *sign* of the instability of human existence. And *fourth*, Vesuvius is a *myth*: it is undoubtedly a *symbol of mankind*, of its tragedy and, at the same time, of the *triumph of human memory*.

Therefore, based on this example with the complex notional structure of Vesuvius, we can say that poetics studies Vesuvius as a “still” mountain. It is occupied with its “relief” (form) and structure. Historical poetics studies the history of the volcano as an accumulated, formed, uniform “text”; onto poetics studies its “Vesuvius” as “energy” having turned the volcano into a cultural myth.

The simplest symbol of onto poetics is the *cross*: when the vertical ontological order (ontology follows a hierarchal, “vertical” logic) is put onto the horizontal poetological order, they produce namely a cross. Thinking in the field of poetics seems to be “horizontal,” linear (poetics perceives its object as uniform text, located in one and the same plane). Onto poetic thinking seems to be “cross-like,” i.e. thinking *through* a cross.

Putting it more simply, everyday consciousness, the same things in life and literature may not only be perceived but also thought in a different manner. Besides, these “things” seem to find their place at different levels of life and different meaning and significance are attached to them.

I will illustrate my statement with a typical example: let us see how two genius poet- contemporaries—Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837) and Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837)—described and perceived the *moon*. It is well-known that these poets lived and worked in one and the same epoch (Leopardi is only one year older than Pushkin and the two died in the same year). Neither of them suspected the existence of the other. Therefore, it is out of the question to talk about influence of one of the poets on the other or about distancing between the two. Nevertheless, we, the readers and the fans of either of the two poets, can read them simultaneously and, therefore, draw the relevant conclusions.

It is not difficult to demonstrate that the moon has a “reserved” honorable place in the poetry of Giacomo Leopardi. The moon is the poet’s interlocutor and a witness to his loneliness. So, it is not surprising at all that the poet addresses the moon directly in his poem *Alla luna* (To the Moon):

*O graziosa luna, io mi rammento
Che, or volge l’anno, sovra questo colle etc.
 (“O lovely moon, now I’m reminded
how almost a year since, full of anguish...”
Trans. A.S. Kline.)*

Here is the beginning of the remarkable idyll *Night-Song of a Wandering Shepherd of Asia*:

*Che fai tu, luna, in ciel? Dimmi, che fai,
Silenziosa luna?
 (“Why are you there, Moon, in the sky? Tell me
why you are there, silent Moon.”
Trans. A.S. Kline)*

Examples of the superior, “upper” status of the moon in Leopardi’s poetry can easily be multiplied. Therefore, its definitions belong to the “upper,” high layer of language: the moon here is featured as *graziosa*, *silenziosa*, etc.

On the opposite side, it is well known that, for Pushkin, the moon is not an object of inspiration but a part of the everyday routine. Many probably remember that he compares the face of Olga from “Eugene Onegin” with the moon:

*Кругла, красна лицом она,
как эта глупая луна,
на это глупом небосклоне...*
 (“the roundest face that you’ve set eyes on,
a pretty girl exactly like
any Madonna by Van Dyck:
a dumb moon, on a dumb horizon.”
Trans. Charles H. Johnston)

Obviously, the moon has a different place in the hierarchy of living and the structure of the poets' world in the works of Leopardi and Pushkin. So, it is present in an entirely different way in the language of their poetry.

Therefore, ontopoetics studies the structure and hierarchy of both the ideal and the material/personal worlds of a certain writer or poet: the object and the personality—as incarnated “idea” and the idea as immaterialized object and depersonalized personality.

The intermediate area of ontopoetics requires intermediate synthetic categories and terms, such as *mind-vision*, *sense-image*, *homotope* (analogously to M. Bahtin's concept of “chronotope”), etc.

In my opinion, Dostoevsky's ontopoetics can be described and outlined through three key concepts—*meeting*, *name*, *icon*.

II. Structure of the Vertical Ontological Order: Eidos and Heroes

Dostoevsky's ontopoetics is about to be studied more properly in the immediate future but here we can outline briefly the most important issue of ontopoetics, namely, the relation between the vertical ontological and the horizontal poetological order.

This relation, the “crossing point” of ontopoetics, can be described most easily and understandably through the relation between “the hero's idea” and the very hero.

All heroes and characters in Dostoevsky's work have their perfect prototype, their eidos and own idea—“the hero's eidos”—this is the pure image (icon) of the hero, its non-(semi)incarnated essence. (I prefer to use this term of Plato's philosophy because the equivalent term in terms of value—“idea”—is too polysemantic and “broad”; the term “type” is also imprecise due to its abstract nature—the type has *no face*. Dostoevsky's world is personalistic, which means that the “type” concept leads us aside from the understanding of the structure of this world. Therefore, “the eidos” is a *type having its own appearance*.)

Then logically comes the question: how far are our thoughts confirmed by Dostoevsky's texts? How much are they justified in terms of the writer's “element of thinking”?

The theory that the “idea” is one of the most important notions (concepts, idiolects) in the artistic world and in Dostoevsky's language is a literary-philosophical truism; the idea of affirming Dostoevsky's

novel as an “ideological novel” was developed already in the 1920s: “He did not write novels with an idea, not novels up to the 18th century spirit but novels for the idea.”³ In a certain sense, it can be said that Dostoevsky is a greater follower of Platonic ideas than Plato himself; it is not difficult to show that the word “idea” occurs more frequently in the writer’s novels than in the philosopher’s dialogues. The famous statement of the elder Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov*, expressing the *profession de foi* of Dostoevsky, himself fully complies with the millennium-old tradition of Christian Platonism:

Much on earth is hidden from us, but to make up for that we have been given a precious mystic sense of *our living bond with the other world*, with the higher heavenly world, and the roots of our thoughts and feelings are not here but in other worlds. That is why the philosophers say that we cannot apprehend the reality of things on earth. *God took seeds from different worlds* and sowed them on this earth, and His garden grew up and everything came up that could come up, but what grows lives and is alive only through the feeling of its contact with other mysterious worlds. If that feeling grows weak or is destroyed in you, the heavenly growth will die away in you.⁴

Analogically, Dostoevsky perceives man as an incarnation of his “speech,” of his ideal essence, of his “idea” as well: “Man is incarnated speech. He has come to realize and say.”⁵ The *eidos* integrates close heroes in itself regardless of whether they are participants in one and the same event within the integrity of the novel or not. Otherwise said, different heroes of one and the same or different novels (such as, for example, Alyosha Karamazov and Prince Mishkin, the elders, Tihon and

³ *Энгельгардт Б.М.* Идеологический роман Достоевского // Ф.М.Достоевский. Статьи и материалы. Сб. II, под ред. А.С.Долинина, М.–Л.: „Мысль”, 1924, стр. 90. [M.B. Engelgart, “The Ideological Novel of Dostoevsky // F. M. Dostoevsky. Articles and Materials”. Vol. 2 (M.–L.: Misl, 1924), 90.]

⁴ *Dostoevsky F. The Brothers Karamazov.* Trans. Constance Garnett (Melbourne-London-Toronto: William Heinemann Ltd., 1959), 334, italics mine.

⁵ *Достоевский Ф.М.* Полное собрание сочинений. Т. 15. Л.: Наука, 1976, стр. 205. [F.M. Dostoevsky, *Full Collected Works*, Vol. 15 (L.: Nauka, 1976), 205.]

Zosima, etc.) aspire to one and the same eidos.

It is appropriate to mention here the viewpoint of Pyotr Bitsili, who says that "Dostoevsky more than anyone else, is an author of one single book,"⁶ i.e. that his books, like the Bible, constitute in their integrity *one* book. Otherwise said, the "unification," the merger of different books into one and the treatment of different heroes from different novels as a single one, as one and the same hero and, more precisely, as different incarnations of one and the same "type with an image," i.e. the eidos is quite reasonable.

The "textological conundrum," related to the novel, *The Possessed*, is a serious argument in support of our understanding. It is a known fact that the censured chapter "With Tihon" was excluded from the first published version of the novel in the "Руски Vestnik" [Russian Paper] magazine (1871) and was not included in the only other publication of the novel during the writer's lifetime (1873). In my opinion, the in-depth reason for this fact is that, within Dostoevsky's artistic consciousness, "Tihon's image" seems to have already been transferred in his later novels through "the eidos" (i.e. he emerges as the elder Zosima in *The Brothers Karamazov*).

The eidos (the image, the icon) of the hero is the ontological foundation of the hero, the basis and the grounds for his living. At the same time, the eidos is the perfect completion of the hero or the incomplete heroes are incarnation of the completed eidos. The eidos is not fully incarnated in any of the heroes (let's remember Dostoevsky's unceasing complaints that he fails to incarnate fully his thoughts, that he spoils "the idea," etc.)

The *absolute* hierarchy of the eidoses and their strict subordination (the writer's *tendentiousness* is a secondary result of this) clearly flash (but only flash!) in Dostoevsky's work.

Dostoevsky's world is contrasting and polar. It is radically divided into two parts, including that the two is its "number." The poles of the world of eidoses are the super-existence and the non-existence (Jesus Christ and the Devil); existence in its own sense of the word (the sphere of the eidoses of existence) is also strictly divided into two—depending

⁶ Бицилли П.М. Почему Достоевский не написал „Жития великого грешника” // О Достоевском / Сб. статей под ред. А.Л. Бема. Т. II. Прага, 1934, с. 30. [P.M. Bitsilly, "Why Dostoevsky Did Not Write 'The Life of the Great Sinner'" in *About Dostoevsky*. Vol. II (Prague, 1934), 30.]

on how a given *eidos* is oriented—upwards or downwards. We have either Hell or Paradise with Dostoevsky—either a life as if in a Paradise or a life as if in a Hell (compare with Dante’s world, which is divided into *three* parts: Hell, Purgatory and Heaven).

I believe that the *eidoses* are situated in between the absolute poles (Christ and the Devil) as follows: up-down—the Saint, the Ascetic, the Innocent, etc., and down-up—the Indifferent, the Sensualist, the Jester, etc. The *eidos* of the *degens* is in the middle of the vertical line. It seems to keep the unity of the *eidoses*: super-existence flashes in it, but the echo of non-existence is also to be heard.

There are certain regularities in the hierarchy of the *eidoses*: the light flows in the upward-downward direction (the super-existence is the Light), while the darkness is (the non-existence is the Dark) downward-upward. Existence is a mixture of the two. The higher the hero stands in the ontological hierarchy, the higher the role of the *chiaroscuro* and the mild sketches in its descriptions—there are less convexities and vice versa. Dostoevsky seems to use two palettes: *Rembrandt’s palette* (for description of the heroes, aspiring to the demonic line of *eidoses*) and *Boticheli’s palette*—for the description of heroes aspiring to the upper angelical line of *eidoses* (therefore, literary critics’ opinions, that the characters of Prince Mishkin, Alyosha Karamazov and the elder Zosima, for example, are “unconvincing” because they are less outstanding and specific, should be rejected once and for all).

Otherwise said, Dostoevsky’s world is a “grand iconic dyptich,”⁷ where the Dark side is mirrored into the Light one.

The ontological order of the *eidoses* can be described through the alteration of the concepts: mask-face-image-personality or pride-ascetism-humility. The lower the *eidos* of the hero, the bigger the possibility that the hero belonging to this *eidos* may commit a suicide (“The non-beauty will kill you,” says the elderly Tihon in “Stavrogin’s Confession”), the more counterparts he will have and the greater attention the writer pays to *his* portrait.

⁷ Мочульский К. Гоголь. Соловьев. Достоевский. М.: Республика, 1995, стр. 453 [*Mochulsky, K. “Gogol. Solovyov. Dostoevsky”* (M.: Republic, 1995), 453.] (K. Mochulski uses this expression regarding the novel *The Possessed*.)

The most striking thing, however, is that the lower the hero stands ontologically, i.e. the lower his *eidos* is located in the ontological scale, the more he talks. *The lower one is, the more words there are*. Undoubtedly, Stavrogin from *The Possessed* ranks first in this respect: in his giant monologue, Stavrogin speaks not only on his behalf but also through his counterparts—Pyotr Verkhovensky, Shatov, Kirilov, Shigalov, etc.

On the opposite: the higher the hero stands ontologically, the less he speaks. *The higher one is, the less words there are*, while the speech itself loses its definiteness and specificity. The hero takes it ever more painfully that he permanently “does not talk about this” (for example, Prince Mishkin). Nobody talks “about this.” Everyone would rather keep silent “about this.” The most important statements in Dostoevsky’s novels are actually made by the author “through someone else’s voice.” In the reader’s consciousness, these statements are quite incorrectly but firmly associated with certain characters, for example, the elder Zosima, Prince Mishkin (“Beauty Will Save the World!”), etc.

Dostoevsky’s speech is crowned by Christ’s speechlessness.

III. Dostoevsky’s Icon and Ontopoetics

In terms of ontopoetics—thus understood—the question about the specific nature of Dostoevsky’s novel can be raised in a different manner. At the same time, we can try and find a new, expressive “key metaphor” for it.

In my opinion, Dostoevsky’s novel is not a tragedy-novel (Vyacheslav Ivanov)⁸ and not a “polyphonic novel” (M. Bakhtin),⁹ because, *first*, in both cases the highly-respected authors construct the “main metaphor” for understanding Dostoevsky’s work and his novel is

⁸ Иванов В. Достоевский и роман-трагедия // Вяч. Иванов. Собрание сочинений. Т. 4. Брюссель: Жизнь с Богом, 1987, с. 401-44. [V. Ivanov, “Dostoevsky and the Novel-Tragedy” in *Complete Works*, Vol. 4 (Bruxelles, 1987), 401-44].

⁹ Бахтин М. Проблемы на поетиката на Достоевски. Прев. К. Попов С.: Наука и изкуство, 1976. 303 с. [M. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics* (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1976), 303.] See, in particular, Chapter 1: “Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel and its reflection in literary criticism” (ibid, 13–58).

related to cultural phenomena, standing outside the authentic context of this art—in the first case, it is related to ancient tragedy and, in the second, to the European music of the epoch of the Baroque (Bach, etc.). *Second*, these “formulae” reflect important aspects of Dostoevsky’s poetics,¹⁰ but not his onto-poetics. *Third*, they can be referred to deeper principles (for example, the principle of encounter),¹¹ on which they are really based.

Regarding the main idea of M. Bakhtin’s book, we can also note that the remarkable Russian thinker relates the idea, the principle of the *dialogue* with the idea, the principle of the *polyphony*; they seem intuitively, internally related but *actually* the polyphony is *monological*: the question in it is about “the translation,” the transposing of one and the same topic (the musical idea) “through” different voices; yes, the different voices can be independent from one another but they do not have their own “speech” (the dialogue is possible, when there are two speeches, two logoi). The semiotic correspondence of the musical fugue, in which the classical polyphony reaches its excellence, is not Dostoevsky’s novel but rather Kant’s *treatise*, where, as in the fugue, the main topic (idea) recurs in different “modes” many times (Kant is often criticized for the fact that the same thoughts repeatedly vary in *Critique of Pure Reason*. In my view, this is not a shortcoming but rather an internal requirement of the “poetics” of this type of treatise, characteristic of the Baroque).

In order to obtain a synthetic, true and seemingly “final” formula-metaphor of Dostoevsky’s novel, it is necessary to find such a sphere of cultural activity, which would meet simultaneously several requirements: *first*, this sphere should belong to the same culture-creating model, in the bosom of which Dostoevsky’s novels emerged; *second*, it

¹⁰ Of course, we cannot but take into account the formulated goal of the book of M. Bakhtin; the author, according to the famous rule, should be judged according to the laws, developed by himself. Let’s remember “the beginning” of the remarkable book: “The current work is dedicated to the problems, related to Dostoevsky’s *poetics* and considers his works *only* through this perspective.” (Ibid, 11.)

¹¹ Comp.: Dimitrov E. L’incontro in Dostoevskij // *Su Fëdor Dostoevskij: Visione filosofica e sguardo di scrittore* / A cura di Stefano Aloe. Napoli, 2012, 401-11.

would constitute a considerable artistic achievement and an expression of the fundamental artistic potential of culture (analogously to ancient tragedy and polyphonic music of the 17th-18th century); *third*, it would be a semiotic correlation and, generally, would express the same “spirit” and structure of culture, view and understanding of the world.

The sphere fulfilling all these conditions is the world of the *Eastern Orthodox icon*.

Therefore, taking into account all requirements to the development of a synthetic “formula”-metaphor, it can be said that *Dostoevsky's novel is an icon-novel*—of course, not in the sense that we should worship and honor it as a sacral object, but that this novel is generally built on the same principles: 1) the principle of *reverse perspective*, 2) the principle of *objectivity of the image* (i.e., the object in the icon is depicted not as it seems but as it actually exists); and 3) the principle of the *reader's involvement* (analogously to the case with the icon, where the spectator stands not in front of it but, seemingly behind it, inside it).

No, it is not true that “everything has already been said” about Dostoevsky.

It is time to make a step to a new road of understanding.

Is Hegelianism one of Genocide's Victims?

Dan Corjescu
(University of Sofia)

Abstract

Hegelian philosophy can be used/tested as a persuasive interpretive historical tool. In this article, we use Hegel perhaps to better understand the violent events of the first half of the twentieth-century and the far more peaceful outcome of the second half. Hegel's dialectical notions of history, based on his concept of “*Aufhebung*,” play a significant role. The article is, in a profound sense, a further elaboration of the prior works of Alexandre Kojève, Francis Fukuyama, and Terry Pinkard; and, of course, Hegel himself.

Introduction

Had Hegel's philosophy of history embraced this age, Hitler's robot-bombs would have found their place beside the early death of Alexander and similar images, as one of the selected empirical facts by which the state of the world-spirit manifests itself directly in symbols. Like Fascism itself, the robots career without a subject. Like it they combine utmost technical perfection with total blindness. And like it they arouse mortal terror and are wholly futile. ‘I have seen the world spirit’, not on horseback, but on wings and without a head, and that refutes, at the same stroke, Hegel's philosophy of history.

(Adorno's “Out of the firing line” from *Minima Moralia*)

It is just when we think we may be moving away from him (Hegel) that he is most likely to be sneaking up behind us.

(Attributed to Jacques Lacan)

Nothing great has been accomplished in the world without passion.
(Hegel)

We need to ask whether our pessimism is not becoming something of a pose, adopted as lightly as was the optimism of the nineteenth century. For a naive optimist whose expectations are belied appears foolish, while

a pessimist proven wrong maintains an aura of profundity and seriousness. It is therefore safer to follow the second course.

(Francis Fukuyama)

TURNING and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

(W. B. Yeats in 1919)

The “short” 20th century, to put it mildly, was a very disturbing era.¹ Most notably it began with yet another European “thirty-years” war, the repercussions of which were to cost the lives of literally tens of millions throughout the globe. Even, if, in total percentage terms of casualties, it is to some extent the equivalent of the worst of the all too frequent conflicts of tribal man, it nevertheless commands our deepest sorrow as well as intellectual, spiritual commitment to never let its likes happen again.² Indeed, it is a moral, ethical, political duty, akin to Kant's

¹ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (London: Abacus, 1994). Hobsbawm coins the term “short” century here. However, my line of thought is very much in agreement with Francis Fukuyama's famous assessment of the book in *Foreign Affairs Magazine* (1995) as a “work of great insight coupled with extraordinary blindness.”

² See the following on the “relative ferocity” of the twentieth-century: Matt Ridley, *The Rational Optimist How Prosperity Evolves* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2011). Especially noteworthy for its historical contextualization of war/violence is Azar Gat, *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). The controversial but nevertheless exceptional works by Napoleon Chagnon, *Noble Savages: My Life Among Two Dangerous Tribes The Yanomamo and The Anthropologists* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013) and Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence has Declined* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2011). And finally, but not least, the magisterial and sure to be instant classic by Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution* (London: Profile Books, 2011).

categorical imperative, never to let the worst of the human rights crimes of the past century repeat themselves.

Yet, like Hegel before me, I am in fundamental agreement that we must understand history as it is and not as we would have liked it to be. After all, to understand is not necessarily to condone. Of course this is but one interpretation of past events which the reader, in the end, can accept, partially agree with, or reject altogether.

To be a Hegelian is both to practice a method and espouse a vision. The method is profoundly entwined with the practice of what I call “deep history” or what Hegel called “comprehended history” (*begriffne Geschichte*).³ In Hegelian terms, History is not “one damn thing after another.”⁴

A key hermeneutical word/concept in all of Hegel's work concerning the dialectic of History is *aufheben*. In the insightful study by Donald Philip Verene of Hegel's multiple meanings, metaphor-rich, and careful play on words, Verene tells us that:

The verb *aufheben* has four senses in English: (1) to lift or raise something up (as in the simple sense of *heben*, to raise); (2) to take something up, to pick it up, or even seize it actively; (3) to keep or preserve something, to retain it; and (4) to abolish, annul, cancel, to put an end to something. Hegel uses the term *aufheben* and its noun *Aufhebung* in all four senses at once: the sense of actively raising and picking something up so that it is preserved and held on to, yet in this act something of it is lost and annulled. It ceases to be what it was, but yet lives on in a new state. This is what occurs when one stage of consciousness is taken up into a succeeding stage through the negation of the former. The one is *aufgehoben* in the other, exists as a transformed presence in the other. The physical

³ Terry P. Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 268. I am deeply indebted to Pinkard's interpretation of Hegel's work. I stand as close to it as I stand as far from Charles Taylor, *Hegel and Modern Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). My concept of “Deep History” as I put it, is just another way of saying that I view History, philosophical history, as a qualitatively different endeavor than that of the historian, proper. History, for the Hegelian philosopher especially, has meaning and directionality. It is not just a statistical “random walk.”

⁴ Apparently the origin of this quote is obscure.

actions of meanings (1) and (2) parallel the more spiritual meanings of (3) and (4) of this very ordinary German verb. To raise something up is a way of keeping or holding to something but to pick something up carries a sense of selection in which something is taken from its context and thus some of what it was in its context is canceled and annulled.⁵

Following these preliminary insights, we can begin to assert that the motor of Hegelian History, as opposed to mere contingent history, is what Hegel calls the world-spirit or world-mind (the German contains both senses of spirit and mind, *die Weltgeist*). World-spirit/mind is the history of man's true, rational comprehension of himself, which culminates in the social-political recognition of each and every man as free and worthy of recognition as a man. Thus, the primary goal of man's history (as opposed to the history of nature) is his rational self-realization of both his inner and outer freedom.⁶

Within this interpretation is the important observation that not all events, epochs, eras, individuals of history are of importance. Some are merely contingent and pass in and out of history without great meaning, such as the conflicts between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons.⁷ Others are of the greatest importance for the advancement of humanity towards its most innermost truth and logic (that each man is free and thereby worthy of recognition). As Hegel stated in his *Philosophy of Mind/Spirit*:

When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength, just because it is the very essence of mind, and that as its very actuality.⁸

Some key moments in the history of this conception of spiritual/intellectual/social embodiment and teleology (World-Spirit/Mind) have been, according to Hegel, the advent of Christianity as a religion

⁵ Donald Phillip Verene, *Hegel's Recollection: A Study of Images in the Phenomenology of Spirit* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1985), 34.

⁶ This is the main thrust, I think, of Pinkard's interpretation of Hegel.

⁷ Pinkard, *Hegel's Phenomenology*, 336.

⁸ Quoted in David MacGregor, *Hegel and Marx After the Fall of Communism* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2014), 14.

which promulgated that all men are equal under the eyes of God, the Protestant reformation which created a space for the individual conscience to choose its relations with both itself and the outside world, and, finally, the French Revolution which, for the first time, set up the universal principles of the Rights of Man which enshrined the concept of each man's innate value and necessary freedom.

A word should be said about the last event in the above mentioned sequence, the French Revolution. Hegel, contrary to his many detractors, never said that History ended with the French Revolution. What he did say is that the French Revolution was the end, in principle if not in practice, of a certain important self-understanding of man; namely that he is free and worthy of recognition from every other man. Hegel was under no illusion that it would take a long time for such realization to be put into practice. Additionally, Hegel explicitly stated that the philosopher can only comprehend his own time and that of the past; he, the philosopher, was not in the business of “prophecy” and had no privileged vantage point into the future.⁹ All the philosopher of history could do is examine the march of history and look for deep meaning in its many strands and convolutions. It is in this sense that Hegel famously meant that World History is World Judgment. Man is, ultimately, rational. History is made by man and thus can be fully comprehended. Therefore, what is, or what has come to pass has an inherent rationality to it, otherwise it would never have been actuated. And the supreme reason of man's development in “comprehended history” is his contradictory march towards subjective and objective self-emancipation (the objective side is ultimately manifested within the rational, free state/government within which he lives).¹⁰

⁹ Joseph McCarney, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel on History* (London: Routledge, 2000), 118. I am most indebted to McCarney's interpretation, specifically, of Hegel's thoughts on History. Among other works which have profoundly influenced my viewpoint on the subject are Alexandre Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on The Phenomenology of Spirit* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969) and Kojève's own recently celebrated interpreter Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

¹⁰ See Shlomo Avineri's, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

In everything that Hegel says, it is crucial to understand that, for him, as for Aristotle, man is rational. The path he takes is rational. Even when, at first or even second, or third glance, historical events, such as the First World War, may appear absurd or profoundly irrational, the Hegelian philosopher, armed with his conception of deep History and his analytical method of historical contradictions, yet may well find meaning where others have found none.

At this point, we should say a word about Hegel's famous "negation of the negation." In our view, this is nothing more (and nothing less) than a new challenge towards what currently is, the given, leading to a resolution of the old given through a new self-reflection or social action thereby creating something altogether new which contains both terms while, at the same time, resolving contradictions within each of the terms themselves. In this technical, logical way, history moves into new ages discarding some things standing in the way of its higher self-realization, while preserving other elements that do not stand in the way of its ultimate development.

For instance, it is popular to conceive both in the West and in Russia that the twentieth-century conflict with Imperial Germany and, later, Nazi Germany was, intrinsically, a war of barbarism versus civilization. Indeed, after almost 70 and more years of historical research and debate, the common consensus of historians is that the birth of Imperial Germany in 1871, its rapid "hot-house" industrialization, its ultra-conservative elites and quasi-feudal social and political structures, as well as its infamous late nineteenth-century culture of anti-modernism and anti-Enlightenment contributed significantly to a general atmosphere of paranoia (the famous "encirclement" complex) which produced two world conflicts of horrific proportions.¹¹

It is also common to view both world conflicts as "avoidable," "senseless," and even the product of two unstable individuals: one the Emperor Wilhelm II, seeking "his place under the sun," and the other

¹¹ My historical viewpoint on German history has been profoundly shaped by the following works: Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1967). Ralph Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York: Norton, 1979). Gordon A. Craig, *Germany 1866 - 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

the charismatic madman, Adolf Hitler, seeking “a new world order” and the “new man” that would inhabit it. We think, after much consideration, that both accounts are only partially correct and that there is another more comprehensive view of the twentieth-century afforded by a close return to Hegel's philosophy of History.

The plain historical matter of fact is that the “West” was neither as free, noble, or progressive as it would like to imagine itself to have been vis-à-vis its historical internal nemesis, Germany. In short, the “West” from approximately 1860 to 1945 was a place rife with intellectual, spiritual, social and political contradictions many of which were barriers to the “world-spirit's” aim of individual freedom, recognition, and self-respect.¹²

The Western world of this time was intellectually and, for the most part (with notable exceptions such as John Stuart Mill) spiritually, racist, chauvinist, classist (particularly in England and Germany), social-Darwinist, imperialistic, misogynist, and anti-homosexual. These attitudes translated themselves, materially, in the various institutions of colonialism as well as racial segregation policies (the American “negro” question, as one notable example) and including the medical practice of eugenics in the form of sterilization, if not murder. In addition, this was a world where the old feudal/aristocratic elites and their institutions were still very much alive, as well as revived in imperialist beliefs and practices as well as ultra-nationalist ideas and parties. Indeed, perhaps most importantly, the old feudal/aristocratic elites had successfully inculcated the middle and lower classes in their “Culture of Honor” which was an extensive social and political belief system which encompassed romantic notions of gendered behavior under the twin notions of “Chivalry” for men, and “Chastity” for women.¹³ Furthermore, the concept of honor was not just an idea, but had very serious historical repercussions

¹² See especially Eric D. Weitz, *A Century of Genocide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). George M. Fredrickson, *Racism A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Dan Stone, “Race in British Eugenics,” *European History Quarterly* 31.3 (2001): 397. Dan Stone, ed., *The Historiography of Genocide* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

¹³ James Bowman, *Honor A History* (New York: Encounter Books, 2006). Ann Goldberg, *Honor, Politics, and The Law in Imperial Germany, 1871 - 1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

such as being a major ideal/material factor in the outbreak of World War One, through the romanticizing of war/conflict and normative notions of masculinity. The historical literature is rife with near obsession of European elites', as well as the classes below them, with national rank, honor, glory, and, from time to time, with the necessity of defending their women's sexual reputation. As Mark Girouard remarked:

Opinions will always differ as to whether the Great War could or should have been prevented. But one conclusion is undeniable: the ideals of chivalry worked with one accord in favour of war.¹⁴

What was essential about this period was a precocious material progress which was not matched by an equally precocious understanding of its spiritual possibilities. In short, this was a world that had achieved great technical progress while not recognizing or being able widely to realize the necessary ethical and moral opinions to have made that achievement less dangerous. Rather, on the contrary, the survival, or revival, of older moral and ethical conceptions and ideas such as "chivalry" was the "determinate negation" that was to give the lie to that unbalanced self-perception of the age and to confront it with the horror of the truth in the form of the trenches of World War One, where not only millions died, but a conception of civilization too was buried. In a word, for the West, real modern war had to reveal the falseness of the earlier concept of the "chivalrous" war, and in this sense World War One, or something like it, was inevitable. Ironically, in the fashion of Hegel, it was the first step, but only a first step, to learning the virtues of a modern peace.

Before we begin to analyze in more detail, under the influence and direction of Hegel, the dual movements, or singular 30 year process, of the two world wars, we should note, also in accordance with Hegel that the objective spirit of both art and philosophy were displaying significant signs of anomie and what Hegel termed "the unhappy consciousness" in the generation before the events of 1914-45. In philosophy, none other than the "Aristocratic Anarchist" Friedrich Nietzsche was to display a fateful dissatisfaction with his time and place, harkening back to and reinterpreting, in his own way, *Arete*, or the notion of agonistic excellence of the Homeric Greeks while forcefully rejecting the triple

¹⁴ Quoted in Bowman, *Honor A History*, 101.

future tendencies of the West: pacifism, socialism, and democracy. While simultaneously in the art world, in the form of Aestheticism and Decadentism a profound sense of loss, ennui, incompleteness, nostalgia, exile, and isolation was being reflected and created in unprecedented works of art. In this way, Nietzsche was right in his frequent observation that he was living in a dying world that was unaware of its own decrepitude; and he was uncannily prescient in his understanding that it would take “dynamite” to reveal its essential truth.¹⁵ In this way, we can say, with Hegel, that art, in objective terms, was already registering a truth that it could not, as yet, fully grasp: an essential contradiction between the state of self-reflection and the longing or desire of self-reflection, which was, of course, for fuller forms of freedom and recognition. But that state of affairs would have to wait for the future, for the horrible resolution of the contradictions of a doomed state of cognition.

If the First World War put a formal end to three Empires (the Hapsburg, Wilhelmine, and Ottoman) and shook the “Culture of Honor,” it did not thereby, completely break it, and the elites which continued to support it. Indeed, in that most famous of unstable political creations after the “Great War,” the Weimar Republic, it was rightly said of it that it was a “democracy without democrats.” As Hegel had noted long before, in his explanation of why Napoleon was unsuccessful in setting up a constitutional monarchy in the Spain of his time, the Weimar Republic was an “alien” construct that was imposed from without and had not been a historically contingent product from within. Democracy for Germany was an external wish, which had very few, true supporters among a large swathe of the population of the time. This historical feeling was encapsulated by the oft repeated phrase of the era, “Everything was better under the Kaiser.”¹⁶

Indeed, elsewhere in Europe, the “Culture of Honor” continued as did the negative impediments to freedom which we had mentioned at the

¹⁵ See in particular Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of The Idols and Anti-Christ*, trans. Michael Tanner (London: Penguin Books, 1990).

¹⁶ See Eric D. Weitz, *Weimar Germany Promise and Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). Hans Mommsen, *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy*, trans. Elborg Forster & Larry Eugene Jones (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Ruth Henig, *The Weimar Republic 1919 - 1933* (London: Routledge, 1998).

outset: racialism, imperialism, chauvinism and all its grotesque institutional and ideational permutations. Thus, the world of pre-1914 had been seriously wounded, but not mortally so. And similar to all living things which are wounded and facing possible annihilation, because it should always be remembered that the “World-Spirit/Mind” is a living concrete, embodied thing made by the actions of men and women in history; the ideational forces of the old-world were to make one last irrational, cataclysmic stand for its understanding of itself and its hoped for promulgation into the future.

And indeed, on a political level, it was in the borrowed language of the future and selected symbolism of modernity that the forces of the past were to sell themselves as a viable option. For neither Nazism nor Communism, being the half-way houses or “pathological transitions” to true modernity, could ever have garnered any support unless they focused on some aspects of modernity while neglecting others. And crucially, both historical movements focused on the technical, scientific side of modernity while discounting as “useless” what they considered the corrupt and decadent “bourgeois morality” of politics, society, and, even art, that had continued to evolve in those lands which had accepted the radical Enlightenment view of themselves as once shaped and reflected in the works of Thomas Paine and John Stuart Mill, among others.¹⁷

Yet, in Hegelian terms, their projects were doomed to failure from the start if not only because they, from the outset, negated the essential nature of man which is rational, seeks equal recognition, and longs for an equal share in freedom, but because their own creations were unstable half-terms of the very thing they were trying to grasp and put to victorious use: modernity.

Both movements took half-steps to meet the modern spirit which had been developing in the nineteenth century and was only increasing in both rationality and reality after the “Great War.” Seen in this way, it is no accident, that, for instance, the old elites of Germany sought to align themselves and then “control” the Nazi party; a task which they

¹⁷ For the meaning of “Radical Enlightenment” and its crucial importance for Western development see Jonathan Israel, *A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009)

were already too pre-modern to undertake. More importantly, in this way, the oft repeated and often puzzled about “modern” nature of Nazi Germany can be more fully understood. In Hegelian terms, Nazi Germany had partially negated the Old Wilhelmine Germany in some aspects (as a broadly based popular dictatorship rather than a traditional monarchy) but had retained many of the same attitudes of the World pre-1914: racist, imperialist, and culturally anti-Enlightenment while intensely focused on industrial/technical/scientific progress. In a sense, Nazi Germany was old-Wilhelmine Germany in a futurist uniform.

The problem of course was that this half-transformation in one of the world’s most dynamic and influential states was led by a “world-historical” figure that also happened to be the greatest madman the Western World had ever produced. However, Hegel would not have been surprised for as he lugubriously noted time and again, world historical figures act on their own passions, destroy much around them, and yet, contrary or unbeknownst to their final aims, establish the will of the world-spirit, despite themselves.¹⁸

At this point, we should make one point clear. We know that Hitler considered himself a “World-historical” figure. Unfortunately for him and the world, he did not read or understand his Hegel well enough. For like all the world-historical figures before him, he was not to realize his own aims, which were a “Thousand Year Reich,” but the very opposite of his aim which has always been the aim of “World-Spirit/Mind”: the promulgation of freedom and the recognition of man. In a terrible historical irony, the “Hitlerian Revolution,” similar to the French revolution a century and a half before it, was to force the resolution and thereby consequent overcoming of many of the illiberal vestiges/contradictions of the West. Thus, from a Hegelian point of view, it is no accident that almost immediately after the disappearance of this uniquely evil “world-historical” figure; the processes of racial equality, minority rights, gay rights, collective security, feminism, de-colonialization, unprecedented and widespread anti-war sentiment, the first public condemnation of genocide as a historical practice, the birth of the bomb (as of this moment arguably the most important modern device di-

¹⁸ This is Hegel's famous “cunning of reason” and we think it applies to Hitler just as much as it once did to Napoleon.

rectly responsible for holding in check the outbreak of global war, if not local war), the unprecedented spread of the “gentle hand of commerce,” the birth of Israel (where Jews, in a Hegelian sense, achieved true recognition), the demise of the eugenicist movement, and even animal rights were to come to the fore. The essential irrationality and irreconcilability of the Hitlerian project with contingent, historical reality removed many of the lingering ideational/material barriers to a modern world. Instead of a “Thousand Year Reich“ of pain and suffering, an infinitely better, if still very imperfect, Pax Americana has arisen in its place and with it, despite all its glaring imperfections, hope for a better future open to the further, hopefully beneficial, unforeseeable meanderings of the world-spirit/mind. Contrary to the hopelessness of Adorno and the Frankfurt school who famously stated that “poetry was not possible after Auschwitz,” we tentatively call the period following the “negation of the negation,” (the first half of the Twentieth Century): the Auschwitz Rebound.

CONTRIBUTION TO STUDIES IN MEDICAL PHILOSOPHY

Wishful Thinking, Hope, and Placebo ... Exploring the Connections between Religion and Medicine Beyond Illusion, Delusion, and Ideation

*David Tomasi
(University of Vermont)*

Abstract

The following article attempts to investigate the conceptual issues at the center of epistemological and methodological frameworks aimed at understanding the placebo effect, with a special focus on medical perspectives on mind-body connection and an emphasis on mental health. Implementing cutting-edge scientific discoveries with a solid philosophical investigation is fundamental in order to avoid possible therapeutic and epidemiological errors and provide a solid theoretical background to those areas of scientific investigation still open to clinical trials, diagnosis and statistical analysis. In particular, the focus on the connections, as well as the differences, between terms such as perception and consciousness fosters the combination of data collected through neurobiological experimentation, especially in neuroimaging, and the philosophical debate on the applicability of such terms in the context of the human healing process. Thus, new perspectives on the reality and reason, in causal terms, of certain healing mechanisms are discussed beyond the current bio-psycho-social standpoint.

In defining clinical expectations in terms of positive outcomes of a therapy, intervention or procedure, we have to take into account those realms of investigation, which are inevitably connected, if not a founding basis, of being a patient and more generally a human being. In this

article we will try to shed light on some basic aspects of such analysis.

When discussing the placebo/nocebo effect, medical professionals usually agree on the definition of a simulated and/or clinically ineffective treatment (procedure, substance, including pharmacological interventions) for a specific disease in the absence of a patient's awareness-knowledge of the presence of the treatment itself.¹ As this definition clearly states, we are talking about an effect happening without, in terms of evidence-based science, a recognized activity; which is to say that a causal mechanism connected to the beneficial or detrimental outcomes of the therapeutic intervention is not observed in this case. What is very interesting is the fact that this effect often seems to happen regardless (e.g. without a direct connection in causal terms) of important factors such as level of education (especially medical and/or scientific) and personal awareness/knowledge of the ongoing process, as during the very administration of the placebo. For instance, a positive response *can* appear even when "just a sugar pill" has been prescribed to a medical professional, in this case in the *role* of a patient, as part of a research on positive therapeutic outcomes.

Now, we should really ask ourselves whether an emphasis should be put on this concept of "role," since in both philosophical and historical terms, there is an important connection between the concept of "medical doctor" and the concept of "healer," in the multiple senses for which the latter allows. In fact, this very realization is at the center of the debate around the applicability of certain philosophical outlooks regarding the connection between spiritual or religious practices and medicine. We are talking in particular about issues which arise from the problematic connection between the application of faith-based ritualistic practices onto the realm of therapeutic intervention, directly connected with an expected positive clinical outcome beyond, outside, or even against scientific medicine. It is the case of certain schools of thought within more extreme fringes in many different religions. In modern

¹ Of note, the term derives from the Latin *placēbō*, "I shall/will please" from *placeō*, "I please," in particular from the medieval funeral functions in which people used to pray (following Psalm 116,9 in the Latin Vulgata Clementina) "*placebo Domino in regione vivorum*," or "I will please the Lord in the land of the living (ones)."

times, these are found in particular within (departures from) the monotheistic tradition. For instance, we could think of Christian Science, some practices of the (Mormon) Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Christianity, as well as some extremist views within the Judaic and Islamic traditions. Certainly, there is not only disagreement with such practices by more “official” traditions within monotheism (in the case of Christianity, the Eastern Orthodox Church and, even more so, the Roman Catholic Church), but an open and straight-forward condemnation, on both a scientific and theological basis, of the very philosophical standpoint upon which they are based; namely, the rejection of scientifically-based medical practice, or even science as a whole, as “against God’s will.” Interestingly, a typical Western phenomenon,² and even more so a phenomenon in the United States, is on one side the strong divide between what is to be considered “spiritual” and what is to be considered “religious,” with the latter often perceived (again, we are not talking here about exact statistical data) as more “dogmatic,”³ “backwards,” even “obscurantist,” and on the other side the dualistic, partisan-based, polarized view of scientific and transcendental issues.

In the case of the Roman Catholic Church, aside from the rejection based on ethno-religious terms experienced by non-English first generation immigrants from Europe—in particular Irish and Italians—the adjective “Roman” is still very often associated with “foreign”⁴ when it

² As referred to in the modern-day context, and given the scope and focus of this article, albeit with referential examples found in other geographical and cultural areas, such as the below mentioned USSR, for instance.

³ Understood in this context in a very negative sense.

⁴ As opposed to “true” American, a concept which requires a totally separate and in-depth investigation on its own. Needless to say, from the early years of Irish and Italian immigration patterns to the United States a lot has changed both in the sphere of political as well as social manifestation of Catholic religiosity. In fact, according to a 2014 poll, the Catholic Church is the largest religious denomination in North America, with 68,503,456 members. However, let us note that this data refers to Canada (including the culturally and linguistically French Québec) and the United States combined. For the U.S.A. alone roughly 46.5% of U.S.-Americans are listed as Protestants, while 25.4% are listed as Catholics. For more information, please see *America’s Changing*

comes to social and political issues. At the same time, however, we find on a more superficial level a strong admiration for anything Roman (ancient, imperialist Roman, that is),⁵ including pre-constructed phrases, mottos, and symbols.⁶ Among the reasons why the Eastern Orthodox Church did not encounter such rejection in more recent years, we could perhaps think of the role that this Church played during the years of the dissolution of USSR and Warsaw-pact communism, thus positioning Eastern Orthodoxy in the position of a quasi-ally of the *American way* against their left wing Archenemy.⁷

Regardless of theological and cultural differences within religions, the very connection with a spiritual, transcendental, metaphysical sphere⁸ is the core problem of interpretation, especially when this term is associated with diagnosis, and therefore even more so in a psychiatric context. In fact, we talk of multiaxial diagnostic *impressions* right from the start, when attempting to maintain an objective outlook, thus an accurate, non-biased assessment in analyzing a patient's presentation following the DSM-5. In this context we would like to stress that an impression is always putting pressure on(to) *something* or *someone*, leaving an imprint, imprinting, permeating, signing, marking, labeling, and so on. The very issue of the independence of value and judgment is therefore still unsolved (rightfully so, some might argue) by solely relying on the symptomatology of psychiatric disorders. We could certainly suggest a more biologically-based approach, using strategies and technologies such as EEG

Religious Landscape. The Pew Forum. 2015-05-12, retrieved 2015-05-12; and *News from the National Council of Churches*. Nccusa.org. 2010-02-12, retrieved 2012-03-17.

⁵ Albeit with a huge exception, which is often misunderstanding in both philosophical and historical terms, of the Roman Republic and related terms.

⁶ The *fasces lictorii* in the US Congress and Senate or on US 1-dollar coins, for instance, although this symbols is found all across Europe and its former colonies, as well as in other geocultural areas such as Russia.

⁷ Although we should note that even Eastern Orthodoxy is sometimes misunderstood or plainly rejected due to its ethno-communitarian (not just in theological terms) component, quite distant from modern American emphasis on the individual.

⁸ Kindly be advised that we are not using a specific philosophical definition/separation of those terms in this context.

(in a more biomechanical manner, focused on the microstructural levels of cellular signaling) or fMRI (allowing us to localize macrostructures or neuronal/neurological areas in the brain). However, the accurate mapping allowed/produced by these neurobiological strategies, while giving us an incredible precision of aesthetically conveyed data (in terms of digital imaging-related perception associated to specific areas), unimaginable only a few decades ago, it does not provide us with any conceptual or even ethical information we could use to interpret what is actually happening in the brain.⁹ Certainly, there are important cognitive aspects we can understand by using these technologies, which would be otherwise hidden from our analysis. However, we must make sure that we do not confuse *terms*, or more precisely *layers* of interpretation. This is absolutely fundamental in understanding the categorical¹⁰ difference between perception and consciousness, with the vast grey area of a conscious/subconscious (self) perception in relation to others. As an example, we might refer to the philosophical implications, both in ethical as well as in more conceptual and structural, and definitely ontological, terms of procedures such as the corpus callosotomy and all the medical paradigms, including the research by Gazzaniga, DeLoux, Sperry, and Revonsuo originating in the biologically understood split-brain phenomenology into dual consciousness. Without digging too much into the clinical aspects of these interventions, for which we refer to the notes,¹¹ one of the most important things to *keep in mind*,

⁹ Please note that at this stage we are not addressing causal relations between the physical/organic brain and concepts such as mind or spirit. A good contribution to the applicability of possible connection between a strictly biological areas of investigation and a more philosophical debate could be found perhaps in the *Orch-OR* model by Penrose and Hameroff.

¹⁰ Not necessarily in the Kantian interpretation, but in the specific sense of an *order-based structure*.

¹¹ See for instance Elaine Albert, *Commissurotomy of the Corpus Callosum and the Remedial Reader* (Washington, DC: ERIC - Educational Research Information Center, 1990), ED325816; <http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED325816>; Roger W. Sperry. *Some Effects of Disconnecting the Cerebral Hemispheres*. Lecture, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1981, 8 December 1981, in Tore Frängsmyr, Jan Lindsten, eds. *Nobel Lectures, Physiology or Medicine 1981-1990*. (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. 1993); and Tim Bayne. *The Unity of*

and one which has to be viewed in terms of ontological and epistemological considerations, is this dichotomy between perception and consciousness, and what are the correctly understood connection between the latter and conscience. In fact, if we are to follow a strictly naturalistic or materialistic approach, thus finding all correlations to the above presented terms in a fully biological expression, we are certainly suggesting that every cognitive or neuronal process, whether manifested or hidden, conscious or subconscious, perceived or non-perceived is directly linked—in causal terms to the neurological activity in (or, if we are following this view, *of*) the brain. By the same token, we are justifying the entire phenomenology of what we refer in psychiatric terminology as illusion, delusion, and ideation; although through fMRIs and EEGs we are still not able to verify the level of truth, also in ethical/moral and spiritual/religious terms, of certain perceptions. Certainly this view might be appealing to some, and we can understand why if we are to praise the incredible development, in terms of exact, evidence-based medical science that neurology on one side and psychiatry on the other encountered thanks to this paradigm. However, there are a lot of unsolved problems which arise if we want to adhere to this exclusive, and excluding, worldview. In the context of this article, we want to specifically address the connections between religion and medicine in discussing wishful thinking, hope, and placebo. One of the first questions is how come the placebo effect seems to be more manifested in some cases and less or almost non-manifested in others? As we discussed elsewhere,¹² taking as an example testing a new medicine for clinical efficacy, modern western medicine has tried to get rid of the placebo effect. This strategy is absolutely convincing and appropriate within pharmacological therapies. However, the same cannot be said about the whole spectrum of therapies or more accurately about all different kinds of patients. This is especially relevant to fields such as psychoneuroimmunology. For instance, we know that what we usually refer to as *empathy*, not just in term of the relationship between doctor and patient, but in an extended

Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome. (Oxford, UK: Journal of Philosophy. 2008), 3/24-277-300.

¹² David Tomasi. *Medical Philosophy. Philosophical Analysis of Patient Self-Perception in Diagnostics and Therapy*. (Doctoral Dissertation. Sofia, BG: Sofiiski Universitet St. Kliment Ohridski).

sense, triggers dopamine and serotonin, neurotransmitters associated with the emotion center of the brain, which is in turn connected to the brain's reward center.¹³ This is even more evident in the medical-scientific analysis of neurological development in children, as Carl Marci indicates: "Human babies have the most postnatal neuronal growth of any species. Without empathy, there is no attachment, and attachment is essential for survival."¹⁴ Similar models of human interaction, such as the connection between mother and infant, are better understood following these considerations. In particular, research has suggested that mothers directly impact their babies' cortisol levels by their reaction to internal and external stressors (and related hormonal levels), thus causing different responses in the modulatory ability of their children.¹⁵

In this sense, we can affirm that our physical health depends on our sense of connectedness with others, or, in other terms, our perception of (our) selves *in relation to* others, including health providers.¹⁶ This outlook on perception opens therefore new perspectives of what it means to be aware and conscious of others. In particular, we argue that there are

¹³ We should be careful in defining what a "center" is, since the term tends to lose its importance, and scientific validity, when analyzed in the context of infinite interactions between different areas of the brain.

¹⁴ Carl Marci, as cited in: David Cameron. "The Look of Love: Love's Many Splendors Begin with Empathy and Attachment," in: Paula B. Byron, ed. *The Science of Emotion*, (Boston, MA: Harvard Medicine 2011), 30.

¹⁵ See, in particular, the research by Dr. Karlen Lyons-Ruth, cited in David Cameron. "The Look of Love," 30.

¹⁶ "When you're disconnected, your immune system goes to hell...If we know that loneliness affects our immune response, it's not surprising that it would happen at the level of DNA expression," according to Richard Schwartz. Jacqueline Olds further explains "we now know that social connectedness and the feeling of being loved also activate...[the] reward center. If you lack the relationships needed to stimulate that part of your brain, you'll likely find it in a drug." Both researchers are discussed in: David Cameron. "The Look of Love", 31. Furthermore, we could argue that the correlation between the empathetic understanding of the other's emotions, feelings, and ultimately, (physical, mental, spiritual, etc.) suffering has a lot of internal value as a founding element in the series of conceptual elements imagination-ideation-fantasy/phantom(izing)-ghost-*Geist*.

still hidden mechanisms which operate either behind or beyond what is so far classified or not (yet?) classifiable under the methodological structure and operative system of evidence-based medical science. These mechanisms operate under the umbrella of “placebo effect” and are possibly connected to this still partially misunderstood, where not completely discarded as non-existent, relational connection between single subjects or groups, including specific interactions such as patient-provider and/or further connection with spheres beyond what is understandable (verifiable, that is) through the methods of modern science. We are talking about metaphysical, some would argue even esoteric, spiritual or religious elements of action. Therefore, and especially since our focus in this context is on psychiatry and psychology, there are certain positions to which we find ourselves very close, especially when it comes to the criticism of certain form of psychoanalysis. However, ours is not a complete rejection of such practice on the basis of either non-falsifiability or lack of scientific basis (internal/external consistency and methods of investigation/research/diagnosis)¹⁷ but on the problematic aspects *within* interpretation. In this sense, we could refer to the views linking, in a critical and to some extent oppositional way, psychology and philosophy, psychoanalytical analysis and Tradition. Needless to say this form of tradition and its related definition is capitalized according to those aspects of perennial philosophy evidenced by scholars such as Pico della Mirandola, Marsilio Ficino, Agostino Steuco, and in more recent times René Guénon and Elémire Zolla. Furthermore, we want to stress the importance of those elements of psychological investigation which, as we discussed above, go beyond what is commonly understood as based in biological structures, especially if we are interested in the healing process. The debate on the metaphysical component of our mind is beyond the scope of this analysis, however we want to clarify that a monistic-materialist perspective which relates (human) mind to its biological element is an assumption which in our opinion lacks logical evidence in determining the root of psychological mechanisms in the physical body. Just because a placebo effect activates certain neurological areas it does not follow that it these areas are the center (read “origin” and “cause”) of the mechanism. Furthermore, even if we did not find any physical data to monitor in a laboratory setting

¹⁷ It is the view shared by, among many, Mario Bunge.

using evidence-base clinical trial we do not have the luxury to discard observable (not in the aforementioned EBM sense of the term) effects, just because they do not fit in our current scientific paradigm.¹⁸ In other words, just because scientific method of analysis is physical it does not follow that all the data we could find are necessarily physical. This is particularly true in the context of psychological healing processes and mind-body medicine: to be sure, we are not suggesting that a dualistic perspective separating the spiritual, mental, transcendental and the physical, immanent, material is the only correct way to go about scientific explanation, but that we can gain a better understanding of the action of all these components in the placebo mechanisms if we are able to separate them and analyze them individually, while maintaining an open and investigative eye on the big picture, comprising all these elements. The same conceptual framework is to be used in order to avoid confusing technological progress with scientific progress, which in our opinion is only possible, especially when we are interested in the healing process through medical development, though layers of knowledge like the Aristotelian Techné, Episteme and Phronesis. To be sure, although we have to understand that these three dimensions are deeply interconnected and mutually influencing one another, we do need to verify their presence in our practice independently. Otherwise we might encounter those conceptual fallacies, which ultimately lead to wrong methodological assumptions. For instance, very often Western (and even more “Westernized” in this context) psychological science tends to accept traditional, tribal, folk theories, rituals and practices only after contextualizing and “leveling,” “lowering,” “reducing” them first in order to fit their methodological-scientific assumptions. This action is quite often connected to the sectorialization of both science—especially medical science—and religious/spiritual subdivisions. This sectorialization/specialization often contributes to our scientific blindness to the aforementioned “big picture” when attempting to understand the placebo effect, and as we have seen there are some areas in

¹⁸ For further reference, please see Karin B. Jensen, Ted J. Kaptchuk, Irving Kirsch, et al. *Nonconscious Activation of Placebo and Nocebo Pain Responses*. (Washington, DC: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. September 10, 2012), and Mario Bunge. *Medical Philosophy. Conceptual Issues in Medicine*. (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing 2013).

which not only contemporary science still fails to provide successful and definite explanation of meanings which often are “so commonplace that they are invisible.”¹⁹ Therefore, at least in those areas of medicine in which the connection between the visible and invisible appears to carry fundamental weight, as in psychology and psychiatry, we have the ethical duty to bring in our research for better medical outcomes all those aspects that not only *make sense*—which is also to say “they work,” in this context—to us as scientist but also to the patient. Therefore, we need to support all those practices, such as praying, meditating, practicing mindfulness etc., which appear to be beneficial *to the patient first*. Obviously, we refrain from substituting one intervention for the other (for instance surgical intervention versus relaxation therapy) in the cases of acute medical problems, which have already been successfully solved by evidence-based medical practice. This is absolutely not to say that the effects, true placebos or not,²⁰ obtained through praying and meditating are “less active” or “less important” than the ones obtained (for instance) with clinically based interventions. In fact, those practices might appear less effective because of the level/order of intervention we decide to put them in, especially in a chronological sense: that is to say that they also work in a preventive manner,²¹ and still work in a context of support of more clinical medical interventions, once the problem has already been manifested in a physical form. In other words, if a patient had a car accident and needs immediate surgery following an internal hemorrhage we *must* operate. However, as clinicians and scientist we should also be respectful and supportive of all those practices that might be beneficial for the patient, often on an individual level which is strongly connected to his/her sense of self, belief system and spiritual and physical expectations. Moreover, it is our opinion that even when we find data which appears to diminish the importance of such practices, as in the case of some studies on the healing power of

¹⁹ John C. Christopher, Dennis C. Wendt, Jeanne Marecek, David M. Goodman. *Critical Cultural Awareness. Contributions to a Globalizing Psychology*. in *American Psychologist* 69.7 (2014): 645-655 at 648.

²⁰ Although it must be noted that there is a certain level of paradox in addressing the medical truthfulness of a placebo.

²¹ They should therefore be included in Preventive Medicine therapeutic offerings.

praying,²² we still are far from a complete understanding of the whole picture. To be sure, this is not a “God of the gaps” argument, as it does not look for a temporary explanation or escape from the need of scientific investigation on the matter. We should never be afraid to dig deeper in our struggle for better scientific explanation, and that is precisely why it is our duty to fight all those who claim that to be spiritual or religious we have to quit doing science. But we must understand that our role as investigators, not only in strictly philosophical terms, but also in the realm of theoretical science (as it is the case with quantum physics and quantum mechanics), has the ability to change scenarios. As in evidence-based practices which are not related to physical interventions, like in clinical psychology (CBT is one of the best examples), we have to pay more attention to the role, in terms of therapeutic success, of all those dimensions linking: a) therapy, b) therapist, c) interactions therapist-patient, d) interactions environment-therapist-patient, both in the sense of internal and external environment, and e) those areas which touch upon those very spiritual and religious dimensions which cannot be simply reduced to psychological activity or mental health disorders.²³ Furthermore, we have to realize that since the main emphasis of modern science has been on the ability to predict and control the (physical) world and the future we might be completely off in capturing the meaning of time in the healing process. The best example is the concept of hope, which from a purely logical perspective doesn’t make much sense if it is not based on previous successful outcomes. Some might argue (and they would be right to some extent)

²² See for instance: Brandeis University. *The Healing Power Of Prayer?* ScienceDaily. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/06/090617154401.htm (accessed August 3, 2015).; and Benedict Carey. *Long-Awaited Medical Study Questions the Power of Prayer*. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/31/health/31pray.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1 (New York, NY: The New York Times; accessed August 3, 2015)

²³ In particular, the scientific-philosophical debate on consciousness and its manifestations/epiphanies within and beyond psychosomatic or biopsychosocial understanding. We refer in this context to certain aspects of transpersonal psychology, and in particular to the work of Stanislav Grof.

that “true” hope happens/works²⁴ only “against the evidence,” and the same can be said about faith. If the clinical presentation of a patient dying of cancer is far from positive, it is often said that “there is no hope” for the patient. The ethical problems behind the decision of telling a patient the complete truth or part of it are by no means easy to solve. We believe that physicians should be honest and precise in communicating the correct diagnosis and prognosis. However, they should also be very careful in providing not only the exact data but also the right interpretation, in terms of statistical probability, percentage, success rate and so on. Going beyond these forms of analysis is very risky, but in order to understand the placebo effect and the power of hope, faith, and belief we have to go a step further. We are not advocating a choice between what can be understood through science and the belief in the supernatural every time we fail to provide a scientific explanation, but we do agree with Einstein’s famous quote “there are only two ways to live your life. One is as though nothing is a miracle. The other is as though everything is a miracle.”

In other words, in trying to understand the role of wishful thinking, hope, and placebo as they connect with religion and medicine we might have to shift our attention from the question “why does this not work in all these cases?” to “why does it work in this case?”.

²⁴ Certainly the emphasis on a passive aspect in the first term and active aspect in the latter is also a fascinating field of investigation and requires further analysis.

SOCIALITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN PERSPECTIVE

MUSIC AS SOCIAL PRACTICE: COMMUNITARIAN AND LIBERAL VALUES IN STRING-QUARTET PLAYING

*Geoffrey Dean
(University of Utah)*

Abstract

In this article, I first examine what I consider to be a shift toward communitarian values in the orientation of recent philosophical thinking on music. Using MacIntyre's definition of social practice, Small's concept of "musicking," and Gadamer's interrelated concepts of "play" and "festival," I discuss how more culturally-inclusive views of music frame music as an activity, a social practice where the once-primary concept of the work is subsumed in the event and its attendant human relationships.

I then turn my attention to classical music, to the kinds and contents of relationships that might be required for a performance that is satisfactory to all participants, regardless of their role. Moving from a 19th-century utopian vision of a town where music is the only profession to more recent examples, I consider how musical practices both embody certain sets of human relationships and act as models for how non-musical social practices might be undertaken. I contrast the communitarian values suggested by the conductor's control of orchestral musicians, who submit to that control for the good of the music, to the more liberal bias of the collaborative, team-oriented decision-making of an orchestra working without a conductor.

I propose that that two similar opposing, yet overlapping models of human interaction—I term them the "*conversation*" and "*control*" *models*—lie at the origins of the quintessential classical chamber music genre, the string quartet, permeating the music itself and coloring the re-

relationships among the musicians who perform it. After looking at historical precedents from late 18th- and early 19th-century Vienna and examining enduring elements of the two models, I consider their relevance to my own experience as an American member of two leading professional string quartets whose other members are all Bulgarian.

Reframing Music: From Thing to Action, From Work to Practice

As presaged by the aesthetics of Heidegger, Dewey, and Gadamer, a mainstream philosophical approach to music that has developed in recent decades refutes the primacy of the musical work as an object and recasts music as a type of human experience. Rejecting the traditional orientation toward compositional “works” treated as objects and identified through scores, this approach centers on music as “something lived through...a musical field [that] holds participants together.”¹ In this view the concept of a “work”—a product of an individual’s imagination and existing before it is performed—is replaced with a concept in which the work exists to give musicians something to perform.² The work has no meaning until it fulfills this social function in actual practice. Thus, the recent shift in emphasis from self-contained works of art to “the social *practices* of art...the *interplay* between works, practices, and participants in these practices.”³

Wolterstorff refers extensively to Alasdair MacIntyre’s analysis of the concept of social practice in elucidating some of its important features. These features can be regarded as communitarian in their reference to others rather than to self. According to MacIntyre, a social practice is a kind of activity that

- requires new practitioners to learn skills taught by modeling or receiving instruction from others;
- [requires new practitioners] to join a group of existing practitio-

¹ Philip Alperson, “Introduction: The Philosophy of Music,” in *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music*, ed. Philip Alperson (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987), 14.

² Christopher Small, *Musicking: The Meaning of Performing and Listening* (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 1998), 9.

³ Nicholas Wolterstorff, “The Work of Making a Work of Music,” in *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music*, 109; his emphasis.

ners, who may be instructed by more experienced practitioners and non-practitioners;

- has a history and traditions, and standards of excellence, set rules, and records of achievement that go along with them.⁴

A social practice, then, is one in which the practitioner engages with others. MacIntyre himself emphasizes this element of developing relationships among the participants in a practice:

To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in the practice, particularly those whose achievements extended the reach of the practice to its present point.⁵

The social practice of music has been characterized as “part of that larger dramatic enactment which we call ritual, where the members of the community acted out their relationships and their mutual responsibilities and the identity of the community as a whole was affirmed and celebrated.”⁶ Small elaborates:

In the culture of villages, as well as of those quite small cities (by present-day standards), from ancient Athens to eighteenth-century Vienna, which up to the recent past have formed centers of urban culture, performers and audience have known one another as members of the same community. Most of the world’s population lived in villages...[where] music specialists were socially necessary for the central part they played in the rituals of the community that celebrated the mythologies of birth, marriage, death, harvest and the other great events of life. Since everyone took part in the singing and the dancing, the distinction between performers and listeners was generally blurred...[J]ust sitting and silently contemplating the performance was no part of the experience.⁷

⁴ Wolterstorff, “The Work of Making a Work of Music,” 109-110.

⁵ Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 181, quoted in Wolterstorff, “The Work of Making a Work of Music,” 109.

⁶ Small, *Musicking*, 40.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 39-40.

In a musical performance that takes place in a concert hall, the roles of the various participants are much more clearly defined and delineated, and the participants in the various roles are often unknown to each other. Even so, the event itself can still be seen in terms of social practice, and the human interaction and relationships which that practice requires. To capture this sense of music as an activity, as a shared experience, Small proposes the verb “musicking,” applying it not only in the sense of “to perform” or “to make music,” but far more broadly, defining “to musick” as “to take part, in any capacity, in a musical performance, whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by providing material for performance (what is called composing), or by dancing.” According to Small’s definition, the activity of anyone who is “contributing to the nature of the event that is a musical performance” is musicking.⁸ It is an inclusive, descriptive term rather than a prescriptive one—it implies no value judgments. Small’s theory of musicking favors music as action and does not privilege any participant or role in the activity. Most significantly, it emphasizes the human relationships—“[w]hatever it is that we are doing, we are all doing it together.”⁹

The philosophical reorientation from the art of music to the social practice of musicking has in my opinion a clear—and unacknowledged, as far as I can determine—theoretical antecedent in the aesthetics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, who has been described as the “greatest recent German philosopher who might be called communitarian.”¹⁰ Gadamer’s concept of “play” is an updating and broadening of the sense of “play” as it had been used by Friedrich Schiller. For Schiller, the subject who “plays” acts alone, autonomously, in an imaginary realm outside his normal realm of experience. According to Jean Grondin, Gadamer argued that the play of art is also a “playing along” or

playing with” in which “the subject is not restricted to himself, nor is he freed from his theoretical and practical expectations. [On the contrary] the

⁸ Ibid., 9.

⁹ Ibid., 10.

¹⁰ Kelvin Knight, “Aristotelianism versus Communitarianism,” *Analyse & Kritik* 27 (2005): 260. See also David Ingram, *Reason, History, and Politics: The Communitarian Grounds of Legitimation in the Modern Age* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).

observer of an artwork is interwoven into an event that he does not control and in which he cannot freely dispose of his normal horizons of experience and expectations.¹¹

Whereas Schiller's play is "playful," Gadamer's play is serious, because to play along implies a kind of participation in which our whole being is at stake.

The element of participation, of "playing together" in this serious sense, is central to Gadamer's related concept of "festival." A festival is an act that brings people together, in which the sense of belonging to the "festive community" becomes more significant, and is ultimately more memorable, to the participants than the actual content of the event. It is a shared experience that involves practitioners of a given social practice. Musicking is just such a festive act, where what is crucial is not that something is being done, but that "we are all doing it together."

This active togetherness of the Gadamerian festival concept also ties its participants to tradition: a festival is itself a recurring event. In MacIntyre's view, tradition is an authority that one must confront and learn from. Gadamer makes a similar assertion in a passage that also seems to demonstrate the communitarian orientation of his thinking:

As finite beings we stand in traditions, whether we know these traditions or not, whether we are conscious of them or *so blinded as to believe that we begin anew*. This does not affect at all the power of tradition over us. However, it does make a difference if we face the traditions in which we stand and the future possibilities that they preserve for us, *or whether one conceitedly imagines that one could turn away from the future into which one is living and program and constitute ourselves in a new way*. Clearly tradition does not mean mere conservation, but rather a passing along, but this includes that one does not leave things unchanged and merely conserved, but that one says anew and learns to grasp anew something old.¹²

¹¹ Jean Grondin, "Play, Festival and Ritual in Gadamer: On the theme of the immemorial in his later works" in *Language and Linguisticality in Gadamer's Hermeneutics* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 43.

¹² Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, trans. N. Walker, ed. R. Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 138f, quoted in Grondin, "Play, Festival and Ritual in Gadamer," 50, note 11; emphasis mine.

Gadamer is clearly rejecting the possibility of self-determination, of being able to “turn away from the future into which one is living,” as a delusion. To him, our embeddedness in tradition and community are not choices—they are facts of being. To imagine otherwise, to suppose that we are “self-conscious, autonomous beings, who control their time and direct their life,” argues Grondin, is to forget “how much tradition and not-knowing belong to our fate.”¹³ This “other-determinedness” strikes me as a common communitarian element of Small’s musicking and Gadamer’s interrelated play and festival concepts.

Small asserts that “a musical performance, while it lasts, brings into existence relationships that model in metaphoric form those which [the participants] would like to see in the wider society of their everyday lives.”¹⁴ Elsewhere he distinguishes two types of relationships thus existing while a musical performance is in progress: “those between the sounds that are made in response to the instructions given in the score and those between the participants in the performance. These two sets of relationships...are themselves related.”¹⁵ The two sets therefore perform two different functions: they are metaphorically *modeling* relationships that *might* exist in other social practices, and they are *exemplifying* relationships that *do* exist in the social practice of musicking. Following Wolterstorff’s suggestion that the social realities of a composer’s time serve as a guide during the creative process and “become embodied in the works,”¹⁶ I would argue that at least two more sets of relationships are “in play.” When the composer is not contemporary with the performance, musicking also exemplifies relationships that *used to exist*, both in the social practice of musical performance and in society in general. In such cases, this in turn implies a fourth function, that of *mediating* between existing and once-existing relationships.

Utopian and Orchestral Musicking: Communitarian and Liberal Approaches

It has been proposed that the origins of an “authentic communitarianism” might be traced to “Romanticism’s celebration of the social con-

¹³ Grondin, “Play, Festival and Ritual in Gadamer,” 48.

¹⁴ Small, *Musicking*, 46.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 138-9.

¹⁶ Wolterstorff, “The Work of Making a Work of Music,” 108.

stitution of the self and of the self's expression of itself as so constituted, including its patriotic identification with its particular community in rivalry with other communities."¹⁷ It was during the 19th century—the period of musical Romanticism—that a kind of “religion of art” developed and artists “gave Art for the first time its capital A. Art was the highest conceivable expression of man. Art was the infallible critic of life and society.”¹⁸ One of the most important adherents to this “religion” was the French composer Hector Berlioz (1803-1869), who is also known for his erudite writings on music and society.

In his 1854 essay “Euphonia,”¹⁹ set five centuries in the future, Berlioz extensively employs metaphors drawn from music as both art and practice to outline his utopian vision of a community where musicking is the primary social practice. By negative reference, Berlioz also comments on the musical practices of his own time, both documenting and critiquing them. His suggestions of new inventions to aid musical study and performance apply the potential of then-new technology, such as the steam engine, to perfecting musical instruments and the efficiency of interaction among musicians. Berlioz's vision seems to me to be decidedly communitarian in orientation.

Berlioz likens the social structure of the town of Euphonia (population 12,000) to “a great Conservatory of music” because the occupations of its inhabitants are all related to the art of music. “Most of them are both instrumentalists and singers. A few who do not perform music devote themselves to the manufacture of instruments or to the engraving and printing of music. Others give their time to acoustical research and to the study of that branch of physics which relates to the production of sound.” Like the organization of a symphony orchestra, the geographical layout of the various districts of Euphonia categorizes its citizens according to the instruments they play.²⁰

¹⁷ Kelvin Knight, “Aristotelianism versus Communitarianism,” 259.

¹⁸ Jacques Barzun, “Berlioz as man and thinker” in *The Cambridge Companion to Berlioz*, ed. Peter Bloom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13.

¹⁹ Hector Berlioz, “Euphonia, or The Musical City” in *Evenings with the Orchestra*, tr. and ed. Jacques Barzun (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 258-297.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 283.

Berlioz explicitly states that the form of government in Euphonia is—and must be, according to him—military and despotic, with a benevolent emperor providing for the happiness of all Euphonians. Here the presence of an authoritarian regime, which is often held out as a dangerous potential outcome of communitarian thinking, is taken as a given that ensures “perfect order...and the marvelous results...for art.”²¹ Similarly, Berlioz proposes a process for preparing musical compositions for performance that gives the composer full control over how his music will sound and a new invention that allows him, as the conductor of the performance, to literally “play” the orchestra. Thus the skills required for the social practice of musicking are put entirely at the service of the musical equivalent of the benevolent dictator.

Throughout the essay, the citizens are treated as a unified, yet passive group. All are given the same musical training, and if anyone’s personal judgment is found to be at odds with the highest aesthetic value (as stated by Berlioz) of “truth of expression,” he is “inexorably banished from the city, however eminent his talent or exceptional his voice”²²—an obvious privileging of one’s usefulness to the group over one’s personal qualities. The citizens have responsibilities, but no stated rights. They are “trained to [keep] silence,”²³ and when Berlioz writes that every Euphonian “has some kind of voice,” it is only to state that all are therefore required to sing.²⁴ They must all have the same musical skills, and figuratively they must all have the same opinion. In both senses, all Euphonians “sing the same song.” The whole population is in attendance when solo performers are chosen, but the composers, ministers and prefects set the criteria and make the selections based on suitability, not social status (i.e., connections with those in power won’t help). Berlioz’s identification of art and society [community] seems clear when he writes that in Euphonia, “no privileges are granted any artists to the detriment of art.”²⁵

Berlioz’s vision of a self-contained community in which music is

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 284.

²³ Ibid., 286.

²⁴ Ibid., 288.

²⁵ Ibid., 288-289.

the only profession suggests a set of ideal relationships that, if they did exist, could conceivably benefit everyone involved in musicking, at least in the sense of making the most satisfactory music. Berlioz presupposes that the rank-and-file musicians will unconditionally accept being controlled by a dictator-like conductor, making it clear that true Euphonians would make any necessary personal sacrifice (indeed, would not even frame such deprivations as sacrifices at all) in the name of art. Serving art is the common purpose, the ultimate common good, of this community. The conductor-dictator is tolerated, and possibly idolized, because he too is seen as sacrificing self for this art.

The idolization of the conductor (a role in musical performance that gained currency during the era of musical Romanticism) has also been observed among modern concertgoers, who hold the conductor in “somewhat disproportionate regard,” considering that he alone among the musicians in a performance makes no sound. The important 20th century composer Paul Hindemith saw the conductor’s visible behavior on the concert podium as a “demonstration of some refined and stylized form of oppression” in which the listener “enjoys the perfect abreaction of his own suppressed feelings.” An identification takes place during the performance between the despotic behavior that the conductor is perceived to be displaying and the individual’s “most natural human desire of governing, ordering, dictating to, and even torturing his fellow men.”²⁶ Thus the activities of the conductor become a kind of vicarious wish-fulfillment for the listener, as long as the concert lasts.

It is important to specify that Hindemith is referring specifically to the enjoyment of watching the conductor, and not necessarily connecting that enjoyment to any pleasure derived from the music that is being made by the orchestra under the conductor’s direction. It seems highly unlikely that any reasonable person, even one who did derive pleasure from identifying with a despotic conductor, would want to see precisely this relationship exist in his everyday life, because s/he assumes that such despotic behavior would never be tolerated in everyday life (i.e., outside the context of the musical performance), and therefore would never achieve the same “harmonious” result.

²⁶ Paul Hindemith, *A Composer’s World: Horizons and Limitations* (Mainz: Schott Musik International, 1952), 106.

Hindemith is also writing in an era when the authoritarian conductor was widely regarded as a particularly successful type of leader personality, one capable of unifying the individual members of the orchestra to shape a convincing interpretation of the music performed. Other conducting “types” have been identified, and their approaches to leading the orchestra drawn on as models for managing a team in a contemporary business environment. Recently the Israeli conductor Itay Talgam has developed a second career as a consultant to businesses, analyzing the videotaped performances of some of the outstanding orchestral conductors of the past in search of models for human interaction in the office and marketplace.

Tellingly, the management model he recommends to business leaders is exemplified by the “enabling” leadership approach of conductor Carlos Kleiber, whose positive spirit of teamwork motivates each member of the orchestra to do his best work, to “tell his own story.” Kleiber supports the player’s efforts through positive reinforcement rather than overtly controlling them. But it is control nonetheless because the player knows he will be rewarded (with a pleased look and more freedom in individual interpretation, for example) if he performs well, and sanctioned (with displeased look and more firm control of the individual’s interpretation) if he does not.²⁷ Conformity to the same high musical standards is expected by both despotic and enabling conductors, but the enabler’s approach has more potential for direct application to other social practices, for transfer from theoretical model to actual practice.

Another model drawn from musical interaction and applied to business contexts involves ensembles that operate without a conductor. The Orpheus Chamber Orchestra, based in New York City, is one of the world’s more high-profile orchestras that never perform with a conductor. This conductorless orchestra is by no means leaderless, but the leaders come from among the orchestra’s players and are intentionally rotated on a regular basis to allow the interpretation of the music to change and evolve. Their approach to preparing music for performance is based

²⁷ Itay Talgam, “Lead like the great conductors,” TEDtalk (2009) at http://www.ted.com/talks/itay_talgam_lead_like_the_great_conductors.html. Last accessed January 22, 2015.

on “the sharing of leadership, the taking of individual responsibility, and the literal movement of players to fit the musical sound.”²⁸ Each player in the orchestra has the right to stop the group during rehearsal to make suggestions for improving the interpretation. A small number of core players (also rotated) is given more responsibility in order to keep rehearsals as efficient as possible while preserving the spirit of dialogue. Thus “the best thinking of virtuoso musicians blends into something more than one person could envision.” This kind of collective decision-making can be contrasted to the way the interpretation is shaped in conductor-led rehearsals. Whatever type of leader a conductor may be, “[t]he large orchestra is built around the notion that the conductor’s authority is absolute. If he/she were ever to accept advice or a suggestion from a member of the orchestra, it would have to be done in private...Any other scenario would suggest weakness.”²⁹

But the model clearly works both ways. The Orpheus type of musicking has been used to challenge the conventional wisdom that “somebody has to be in charge,” but at the same time Orpheus players use business metaphors: “at this level of participation,” says one, “*we own the company*.”³⁰ Lubans suggests that Orpheus’ approach is both a model the elements of which could be applied in non-musical contexts and a putting into practice of a general management theory model in which, according to Mary Parker Follet, leaders and followers “are both following the invisible leader—the common purpose.”³¹

The String Quartet: Embodiment of Both Liberal and Communitarian Values

The skills that the members of the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra employ—“listening closely, knowing when to lead, and when to follow, approaching performance with a collaborative spirit”—are the same

²⁸ John Lubans, Jr., “The Invisible Leader: Lessons for Leaders from the Orpheus Chamber Orchestra,” *OD Practitioner*, 38.2 (2006): 7.

²⁹ Orpheus Chamber Orchestra musicians quoted in Lubans, Jr., “The Invisible Leader,” 7.

³⁰ Quoted in Lubans, Jr., “The Invisible Leader,” 6; my emphasis.

³¹ Quoted in Lubans, Jr., “The Invisible Leader,” 6.

skills that are learned “in performing chamber music.”³² Broadly defined, chamber music is music performed without a conductor, but the main categories of chamber music compositions are ensembles with ten or fewer players (a chamber orchestra can have as many as fifty or sixty), in which each individual part in the musical score is played by a single player (not by sections of players as in the orchestra). Chamber music (*musica da camera*) takes its name both from the small number of players and the intimate spaces (chambers) in which it was first performed. The string quartet, a four-member chamber ensemble consisting of two violins, viola, and cello, is widely regarded as the quintessential classical chamber music medium and genre. It is the instrumental medium for which composers write in the genre of the string quartet, multi-movement compositions for this combination of instruments.

The concept of string quartet emerged during the mid-eighteenth century as a kind of “music of friends.” Early documented performances took place in private homes, sometimes with only the players themselves in attendance, and sometimes with a select audience hardly larger than the players in number. A well-known example is the February 1785 gathering of five in Vienna when Mozart himself was among the four players who read three of his new string quartets. Mozart dedicated these compositions to an older Viennese composer, Joseph Haydn, who is often credited with having a leading role in originating the string quartet genre several decades earlier. Haydn also participated in the February 1785 reading.³³ It was on this occasion that Haydn declared to Mozart’s father Leopold “before God, as an honest man, that your son is the greatest composer I know either personally or by reputation. He has taste as well as a consummate knowledge of the art of composition.”³⁴

Due to the marked development of musical competence among the

³² Robert Gibson quoted in “Orpheus Chamber Orchestra and Morton Subotnick in Residence at the University of Maryland,” University of Maryland College of Music news item posted Friday, April 15, 2011 at <http://www.music.umd.edu/news/post/256>. Last accessed on January 22, 2015.

³³ Christina Bashford, “The String Quartet and Society” in *The Cambridge Companion to the String Quartet*, ed. Robin Stowell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3-5.

³⁴ Paul Nettl, *Mozart and Masonry* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), 33.

European middle classes, whose members had over the course of the 18th century become increasingly knowledgeable in matters of music theory and as amateur performers, professional composers were able—and commercially obliged—to

consider them not as passive receivers but as active partners in the process of communication, and thus to engage them in a game played upon the technical rules of composition...suggest[ing] that, within the metaphor of language [in general use at that time in treatises about music], the ancient model of oration gradually gave way to a more modern ideal of conversation.³⁵

This new “ideal of conversation” is clearly reflected in a statement by Goethe, who famously wrote that in a string quartet, “One hears four intelligent people conversing with one another, believes one might learn something from their discourse and recognize the special characteristics of their instruments.”³⁶ Goethe is actually distinguishing between two types of conversation: first, among the four instruments of the string quartet, and second, to the dialogue between composer and the listener that the composer is addressing. He also seems to betray a liberal bias, referring to “four intelligent people” as individuals rather than as a group and to “the special characteristics” of the individual instruments, revealed to him through the performance of the musical composition. There is no implication of a social hierarchy—the four are equals.

Haydn and Mozart both engaged in non-musical social practices that may be reflected in the nature of their private chamber music gatherings and in the rational, individualistic content of their string quartet compositions. At the time of the February 1875 read-through of Mozart’s “Haydn” quartets, four of the participants—including Mozart and the two Tinti Barons—were initiated Freemasons, and Mozart’s father was initiated soon thereafter.³⁷ Mozart biographer Maynard Solomon explains that unlike other Freemason members who delved into the occult, Mozart was a member of the Freemason movement’s rationalist,

³⁵ Agawu Mirka, “Introduction”, in *Communication in Eighteenth-Century Music*, ed. Agawu Mirka (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.

³⁶ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, quoted in William Drabkin, *A Reader’s Guide to Haydn’s Early Quartets* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000), 3.

³⁷ Nettl, *Mozart and Masonry*, 30-33.

Enlightenment-inspired faction known as the Illuminati.³⁸ Founded in 1776 by University of Ingolstadt professor of canon law Adam Weishaupt, a personal acquaintance of Mozart's, the Illuminati shared the humanist views of the French encyclopedists Rousseau and Diderot, who contended that nobility of spirit was not contingent on social rank. The Illuminati had grown out of Weishaupt's secretive meetings with his university students in Bavaria:

They assembled in a private apartment, and there he discussed with them philosophic subjects, and sought to imbue them with a liberal spirit. This was the beginning of the Order of the Illuminati, or the Enlightened — a name he bestowed upon his disciples as a token of their advance in intelligence and moral progress.³⁹

The Freemasons believed that music should “inculcate feelings of humanity, wisdom and patience, virtue and honesty, loyalty to friends, and finally an understanding of freedom.”⁴⁰

Citing what he calls “the common foundations of music and ideas,” Stephen Rumph points out that “Mozart enjoyed wide intellectual contacts” and elaborates:

This is not to imply that Mozart or his fellow composers consciously realized the ideas of philosophers (although these figures people their operas). Leopold Mozart need not have read Locke to assert in his 1756 violin method that “all our perceptions originate in the external senses.” Mozart's father was simply passing on received wisdom, echoing ideas that circulated among the educated classes during the eighteenth century. [But s]uppose...that we could prove that Mozart read a particular treatise.

³⁸ Maynard Solomon, *Mozart: A Life*. (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 467.

³⁹ Albert G. Mackey, “Weishaupt” and “Illuminati of Bavaria” in *Encyclopedia of Freemasonry Vol II* (1878) at <http://www.masonicdictionary.com/weishaupt.html> (“Weishaupt”) and <http://encyclopediaoffreemasonry.com/about/> (“Illuminati of Bavaria”). Last accessed on January 22, 2015.

⁴⁰ Ludwig Friedrich Lenz: Freymäurer-Lieder (Freemason songs; Altenburg, 1746), 34-36. http://www.muellerscience.com/ESOTERIK/Freimaurerei_Lieder_Gebete/Lenz_Gesaenge.htm. Last accessed on January 22, 2015.

In fact, such an example exists. In a letter of 4 April 1787, Mozart seems to have paraphrased a passage from Moses Mendelssohn's *Phädon*, a book he owned. If Mozart read the short dialogue in its entirety, as seems not unlikely, he came across this account of human cognition: "With every sensation a multitude of cognitions streams into [the individual], which are inexpressible to the human tongue; and if he juxtaposes the sensations to each other, if he compares, judges, decides, chooses, rejects—he multiplies this multitude into infinity. At the same time, an unceasing activeness unfolds the capabilities of the spirit innate in him." The passage faithfully expounds Christian Wolff's faculty psychology, rehearsing the Leibnizian theory of the mind as a "power of representing" (*vis representativa*). Based on this evidence, we might plausibly argue that Mozart was acquainted with a fundamental component of German rationalism.⁴¹

As a "music of friends," I would argue that the string quartet of the 1780s shared much with freemasonry as a social practice. Like the public figures who joined the freemason movement, the quartet players were like-minded people who met behind closed doors. Both groups aspired to be enlightened, rational thinkers. In translating that thinking into musical action, they chose musical "topics" of conversation of interest both to themselves and to their enlightened listeners, and wove these topics into "an intimate and tightly constructed dialogue among equals."⁴²

This picture of the liberalistic origins of the string quartet in the social milieu of late 18th-century/early 19th-century Vienna is further developed by composer and music critic J. F. Reichardt, who wrote in December 1808 about a series of string quartet concerts in Vienna that,

[as d]ifficult as it is to bring this sort of music to perfection in performance—for the whole and each of its single parts are heard in their entirety...it is the first variety to be provided wherever good friends of music meet to play together.⁴³

⁴¹ Stephen Rumph, *Mozart and Enlightenment Semiotics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 4-5.

⁴² Bashford, "The String Quartet and Society," 4.

⁴³ Johann Friedrich Reichardt, "Briefe geschrieben auf einer Reise nach Wien" in *Source Readings in Music History: The Classic Era*, ed. Oliver Strunk (New York: Norton, 1965), 154-166.

He offers important insights into the nature of chamber music as social practice as he observed and understood it:

- The concerts were “opened by subscription” (i.e., admission was charged);
- The concerts took place in a private house;
- The audience was small and “consisted entirely of ardent and attentive friends of music”;
- This type of audience is considered by Reichardt “precisely the proper public for this most elegant and most congenial of all musical combinations” [i.e., the string quartet];
- Each player “takes at least some degree of pleasure in the performance, once he has brought to it all that he can offer it individually or through his immediate background”;
- Because of the technical difficulty of achieving “the most perfect intonation, ensemble [togetherness], and blending” within the group, the “over-trained” ears of enlightened listeners and critics might not find the performance very pleasurable.

Reichardt then dwells at length on the specific string quartet concert he attended. Finding this ensemble to be “on the whole well balanced,” Reichardt praises first violinist Ignaz Schuppanzigh, whose “capricious manner of performance” he finds appropriate for the quartets of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, but notes that the “local virtuosi” have better intonation than Schuppanzigh, who “plays the most difficult passages clearly, though not always quite in tune.” He credits Schuppanzigh’s leadership of “his carefully chosen colleagues” for the way they “enter admirably into the spirit of the composer.”⁴⁴

What follows in Reichardt’s account of the performance is an extended critique of one over-bearing feature of Schupannzigh’s leadership: his “accursed fashion...of beating time with his foot.” Reichardt goes into some detail about how this habit adversely affects the quality of the individual players’ execution of their parts in the performance, where “it is far better to let a mistake pass without censure, whether actually committed or only feared, than to try to help matter by using strong measures.” He also describes how it negatively impacts the “mu-

⁴⁴ Ibid., 159-160.

sicking” experience, distorting it for the listener: “Generally speaking, one seldom hears a forte here—let alone a fortissimo—without the leader’s joining in with his foot. For me this ruins the pure free enjoyment, and every such beat interrupts for me the co-ordinated and perfected performance which it is supposed to help bring about and which I had expected from this public production.”⁴⁵

In reaching his conclusion about this kind of controlling behavior similar to that of Hindemith’s despotic conductor, Reichardt offers a pointed assessment of quartet-playing as a group practice *of individuals*, each of whom needs his *own space within which to operate* for the benefit of the group and the performance result that they are trying to achieve together.

Furthermore, an attentive and conscientious colleague ought never to be disconcerted by such shameful public prompting—it can only disturb his repose and [self-]control, on which above all the perfection of the performance depends; an inattentive and sluggish colleague ought not to count on so ordinary means of assistance and stimulation. Each one must help with all his senses and his entire attention; he who is incapable of this cannot be trained to it by beating time.⁴⁶

“American” and “European”: The Conversation and Control Quartet Models

The model of string quartet “musicking” as a conversation, with its origins in the Masonic friendships of the Viennese musical circle of Haydn and Mozart, is based on preponderantly liberalist values. It relies on the free exchange of individual opinions to reach a common goal. The model imposed by Schuppanzigh’s foot alters the balance of the relationships among the participants toward communitarian values and a potentially totalitarian outcome—individuality is suppressed in the name of the common good and a leader emerges to enforce that suppression. Just as communitarian thinking does not necessarily exclude liberal values, the two models are not mutually exclusive. Variations on and combinations of the two models continue to permeate the traditions of string quartet preparation and performance, contributing to the uniqueness of

⁴⁵ Ibid., 159.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

the approach and sound of different ensembles working in the string quartet medium. The two models seem to me to correspond in large measure to what have been identified as “two subtly different styles of string quartet performance”⁴⁷—the American and European styles.

While all string quartets would probably agree on the performance goals that Reichardt enumerated—perfect intonation, ensemble [togetherness], and blending—it is important to clarify that the first two goals are more “factual” in that certain objective standards can be applied to aurally perceiving what is “in” or “out of tune” and what is or is not together. “Blending” is a much more subjective category, because while the amount of blending among the instruments—to what extent the individual parts are heard as separate strands in the texture; or conversely, to what extent the quartet sounds as if the four instruments are playing “as one”—is also perceivable, there is much greater leeway in how much blending is desirable at any given moment in the music. So intonation and ensemble are the “constants,” the objective foundation that every ensemble must have, while blending (or “balance” among the individual parts) is the major variable in shaping a unique interpretation of a musical composition scored for string quartet. The manner in which a string quartet blends is a major distinguishing feature between the American and European styles of string-quartet playing. “Sounding as one” is associated with European quartet playing, while an approach in which “the quartet sounds like four voices, combined harmoniously; the members retain their individuality but relate to each other’s sound in an organized way” is recognized as American.⁴⁸ The following press quotes, from reviews of performances by the aptly-named American Quartet from (surprisingly) the United States, confirm the differentiation between American and European styles of quartet playing: “[a] combination of individual brilliance and ensemble perfection” (Darmstädter Echo); “Americans certainly, but with a refined European style” (Giornale de Sicilia).⁴⁹

In recent decades, increasing attention has been focused on how

⁴⁷ J. Keith Murnighan and Donald E. Conlon, “The Dynamics of Intense Work Groups: A Study of British String Quartets,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 36.2 (1991): 166.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 166.

⁴⁹ American Quartet reviews at <http://www.americanstringquartet.com/reviews.htm> Last accessed on January 22, 2015.

the string quartet functions as a social unit. It is referred to as a self-regulating organization⁵⁰ and studied as a type of self-managing team⁵¹ or Intense Work Group.⁵² Murnighan and Conlon identify the following characteristics that mark string quartets as intense work groups:

Members are reciprocally interdependent (Thompson, 1967), using each other's outputs as their own inputs, and vice versa. Their interdependence is also complete and immediate: Their work is done only as a unit; they cannot perform a string-quartet composition without all of the members working together simultaneously. They are artists who collaborate; they must simultaneously devote their concentration to their own and to each other's playing. Many quartet players commented in the interviews that the ability to listen and respond to each other was the most important characteristic that differentiated quartet players from soloists...their collective task is to reach a high level of coordinated sound.⁵³

The first violinist of a well-known American string quartet, discussing how an ensemble can take root in a community and nurture its musical and professional development, writes that this

self-sufficient cell...is self regulating. Ensembles tend to pressure their members to aspire to ever higher standards and, though this can cause internal tension, it tends to work. This quartet's steady improvement then inspires all those around them and creates a virtuous cycle from which everyone can benefit.⁵⁴

One set of variations on the juxtaposition of liberal and communitarian values found in a string quartet as a social unit results from its

⁵⁰ Bashford, "The String Quartet and Society."

⁵¹ See Avi Gilboa and Malka Tal-Shmotkin, "String quartets as self-managed teams: An interdisciplinary perspective," *Psychology of Music* 40.1 (2012): 19-41.

⁵² Murnighan and Conlon, "The Dynamics of Intense Work Groups."

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 165-6.

⁵⁴ Nicholas Kitchen, New England Conservatory of Music blog entry posted on July 27, 2011 at <http://necmusic.wordpress.com/2011/07/27/guest-bloggers-quartetutopia-by-nicholas-kitchen/> Last accessed on January, 2015.

particular combination of ages, musical training, cultural backgrounds, and personal relationships among its members. Even quartets whose members have similar training and backgrounds and a reputation for excellent performances do not necessarily “get along,” as the famous example of the Budapest String Quartet, whose members insisted on staying in different hotels while on tour, demonstrates. Quartets such as the Tokyo (originally all Japanese members) and the Shanghai (originally all Chinese) are perceived as having unique sounds and approaches to music-making in part because of their unified cultural backgrounds. The same holds true for quartets consisting of members of the same family, such as the Hagen Quartet of Austria and the Ying and Jupiter Quartets in the United States.

Borodin Quartet founding first violinist Rostislav Dubinsky, with whom I studied chamber music at the world-renowned Indiana University School of Music, complained that his quartet could never achieve the sound he wanted because the Soviet government had replaced his original Jewish colleagues in the quartet with non-Jewish ones who did not have the same inherent understanding of string-instrument playing as he and therefore weren’t already seeking the same kind of sound or interpretation as he was. He countered this perceived problem through his role as artistic director of the quartet, which put him in charge of the rehearsal process, the shaping of the musical interpretations, and dictating how much time would be spent on each composition. Dissenting opinions within the ensemble were seen as distractions or, worse, mutinies against Dubinsky’s competence and authority.⁵⁵

In actual practice, a string quartet’s sound usually exhibits features of both styles, depending on what the music being interpreted seems to require. David Soyer, cellist of the Guarneri Quartet, widely regarded during its 45-year career (1964-2009) as a quintessentially “American” ensemble both in terms of nationality and approach to performing quartets, explains:

The core of the matter is that the unanimity of our approach in a performance is determined not by a preconceived philosophy of what string-quartet playing is supposed to be but by our musical conception of the

⁵⁵ Rostislav Dubinsky, *Stormy Applause: Making Music in a Worker’s State* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989).

work at hand. We're four musicians performing a single piece of music, and we come to a common opinion about that work.⁵⁶

Second violinist John Dalley elaborates: "Each piece will make its own demands; you can't put down a general rule about 'blending.' There are many passages which require a total blend...But sometimes you have the opposite problem: that of blending too well. For instance, certain voices may not stand out in adequate relief."⁵⁷ So the actual situation at hand and the necessity of "coming to a common opinion" dictate the type of blending that is sought.

The Guarneri work method starts with the individual voices, the opinions of each of the four players, and proceeded by looking for common ground in shaping a unified interpretation. Like Haydn's compositions, this method is "conversational." It is also liberal because it leaves open the possibility of individual variations in performance within the framework of the established interpretation. In their work together, the members of the Guarneri Quartet made conscious choices—at times as individuals, at others as a group—that balanced group unity and member individuality, and that made this balance "hearable" in the way their musical interpretations were perceived by their listeners.

In my opinion, this liberally-oriented work method only really works when it is grounded in a set of unspoken, "unifying communitarian ideals" that govern the quartet as a work group. These ideals, for me, include the following:

- all of the members of a string quartet come from a similar professional background, with similar training in a specific set of skills;
- all are rooted in the same tradition of music as a social practice;
- all have similar reasons for being members of the ensemble, and have all voluntarily chosen to become members;
- all have a similar awareness and transcendence of the drawbacks

⁵⁶ Quoted in David Blum and Guarneri Quartet, *The Art of Quartet Playing: The Guarneri Quartet in Conversation with David Blum* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 4.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

of this type of work (long hours, unstable compensation, psychological drain, etc.);

- all have a commitment to the same goals of high-quality performance standards, faithfulness to the composer's intentions, etc.;
- all have the ability and the inner need to "listen and respond to each other"—to embrace their reciprocal interdependence—that separates chamber musicians from solo performers.

I believe that the greater the extent to which each of these ideals is actualized within the group, the greater the chances of actualizing Small's two basic sets of ideal relationships through "musicking" as the social practice of string quartet playing.

My Intercultural Experiences in the Dimov and Sofia Quartets

For twelve seasons, I performed as the cellist of the Sofia Quartet, a resident chamber ensemble of the Sofia Philharmonic Orchestra. Prior to that, I was a member of the Dimov Quartet for five seasons. In this final section, I will contrast my experiences in these two ensembles. These experiences illustrate the relations among specific groups of people united in a common social practice, in which the participants purport to share the same understanding of the "unifying communitarian ideals" outlined above, but in fact are hampered by internally conflicted and externally conflicting individual interests.

Dimov Quartet, 1997-2002. The Dimov Quartet was founded in 1956 by its first violinist Prof. Dimo Dimov. While the other members of the quartet have changed over the years, Prof. Dimov is the ensemble's constant, its unbroken connection to its own traditions. When I joined the quartet in 1997, I replaced its first non-Bulgarian member, the Russian cellist Nikola Bepalov, who had decided to join a German orchestra for greater job security and financial reward. At the time, the other members joked that replacing their Russian member with an American one was a clever political realignment. They hinted at the possible benefits that I might bring to the group—concerts sponsored by the U. S. Embassy, concert tours to the United States, recording contracts with U.S. labels, etc. Already there was a rift between the musical reasons I joined the quartet and the non-musical reasons that my colleagues welcomed me as a new member, a rift rooted in the (mis)understanding of what it is to be "American." My self-identity was as an adventurous

musician seeking a rewarding “conversation” with like-minded colleagues in a foreign country. To my colleagues, I was an American, and therefore financially well off and professionally well-connected. Any musical qualities I might bring to the table were relatively unimportant. And as the youngest member of a group whose first violinist, at 60, was exactly twice my age, my own expectations for convergent points of view, for a “conversation among equals,” were naively misguided.

The Dimov Quartet, in this incarnation with myself as cellist, was decidedly “European” both in terms of the sound ideal that was sought and the means that were used to get it. While trying to appear open to discussion, Prof. Dimov more than once admitted that he had “already had all those arguments” about interpretation (he and the quartet’s original cellist, Dimiter Kozhev, are said to have argued constantly in rehearsals). He preferred to tell the rest of us how the music should go, got impatient when anyone disagreed, and indirectly praised me for not challenging his authority. Like Dubinsky in the original Borodin Quartet, Dimov was by unspoken assent the artistic director of the quartet, deciding what, where, when, and *how* we would perform. To me this seemed an acceptable compromise, since Dimov was clearly the most experienced member of the group.

Dimov’s ideal quartet sound was typically “European”—a homogeneous, completely “blended” sound. I believe that the many recordings that the original Dimov Quartet made for Harmonia mundi and Balkanton in the 1960s, and the intense daily rehearsal routine of those early years, had a major influence on what he perceived as ideal. His concept of blending seemed foreign to the realities of the concert hall, an acoustic environment that the performers can confront and work with, but cannot control or alter. He was reluctant to have any one voice within the quartet stand out from the whole, and spent much time in our rehearsals bringing the general dynamic level down. He routinely chastised us for basically being ourselves, criticizing the second violinist for always trying to project his own line in the music and the violist for his habit of “swelling” on long held notes instead of keeping an even dynamic level. When he felt he needed to discourage what he perceived as my own ambitions to be heard above the others, he would just look across at me (because we used the European seating arrangement), smile knowingly, and slowly lower his left hand, palm down, in a “shushing” gesture.

Sofia Quartet, 2002-2014. The Sofia Quartet, whose members

from 2002 through 2011 had, with the exception of the first violinist, been together in the 1997-2002 version of the Dimov Quartet, in some ways cultivated an “American” approach to an extreme. This was in part due to our mutual desire to allow our individualities free reign following the period of Dimov-directed repression, but also to a general unwillingness to put in the hours of painstaking rehearsals that each of us knows deep down is necessary to achieve a “group” sound. The major criticism from other musicians of our Sofia Quartet performances was usually that we “didn’t sound like a quartet,” but rather like four soloists who have come together by chance and seem to have no real desire to conform to, or be limited by, each other’s ideas of how the music should go. On occasion, the spark caught fire in performance and we proved that we did have the ability to “listen and respond to each other” and could apply that ability—if we felt like it.

The problem in my view was that among our members there was a variance in the intensity of the inner *need* to listen and respond. The listening/responding capability was tempered, or thwarted, by lack of desire. Instead of four equals in conversation, it often became four equals engaging in simultaneous monologues and trying not to be distracted by the others. At times, as the Guarneri Quartet’s Michael Tree puts it, the performance would sound as if we were “arguing.”⁵⁸

This argumentative quality is the result of the mutual unwillingness of two or more of the members to step back and let another line in the music be heard above his own. In such moments, interpersonal relations among the players are allowed to take primacy over the requirements of the music itself, and the music is simply used as a means of “being heard” or “asserting oneself on stage.” The performance ceases to be an interpretative act because players whose interpretative disagreements have not been resolved through a disciplined rehearsal process essentially “play out” their differences on stage.

Early in our reformation with a new first violinist as the Sofia Quartet, I asserted my “Americanness” by insisting to sit between the second violinist and the violist rather than across from the first violinist. I did it more as a symbol of change than from any conviction that a quartet sounds better when using this seating arrangement. Later I de-

⁵⁸ Michael Tree quoted in Blum and Quartet, *The Art of Quartet Playing*, 6.

cided that the European arrangement is more logical for certain repertoire and wanted to move back to the outside, but our second violinist dissuaded me because he and the violist were not getting along!

The one member of any string quartet whose position never physically changes, no matter what seating arrangement is employed, is the first violinist. His position on the outside left is the equivalent to the placement of the concertmaster, the leader of the first violins of the orchestra. The concertmaster position is a prestigious one of high responsibility and correspondingly high remuneration. When a soloist performs with an orchestra, the first violins move back so that the position of the soloist is roughly where the concertmaster normally is, so this position carries with it certain embedded perceptions of “standing out” from the group in which one is a member, for both the player and audience members alike. The concertmaster is perceived as a leader whom others must follow in the service of a common good—preserving the “spirit of the music.” The soloist’s role is similarly a leadership one, but his technically demanding solo part rarely “blends” with the orchestra—this part is intended to project above the orchestra, which provides a subsidiary accompaniment.

In my observation, the concertmaster/soloist model cannot be transferred “as is” to the social practice of string quartet playing. If the first violinist is unwilling to relinquish at least to some degree his individual sovereignty, to reciprocate the interdependence of the other members of the group by seeing himself as “one of them,” it significantly reduces the chances of success for the chamber music project. Prof. Angel Stankov, the first violinist of the Sofia Quartet from 2002 to 2014, was a former concertmaster whose approach to chamber music in my opinion reflected an internal conflict between “standing out and being heard” and being an equal—but not privileged—partner in the musicking. To his credit, he approached chamber music with the best of intentions and attempted to ignore or transcend any cognitive dissonance he might have had about his place in the ensemble.

In the end, I think it comes back to Small’s two proposed sets of musicking relationships and the balance between them. If we unconsciously emphasize the unhealthy or poorly-developed relationships among the players, we manipulate the music rather than expressing it in a natural way that lets the music “speak for itself.” Instead of hearing music and the ideal relationships it embodies, our listeners hear us and

the distorted relationships embodied by an interpretation of the music that is based at least in part on our refusal to interact for the common good. The refusal stems in part I think from the fear that if we did honestly try through diligent work and daily dedication to develop the “natural” relationships the music is asking us for, we may well prove unable to *sustain* the same level of commitment, unable to meet the accordingly heightened expectations of our audiences and colleagues. Consistent averageness somehow becomes more desirable than inconsistent greatness. The result of this refusal seems to demonstrate the damage to the group caused when individual interests are not aligned with or not allowed to be subsumed by group interests, when the members are not attuned to each others’ needs or to the fact that they, each and all, belong to a common tradition of social practice.

My experiences in the Dimov and Sofia Quartets have given me some of the high points in my professional career as a performing musician. They have also shown me both the necessity of finding the “correct” balance of liberal and communitarian thinking and action, and the enormous difficulty of actually achieving this balance. The best professional quartets are said to recognize certain paradoxes and to transcend them without actually talking about them.⁵⁹ We didn’t talk about them either, but it seems clear to me that even if each of the members of the Sofia Quartet had tried to honestly answer the fundamental question, “Why do I participate in this group?” the responses would have highlighted an alarming—and, in my opinion, ultimately insurmountable—divergence of individual interests and motivations within the group.

⁵⁹ Murnighan and Conlon, “The Dynamics of Intense Work Groups,” 177-178.

TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES:

Ricoeur's Reinterpretation of Husserl's ... Phenomenological Intersubjectivity

Man-to TANG

(The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Abstract:

Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is always criticized by philosophers (e.g., Adorno, Schuetz and Heidegger) for falling into solipsism, which means the other is treated as a mere 'phenomenon.' Many of the criticisms draw their resources from Husserl's *Ideas I* and the Fifth Meditation in *Cartesian Mediations*. However, Ricoeur carefully and insightfully reinterprets Husserl and finds his non-idealistic side. He argues that Husserl's phenomenological intersubjectivity is not trying to prove the others exist, but traces the origins of the meaning of the others back to the concept of *alter* ego through perceptual experience. Thus, Husserl's phenomenological intersubjectivity does not only offer a faithful account of the other together with methodological steps, but also establishes a foundation of human sciences.

Introduction

Husserl, for a long time, has been criticized by philosophers. The criticisms can be divided into three types. The first is a radical criticism that his phenomenological idealism forms an abstract subject and falls into solipsism and subjective idealism. Adorno criticizes Husserl as the "most static thinker of his period."¹ This criticism concludes that

¹ Theodor W. Adorno, "Husserl and the problem of idealism," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 37.1 (1940): 4.

Husserl's phenomenological idealism is a total failure. The second is a more refined criticism that Husserl's phenomenological method and concepts are not sufficient to give a faithful account of the real and concrete social phenomena. Schuetz criticizes that Husserl's phenomenology is not "conversant with the concrete problems of the social sciences."² The third criticism is Heidegger's hermeneutic criticism. The first and second criticisms are based upon this criticism in the sense that Heidegger formulates Husserl into an idealistic, abstract and static philosopher, who introduces a theory of absolute subjectivity without the others and the world. Thus the others are reduced to 'being-in-me' and fall into the trap of solipsism. This paper aims at arguing that phenomenological intersubjectivity, through Ricoeur's reinterpretation of non-idealistic Husserl, is a necessary condition for the establishment of the human sciences. Through this reinterpretation, hermeneutic critiques are refuted. In section one, phenomenological idealism and its problem are explained. In section two, Heidegger's hermeneutic critique is illustrated. In section three, Ricoeur's reinterpretation of Husserl in non-idealistic terms and the phenomenological foundation of the human sciences are shown.

1. What is Phenomenological Idealism?

In *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl explicates that

phenomenology: this term designates a science, a complex of scientific disciplines; but it also designates at the same time and above all a method and an attitude of thought: the specifically *philosophical attitude of thought*, and specifically *philosophical method*.³

It shows that phenomenology is not only a science, but also a method and an attitude. Its specifically philosophical attitude and method are the most important characteristic of phenomenology. What, then, is the philosophical attitude and method?

The specifically philosophical method is the phenomenological reduction and the attitude is the phenomenological attitude. The phenome-

² Alfred Schuetz, "Husserl's importance for the social sciences," in Taminiaux Jacques and Van Breda Herman, eds., *Edmund Husserl 1859-1959* (The Hague: Nihoff, 1959), 88.

³ Edmund Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. Hardy Lee (Dordrecht: Springer, 1990), 19.

nological reduction is a way “to alter the natural attitude radically instead of remaining in this attitude.”⁴ One procedure is the attempt to doubt universally. This doubt “does not give up the positing we effected,” but the positing undergoes a modification. The positing remains what it is, but we “put it out of action,” we “exclude it,” we “parenthesize it.”⁵ It is a changing of attitude from the taking for granted to the reflective examination.⁶

Through the phenomenological reduction, we shall go as far as is necessary to effect the insight at which we are aiming, namely, the insight that consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own, which in its own absolute essence, is not touched by the phenomenological exclusion. It, therefore, remains as the “phenomenological residuum.” Therefore, the phenomenological way is firstly to “keep our regard fixed upon the sphere of consciousness and study what we find immanently within it.”⁷ It is an important insight in Husserl’s phenomenology that the absolute character of consciousness and the relativizing of everything else result from the reduction. In addition to a simply methodological concern, Husserl shifts further from objective science to the investigation of subjectivity. Through the eidetic reduction, the ontological significance of subjectivity is grounded such that,

The result of the phenomenological clarification of the *meaning* of the manner of existence of the real world (and, eidetic ally, of the real world generally) is that only transcendental subjectivity has *ontologically* the meaning of Absolute Being, that it only is non-relative, that is relative only to itself; whereas the real world indeed exists, but in respect of essence is relative to transcendental subjectivity, and in such a way that it

⁴ Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Fred Kersten (Dordrecht: Springer, 1983), 57.

⁵ Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, 59.

⁶ For a detail account of Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, please see Man-to Tang, “Husserl’s transcendental idealism and its way out of the internalism-externalism debate”, *Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical philosophy* 6.2 (December 2014): 463-483.

⁷ Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology*, 65 (*First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*).

can have its meaning as existing reality only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity.⁸

Strictly speaking, we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being, which rightly understood, contains within itself, 'constitutes' within itself, all world transcendencies.⁹

Ontologically, the non-existence of the world, taken as the totality of the correlates of consciousness, is possible; it is only consciousness of which non-existence is impossible; it is, therefore, consciousness which has absolute and necessary being; the world, by its contingency, has merely relative being as a phenomenon.¹⁰ Epistemologically, transcendental subjectivity is the ultimate source of meaning-constitution for all transcendencies. In brief, consciousness as the ultimate source of meaning-constitution is absolute, but the world as the meaning-product of consciousness is relative. By performing the phenomenological reductions (both the transcendental reduction and the eidetic reduction), consciousness as transcendental subjectivity remains as the residue and opens a new region of Being. The discovery of the new region of Being, absolute consciousness, is the achievement of Husserl's phenomenological reduction. The achievement has two idealistic features: (1) the central position of consciousness and (2) the primacy of the subject-object relation.

The transcendental idealism reaches a climax in *Cartesian Meditations*,

when I regard my life exclusively as consciousness of this world, I gain myself as the pure ego with the pure flux of my cogitations...the world is for me only what exists and has status for my consciousness in such a cogito.¹¹

I gain myself, that is to say, I posit myself in myself, namely the self-positing of consciousness as the pure ego. Besides, the world is a phenome-

⁸ Ibid., 14. My emphasis.

⁹ Ibid., 113.

¹⁰ Paul Ricoeur, *Main Trends in Philosophy* (NJ: Holmes and Meier Pub, 1979), 129.

¹¹ Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 1977), 60.

non *for* me and the meaning of the world is constituted *in* me, the meaning inherent *in* my existence, and finally, the meaning of my life. Consciousness as the pure ego with absolute status is the ultimate transcendental basis for all meaning-constitutions. The world, through the phenomenological reduction, shifts firstly from the being-outside-me to the being-for-me; then from the being-for-me to the being-in-me. Conversely, the world does not exhaust the meaning-constitution of the ego. “The ego exists for itself” and “it continually constitutes itself as existing.”¹²

2. Hermeneutic critique of Husserl’s phenomenological idealism

To circumvent Husserl’s phenomenological idealism, it is necessary to depict how hermeneutics in general (especially Heidegger) focuses on Husserl’s idealistic manner and what illusions Husserl’s idealism arouses.

Heidegger gives two criticisms. Firstly, the centrality of consciousness is challenged. In Husserlian idealism, consciousness enjoys absolute status because it is self-positing, independent and transparent.

Husserl’s phenomenological idealism misguidedly attempts to constitute the meaning of everything in a constituting of subjectivity, namely pure consciousness. In *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, Heidegger explicitly criticizes Husserl’s notion of pure consciousness. He argues that consciousness, as the pure and absolute phenomenological region, has four determinations:

- (1) being as immanent being,
- (2) being as absolute being in the sense of absolute givenness,
- (3) being as absolute being in the sense of constituting being over against everything transcendent, and
- (4) being as pure being over against every individuation.

“With regard to its role as constituting being, as that in which every reality manifests itself, it is absolute being in the sense of *nulla re indigent ed existendum*” [needs no extra-mental thing to exist].¹³ How-

¹² Ibid., 100.

¹³ Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009), 108.

ever, without the investigation of the mode of being of consciousness, all these attributions are not drawn from the entity itself but simply self-positing. He uses a metaphor for his illustration: the self-positing of consciousness is similar to a mathematician who provides a certain definition of the object of mathematics without ever necessarily posing the question of the mode of being of mathematical objects. He believes that Husserl does not only neglect the question of being, but also treats the question as an "absurd question."¹⁴ Under these circumstances, the ontological status of consciousness as pure ego is taken for granted. Subjectivity, in this interpretation, is isolated from being as an object among objects and becomes a theme to be investigated for its own sake. The Ego tends to posit itself and remains in the sterile circle of the self's constant return to itself.¹⁵ In contrast with consciousness as pure ego with absolute ontological status, Heidegger places the emphasis on Dasein, "this Dasein is not a subject for which there is an object, but is rather a being within being," and "it is part of its structure as being to have an ontological pre-understanding of being."¹⁶ The pre-understanding of being directs Dasein towards the explication of something "founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception."¹⁷

Accordingly, the pre-understanding of being shakes the absolute status of consciousness as pure ego. The sedimentation of hidden meaning gains a priority over consciousness. Consciousness now can no longer remain as an absolute subjectivity. This attempt leads to the problem of self-constitution. The first transcendental illusion is what hermeneutics called "the project of self-constitution, the self-transparency

¹⁴ Ibid., 112.

¹⁵ Paul Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, trans. Erazim Kohak (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 14.

¹⁶ Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, ed., trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 54.

¹⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962): 191.

typical of phenomenology's idealistic formulation."¹⁸ More importantly, the first criticism leads to the second criticism.

Secondly, the idealistic interpretation of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology promotes a great problem, namely the existence and the meaning-constitution of the Other. The primacy of consciousness leads to the absolute primacy of the subject-object relation. The meaning-constitution is based upon the subject-object relation. The Other is reduced to an object-in-me or a being-in-me. The Other becomes an alter ego or alter body in my sphere of ownness. Hence, the otherness of the Other is ignored. Phenomenology faces the crisis of solipsism.¹⁹ The crisis of solipsism means that my ego, after the transcendental reduction of the being of the world and the eidetic reduction of the factual ego, becomes the only ego. The pure ego has no reference to the Other in the second person but has reference to and in itself only. Nevertheless, In *Being and Time*, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as "Being-with" (*Mitsein*) characterizes Dasein not as a constitutional source of understanding the Other. The self-understanding of Dasein cannot be separated from the understanding of the Other, other Dasein.²⁰ The second transcendental illusion is the ontological underestimation of the Other.

Thus, Geniusas claims that "the hermeneutical critique of Husserl's phenomenology is first and foremost directed against the idealistically interpreted subjectivity that we find so deeply entrenched in Husserl's program."²¹ As elaborated above from the hermeneutical perspective, Husserl's phenomenological idealistic interpretation of subjectivity is one of the most elaborate falsifications of subjectivity.

¹⁸ Domenico Jervolino, *The Cogito and Hermeneutics: The Question of the Subject in Ricoeur*. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 24; Domenico Jervolino, "Ricoeur and Husserl: Towards a Hermeneutic Phenomenology", in *Analecta Husserliana Vol. 36*. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 42, 89.

¹⁹ It is interesting that Ricoeur argues "Kantianism would never encounter such a problem" because of the two reasons: (1) Kant encounters only a consciousness in general, not an individual subject; and (2) "the transcendental – object=X" presupposes the otherness of object that it always escapes from the phenomenon and could be the absolute existence of the Other.

²⁰ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 149-168.

²¹ Saulius Geniusas, *The Origin of Horizon in Husserl's Phenomenology*. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 156.

3. Ricoeur's Reinterpretation of Phenomenological Intersubjectivity and the Foundation of the Human Sciences²²

Unlike Heidegger, Ricoeur argues that the notion of subjectivity has its philosophical significance but must be recovered via a detour. "Subjectivity must be lost as radical origin, if it is to be recovered in a more modest role."²³ "And yet the sense of subjectivity, once, acquired, should not be lost again, for to transcend the ego would be both to retain it and to suspend it as the supreme instance."²⁴

To establish the foundation of human sciences, it is necessary to trace a detour to "bring to light the proper sense of subjectivity."²⁵ This detour means that if we have to know the existence and the interrelationship among human beings, e.g. we (you and me) relationship, face-to-face relationship, I-other relationship, then it is necessary to trace the origin of the meaning of the 'I' and the 'others.' Ricoeur finds that the 'I' is not only a subject but also an intersubject that it means it is a 'self being with the others' and a 'self interpreted by the others.' It is correct for Kearney to claim that "if subjectivity continues to exist for hermeneutics, it is as 'self-as-another,' exists at the end, not the beginning because it can be attained only

²² The term, human sciences (*sciences humaines*), is opposite to natural sciences. Natural science refers to the science which pay attention to the quantitative methodology, for which the ability to link an individual phenomenon into generalized groups is emphasized, whereas human sciences refer to the sciences which pay attention to the qualitative methodology, for which the ability to detail describe an individual phenomenon is empathized. Instead of offering an 'objective' explanation and explaining (away) any subjective or personal phenomena, human sciences provides many fields of area for the study of different human phenomena. In French, human sciences must be plural because they refer to disciplines including both humanities and social science(s), which aim at the study and interpretation of the existence, interrelationship, experiences, development and activities of human beings in a qualitative way. Ricoeur uses the term, 'human sciences' in this way.

²³ Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 113.

²⁴ Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, trans. Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 232.

²⁵ Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, 233.

after the intersubjective detour of interpretation”.²⁶

Ricoeur’s insight can be found in his analysis of the pronoun ‘I’. “As used, the term, ‘I’ has a uniquely singular reference; but as understood, it is general. This distinction is between the descriptive and the indicative.”²⁷ To understand the distinction, Ricoeur employs reflexive verbs to illustrate that “the reflexive form of the verb emphasizes this relation, at once active and reflective, of the self with the self.”²⁸ For example, ‘she dresses herself’ in English, ‘*Sie zieht sich an*’ in German, and ‘*Elle s’habille*’ in French. In grammar, a reflexive verb is a verb whose direct object is the same as its subject. In semantic terms, a reflexive verb has the same semantic agent and patient. Generally speaking, the reflexive verb (dress, *ziehen* and *habiller*) has the subject-pronoun (she, *sie* and *elle*) and the reflexive-pronoun (herself, *sich* and *se*). The subject pronoun is indicative with a singular reference. If I use the pronoun, “I”, who I can indicate is the one who speaks “I”. If I use the pronoun, “she,” who I can indicate is not the one who speaks “she” but the other person. Alternatively, the meaning of the subject pronoun, “I” is always general that all of us can understand because of the universality of linguality. Turning to the reflexive pronoun, it is descriptive only, without being indicative. Therefore, it is important to note the ‘I’ is not primordially the transcendental ego as absolute subjectivity but intersubjectivity.

Ricoeur insightfully finds that Husserl does not only have an idealistic interpretation as hermeneutics indicated, but also a non-idealistic interpretation. It opens Ricoeur’s path to reinterpret and re-read Husserl’s phenomenological intersubjectivity. He claims that only one can develop a non-idealistic analysis and the analysis of ‘find oneself in a situation’ and ‘purposely directing oneself thither’ by pairing.

Pairing is one of the three stages in Husserl’s theory of empathy: (1) the pairing of my body and alien body; (2) the index of an alien life through his concordant behaviors; and (3) the liberation of the Other from my primordial sphere. Then what is pairing? Pairing specifies the

²⁶ Richard Kearney, *On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 5.

²⁷ Ricoeur, *Main Trends in Philosophy*, 272.

²⁸ Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 224.

analogical transfer brought into play in the experience of the Other. The analogical transfer is a process of pre-reflective, antepredicative experience, in which a new experience always finds its model or its type in an originary experience. It is the process which "brings into play this encroachment from the originary towards the non-originary. In stage (1), the pairing provides the association of the analogy between the two bodily similarities and brings into play from ego to alter ego through the passive synthesis. It seems obvious that this pairing reaches the climax of egological constitution as the meaning of the others is constituted *in me*. But Husserl himself raises several questions to his attempt, "is the structure of the apperception truly transparent at this point? Or is it a simple apperception by transfer like any other?"²⁹ What out of scholars word expect is that pairing, for Husserl, is a relation which lacks the fullness of a living experience. In stage (2), that an alien life expresses itself through some concordant behaviors is a sign. There are two species of signs, namely indices which indicates and signs of language which signifies. Concordant behaviors represent indices as they are the index of an alien life and the alien life gives a 'verifiable accessibility.' In this regard, the Other remains an analogue of my ego, the Other is a modification of my ego. "The Myself-Other relation is essentially asymmetrical or non-reciprocal."³⁰ Nevertheless, Ricoeur pays much attention the ambiguity of concordant behaviors as sign in this stage.

A sign, which can signify, is a symbol. "Symbols are bound in a double sense: bound to and bound by."³¹ The term, 'bound to' refers to its primary and literal meanings; whereas the term, 'bound by' refers to the primary, literal meanings 'resides' in the symbolic meanings. Thus, making an alien body a symbol-body, it gives a first and literal meaning and a second and symbolic meaning. Ricoeur now uncovers the non-idealistic elements and draws further resources from *Ideas II*. The body leads to two interpretations, namely the body as locus of sensation naturalistically considered and the body as organ of the will personalistically considered. The

²⁹ Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 143. See also Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 127.

³⁰ Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 131.

³¹ Paul Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics*, ed. Don Ihde, trans. Willis Domingo *et al* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 31.

latter cannot be fully explicated through pairing because the body is imprinted with a sense just like the cultural object, the book, or the temple.³² Then I realize the Other has its spiritual life with its sedimentation and habits. The Other cannot be reduced to my primordial sphere.

Ricoeur reads carefully and elucidates insightfully that

Husserlian phenomenology then appears as a struggle between two tendencies: (1) As description restricted to the thing just as they are given, phenomenology is a generous effort to respect the diversity of appearing and to restore to each of its mode...of otherness...(2) In its capacity as an idealistic interpretation of its own descriptive activity, Husserlian phenomenology is a radical effort to reduce all otherness to the monadic life to the ego, to ipseity.³³

Sometimes Ricoeur would call them ‘the descriptive tendency’ and ‘the dogmatic tendency.’ The descriptive care in respecting the otherness of Others and the dogmatic care for founding the Other in the ego’s absolute and pure region of sphere find their balance in the notion of an analogical grasping of the Other.³⁴ Yet the Other is there himself *for* me, and it cannot be reduced to my ownness. It is what Husserl calls *appraesentiert*. On the other hand, the Other is constituted *in* me, and it is the meaning-constitution of the Other in virtue of the pairing (*Paarung*) between my body here and the other body there. It is what Husserl calls *praesentiert*. The two tendencies found a balance through this couple configuration in the problem of the Other.

Instead of falling into solipsism, what Husserl develops is not a dogmatic approach but a descriptive one through his methodological guidance. What is important in Husserl is not what he says about community or how he solves the problems of transcendental intersubjectivity; on the contrary, it is how he formulates the problems and how his analysis moves step by step towards community.

The Fifth Meditation teaches us that transcendental solipsism is not an impasse but a strait through which philosophy must pass. Just like what

³² Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 74.

³³ *Ibid.*, 114.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 197.

Husserl says, 'it is necessary to develop it as such for methodological reasons, notably in order to present the problems of transcendental intersubjectivity in a suitable manner.'³⁵

Once, the otherness of the Other is justified, the 'I' then takes advantage of the co-existence or co-presence of subjects.³⁶ In stage (3), since the Other cannot be reduced to my primordial sphere, I realize the Other has his/her own perspective or point of view. The Other is not a being-in-me but only a being-for-me in the meaning-constitution. At the same time, from the Other's perspective, I am a being-for-the Other. Under the reciprocal relationship, the ego is under a metamorphosis.³⁷ The self-understanding can be fulfilled by the alien self.

My existence for myself is dependent on this constitution in another's opinion. My 'Self', it may be said, is received from the opinion of others that establishes it. The constitution of subjects is thus a mutual constitution through opinion.³⁸

For example, Sartre describes that my self is received from the opinion of others that "the Other is the one against whom I must not act."³⁹ The constitution of subject is through

the existence of the Other with the experience of being seen, of being caught by a gaze which freezes me in my tracks, reduces me to the condition of an object, steals my world from me, and takes away my freedom along with my subject position.⁴⁰

Take another example, Ricoeur suggest that my self-esteem or existence-worth is received from the opinion of others that "one can detect in sexuality a note of possession, some nuance of domination, as well as

³⁵ Ibid., 92.

³⁶ Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 203.

³⁷ Ibid., 144, 159, 177, 185.

³⁸ Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 121.

³⁹ Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 200.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 212.

a seeking for mutual recognition.”⁴¹

Up to this point, Ricoeur, through his reinterpretation, establishes the ‘I’ is never a static and absolute subject but an embodied and affected member among the other members. “It is noteworthy that the Self is never certain: the triple quest in which it seeks itself is never complete”⁴² because “the privilege accorded to misunderstanding, to conflict, to encounter, to reciprocity, to the collaboration of a teammate or of a gallery slave betrays a different ontological style.”⁴³ For each of these senses given to man’s existence, there are so many descriptive styles in existential phenomenology. Nevertheless, these descriptive styles or sense given to man’s existence may be opinions of the other. It follows that these opinion of the other may be an ideology that comes from a dominant class. Ricoeur identifies three features of ideology: (1) it is always more than a reflection, is always also a justification and project; (2) it is operative rather thematic; and (3) it is the error which makes us take the image for the real, the reflection for the original.⁴⁴ It rest on the ontological illusion that the meaning is always precede self-understanding if the pre-understanding does not take into a critical consideration. As a result, it is true for Richard Kearney to claim that Ricoeuran development of phenomenological intersubjectivity

may serve as a double critique. It is a critique of egology as expressed in the transcendental illusion that the self can constitute itself as ultimate and absolute origin. But it is also a critique of ideology which rests on the illusion that self-understanding has no role to play in a socio-historical or political context.⁴⁵

In conclusion, through the hermeneutic critique of phenomenological idealism, the limitations of it are exposed. However, Ricoeur insightfully reinterprets Husserl and finds Husserl’s non-idealistic manner. Husserl’s theory of phenomenological intersubjectivity is a detour way with methodological steps to give an account of the meaning-

⁴¹ Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 128.

⁴² Ibid., 126.

⁴³ Ricoeur, *Husserl*, 212.

⁴⁴ Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 226, 227, 230.

⁴⁵ Kearney, *On Paul Ricoeur*, 33.

constitution of the Other 'in' and 'through' my perceptual experience. This theory pays attention to a first personal (subjective) experience. It offers a foundation for later development of human sciences, which focuses on the descriptive and qualitative methodology instead of explanatory and quantitative methodology, which is empathized by the natural science. Therefore, Ricoeur's reinterpretation of Husserl's phenomenological intersubjectivity brings a light towards the future development of both phenomenological intersubjectivity and the human sciences.

BOOK REVIEWS

*Slavoj Žižek and Srećko Horvat, editors,
What Does Europe Want? - The Union and its Discontents
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 240pp.*

Reviewed by Eleftherios Sarantis (University of Sofia)

In this collection of essays, the prominent leftist intellectuals Slavoj Žižek and Srećko Horvat, with the participation of SYRIZA leader and current Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, foresee the imminent social challenges for the peoples of Europe, while sketching a scattered reaction agenda for the Left. Žižek and Horvat are masters in asking intricate questions through which they launch a targeted discourse against the expansion of neoliberal economic policy in Europe and in particular in the EU. They focus a big part of their essays on the hegemonic expansion of neoliberalism to peripheral EU and European countries, which remains today a tangible reality two years after the book's first publication. The authors derive intellectual material from personal experiences, historical events, anecdotal stories and jokes, which assist them to present an attractive narration of their critique of the hegemonic European elites, by avoiding pompous language or a highly theoretical argumentation, which would be discouraging for unfamiliarized readers. The result is an easily digestible text for the non-specialized reader who is interested in the modern challenges of the Left.

In their responses to "What Does Europe Want," the authors suggest that Europe and its dominant political structure, the EU, seem trapped between to American imperialist ??? capitalism and Europe's social reflexes, which still work in favor of the Franco-German model of the welfare state. Žižek and Horvat ask intriguing questions other than just "What Does Europe Want?", criticizing globalization, labor exploitation, the rise of nationalism and the containment of democracy as result of neoliberal policies. However, even though they tend to touch upon the necessity for a concerted and centrally coordinated social reaction, they do refrain from elaborating extensively on providing the corresponding answers. Nevertheless, one cannot disregard their evident, yet fragmentarily expressed, hope that the solution for Europe would come from the South and in par-

ticular from Greece and the leftist SYRIZA.

Even though more than two years have passed since the initial release of this book (autumn 2013), its discourse remains prophetically relevant to the most recent developments in the EU (e.g. the refugee crisis, EU relations with Turkey, the rise of far-right nationalism in many EU countries, the dream of EU accession for peripheral European countries etc.). In the co-named chapter “What Does Europe Want” (Chapter 5), Žižek criticizes the decision of the EU to establish a common border police, a measure that according to Žižek depicts globalization’s tendency to limit human mobility in contrast to the absolute free commodity circulation across borders. The tragic irony of the ongoing refugee crisis, on the back of the Syrian war, confirms Žižek’s criticism and reveals part of EU’s inhuman face and fear of the other. Žižek further quoted Max Horkheimer’s “those who do not want to speak (critically) of liberalism should also keep silent about fascism.” Who would have believed at the time that the Danish government would decide in 2016 to confiscate goods from incoming refugees? Horvat was also alert and warned about the rise of the far-right in Europe and the tough acceptance of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia into the EU, but in the meantime the fear of “outsiders” across core EU states has broadened to include Syrian refugees and the Islamic State, a direct result of Western foreign policy in the Middle East. In a discursively coherent manner, the authors suggest that the EU will need to change its market-driven trajectory, which propagates economic competitiveness across the peoples of Europe. This was a prophetic warning when considering the recent risks of a potential Schengen zone dissolution, following the substantial influx of Syrian refugees, which stressed the EU’s conformist and individualistic mentality. If Schengen dissolves, how long would it take until the EU falls apart?

Despite the authors’ inspiring discourse, the book fails to follow a progressive logical line of argumentation and consist of a diverse collection of heterogeneous concepts, separated in several chapters, which fail to constitute an intellectual whole. On top of that, one cannot disregard the involvement of the current Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, who wrote the foreword of the book, while he participated in an interview and debate with Horvat and Žižek (both published as the last two chapters of the book). The Greek Prime Minister seized the opportunity to communicate his fierce political discourse against the elites of the EU

and on the implementation of austerity-driven neoliberal policies. Since then political reality caught up with Tsipras. In fact, his government renewed Greece's fiscal consolidation program in July 2015 (for three additional years until 2018), accepting a EUR 86 billion loan, while committing to implement the exact same policies that Tsipras used to condemn.

Most notably, the Tsipras-led administration has already completed its first public sector cuts and privatization projects, which comes in direct conflict with Tsipras's expressed views in "What Does Europe Want?". It follows that Tsipras has been either politically transformed by power and shifted his political platform to the center to sustain his popularity or he serves as a Trojan Horse of the Left within the EU, attempting small strategic steps in an effort to attract more European forces to his side. The answer to this dilemma would be premature and is left for now to be addressed by historians and political analysts of the future. Nevertheless, if Tsipras is not compromised and is actually attempting to reform the EU from the inside, he is surely running out of time, as his popularity in Greece declining rapidly and the Right in Greece (New Democracy) is gradually building momentum for a glorious return to power. In Chapter 17 of the book, Žižek suggests that Europe needs a Margaret Thatcher of the Left, acknowledging the hegemonic advantages that a gifted politician or intellectual endows to a particular political space. To the disappointment of many, Tsipras shows that he is unlikely to be such a leader for the European Left, as he seems unable to bear alone the weight of social transformation in the EU. In fact, his compromised stance probably does more damage than good to the prospects of the Left for now.

Jason M. Wirth, *Commiserating With the Devastated Things: Milan Kundera and the Entitlements of Thinking* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 227 pp.

Reviewed by Ilona Valcheva (University of Sofia)

Jason M. Wirth's investigation of Milan Kundera's works is impressive and deep in two ways — in his immersion into the works of the Czech-born writer and in relating them to other works and philosophies (conditioned by his education in Western philosophy and interest in Mahayana Buddhist philosophy). Yet, Wirth asserts, philosophy is a universe distant from the universe of the novel. And all the time he keeps the two separate by contrasting what novels do with what philosophers in the general sense (with a few poetic exceptions like Nietzsche, for example) do. Even as he keeps these universes separate before our eyes, Wirth shows that they can touch, though not substitute for each other, or fuse into a whole. And in this sense, "Kundera's work in the very terms that he poses them, flirting with philosophy, while avoiding philosophy's ambush," is the best example of the fluidity and interaction between the two practices, without the essence of either suffering damage. Philosophy and literature (art) should remain separate. The philosophy that relies on rigid dogmatism and delivers answers instead of questions, this systematic, all-explaining and specific philosophy (phenomenology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.) will profit greatly if it takes from the novel the latter's lack of certainty, its humor, its *questioning*, as means and practice. What is philosophical in the novel is that it poses questions which might or might not be philosophical. The tenor of its revelations, however, is totally different. The novel aims not to fix the world or to impose some fixity as its essence, but rather the opposite — to shake it (with its freedom) and to doubt, but not to erect any philosophical, political or other ideology, any "know-how," "morality" or coherence.

Wirth's book is valuable because it juxtaposes the novel and philosophy as different types and shows that the novel (art) is not necessarily derivative of philosophy (quite a big prejudice). The realm of art has its own importance, means and ways of discovering truth (if it seeks it) and of contributing to the wholeness of human cultural activity. Such

claims coming from an author who is a philosopher himself reveal a fine self-awareness and broad mental horizons. The theme of “commiserating with the devastated things” shows that only the novel can reveal the fullness of the human condition in its nullity, treating it in another, compensatory manner — with laughter and compassion. This line finds its solid expression in Wirth’s historical and philosophical inquiry, which gathers together great stretches of time and topics philosophically, novelistically (the history of novel and Kundera’s novels in particular) and historically.

One thing is common to the novel and philosophy — both contain wisdom. The wisdom of the novel appears (like the Japanese *zuihitsu* style of writing), rather than being sought and logically completed; it arrives through the “instrument” of laughter (the total shaking of any certainty, the comic in itself, the reversion of any given thing). Philosophy of the classical type, in contrast, reaches grand conclusions, and is characterized by preaching and absolute knowing.

On the basis of impressive philosophical analyses of Kundera’s works, strengthened by solid philosophical passion and knowledge, and ample quotations of the author’s works, Wirth distinguishes another two topics, important for philosophy, revealed in Kundera’s works in their own novelistic way — the collision of the novel with history and the problem of graphomania, found in modern writing and in the modern approach to writing, a self-obsessed attempt to immortalize oneself. Commiserating with the devastated things can be done only within the world of the novel, which on another level relates to the merciless depersonalization of history (in Hegelian terms) and to the nothingness of death and the abrupt and again merciless renunciation of meaning. Kundera’s characters deal with the problem of mortality and the related problem of time in different ways. One important tool is laughter. We can either see the rupture, the beyond-ness of the gesture, the simplicity of mortality (without fuss) or else graphomania as a desire for one’s own life to be memorialized and revered, both as tools for coping with the problem of time and the iron hand of History, the almost unavoidable “march” (of Logic, coherence, of the Book which does not allow humor, unanswered questions, ambiguity). The existential motivation behind graphomania is pitiful yet understandable and forgivable in the face of the human condition. However, this does not silence the critical voice we may hear regarding the fact that today everyone is an “ingredient” in

the Chicken Soup of the world, where everybody writes something (allegedly) important, and we read less and less. These delusions of our lyricism, as Wirth calls them, the dramatic and self-important living and dying, are scattered by history — and by dogs as well, as the fundamental “companion species,” which show us another mode of being, and thus make us aware we are not the summit or the owners of the world.

Kundera’s relation to kitsch is also very interesting, one from which Wirth elaborates great philosophical conclusions. We are all in kitsch somehow, Kundera points out. Kitsch is the all-encompassing rigid existential mathematics, the rude business of utilitarianism, of definitive conclusions about truth. It is not bad art (art failing to make its message understood for one reason or another); rather, it is non-art, a devilish practice which pretends to express the whole truth. Its total deceptiveness leads Wirth to call kitsch “radical evil,” relying on Kant’s idea that we are not intrinsically evil, but become so because we invert our self-love and thus pervert our value systems and action. All self-obsession and drive to autobiography (both in philosophy and novel writing) is a kind of kitsch.

The people most able to commiserate with the devastated things (the world of the novel, and our own reality) are the idiots, those who don’t fit in (saints, the writer who allows every human to be realized in the novel, madmen). In contrast to the hazy egocentric lyricism of philosophy and life, the thinking of the novel pauses to see and hear the devastated things in the devastated world and to try to grasp them together in the idea of the wholeness and infinity of human possibility. Quite philosophical, but given its moderate sentimentality and open-endedness, it can be found only in the novel with its methods and characters. The practice of the novel is true freedom.

***Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, Hermeneutic Communism:
From Heidegger to Marx
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 264 pp.***

Reviewed by Hans Krauch (University of Sofia)

Looking at the title of this book, other oxymorons like “fresh frozen,” “jumbo shrimp” or “military intelligence” come to mind. How could a seemingly nihilistic yet totalitarian ideology work in real life? Every aspect of life is controlled, yet at the same time no rules are applied because, after all, what is the point of anything?

Let us try to unravel this mystery to see where we end up with the concept of this book. We begin with a fairly standard appeal to philosophy to become more involved and deliver practical solutions to our current problems. Indeed, given our place today — in the shadow of the grave of the Enlightenment — we long to break free and search again for the promised land. Nowhere is the chilling effect of standing in the shadow of this grave felt more than in the ex-Soviet bloc countries. Recently released from decades of Soviet Communist rule, they look like newly released prisoners thrown into the sunlight. They are left dazed and confused, unsure and nervous about what direction to take.

They certainly are not getting any direction from the self-loathing Analytic school of thought, so perhaps the best option is to find it within themselves or amongst like-minded Continental philosophers? First of all, they (the authors) wish to perform an autopsy on Communism to see how exactly it died: its death can reveal a way of giving birth to a new vision of utopia.

Metaphysics is identified as being the primary cause of death. It is rather unfortunate that metaphysics was not itself explained as fully as it might have been. Of course, anyone could simply look up the term, but it would have been helpful to know exactly Vattimo and Zabala’s definition of metaphysics. Despite this, they do a fine job of describing how metaphysics killed Communism, so with a little energy readers could put the pieces of the puzzle together themselves on the basis of the entire book.

Overt destruction of metaphysics is seen as impossible, so, to bring

about its demise, Vattimo and Zabala craft a strategy of piecemeal assimilation and digestion into grassroots socialist and humanitarian policies and ideologies (called here “Specter Communism” — a good ploy as the term Communism itself evokes too much of a negative reaction). I see it as similar to the way that Globalization and Multiculturalism destroy culture — under the pretence of accepting all, none is seen as unique, and therefore any value or meaning in culture dissolves.

Here, it is objective truth that is dissolved into valueless vapor — the value of metaphysics is tied to the value of objective truth. Once we realize that objective truth really does nothing to guide and help lead the human race towards the abolition of poverty and injustice, then any appeal to metaphysics will be meaningless. That way you remove it from the game completely. This book recommends a complete rewriting of the rules of how the game is played, and this is why the figures of the old system are so nervous about talking about it. If I were Derrida I would be honored for being such an overt target of attack — the rest of us are simply ignored and that is enough to keep us silent.

Certainly, Crony Capitalism and neoliberalism have not had a beneficial effect on the weak, so methods of escape from this weakness are sought outside the previously mentioned ideologies and policies. As it stands today, political science has as much relation to science as it does to astrology, so any appeal to this academic discipline to give us coherent answers on anything of a political nature is doomed to chance or failure: “politics cannot be founded on scientific and rational grounds but only on interpretation, history and event” (22).

If removing metaphysics from the equation brings together Hermeneutics and Communism, then it is metaphysics itself that separates the two. This is an appeal to the value of the subjective. Yes, the Communist idea that war is a necessary part of capitalism has been proven correct in some instances, but this rule is now rather the exception. There are much cleaner ways these days to enslave and subjugate sovereign nations other than armed force — perfected by decades of practice, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund make entire countries dependent on the production of a handful of commodities, or just one.

Thankfully, violent revolution is not called for in this book — as history has shown, those who use such methods turn out no better (usually end up being worse) than the ones they overthrow. Vattimo and Zabala’s method calls for resistance to capitalist exploitation of the poor

while gaining understanding of the subjective truths behind human existence.

Hermeneutics will now become the totalitarian ideology and communism its functionary arm — the most enlightened of despots. Vattimo and Zabala point to the tiny budding examples of South American practices as a way to move forward. I spent several months in Uruguay during Mujica's presidency and witnessed soaring commodity prices and stagnant wages (similar to what is going on in Venezuela today). The actual macro-beneficial results of these policies is inconclusive at best.

Such considerations are not part of the analysis here. Vattimo and Zabala are only concerned with the promotion of the interests of the weak, the disenfranchised, the poor, the losers, and, most importantly, those beyond the control of the powers that be. The powers that be are also known as the strong, or the winners. The weak are finding few friends in popular academia, and here Vattimo and Zabala especially mention the works of Searle — the most powerful Madame running the brothel that is the current business of Analytic Philosophy. Their most important clients are governments and international institutions, the so-called "winners."

I am nearly out of space and have only just begun my assessment, so the remainder will have to be painfully brief. Where we stand today is known as "Framed Democracy" (a pseudo-democracy — despotic in nature). Vattimo and Zabala confuse the subjective and the objective, the results of which are abominations like moral relativism. They never explore the "why," only the "what."

The violence of truth is a simple enough concept. Truth is force, and those who move against force receive violence. Jump off a building and the violence of the truth of gravity will become self-evident. Truth is political power, which is violence. The violence of subjective truth lies in the ethics of value, the "Golden Rule." The conservative nature of realism is that it seeks out and destroys anything that threatens what is currently considered "real," a similar argument to what is mentioned in the chapters on "The Winners' History" and "Armed Capitalism." We can safely say that efforts to seed democracy with bombs or bullets have not ended with successful germination thus far.

In economics, we find that free markets are not so free. Risk is transferred from the winners to the losers, so if the winners make a mistake, it is the losers who pay for it. This finally brings us back to the im-

portance of Hermeneutic Communism — that it gives us an alternative to simply being exploited with a forced smile on our faces. Truth is not the problem. It is the winners' interpretation of it and this is why interpretation is stressed. I will skip over the deeper elements of Being and such, but conclude that this idea is, at the very least, an entirely worthwhile endeavor in an effort to both aid the weak and unshackle ourselves from the dominion of the dogmatic prostitutes that inhibit free thought and progress.

Yanis Varoufakis, *The Global Minotaur: America, The True Origins of the Financial Crisis and the Future of the World Economy* (Zed Books, second edition, 2013), 296 pp.

Reviewed by Eleftherios Sarantis (University of Sofia)

One could humorously claim that Yanis Varoufakis is the modern “Elvis Presley” of political economics, though he himself personally enjoys describing himself as a liberal communist or erratic Marxist. After a long academic trajectory, Varoufakis built his fame following the 2008 global financial crisis by commenting on structural deficiencies in the EU, on TV and in various online media, establishing himself as an expert on the economy, especially in the eyes of the Greek public. His popularity spiked when he briefly served as the Greek finance minister in 2015, becoming part of the newly-elected government, led by SYRIZA (The Coalition of the Radical Left). The controversial handling of the early stages of the Greek crisis in that year marked the beginning of Varoufakis’s political career. However, the moderation of SYRIZA’s earlier radical agenda by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras led Varoufakis to quit the party within months. Independent of his direct involvement in Greek politics, Varoufakis announced the formation of a Pan-European movement for the “reinstatement of democracy in the EU.” Following the necessary preparatory work, Varoufakis released a small manifesto for his movement (the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 or DiEM25) in February 2016.

Back in 2011, Varoufakis published the first edition of *The Global Minotaur: America, Europe and the Future of the Global Economy* in which he attempted to recount in an understandable manner the economic, moral and regulatory downturn that led to the US housing and banking crash of 2008. This new edition similarly adopts a critical discourse on the crisis that would appeal equally to technocrats and non-specialists. It is important to mention that even though Varoufakis attempts to explain technical terms and economic theories in simple terms, the untutored reader will still have to make a small scientific leap in order to grasp Varoufakis’s economic and financial arguments. In addition, Varoufakis is keen on flamboyant language, which distinguishes

his work from the myriad of similar economic analyses, without however distracting the reader from the essence of his arguments. Most importantly, Varoufakis accompanies his account with various highly interesting philosophical references, which enrich and give weight to his rhetoric. In fact, Varoufakis's philosophical parallels and literary style will appeal to readers with a background in philosophy, even those who would be interested in a more technical description of the causes behind the 2008 global financial crisis.

The heart of this book is the metaphor of the Global Minotaur, which Varoufakis wisely invented to explain that above all other factors (i.e., greed, financialization, regulatory mistakes), the main cause of the crash of 2008 was the failure in the recycling of global trade imbalances. The Minotaur of mythology was half-man and half-bull (*taurus*). The myth states that the gods caused the wife of the Cretan King Minos, Queen Pasiphae, to fall deeply in love with a bull, resulting in the birth of the Minotaur. Minos, ashamed of Pasiphae's beast-like offspring, asked Daedalus to construct an underground labyrinth, where the Minotaur would reside. The interesting part of the myth for Varoufakis is that Minoan Crete was the economic and political hegemon of the region at the time, forcing ancient Athens to feed the Minotaur with fourteen young boys and girls annually, in order to sustain peace in the region; a Pax Cretana.

Varoufakis draws a parallel between the myth of the Minotaur and the modern trajectory of the US economy. He explains that the US became a deficit economy in the late 1960s and instead of trying to balance its twin deficits (the budget deficit and the external trade deficit), it strategically decided to exit the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and seek external foreign capital to finance its deficits perpetually. Varoufakis explains that several surplus economies, most notably Germany, Japan and China, "fed" the US economy with immense amounts of capital (more than 70% of their surplus capital). In exchange, the US economy offered to its deficit-recycling peers a global framework of financial stability and economic growth for decades; a modern version of the Pax Cretana. In other words, the surplus economies paid their tributes to the labyrinth of Wall Street, wherein lived the Global Minotaur of the US twin deficits. US capital inflow led to an era of extreme financialization within the US, during which Wall Street technocrats immediately turned the incoming capital into investments, shares, new complicated financial

instruments and loans, from which bankers made enormous bonuses. The most toxic of those instruments was a new form of mortgage-related securities, with a complicated structure and unclear risk profile, which directly linked Wall Street mannerisms to the real US economy and the housing market. According to Varoufakis, in this period of escalating financialization, the poor regulation of bankers' greed and the incapacity of experts to estimate systemic risks related to the new complicated financial instruments, laid the foundation for the housing bubble and banking crash of 2008.

Varoufakis seems unconvinced that global policy makers have learned the lesson of the 2008 crisis. In this second edition of the book, Varoufakis adds a new chapter to his allegorical account to support his view that the US continues to sustain the Global Minotaur model, even though its economy has lost its earlier capacity to attract capital at the same pace. Varoufakis fears that the world risks entering an era, like the one before World War II, of dangerous economic imbalances between emerging economies and the gradually disintegrating reality of the US Global Minotaur; of which the EU in the post-2008 period is a smaller self-enclosed replica. Varoufakis concludes that to avoid the social evils of such profound economic imbalances (e.g., rising inequality, exploitation, de-democratization or even war) the only solution would be the establishment of a global surplus recycling mechanism (GSRM). In a good scenario, the GSRM would regard only emerging economies, but in the best scenario, it would also include the West (mainly the US and Europe). The GSRM that Varoufakis proposes is very similar to the International Clearing Union (ICU), an international trade clearing mechanism that John Maynard Keynes proposed at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, and which was emphatically rejected by the US government.

The Global Minotaur is a metaphor that aims to explain the failure of capitalism from a systemic point of view, but it provides little room for contemplation of the socio-political causes and future implications of the 2008 global crisis. Even though Varoufakis remains loyal to his Keynesian-oriented economic theory, he has gradually shifted his thought towards political theory and democratization, a pragmatic sign of which is his decision to form DiEM25. Notably, in his most recent Ted Global speech (December 2015), Varoufakis exhibited strong signs of nostalgia for ancient Athenian democracy, suggesting that Western

liberal democracy was constituted on the basis of the separation of the economic sphere (the corporate world, the masters) from the political sphere (democracy). Varoufakis warned that the power hegemony of the economic sphere over the political sphere in the US and Europe threatens to transform Western capitalism into a surveillance-mad autocratic dystopia, similar to the current Chinese regime. To prevent this outcome, Varoufakis called for the reunification of the economic and political spheres, under a new revised economic model similar to the GSRM, adding to his vision a Marxist corporate management model that would render wage labor obsolete. Varoufakis's next book *And the Weak Suffer What They Must? Europe's Crisis and America's Economic Future* is due in 2016, where we can expect him to bring his Keynesian GSRM vision forward in time, while strengthening his arguments with a sturdier socio-political analysis that is missing from the Global Minotaur study.

Arab Kennouche, *The Hegelian Return to The Barbarism of Reflection in the Light of the Vichian Imagination of Power*
(Berlin: Mensch und Buch Verlag, 2015), 275 pp.

Reviewed by Blagoja Petrovski (University of Sofia)

Arab Kennouche's *The Hegelian Return to The Barbarism of Reflection in the Light of the Vichian Imagination of Power* is a masterful exercise of philosophical and historical comparison, applying the historical philosophy of Vico's *New Science* to the fundamental works of the Hegelian system. Kennouche tries to identify Hegel's Absolute Idea (*Göttliche-Idee*) with the Vichian fundamental desire to give humanity a new comprehensive architecture of becoming, one not limited just to historicity but including an *imagination of power*. The Hegelian idea of Kenosis is comprehensible in the light of the relation that the author makes between that "power" and "imagination" (64). Thanks to the topography of the Absolute Idea's voyage, Kennouche asserts that a powerful imagination lay behind every reversible displacement of the Idea, an infrastructure of imagination with Vichian origins thus grounding Hegel's imagination on the Vichian laws of Nature.

"Imagination is the first form of thought for the whole humanity, who has left the animal condition" (iv). The author writes that Hegel's thought is thus essentially imaginative and not rational. Beyond the powerful imagination inherited from Nature, we may find the imagination of Power ruling over the conception of the Idea.

Vico's interpretation of the history of civilization states that there is an underlying uniformity in human nature across all historical settings that permits the explanation of historical actions and processes. He believes that there are three epochs in human history: the epoch of the Gods, the epoch of Heroes and finally the epoch of Humans. There is a vital element in the first two epochs, which is the common sense. The human epoch celebrates the rise of the new barbarism, the barbarism of reflection, not the barbarism of sense. Kennouche sees Vico's notion of the general progress of civilization to perfection as repeated "return to barbarism" as a mode of apperception on the Hegelian dialectical realization of the Absolute Idea. The barbarism of reflection is opposed to

the barbarism of sense. The barbarism of reflection is perceived as a barbarism of intellect, reconciliation, self-heroicization, self-identification, purity, self-reflection and self-deification.

The Hegelian Reason and Spirit are inserted and governed by a powerful imagination, the Vichian first thought, and the Barbarism of Reflection. We achieved to depict the Vichian imaginative infrastructure which accounts for the travel of the Göttliche Idee to perform a barbarous junction between God's pure Reason and Man's Mind as Spirit. (52)

The barbarism of reflection is identified as Hegel's desire to actualize the Kenosis of the Göttliche-Idee by discarding its substantial and poetic features. The Kenosis of the Idea is topical at the infrastructural level and depicts a journey from the vision of the Idea as God, pure thought, pure reason fusing with Nature and the Human Mind. The barbarism of reflection is effected in the imagination of Man acquiring the Idea as the Concept. Kennouche confronts Hegel's idea of Kenosis with a discussion on the intrinsic link with Vico:

Hegel depicts two processes which are poetical and barbarous: the kenosis of a pure divine reason within the world, which will end in a spiritualization and secondly the possibility for human reason, to be identified with the exterior world. The Kenosis of God intended as a pure rational substance which realizes itself can be ascribed to the work of a Vichian poetic reason, which will end in a barbarous Hegelian reflection, the possibility for the divine reason to purify all the natural substances, including the human brain to produce Spirit. (185)

Vico's concept of the barbarism of reflection can be identified as the eternal law of History in Hegel's desire to imagine a State outside the principle of *sensus communis*. Kennouche states that the barbarous passage of the Idea into Nature is thus an attempt to foreclose the demiurgic power of Nature, so as to pave the way for the birth of an Absolute Spirit, endowed with the same powers as God. He furthermore asserts that nature has to be spiritualized, not in the pagan manner, but rather on the basis of a human consciousness which will develop into a divine spirit.

Kennouche furthermore associates the "naturalization of Hegel's idea" as the "kenosis of God's pure thought" with "the first imagination of Power" which is the result of the birth of a corporeal power stemming from nature, a "bodily perception of the divinized nature" (72). In this

way the author enters into a rational unfolding of the Göttliche-Idee that is to be understood as depending on the imagination, while Hegel's desire "to eliminate every kind of empty unrealized abstractions, based on perceptual understanding" becomes the "first step" of "reflective barbarism" (84). The question of barbarism becomes more evident when Hegelian Reason begins to grasp itself as "both ideal and unreal, subjective and objective, unreal and transcendental" (115), and thus symbolizes the beginning of a "progressive anthropomorphization of the Spirit," ending in "its own divinization" (132)

The Inclusion of Hegel's mind within the Vichian eternal laws of History is a rehabilitation of the historical power of myth and imagination towards the understanding of the idea of political power. (iv)

The book concludes with a poetic discussion, Kennouche himself trying to put to use the poetic imagination and to envision the fall of the Promethean ideal of the divinization of humanity bringing about instead the death of human Reason. "After Vico and Hegel's relative optimism, we should start thinking about the era of the Phenomenology of Evil" (263). This somber thought closes the work.

ANNOUNCEMENT

Master's and Doctoral Studies in Philosophy Taught in English at Sofia University

Sofia University was founded in 1888 following the best patterns of European higher education. Sofia is the capital city of the Republic of Bulgaria. Bulgaria is a Member of the European Union (EU).

MASTER'S PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY TAUGHT IN ENGLISH

The MA Program in Philosophy taught in English provides instruction in all major areas of Western Philosophy. In addition, the master's thesis can be written on a topic from Eastern Philosophy - an expert in this field will be appointed as the supervisor. The program is structured, yet leaves enough room for student's own preferences. The degree is recognized worldwide including in the EU/EEA and Switzerland, the US, Canada, Russia, Turkey, China, Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Courses offered: Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics, Axiology, Philosophical Method, Truth and Meaning, Philosophy of Intercultural Relations, Social Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Philosophy for Children, Philosophy of Culture, Logic in the Continental Tradition, Theories of Truth, Existential Dialectics, Philosophy of Subjective Action, Phenomenology, Renaissance Philosophy

Faculty Members: All faculty teaching at the program are approved by the Bulgarian State Highest Assessment Commission. They feature successful teaching experience in this country and abroad and are well published in Bulgarian and English.

Duration of Studies: two semesters of course attendance plus a third semester for writing the master's thesis; opportunities for distance learning.

Admission Requirements: Bachelor's degree in any field of humanities, social science, science, or professional disciplines. No tests or application fee are required (for citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland

applying for a state scholarship €16 fee is charged and an interview is held). No previous degree in philosophy is needed.

Tuition fee:

- 1) citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland — €815 per school year
- 2) international students - €3 850 per school year

Financial aid:

A) ***Citizens of the EU/EEA and Switzerland*** are eligible for state scholarships carrying a 75% tuition waiver plus a monthly stipend beginning from the second semester.

B) Fulbright Graduate Grants are offered to ***American citizens*** as a form of very competitive financial aid; for more information see www.fulbright.bg. Furthermore, American applicants are eligible for Federal Loans; please check for more details at the Education Department web site, <http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DirectLoan/index.html>; at Sallie Mae, <http://www.salliemae.com/>, and at the Student Loan Network, <http://www.privatestudentloans.com> and <https://www.discoverstudentloans.com>. It is possible for the American citizens to use some other sources of government financial assistance (please contact the Program Director for details).

C) Financial aid to ***Canadian nationals*** is provided in the form of Government Student Loans by the Province where they permanently reside.

D) ***The Western Balkans citizens*** are welcome to apply for Erasmus Mundus/BASELEUS Project scholarship carrying full tuition waiver and monthly stipend, <http://www.basileus.ugent.be/index.asp?p=111&a=111>.

E) ***Students from Turkey*** can receive financial aid within the Erasmus Student Exchange Program.

F) Financial aid for ***Chinese students*** is available within the bilateral Chinese-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Chinese Ministry of Education for more information.

H) ***Students from Russia*** (Financial aid for ***Russian students*** is available within the bilateral Russian-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Russian Ministry of Education for more information). ***Students from the Ukraine, Belarus, and the other CIS countries, the Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East*** receive financial aid in the form of inexpensive dormitory accommodation (about €50 per month including most of the utilities) plus a discount on public transportation and at the University cafeterias. The same type of financial aid is available for ***the citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland, American citizens, Canadian nationals, Western Balkans citizens, students from Turkey, and Chinese students.***

Application deadline: September 30, to start in October; January 31, to start in March.

Student Visa Matters: Sofia University in cooperation with the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science provides the necessary documents for student visa application to all **eligible** candidates outside the ***EU/EEA and Switzerland.***

Cultural Life and Recreation: Being the capital of Bulgaria, Sofia features a rich cultural life. In most of the cinemas, English language films can be seen. There are a number of concert halls, dozens of art galleries, and many national and international cultural centers. The streets of Sofia are populated by cozy caf  s and high quality inexpensive restaurants offering Bulgarian, European, and international cuisine. Sofia is a favorable place for summer and winter sports including skiing in the nearby mountain of Vitosha. More about Sofia and can be found at <http://www.sofia-life.com/culture/culture.php>. You can follow Sofia and Bulgarian news at <http://www.novinite.com/lastx.php>.

Contact person: Dr. Alexander L. Gungov, Program Director
E-mail: agungov@phls.uni-sofia.bg, agungov@yahoo.com
Phone: (+3592) 9308-414 (Bulgaria is within the Eastern European Time Zone)
Mailing address: Department of Philosophy, Sofia University, 15 Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd., Sofia 1504, BULGARIA.

DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY TAUGHT IN ENGLISH

The Ph.D. Program in Philosophy taught in English, besides studies in residence, offers an opportunity for extramural studies (extramural studies is a Bulgarian version of distance learning). This Program provides instruction in all major areas of Western Philosophy. In addition the doctoral dissertation can be written on a topic from Eastern Philosophy - an expert in this field will be appointed as the supervisor. The program is structured, yet leaves enough room for student's own preferences. The degree is recognized worldwide including in the EU/EEA and Switzerland, the US, Canada, Russia, Turkey, China, Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Courses offered: Psychoanalysis and Philosophy, Philosophical Anthropology, Applied Ethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Social Philosophy, Philosophy of Intercultural Relations, Philosophical Method, Continental Philosophy, Philosophy for Children, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Culture, Time and History.

Eligibility Requirement: Master's degree in any field. No previous degree in philosophy is needed.

Checklist: CV, two letters of recommendation, standardized tests scores are NOT required. No application fee (for citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland a €32 fee is charged and an entrance exam is held).

Tuition fee:

1) citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland — €1450 per school year; extramural: €2440 per school year

2) international students - in residence: €6 500 per school year; extramural: €3 300 per school year

Dissertation defense fee: €950

Duration of studies: in residence — 3 years; extramural — 4 years; opportunities for distance learning.

Financial aid:

A) *Citizens of the EU/EEA and Switzerland* studying in residence are eligible for state scholarships carrying full tuition waiver and waiver

of the dissertation defense fee plus a significant (for the Bulgarian standard) monthly stipend. For extramural studies only tuition waiver and the dissertation defense fee waiver are available.

B) Fulbright Graduate Grants are offered to **American citizens** as a form of very competitive financial aid; for more information see www.fulbright.bg. Furthermore, they are eligible for Federal Loans; please check for more details at the Education Department web site, <http://www.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DirectLoan/index.html>; at Sallie Mae, <http://www.salliemae.com/>, and at Student Loan Network, <http://www.privatestudentloans.com> and <https://www.discoverstudentloans.com>. It is possible for the American citizens to use some other sources of government financial assistance (please contact the Program Director for details).

C) Financial aid to **Canadian nationals** is provided in the form of Government Student Loans by the Province where they permanently reside. This type of aid is usually unavailable for extramural studies.

D) **The Western Balkans citizens** are welcome to apply for Erasmus Mundus/BASELEUS Project scholarship carrying full tuition waiver and monthly stipend, <http://www.basileus.ugent.be/index.asp?p=111&a=111>.

E) **Students from Turkey** can receive financial aid within the Erasmus Student Exchange Program.

F) Financial aid for **Chinese students** is available within the bilateral Chinese-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Chinese Ministry of Education for more information.

H) **Students from Russia** (Financial aid for **Russian students** is available within the bilateral Russian-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Russian Ministry of Education for more information). **Students from the Ukraine, Belarus, and the other CIS countries, the Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East** receive financial aid in the form of inexpensive dormitory accommodation (about 40 € per month including most of the utilities) plus a discount on public transportation and at the University cafeterias. The same type of financial aid is available for **the citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland, American citizens, Canadian nationals, Western Balkans citizens, students from Turkey, and Chinese students**.

Application deadline: September 30 (for state scholarship applications--September 15), to start in October; January 31, to start in

March.

The citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland please check with the Program Director about the state scholarship deadline.

Student Visa Matters: Sofia University in cooperation with the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science provides the necessary documents for student visa application to all **eligible** candidates outside the ***EU/EEA and Switzerland***.

Cultural Life and Recreation: Being the capital of Bulgaria, Sofia features a rich cultural life. In most of the cinemas, English language films can be seen. There is a number of concert halls, dozens of art galleries, and many national and international cultural centers. The streets of Sofia are full of cozy cafés and high quality inexpensive restaurants offering Bulgarian, European, and international cuisine. Sofia is a favorable place for summer and winter sports including skiing in the nearby mountain of Vitosha. More about Sofia and be found at <http://www.sofia-life.com/culture/culture.php>. You can follow Sofia and Bulgarian news at <http://www.novinite.com/lastx.php>.

Contact person: Dr. Alexander L. Gungov, Program Director

E-mail: agungov@phls.uni-sofia.bg, agungov@yahoo.com

Phone: (+3592) 9308-414 (Bulgaria is within the Eastern European Time Zone)

Mailing address: Department of Philosophy, Sofia University, 15 Tsar Osvoboditel Blvd., Sofia 1504, BULGARIA.

INFORMATION ABOUT AUTHORS AND EDITORS

(in alphabetic order)

Dr. Alexander L. Gungov is Professor of Logic and Continental Philosophy at the School of Philosophy and Director of the Graduate Program in Philosophy Taught in English, University of Sofia, Bulgaria, EU.

Mr. Blagoja Petrovski is a Graduate Student at the M.A. Program in Philosophy Taught in English, University of Sofia, Bulgaria, EU.

Mr. Dan Corjescu is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Doctoral Program in Philosophy Taught in English, University of Sofia, Bulgaria, EU.

Dr. David Tomasi works in the Inpatient Psychiatry Unit at the University of Vermont Medical Center, Vermont, U.S.A.

Mr. Eleftherios Sarantis is a Ph.D. Student at the Doctoral Program in Philosophy Taught in English, University of Sofia, Bulgaria, EU.

Dr. Emil Dimitrov is Associate Professor at the Institute for Literature, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgaria, EU.

Dr. Geoffrey Dean is Lecturer in Music at the University of Utah, U.S.A.

Mr. Hans Krauch is a Ph.D. Student at the Doctoral Program in Philosophy Taught in English, University of Sofia, Bulgaria, EU.

Ms. Ilona Valcheva is a Ph.D. Student at the Doctoral Program in Philosophy Taught in English, University of Sofia, Bulgaria, EU.

Dr. John McSweeney is Independent Scholar residing in Cork, Ireland, EU.

Mr. Karim Mamdani is Independent Scholar residing in North America and Europe.

Dr. Kristina Stoeckl is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, University of Innsbruck, Austria, EU.

Mr. Man-to TANG is a Ph.D. Students in Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, CHINA.

Sofia Philosophical Review
ISSN 1313-275X

Alexander L. Gungov, Sofia University, Editor
John McSweeney, Cork, Ireland, Associate Editor
Karim Mamdani, Toronto, Canada, Book Review Editor
Kristina Stöckl, University of Vienna, International Editor
Aglika A. Gungova, Cover Design

Published by Center Academic Community in Civil Society

Printed at BPS
E-mail: info@avangard-print.com