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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Life and Horizon

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Abstract:

In this article, I expand Husserl's concept of horizon by relating it to the experiential horizons of non-human animals. Using Darwin's description of the "web of complex relations" that binds different species together, I show how the human horizon connects to the horizons of other sentient creatures. The result is an enlargement of Husserl's "horizon of horizons" beyond the human totality of experiences. I conclude by showing how this expanded notion of horizon allows us to address the problematic aspects of Husserl's original notion of horizon.

Introduction

The concept of horizon has a certain paradoxical, aporetic quality. On the one hand the term signifies a limit, a border. The word comes from the Greek, ὁρίζων (*horízōn*), which is taken from ὅρος (*hóros*), signifying a boundary. Thus, we can speak of the horizon as the border between the earth and the sky. This border is the limit of what we can see. As we advance, it recedes before us. It appears as a border that can never be crossed. It is, paradoxically, a one-sided border—a border that we can never, as from some sort of aerial view, see from both sides. In this, it shares the aporetic quality that death exhibits. Death also exhibits itself as a border, a threshold that we cannot cross. This threshold is constantly present to us. Living, we approach it, but we cannot, as long as we are alive, cross it. As Derrida writes, "Indeed, concerning the threshold of death, we are engaged here toward a certain possibility of the impossible."[1] Death is the ultimate expression of the "I cannot."

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[1] Jacques Derrida, *Aporias*, trans. Thomas Dutroit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 11.

Like the horizon, it remains a one-sided border.

What does this comparison say about the idea of horizon? Is it a coincidence, or does it point to something essential in its conception? Certain things suggest an essential connection as, for example, the fact that only living beings can die. Death, in other words, is only possible in the context of life. It is in terms of this context that death assumes its quality of a border. There is also the fact that living beings are embodied and, as such, are capable of motility. Because of this, they are open to experiencing the ongoing advance of the horizon and, with this, its quality of being a one-sided border. That the notion of such a border occurs in the context of life points to the tie between life and horizon. In what follows, I will examine this relationship. My thesis will be that the horizonality of experiences is structured by life. Such horizonality is not just a structure of the "life-world," the world of lived experiences that, according to Husserl, we enter once we bracket the claims of science. Horizonality, I will argue, is an ontological principle, one that informs the living world as such. It is a principle determinative of the factual course of experience of sentient beings.

Horizon and Facticity

In phenomenology, the concept of horizon signifies a series of experiences that have been connected and, in their connections, determine the further experiences which can join this series. Thus, in the appearing of a spatio-temporal object, the experiences which we have grasped form the actually experienced portion of a larger horizon. This horizon is composed of the experiences which can connect with the perspectival views we have already experienced. If they fit in with them, they join with our previous experiences so as to more closely determine the object's sense. If they don't, then they make us correct our interpretation of this sense. This sense is not just visual. The horizon that determines it includes our experiences of the object's tactile, auditory, and other sensuous qualities. It also includes the experience we have of its relations to other objects, for example, when we use it as a tool. An object's horizon is, in fact, not just "internal," i.e., directed to the specification of its particular features; it is also "external." Husserl writes regarding the latter,

> The individual—relative to consciousness—is nothing for itself; perception of a thing is its perception in a *perceptual field*.

And just as the individual thing has a sense in perception only through an open horizon of "possible perceptions,"... so once again the thing has a horizon: an "external horizon" in relation to the "internal"; it has this precisely as a thing of a *field of things*; and this finally points to the totality, "the world as a perceptual world."[2]

The experiences forming this external horizon relate the sense of the object to the senses of the objects composing its surrounding world. My perceptual field includes them. When I move from one object to another, the series of my experiences makes the second object occupy the foreground of my visual field. By virtue of such external horizons, an object acquires its sense as an individual member of the objects of the world. It appears as a numerical (or countable) singular, i.e., as one of many different objects. It also becomes classifiable. Objects with similar senses have the same general internal horizons. Their relations to other objects as given by their external horizons are also similar. Burning matches, for example, all shed light and warmth on their environment.

The most general sense of objects is that they are objects of the world. This signifies that we experience them as part of our unfolding experience of the world. Husserl writes regarding this: "Things, objects...are 'given'...but in principle only in such a way that we are conscious of them as things or objects *within the world-horizon.* Each one is something, something of the world of which we are constantly conscious as a horizon."[3] This world-horizon is the totality of the internal and external horizons through which we grasp objects and their relations. Its correlate is the world considered as the totality of objects. Each worldly object is a one-among-many, but the world, taken as a whole, is simply one. It is not a numerical, but rather a *unique* singular. In Husserl's words, "the world does not exist like an entity, an object, but exists in a singularity for which the plural is senseless."[4] This means that there is a "fundamental distinction in the way in which we are conscious

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[2] Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*, ed. W. Biemel (Den Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 165. All translations from the German in this essay are my own.

[3] Ibid., 145.

[4] Ibid*.,* 146.

of the world and the way in which we are conscious of the thing."[5] We are "constantly consciousness" of the world "as a horizon." We can only think of the world as the unending totality of the unfolding experience that, in its connections, allows us to posit individual objects.

Left unresolved in this view of horizon is the existence of the connections that allow us to posit objects and, ultimately, the world as the totality of objects. For Husserl, such connections are simply a fact. He writes:

> The factual (*das Factische*) is the course of consciousness. This holds for every case, whether or not this consciousness be sufficient for the constitution of an exact nature, i.e., our nature, and whether or not it be, as well, one which requires this…Prior, then, to transcendental phenomenology, it is, therefore, a fact that the course of consciousness is so structured that within it a nature as a "rational" unity can constitute itself.[6]

Implicit in calling the course of consciousness a fact is the idea of its contingency. Facts could be otherwise and so could be the experience that allows us to posit the world. As Husserl puts this point: "The existence of the world is a correlate of certain multiplicities of experience marked out by certain essential formations. But it is *not* a matter of insight that actual experience could proceed *only* in such forms of connections. This cannot be inferred purely from the essence of perception *per se*."[7] The essence of perception, which designates the possibility of perceptual synthesis, is actualized when experiences occur in a certain order—for example, the order of perspectival givenness, where one side of an object gives way to another as we move around it. In the absence of this order, the synthesis that yields the perceptual presence of a three-dimensional object cannot occur. This factual dependence thus opens up the possibility that experience could proceed in a way that makes positing impossible. Thus, when Husserl asks, "Must there always exist an

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[5]   Ibid.

[6]   Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/1924), Erste Teil, Kritische Ideengeschichte*, ed. R. Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 393.

[7]   Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch*, ed. R. Schuhmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 103.

ego and a physical nature? Cannot consciousness collapse in a tumult of formations?". His answer is affirmative.[8] For him, "the being (the actual existence) of nature is an open pretension on every level."[9] It depends on the factual course of experience.[10]

What is responsible for this factual course? Husserl writes: "Because

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[8] Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Erster Teil,* 393. Husserl remarks, "a complete dissolution of the world in a tumult of experiences is equivalent to a dissolution of the ego" (Ms. K IV 2, p. 14). I am grateful to the Husserl Archives in Leuven, Belgium for permission to quote from the unpublished manuscripts.

[9] Husserl, Ms. K III 2, Oct. 10, 1935, p. 10. Iso Kern writes with regard to Husserl's stress on facticity, "In his interpretation of the facticity of world-constitution or of the 'ego of transcendental apperception,' Husserl was aware that he was in a fundamental opposition to German idealism." For the latter, as represented by Kant, the ego is prior to and determinative of the factual. For Husserl, the reverse is the case. Regarding the resultant contingency of both the ego and its world, Kern expresses this opposition as follows: "Insofar as Husserl teaches that world-constitution or, as the case may be, the ego who possesses the world (the 'ego of transcendental apperception') does not, itself, have a basis in a transcendental subjectivity which would make this constitution necessary and permit the positing of the ego itself as necessarily possessing the world—or, better, insofar as world-constitution does not have a basis in a transcendental subjectivity which could guarantee the genesis and continuance of this constitution so that there would not continually exist for transcendental subjectivity the possibility of the dissolution of the cosmos and the 'ego of transcendental apperception'—there results for Husserl a concept of transcendental idealism which is basically different from those of German idealism" (*Husserl und Kant* [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964], 297-98).

[10] Thus, for Husserl, "Facts are, in principle, incapable of being derived from essential laws; such laws, in the manner of ideal norms, only specify facts with regard to possibility" (Ms. F I 14, p. 49, June 1911). They specify, in other words, the possibilities of what would obtain, *if* certain factual conditions were, indeed, given. They do not, however, prescribe the obtaining of such factual conditions. In Husserl's words, "These laws...cannot pronounce with regard to an actuality—i.e., whether or not there exists an actuality which corresponds to them. Essential laws possess a meaning for the real if something real (an individual being) can be given which falls under the essences, the ideas" (Ms. D 13 XXI, p. 26, 1907-09).

the rationality that facticity actualizes is not such as the essence demands, in all this there lies a wonderful *teleology*."[11] In other words, because the essence cannot demand that perception give us an actual, "rational" world, the necessity must lie in such a world taken as a goal or *telos* inherent in constitution. Husserl embraces this solution in the *Crisis* and the unpublished manuscripts associated with it. He writes that "each transcendental ego has something innate. Within itself, it innately bears the teleological ground of its streaming, constituting, transcendental life."[12] This ground, which is also a goal, determines the factual course of its consciousness and, hence, its "constituting, transcendental life." As "immanent" within subjects, "as the form of their individual being, as the form of all the forms in which subjectivity exists," this ground determines both "the universal being of transcendental subjectivity" and the world that such subjectivity posits.[13] Given this, "teleology can be exhibited as that which ultimately makes possible and thereby actualizes all being in its totality."[14] For Husserl, then the teleological directedness of consciousness towards the constitution of a stable world is the reason why neither the subject nor its world collapses into a "tumult of formations."

In what sense is this position phenomenological? If we take phenomenology as a descriptive science of the actually existing formations of consciousness, then its descriptions, like such formations, presuppose the factual course of consciousness. In attempting to account for such a factual course, we thus go beyond such phenomenology. What we face, Husserl writes, is "the problematic of the irrationality of the transcendental fact, which appears in the constitution of the factual world and factual mental life." The attempt to solve it involves "metaphysics in a new sense."[15]

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[11] Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch*, ed. R. Schuhmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 125.

[12] Husserl, Ms. E III 9, p. 11.

[13] Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Dritter Teil: 1929-1935*, ed. Iso Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 1973, 378.

[14] Ibid., 380.

[15] Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24)*, 188. That this metaphysics also has a theological sense is indicated by Husserl's asking: "Can one say, in this situation, that this teleology with its primal facticity has its basis in God" (*Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Dritter Teil: 1929-1935*, p. 385). God, here, is understood as the logos or principle of rationality. See ibid., p. 610.

Life and Horizon

We need not embrace such metaphysics to solve this problematic. The factual course of consciousness can also be taken as determined by nature, taken in a Darwinian sense. Doing so, we broaden the concept of horizon. We extend it to all sentient life. For Darwin, nature is determined by natural selection. Comparing its results with those of domestic breeding, Darwin writes,

> Nature, if I may be allowed to personify the natural preservation or survival of the fittest, cares nothing for appearances, except insofar as they are useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects only for his own good: Nature only for that of the being which she tends.[16]

This notion of the "being which she tends" and its benefit becomes highly ambiguous once we bear "in mind how infinitely complex and close-fitting are the mutual relations of all organic beings to each other and to their physical conditions of life."[17] For Darwin, each organic being is enmeshed in "the web of complex relations" that binds different species together. This web, he writes, is such "that the structure of every organic being is related, in the most essential and yet often hidden manner, to that of all the other organic beings with which it comes into competition for food or residence or from which it has to escape or on which it preys."[18] In Darwin's view, the individual features that make up a living being's structure, from the shape of its legs to the type of eyes it has, are actually a set of indices. Each points to the specific features of the environment in which it functions, and which, for the purposes of survival, its evolutionary history has internalized as part of its structure.[19] This holds not just for nature's shaping the physical features of organisms, but also for its action on their sensate, conscious lives. An animal's senses are determined by its need to function in a given envi-

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[16] Charles Darwin, "The Origin of the Species," in *The Origin of the Species and the Descent of Man* (New York: Random House, 1967), 65.

[17] Ibid., 63.

[18] Ibid, 62.

[19] See ibid.

ronment. The interrelation of this environment with those of species composing it extends in a horizonal manner to the whole of life. Understood in these terms, then, the "being" that nature tends can be understood as life itself understood as a web of relations. This becomes the shifting *telos* determining individual lives.

If we accept Darwin's position, there is a horizonality built into life. Ontologically, that is, in terms of each species' being, this horizon is expressed by the interrelation of the life forms and their environment. The horizon of each species includes both the physical environment in which it functions, as well the other species that function in this. Thus, the individual's ontological horizon includes those whom it feeds upon and those who prey upon it. It also includes those who compete with it for food or mates, as well as those, if it is a social species, with whom it must cooperate if it is to survive. Each of the members of the species with whom it comes into relation has its own horizon, one that extends beyond the original species' horizon. Ultimately, this horizonality extends to the web of life itself. In this web, each species directly shapes the species that form its environment. Mediately, it shapes all the others. Such shaping also includes its physical environment. Thus, the oxygen we breathe is present through the chemical actions of plants; the carbon dioxide that plants require is provided through animal respiration. Similar assertions can be made of the quality of the soil, and so on.

Given that an animal's senses are determined by its need to function in a given environment, we can say that its *phenomenological* horizon is founded on the ontological one of animate and inanimate entities. As determined by the latter, each of its senses has its own horizon. The horizon of a bat's sense of hearing, for example, is determined by the darkness of the sky and the insects it feeds on at night. It is also determined by its ability to fly, to issue high pitched sounds, and to locate insects through the echoes it receives. Its auditory horizon, as it hunts on the wing, unfolds according to these factors. The same can be said of its other senses. They are all determined by the web of life (and the nonliving material that is part of this). Similar assertions hold for the other animals in this web. Each has its own perceptual horizons. Such horizons are also tied to its bodily structure as determined by its environment. They, too, are linked to the organisms with whom they compete or cooperate, pursue or fall prey to. The totality of such linked horizons forms, we can say, the horizon of experiential horizons. The human ho-

rizon is just a part of this. Husserl's world horizon is also part of a greater whole insofar as it consists of experiences available to human subjects. Viewed in the context of life, Husserl's ultimate horizon thus cannot be taken as the phenomenological expression of the world as a totality—the uniquely singular world. The totality of experiences that define such a world exceeds the human.

With this, we can return to the question of the factual course of our experiences. The defining factor, here, must be the web of life. As Nietzsche expresses this insight: "we have senses for only a selection of perceptions—those with which we have to concern ourselves in order to preserve ourselves."[20] The same holds for the other animals. In each case, the factual course of its perceptions is determined in their order and their kind by its functioning in its environment. Its particular senses determine the *kind* of perceptions it has. Its bodily motility determines their *order*. Thus, out of the multitude of information its animate and inanimate environment offers, it attends only to those that match its needs.[21] If it did not, it would not survive: the processes of natural selection would result in its extinction. The teleology inherent in this is directed to life as whole, life as affirming itself in its changing parts. The goal of such teleology is, in Darwin's terms, simply "the "being" that "Nature" tends." It is ultimately life itself, understood in terms of the web of relations that binds it together.

Motion and Horizon

Implicit in the assertion that our bodily motion determines the order of our perceptions is the fact that motion is what actualizes our perceptual horizon. As we move, our experience unfolds horizonally. Motion, then, is at the basis of the appearing of our world. It is also, according to the Czech phenomenologist, Jan Patočka, at the basis of its existence. In asserting the primacy of motion, Patočka thus gives us a basis for understanding the relation between the phenomenological and ontological horizons that Darwin joins together. In announcing his inten-

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[20] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1968), 275.

[21] Since biologists ascribe senses and motility to plants, the same assertions hold with regard to them. Their horizons are linked to those of the animal world.

tions, Patočka writes that his goal is "a philosophy of a distinctive kind, one that takes movement as its basic concept and principle." "What is distinctive about our attempt," he adds, "is our interpretation of movement; we understand it independently of the dichotomy between subject and object."[22] Its independence comes from the fact that motion is not itself an entity, but rather the *realization* of entities—be they embodied subjects or objects. As Patočka expresses this: "Movement is what makes a being what it is. It unifies and maintains cohesion; it synthesizes the determinations of the being. The persistence and the determinations of substance, and so on, are movements."[23] His point is that movement is the very *existence* of what exists. It is its actuality or being in act. This insight can be put in terms of the etymological sense of the term "existence," which is that of standing out—*ex* and *istimi* in the Greek. Things stand out, that is, ex-ist, by affecting their environment, such affection occurring through their motion. On the most basic level, living beings do this through engaging in metabolism, i.e., by exchanging material with what surrounds them. Inanimate objects do this through such motions as the vibration of atoms, the movement of electrons, the flux of subatomic particles, and so on. Without such motions, entities could not distinguish themselves from their environments; they could not affect them. Environmentally, then, without movement, they are indistinguishable from non-entities. If we accept this, then we can also say with Patočka, "movement is...what founds the identity between being and appearing. Being is being manifest."[24] This follows because

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[22] Jan Patočka, *Body, Community, Language, World*, trans. Erazim Kohák (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1998), 153.

[23] Patočka, "La conception aristotélicienne du mouvement: signification philosophique et recherches historiques," in *Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine*, ed. and trans. Erika Abrams (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 136. At issue, then, is "the problem of movement ontologically conceived, the problem of movement that is not a simple relation, the result of a constitution, but rather the very movement that constitutes the being of entities, which itself exists through movement and becoming, not simply exteriorly and relatively, but in terms of everything that they are" (ibid.). Such a conception, it should be emphasized, is not Aristotelian. Aristotle conceived of motion as the motion of some underlying substrate.

[24] Ibid.

the movement that makes something stand out or exist also makes it present to its environment. It appears in affecting it, and it affects it through its motion.

Whether or not Patočka's conception can apply to existence as a whole, it finds a ready application to the Darwinian conception of life. This is because "the web of complex relations" that characterize life is not static, but continually evolves. This evolution is the result of what can be called the motion of evolution. Such motion actualizes the species. In doing so, it results in the ways in which the individuals composing them presently affect each other and, hence, in the ways in which they "stand out" or exist for one another. In endowing them with senses and bodily motility, it also actualizes their perceptual horizons and, hence, the appearing for each of its world. With this, we have the actualization of the world-horizon in the extended sense of including all their interrelated experiential horizons.

When we apply Patočka's conception to life, two conclusions thus follow. The first is that the web of life is itself actualized as motion. Each of the individuals composing it has been shaped by the motion of evolution. Such motion is a primary example of Patočka's dictum that, ontologically understood, motion "no longer presupposes constituted being but rather constitutes it."[25] For Patočka, this dictum holds generally. In living beings, such constituting motion consists of such things as an animal's metabolic processes, the flow of blood in its veins, the movements of respiration, of digestion, in short, all the organic movements that characterize its being alive. It also includes its bodily motility, which includes the motility of its senses, such as its focusing its eyes, sniffing the air, responding to echoes and so on. All these things, and more, are, in Patočka's words, "movements tied to the fundamental functions of organisms." In humans, he adds, movement includes "language, the movement that, by its composition and decomposition, seizes upon or lets escape the real relations between things and their qualifications." Given our capacity for imitation, our movement also includes the motions of "artistic mimesis," for example, those of singing, dancing, drawing, etc.[26] All these

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[25] Patočka, "Nachwort," in *Die natürliche Welt als philosophisches Problem, Phänomenologische Schriften I*, ed. Klaus Nellen und Jiří Němec, trans. Eliška und Ralph Melville (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990), 242.

[26] Patočka, *Aristote, ses devanciers, ses successeurs*, trans. Erika Abrams (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2011), 128.

movements, and many others besides, go into making a person *be* what he or she is. The second conclusion is that this actualization is one with the appearing that occurs through the associated horizons. It is responsible for the bat's perceptual world, as it hunts on the wing. It also results in the world that humans encounter.

The One-Sided Border

With this, we have the reason why both life and experience are confronted by borders that they can never cross. The border of what we do experience (its horizon) always advances before us. We can never catch up with it. The same holds with regard to our death, which, as long as we are alive, is always ahead of us. Both follow from the fact that the ongoing quality of our experiential horizon is tied to the motion that is essential to life. When the motion that actualizes our life and its associated horizon of experience ceases—when, on the basic level, metabolism stops—we lose the basis for both being and appearing. Given this, we can never cross the boundary of the horizon. The horizon must always advance since its stasis is one with the end of our existence. The actual, underlying one-sided border is, thus, implicit in motion itself understood as the ground of both being and appearing.

Derrida's paradox of the "possibility of the impossible," i.e., of the one-sided border, thus, points beyond itself to Patočka's reformulation of phenomenology. It also indicates the biological basis of both the factual course of consciousness and the horizons that this course actualizes. In this, it shows us our interconnectedness—in both a phenomenological and ontological sense—with the rest of nature. To interpret this in a Darwinian sense may, to some, appear as a questionable "naturalization" of phenomenology. Such naturalization, however, may also be taken as sign of and an obligation to the natural world that sustains us.

Husserl's Intentional Meaning and the Concept of Ineffability

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Introduction

There are words which by themselves seem to lead to nowhere, to have no clarity, no definition. Ineffability is one of those words which tends to unleash a series of questions rather than point to very specific semantic traits as is often expected. At first sight, ineffability sounds like a contradictory term, an oxymoron, as *it is a use of language to determine something that language itself cannot express*. From this first observation, it becomes clear that human language has the dual faculty of expressing with words a large number of impressions or perceptions, while it may also confess to its incapacity to put into intelligible language a certain number of impressions and sensations surrounding human beings. And yet, this incapacity needs language to be expressed. If we were to apply the traditional tools of linguistics to a situation of "Ineffability," we would therefore be faced, at least, with the problem of reference, the object of which, we have the impression, cannot be described properly for some reasons to be determined. Through a pure Sausurrean perspective, ineffability could not ideally match the three poles of its ternary semiotic interpretation: the acoustic image "ineffability" would first point to an idea of ineffability whose abstractedness could be conceivable. For Saussure the linguistic sign remains a psychical entity,[1] even though not pointing to any specific reference, other than in given situations where the human being understands that he is confronted with an extra-linguistic impression. In fact, the production of meaning, between the word, its idea and a possible reference, has to be

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[1] In his account of the linguistic sign, F. de Saussure first relates the acoustic image to its concept but only with the intention of depicting one single entity with two sides. F. de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale* (Paris, Payot, 1960), 97-99.

construed both in topological terms so as to determine the origins of meaning and in term of its effects on the concept of ineffability. For such a purpose, the relation of thought as a first motor with language may be of use in our attempt to analyse its topological function within or outside the Word-Idea-Object triad.

Already with the Saussurean conception of the linguistic sign, thought is placed at a crucial point in the process of relating words to ideas and references. In this design, the unsayable can be ascribed to at least three phenomena: either man is deprived of a specific word to account for the phenomenon with which he is confronted; or he does not possess a glimpse of an idea of such a phenomenon, clear enough to be able to relate it to the word he has in mind; or again, the external reference itself does not exist in reality, despite his capacity for using some mental acoustic image, and being able to relate it to an idea, a signified, a concept. In that latter case, ineffability is still not reduced to something which cannot be expressed in reality, as this time the reference is provided by imagination and works as if the object existed in real life. In a state of perfect equilibrium, between the signifier (let us say here the pronounced word), the idea evoked and the external object, communication becomes almost natural and eased with any interlocutor, who knows the identity of a word, namely all its connections with other words, founding the most basic and natural communication between individuals. It would therefore be relevant to ask which part of the linguistic sign bears the significance of effective communication, when one word is perfectly understood, and clear enough to link two locutors. The dynamics of communication seems to involve all three elements together, as the uttering of the signifier "dog" would instantaneously trigger the concept/idea of dog, as well as its exterior manifestation when required by a specific context. Can we therefore infer the precedence of the uttering as it is understood in the Saussurean triangle from the mere fact that any idea could not be communicated without its material framing? In our view, there is no such consecutive process in the triangular relationship between word, idea and object.[2] Indeed, the production of meaning may

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[2]   In fact, in the triad between the acoustic image, the idea and the reference, there are various levels of meaning, ranging from the pure denotative one, as a 'burning flame' would designate the object itself, the physical phenomenon, but could also point to someone's passion or love. Here, the extra-

start from the sole intelligibility of the concept, or the mere perception of the objectified reference. Furthermore, the relation of communication, in terms of signification, may well start at any of these poles, whatever the dual or mutliple relationships implied by any of them.[1]

Signification (against mere meaning) is indeed the most fundamental process whereby any linguistic sign acquires its true value. It is not because the relation of the acoustic image and the signified is arbitrary that meaning can be endlessly expanded, but because any use of a linguistic sign inevitably involves a more fundamental process of signification, as Stephen Ullmann remarkably noted, including denotation and connotation.[3] The ultimate 'truly involved reference' therefore becomes crucial. And that is why the notion of ineffability becomes utterly important, as the inexistence of a word does not preclude by itself communication of not implied meanings. In other words, words themselves can become useless in communication, as they have no hierarchical function to play in triggering ideas and pointing to external reality, as is assumed in the Sausurrean model of linguistic signs. It is obvious that words can just be the ultimate phase in the process of thinking because the idea may come up in the mind much earlier than when it is vested with a material form. It is therefore possible at times to reverse the Saussurean triangle and put in the first rank the idea as the first bearer of intersubjective communication. Communication can also arise from any exterior object in the first place, fuelling the mind with ideas coming from varied external percepts. The process of meaning this time starts with the perception of forms and goes to the mind with the possibility of forming multiple ideas, of which some will be coined in already existing words by an impending speaker. The process of meaning underlying communication is then not caused exclusively by a linguistic trigger, the word, but by an external perception. If meaning has no unique established linguistic origins, thought could be the first motor, and language only subservient to it.

In a process of communication, intended as a rhizomatic transfer of meaning,[4] some words may not be translatable at all, and this could de-

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linguistic reference will therefore illuminate in the first place the relation between the acoustic image, and the concept involved.

[3] Stephen Ullman, *Semantics*: *An Introduction to the Science of Meaning* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1962).

[4] Rhizomatic, namely without any foundational or precise topological origin.

fine a first form of ineffability. It is well known that languages have both particular items and universal ones, the former being related to a specific *Anschauung* of the world, whereby for given geographical and cultural reasons words emerge in certain countries and not in others. It is therefore in the nature of language not to be able to express everything in another one, as two different languages are not two equal layers of corresponding words. Some objects being absent in one part of the world, the necessity of coining a word was not felt in other cultural contexts. The unsayable may thus result from a cultural perception of the world, culture being understood here as a product of geographical prerequisites. Likewise, the vital necessity of water to human beings leaves little doubt regarding a possible universal meaning of water among all human societies, both in time and space. Words such as "eye," "hand" are bound to find also a universal meaning, even if a cultural one could also be derived from a specific use of the word. But when an object lacks in any given cultural reality, how could it be spoken of?

Here, the material form seems to impede, through its passage, the transfer of meaning, from one language to another, and we have thus to resort to the perception of that alien object, that is to the meanings derived from percepts to attain the ideas and conceptions raised in the mind, from which at last, some words would be used in a dovetailing, periphrastic way. The unsayable can be cultural, linguistically speaking, but there are ways of bringing foreign languages together through the use of perception and thought. It is natural, and certainly logical, from that viewpoint to consider language as deficient or lacking completeness. That is why, many also consider language as potentially capable of expressing anything only under the guise of metaphorical discourse. However, what really lies under this power of expression is a crucial feature of ineffability, resulting from the limited number of words that a language possesses compared to the immense world of possible experiences: we will refer to this world as the Husserlian *Lebenswelt*. A word

We are referring here to Guattari Deleuze's implementation of the rhizome, a term coming from botanics and describing a multicentered bulb, growing anarchically. The abscence of unity in the rhyzom is implemented to deconstruct the relation Subject/Object or any defined attempt to create a structure or an arborescence. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Rhizome* (Paris, France, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris, 1976), 13.

is thus both an overture and a barrier in meaning. Some structuralist thinkers, and still optimistic views on language, tend to define this opposition in terms of differentiation, or selection, of *what it is not* in order to reach *what it really is.* But it would be more appropriate to consider ineffability in a more negative way, that is without being superseded by a positive end or teleological gain of meaning, especially when language is differentiated from discourse.[5] Language is truly a deficient tool, which can only be compensated by insertion into a vaster semiotic compound of percepts submitted to complex processes of communication, hence our interest in the Husserlian phenomenological *Lebenswelt.*

The relation between a word and the idea linked to it seems to be much more complex than the mere schematic relationship described in the Saussurean triangle. Let us forget the inexisting object for the moment and let us try to concentrate on the relation between the word and thinking. The most "scientific" design of linguistic signs seem to connect a material acoustic word with an idea, as if in a linear and causal relationship, one being the consequence of the other. The mechanics of language may have some bypasses when it comes to interpret the meaning of that relation, whatever the possible derived meanings, but even denotation and connotation are carefully analysed under the rule of the word itself and more precisely its essential and core meaning. A whole tradition in the philosophy of language has put the essential meaning of the word as the foreground of any interpretation, far away as this interpretation might be leading, "discourse" being the absolute limit.[6] Too

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5   Both the Chomskyan generativists and Saussurean structuralists believe in the absolute power of creativity inherent to language. A lack of meaning is interpreted positively as a possibility for creating meaning. For Mariana Tutescu, in a thorough study of semantics: "The sign is both a mark and a lack, namely a marker signifying a concept, and lack of another concept in the perceptible object" (Mariana Tutescu, *Précis de Sémantique Française* (Paris: Librairie Klincksieck, 1975), 19).

6   Semantics is defined as the science of meanings derived from the structure of language. It should be noted that semantics was not concerned in the first place by the topological position of thought, as a first motor in the production of meaning; leading to such terms as, explicit or implicit meaning, presupposed meaning, context of signification… Meaning was essentially derived from the words themselves. The French linguist Guillaume made a great exception to that trend and advocated a new approach to the problem of

much concern has been put on the trustful and truthful relation between the material sign and the meaning it should or could convey. The unsuspected docility of the material sign was neglected to the point that language became a tool of mere pragmatic communication, as was once understood by Austin. It is thus time we thoroughly questioned this performative aspect of language, when thought is not necessarily subservient to the essential meaning of a word. Have not there been frequent situations where human beings felt like saying one thing in order to make their interlocutor do another, contradicting the dogmatic view that words are the essential origins of meaning?

1. "How (not) to do things with words"

There are many pragmatic situations in which language is so much distorted that the words uttered do not only have a double or third meaning, or a concealed meaning, but thoroughly an opposite meaning from the pretended original one. The hermeneutics of communication is always very close to the possible interpretations words can be given, following in that a pure logical tradition. For instance, Benveniste sees in words their essential meanings and endows them with a supreme power of creation (like the creation of subjectivity), never quite escaping a *linguistic* reading of the events,[7] even though sometimes redeemed with a more pragmatic approach, mostly interpreted in terms of general contexts of communication. However, even when words are re-cast in a general pragmatic context, they never cease to deliver their conventional meaning as a background and limited set of essential meanings from which some pressupposed ideas, feelings, or implicit deductions are fi-

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meaning, giving precedence to the psycho-systems, the sources of "thinking thought." See Mariana Tutescu, *Précis de Sémantique Française*, 9.

[7] Words like utterance, pronouncement, or what is uttered and pronounced as in Benveniste's coining are still too much related to an original saying, itself perceived from its conventional origin, the linguistic word. It is interesting to note that for Benveniste, the constitution of the subject originates in language itself, as it is language that creates the "ego": "It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject because language alone establishes the concept of the Ego in reality, and its reality which is that of the being." (Emile Benveniste, *Problems of General Linguistics* (University of Miami Press, 1971), 224.)

nally retrieved. The psycholinguistics of communication is presumably also linguistic as the word governs thinking and its interpretations. Indeed, the Sausurrean and structuralist tradition established the power of the sign not only as a bearer of meaning by itself, considering that language could be so autonomous and self-existing that the plays of language were limited to a certain point. Linguistic strucuturalism even developped a new method for analysis in very distant fields of knowledge like anthropology and psychoanalysis, causing at times some harsh controversies over its epistemological validity.[8] It is true that the structuralist interpretation of language left little space for a renewed interpretation of the sign, too much embedded in conventionalism, and social meaning. The sign was given a determinative form for the sake of structuralism, that is with the view of affording all the possible connections from this form. Seen as a nexus within a stucture, words could be associated in pairs of homonyms, synonyms, antonyms…with all their power of interpretation limited in terms of logical meaning. For instance, Austin's famous phrase, "How to do things with words," would have a whole set of possible interpretations of what to do, whatever doing would imply in terms of good or bad results, but always within the scope of the words inserted in a *structure* of meaning.

However, the fact of not doing something, in a deceitful or unwill-

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[8] The intellectual relation between Roman Jakobson and Claude Lévi-Strauss led to the implementation of the structural theory of language in the field of anthropology. For Lévi-strauss, there is a structural unconscious involving all human societies and any social fact, like kinship may be interpreted by the formal laws of this unconscious, which are similar to structural linguistics. Citing N. Troubetzkoy : "the illustrious founder of structural linguistics, himself furnished the answer to this question. In one programmatic statement he reduced the structural method to four basic operations. First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to study of their unconscious infrastructure; second, it does not treat terms as independent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis the relations between terms; third, it introduces the concept of system— 'Modern phonemics does not merely proclaim that phonemes are always part of a system; it shows concrete phonemic systems and elucidates their structure'; finally, structural linguistics aims at discovering general laws, either by induction 'or . . . by logical deduction, which would give them an absolute character.'" (Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 33.)

ing sense, is discarded from the performative interpretation of the sen-
tence. It is obvious that any order or command, such as the one evoked
by Austin could also mean the contrary of the act intended in words, and
even in pragmatic communication.[9] In daily communication, where
common and conventional meaning is ruling over any other intention of
communication, such a sentence like "You may come to my dinner
party" could deliver many meanings between a full invitation up to a
high degree of reluctance, depending on the circumstances surrounding
the invitation. But this may also deliberately mean: "Do not come to my
dinner party," in an absolute intention to prevent the despised guest from
coming. Austin's attempt to oppose pure logical or descriptive sentences
to performative ones fails to see, in the first place, the unperformative
within the performative itself: "In these examples, it seems clear that to
utter the sentence…is not to describe my doing of what I should be said
in so uttering to be doing or to state I'm doing it: it is to do it. None of
the utterances cited is either true or false: I assert it as obvious and do
not argue about it."[10] If Austin's view of performative utterances seems
correct as they involve something else than mere description or judge-
ment, they still fail to unravel the question of counter-performance in
terms of intentional meaning. In his opinion, it is not the words pro-
nounced themselves that account for the performance of the act, but
rather a certain context necessary for the words to be performed:
"Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in
which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways appropri-
ate…Thus for naming the ship, it should be essential that I should be the
person appointed to name her."[11] However, the appropriateness advo-
cated here by Austin in terms of coherent contextual information is not
necessarily a protection against any misinterpretation. This is the reason
why Austin endows an effective and explicit performative utterance
having thoughts and feelings with the absolute condition of the per-
former *really* being intent on acting.[12] Still, Austin eventually elaborates

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[9]   J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962).
[10] Ibid., 6.
[11] Ibid., 8.
[12] Austin forsees the misfortunes of one performer not really wanting to do
      something and concealing his real intention. In his analysis of performative
      acts, he is able to establish 6 conditions for their fulfillment: A.1: accepted

a crucial distinction between unachieved utterances due to circumstances and others caused by a bad intention. The first ones are ranged under a specific category (in Roman letters in the text), while the others are set under Greek letters to specify their absolute difference in character.[13] For instance, if a marriage between two persons cannot occur because one is already married and without any concealment of the fact, then the inefficient performance of the utterance would be accounted for by a circumstance. Austin calls these circumstances "infelicities," leading to "misfires," when the intention was correct, but "abuses" when it was not. Austin's schema of missed performative utterances becomes more complex, but, as he himself confesses, it only serves the purpose of very precise examples, like the promise of marriage.[14] Besides, if there is some misconduct, or abuse, it is always analysed under the larger category of performative infelicity. Therefore, the substrate of language, although performative this time, still regulates the intentional meaning.

Let us now consider that intentional meaning is our first motor. Even the slightest pragmatic and behavioural detail which could disclose the intention of not being willing to invite that person could be hidden so that even the poor interlocutor would not have been able to understand the true intention of his nefarious host. Sometimes, the idea of not really wanting something deep inside oneself or some action requires so much concealment that such a person tends to outplay his intention, resulting in an opposite speech act. Not having understood the intention of the host, or having understood lately but with no certainty at all, the guest finally comes to the party to check and take the risk of either spending a bad evening full of doubts and qualms, trying to decipher the truly hypocritical attitude of his host, or spend a beautiful one, after having assured himself of his false interpretation. Obviously, saying is not always doing, it can mean the exact opposite, and therefore, words are not the ultimate bearers of meaning.

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conventional procedure, A.2: Appropriateness of the particular persons and circumstances, B.1: The procedure must be executed by all participants, B.2: and completely, G.1: In case of the participants having thoughts and feelings, they must have them and must intend so to conduct, G.2: must actually so conduct themselves and subsequently, Ibid., 14-15.

[13] Ibid., 16.
[14] Ibid., 18.

2. The Use of Intentional Meaning: Sinngebung

Presumably, we could choose to use words in a completely oppo-
site meaning to the ones to which they refer. And this is absolutely not
the case only in contexts of war or secrecy, where encoding could imply
any kind of subverted meaning, but also in given situations, where the
intention is not to make someone do something, but someone not to do
something. At the core of the question of ineffability lies the question of
intention, as a product of thought or consciousness, using words, not as
compounds of internal meaning and external objects being united under
the auspices of the acoustic image, as the structuralist argued, but as
newly intended objects, made of words whose original meaning could
be neutralized. Intentional meaning is derived this time not from the ma-
terial cover, or form of the word, but from the intended meaning as-
cribed to the word, and this power should be located elsewhere than in
the mere word-thought concave relation. The emotional brain is cer-
tainly an interesting place for such an intention to arise, as would be the
heart, following a classical interpretation. Ineffability finds a perfect
ground for analysis when it is understood not as a word only but as a
process of meaning which does not originate in conventional language,
one undoubtful aspect of communication, but on the conscious and un-
conscious processes of intentional meaning, coming from a much more
encompassing process, involving the heart and the mind faculties. That
is why a phenomenological approach of ineffability becomes relevant,
as meaning this time is not reduced to a formal and linguistic require-
ment but would be understood as a lived experience of consciousness,
widening the prospect of multiplied eidetic meanings for it. The Husser-
lian idea of pure lived experience (*Erlebnis*) brings to the concept of in-
effability all its essential character as the word is no longer a set of de-
terminative semantic traits (still hard to establish), but a phenomenol-
ogical experience whereby meaning becomes manifold. If we add to the
pure experience of meaning by consciousness, the idea of a possible
sense-bestowal to that experience, we become more aware of all the
epistemological and ethical stakes hidden behind the concept of ineffa-
bility. From a preclusion of meaning, we arrive at an outburst of multi-
ple significations.

We could ask first if there is some logics underpinning any inten-
tion of meaning, as there is one for pure linguistic meaning, but it would
seem nonsensical to attempt to search for the logical rules of ineffability,

as we did for those of logical discourse. The pragmatics of ineffability is bound to adapt to the boundless limits of the mind itself, that is in a world of unlimited intended meanings, which never cease to haunt people's brains. However, it is worth adopting a positivist stance and exploring so many situations as we may come across to uncover the last mysteries of ineffability. In so doing, one difficult question remains the place and importance we should dedicate to the concept of intention. It is true that the Husserlian intentional consciousness,[15] as a guiding principle, would serve to explore the question of ineffability as a conceptual problem more than a mere definite concept (*Begriff*). Husserl provided the field of phenomenology with some interesting words, which had the power to transgress the laws of structuralism, words much more capable of getting rid of *their linguistic and conventional identity* like *Sinngebung*, and which are more inclined to account for the entwined problems of ineffability and intention.

With the Husserlian *Sinngebung*, the intention of giving some meaning is reverted to the consciousness, therefore to the person himself, whatever the degree of conventionalism is accepted by the speaker and its interlocutor. Ineffability thus becomes a clearer perspective of meaning, when the production of meaning does not only come from a social background but from the free speaker himself, who has the power to manipulate language outside its referential frame, the one society once accepted and imposed on everybody. The donation of meaning (*Sinngebung*) refers to the power of creating meaning against a generativist view, and outside the frame of the conventional sign, which by itself puts to the fore the idea of an overwhelming power of thinking. Obviously, it is possible to redefine the relation between thought and language, in a way that would emphasize the absolute autonomy of the former without presupposing any form of hierarchy between them. When the concept of ineffability is analysed through the power of the donation of meaning (A) and when the power of thought is rendered autonomous, having been disposed of any linguistic element (B), then

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[15] Husserl insists on the fact that the act of perception is a lived experience of the intentional consciousness and as such must be taken into account into the constitution of the perceived object. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), § 84, p.168.

we might be in a better condition to perceive the false character of language as only a provider of truths and good morals (C).

A. Ineffability and Sinngebung

The donation of meaning entails a redefinition of the linguistic sign, from a polymorphic point of view this time, against the traditional conception of the determining form of the sign mostly represented by the acoustic image and the prejudices of logics. From a phenomenological standpoint, the sign is no longer the true cover of meaning, but a *mere object of intentional consciousness*. Therefore, it is consciousness which allows meaning to circulate between human minds and words become just objectified. As such, they no longer belong neither to the structure of language itself, as a social instrument, nor to the performer of language, who gains a tremendous power over meaning.[16] The donation of meaning is a powerful instrument as it allows anyone to subvert meaning from the conventionally established one. And for such a purpose, the linguistic form has precisely to be annihilated in order to *make of the sign an intentional object*, which this time will bear all the meanings intended by the locutor, apart from the main linguistic ones.[17] In a fatidic passage from the *Ideen*, Husserl depicts intentional consciousness entering the phenomenological stage as a noetic experience:

> Owing to its noetic moments, every intentive mental process is precisely noetic, it is of its essence to include (*bergen*) in itself something such as a 'sense' and possibly a manifold sense, on the basis of this sense-bestowal, and in unity with that, to effect further productions (*Leistungen*) which become 'senseful' (*sinnvolle*) precisely by this sense-bestowal. Such noetic moments are, e.g, directions of the regard of the pure Ego to the objects meant by it (*gemeinten*) owing to sense-bestowal to the \<object\> which is in-

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[16] To have power over meaning is just another definition of intentionality. Consciousness aims at some meaning, "etwas in Sinne zu haben" (Husserl, *Ideas*, §90, p.185).

[17] In fact, the linguistic sign being bracketted and then reduced by the phenomenological consciousness, it becomes a phenomenal object whose essences also come from the perception of the real one, (reales), but not as such (§90, p.187).

herent in the sense for the Ego, furthermore, seizing upon the object, holding it fast while the regard adverts to other objects which appear in the 'meaning' (*im Sinne liegt*) (*Vermeinen*).[18]

Husserl also clarifies the nature of noetic consciousness to the noemas it deals with. If consciousness as an intentive mental process is by itself full of sense, the perceptual data it deals with as such are also meaningful. Thus, any act of intentional remembering for instance gives vent to a noetic meaning altogether with the noema itself, or the *remembered* itself. Husserl is that in fact, makes an insightful distinction between an actual object (*schlechtin*), which is perceived from a natural attitude and its counterpart tackled by a phenomenological consciousness, whose noemas are released only by a mental intentive process. Another very important point for Husserl is that a phenomenological perception is bound to be intentional, therefore, linked to a specific person's consciousness in a given *Lebenswelt*. The world of experience is a fundamental and unavoidable place where meaning first arises. But perceptual and unbracketed meaning is different from a pure phenomenological one whereby the objects of reality acquire a new meaning, as their noemas become intended (*vermeint*) by consciousness: "It is clear that all these descriptive statements, even though they may sound like statements about actuality have undergone a radical modification of sense."[19] Lastly, Husserl also points to the multiple layers of meaning that an intentional consciousness covers despite the unique *gemeint* or *vermeint* one. The nuclear meaning (*kernschicht*) thut arises under sense-bestowal may be followed by other infinite moments of meaning, according to the mutations or redirections of consciousness.[20]

By nature, this entails a new interpretation of meaning, which is not connected to any rhetorical process originated from the word, as would for instance be the case in using euphemisms or litotes, but would rather relate to the disruptive power of intentional consciousness. Let us be clear once more on the difference between understating something or making it sound courteous, or politically correct, and saying something but intending something completely different. For instance, in the example given

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[18] Husserl, *Ideas*, §88, p.181
[19] Ibid., §89, p.184.
[20] Ibid., §90, p.185.

above, "You may come to my dinner, of course," we could analyse the adverbial locution "of course" as both a marker for an unconditional invitation, or a profound willingness to invite the person, but it could be just ironical, and be finally interpreted as some reluctance not to let that person come. The linguistic interpretation of such a statement would put the stress on the multiple connoted meanings derived from the words used in such a context. Ineffability would therefore be ascribed essentially to the hermeneutics of words used in contexts, and the perspective of interpretation limited to the forms derived from the context of communication. The primacy of the words, even linked to the most enlarged context in which they are produced, would cause interpretation to end in precise rhetorical processes, often defined under the categories of understatement, implicitness, euphemisms, litotes, but quite never in pure realistic terms, as would a phenomenological understanding do. Yet, when the intentional meaning is given precedence over the linguistic one, it is possible to detect the true nature of the sentence, whose meaning is analysed in objectal terms, that is in intentional meaning.

Also, is there any difference between an intentional meaning, and a linguistic meaning, the ironical statement of which would be comparable to the intention of not wanting that person to come? By nature, what is the difference between making one's interlocutor understand in ironic terms that he is not "so much" desired at that party, and intending his not coming at all, by using extremely positive words, instead of semi-negative ones? It is the donation of meaning that can give us some clues on the use of words in their subverted forms. When the whole sentence "*Of course, you may come to the dinner party*" is analysed as an intentional object, the linguistic forms (both syntagmatic and paradigmatic) may completely vanish as the *intention is both the start and the end of meaning*. In such a sentence, the true intention is to make the person not come to the party without him knowing it through the linguistic form. The intentional object supersedes the linguistic structure, from which the information of the intention is completely removed so that no traces of irony or political correctness should be left over, also with an intention of delivering a smooth message. With the intention of only expressing to oneself the extremely unpleasant feeling that the coming to the party of that guest would cause, we enter in the world of monologue barely comparted with the others, instead of the communication of one's polite unwillingness to invite someone. Therefore, as we

have seen, the sentence "Of course, you may come to the dinner party" may just mean, when turned into an intentional object "I just want you not to come," at least, and even at worse, "If you come, I will kill you." It is therefore necessary to distinguish between several levels of meaning or interpretation around any word or sets of words since meaning rests both at the level of intentional consciousness and intentional interpretation: intention of the producer of meaning and interpretation of the receiver of meaning. The psychological aspects of meaning are certainly more encompassing than those of the mere linguistic substrate, so much so that words can be so distorted that any hermeneutics based on an expanded interpretation of words alone, an expansion limited by the capacity of thought as once proposed Wittgenstein, would seem ridiculously flawed when the "whole picture" is not taken into account.[21] Even more, intentional meaning makes of words a cover or an undercover for the concealment of intentions and affects beyond the logical or implicit meaning that one can derive from the forms of language.

As a matter of fact, there are plenty of situations in everyday conversation where words do not express their meaning but are just used for the purpose of meaning something else much beyond a formal connotation. We could call this beyond of meaning, ineffability. Sometimes, and not in rare occasions, the conversation takes place just to provoke a change of attitude of the person targeted, the intentional meaning being completely alien to the exchange of good manners and courteous greetings, as was the case when, in a Parisian café, the waiter could not stand

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[21] It is therefore obvious that any analysis in terms of logical sense as in the works of the first Wittgenstein would cause a restriction in terms of possible meaning, without necessarily indulging in a metaphysical discourse. Here the pragmatics of communication does not relate to the philosophical critique of metaphysics dear to the analytical tradition. The Wittgensteinian unsayable represents a reduction of the problem of meaning in that it connects meaning to the possibility of producing sense only in the substrate of language. Wittgenstein sets a very clear aim to his masterpiece work, the *Tractatus*: "Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e., we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought." (Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Preface" in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Routledge, London and New York, 2005), 3.)

any longer the presence of a customer having coffee, a cheap beverage, and being seated at a big table for multiple clients, told him "That he could stay as long as he wished." The customer finished his coffee at once and left the place, having perfectly understood the message. It is also a well-known fact that the practice of writing always tends to produce distorted or smoothed ideas, words being by nature, powerful modifiers of meaning when compared to the original intention of the author. Speaking is much closer to the real world of intentions than is writing and if we were to write down every single thought haunting us, we would find profound distortions and a much more acceptable written version of our own ideas than a spoken one. Indeed, words are not providers of meaning as it is understood by the structural approach of language, but are at best providers of pseudo-meaning, of something that is not intented at the beginning, as if language itself had the last always smooth word, so to say, in the general production of meaning. In writing, the form of language does not reproduce exactly the form of thought, that is the intention of meaning. There is always something else which is added or removed from the original intended meaning, and that is why the intentional meaning of a sentence cannot be found back in the structure of the sentence itself, but further up in the mind of the speaking person, inserted in a special phenomenological *Lebenswelt*.

B. Thought and Sinngebung

The question of the nature of the relation that intentional meaning keeps with the words implied in a process of signification becomes crucial. Is intention completely disconnected from the words it uses, or is it still partially linked to them and to what extent? We have seen that the linguistic meaning in a sentence can bring about something completely different for the interpreter. We may mean something in our mind by using the opposite meaning in language. In that respect, intentional meaning, a product of thought, is completely separated from language. Of course, one may argue that there is a logical connection between an intentional meaning (a) and its linguistic opposite (-a') as it is always something of "a" which is meant to be acted or not. Not wanting someone to come and inviting him to come by speaking belong to the same world. However, there are other situations in which words bear a completly new meaning, as is the case in encoded messages, like during the Second World War were poems where used to deliver military orders.

The linguistic garment is then reduced to its simplest form, the material one, and it is intentional thought and meaning that prevail over any word consideration. Even more, words would be selected to divert any understanding of the original intention, bringing any interpreter as far away as possible from the pure linguistic meaning, for the sake of deception.

As a consequence, language could be said to be as much a tool for the expression of truth, as it could be for the expression of falsehood, or anything else which would be completely irrelevant from the conventional meaning of a word. Words can then deceive, divert, conceal as much as they can express truths, orders, feelings. It is not in the nature of words to be only the instrument of good morality, of coherence, logical and authoritative discourse. It is also possible to claim that words too often impede the expression of undisputable truths as the utterance of words proves to be an exercise of concealment and attenuation all the time. In the example given above, "If you come to that dinner party, I will kill you," as an expression of true intentional meaning, I myself quite hesitated to use the word "kill" for the expression of absolute unwillingness, as I could have chosen something less harsh and much more acceptable for the academic public, thinking that it could be connotated from so many perspectives (literary style, observation of scientific and academic rules, desire to be perceived with good morals, desire to conceal any interpreted suspicious side of my personality…), but I finally chose to be purposely radical. My real intention here is to show that language used as a written form tends to dissimulate or attenuate meaning rather than uncover it. It is therefore thought that prevails over language, a kind of tight control which can lead to any kind of subversion, as intentional meaning directs meaning towards any final object, a phenomenological *Sinngebung* leaving little power to the structure of the word itself. Husserl connects this power of *Sinngebung* to the absolute freedom of the Ego, which in his proper terms decides which attention to effect on the noema taken up by consciousness. Husserl's return to the pure Ego and to its absolute power of sense-bestowal is profoundly telling on the precedence of thought over language. The correlative interplay of *Sinngebung* within the noetic-noematic structure of consciousness allows Husserl to elaborate on a pure Ego, an *Ich-Strahl,* or I-ray, which

aims at the object of attention as a pure free Being (*freie Wesen*).[22] With the pure *Ich-Strahl*, we definitely enter the complex realm of ineffability.

C. Sinngebung and Morality

Ineffability, therefore, is not only a pure linguistic matter. It is also a feature of the mind, which chooses the words for implementation or concealment, always in order to attain a certain final and extra-linguistic goal. The intrinsic relation between thinking and ineffability has been already tackled in the field of literature, ethics, politics, science in various positive and negative ways. Saadi, an Iranian poet of the XIIIth century, made himself famous with his witty assertion on the power of the tongue; small as it is, it may cause great damage: "*Oh intelligent man, what is the tongue in the mouth? It is the key to the treasure-door of a virtuous man. When the door is closed, how can one know whether he is a seller of jewels or a hawker.*"[23] Al Ghazali, another famous Muslim philosopher, also discussed the matter of using appropriate words and controlling one's tongue. They were certainly not the first to do so, but their contribution is of importance regarding the question of Ineffability. It is not so much words themselves that account for Ineffability, or sayability, but the power that the mind has over words, its capacity to decide or not which should be released and which not. Saadi warned us that as long as the word is in the mind, we have all the power over it, as a donator of meaning, or as an interpreter of meaning, but as soon the word is released from the tongue, we lose this power especially on the hermeneutic side. Saadi's exquisite description of the tongue's power is profoundly enlightening the true relation between thought and words. Words have a two-sided connection, they connect the mind with intentional meaning, and when they are spoken out, they start to involve other minds, through the meaning the words give to each individual. Of course, this conscious process could be more complex by adding unconscious intentional meanings to the purely conscious ones. And the receiver of words could also bring about interpretations alien to his pure

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22 Husserl, *Ideas*, §92, p. 192.
23 Sheikh Muslih-Uddin Saadi Shirazi, *Gulestan*, English translation, http://www.thesongsofhafiz.com/Saadi2.pdf, 9.

will. Whatever the perspective, widened to the unconscious, it is remarkable to see how the use of some words could be indeed only a pretext for intending meaning beyond their linguistic capacity, rather than a conveyor of meaning.

3. Ineffability and Negative Reference

However, we should not be mistaken about the thought perspective. It is not always the case that some kind of deception is involved. Distortion is not always deception. Ineffability is sometimes the expression of the mere limits of language, whether in science, politics, literature… The lack of words, the emergence of the unknown, or novelty, the incommensurability of the world of experience with that of language make it impossible to express everything in an accurate way. It is in the nature of human beings not to know "how to say it" or not to find the right words in front a given context. Let us take the trivial example of UFO's, those famous unidentified flying objects: we know partially what they are, and partially what they are not. Ullman would define them in his semantics as opaque meanings. The word was coined to define objects, but sometimes, we are not sure if they are true objects, or only phenomena. What is the nature of a linguistic object, when as it is given to be understood, a word should characterize an object through the most accurate semantic traits, whether material or abstract ones? However, the feeble degree of correspondance between the material sign, the idea and its reference, or the lack of items in a linguistic class of objects make of the word something closer to Ineffability rather than clearly defined objects. Would Ineffability represent then only a pure Wittgensteinian '*sinnlos*' utterance?[24]

The question of reference seems to be of outmost importance as was the fundamental question of signification. A word is due to function properly in terms of its capacity of diffusing meaning, when vagueness

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[24] For Wittgenstein, every single thought cannot find a sensed linguistic expression. What is sayable is bound to have meaning, while the unsayable is nonsensical. Wittgenstein's intention is to separate the ineffable, which he does not reject, with the pure domain of the sayable. For him the sayable is bound to be logical: "It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic—The truth is that we could not *say* what an illogical world would look like." (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 3.031, p. 12.)

is stabilized through a set of criteria, giving vent to a stabilized meaning. In general, when we are faced with a new object of meaning, like UFO's, words would be used to circumvent a stabilized set ot meaningful traits as it is shown through the words, *unidentified*, *flying*, and *objects*. Of course, those words do not suffice in capturing any unidentified flying object, under the category UFO, since, for instance, any unidentified bird in the distance could be a UFO, depending on the seer… Here the circumventing of meaning is reduced to three criteria, but it could have been extended to the features of space, astronomy, alien universes, extra-terrestrial living species… The absence of reference does not entail the absence of meaning, however. It is the stabilization of a core meaning, even vague, that renders the word fully practicable in communication. Thus, the existence of the reference (its full perception here) is not necessary to fulfil the requirements of meaning. Meaning does not rely on the full perception of an existing object, but rather on a kind of meaning which can be partial if not negative.

Partial, when only a few features point to the object, of which we might have some experience. Negative, if an object gains its meaning not from the word itself, but from the intentional meaning shedding light on the linguistic cover. We already know this phenomenon of negative definition, when, for instance, it is hard to tell what something is, so we tell what it is not. The relation between an absolutely blurred, confused, unclear or concealed reference and the idea of it causes the mind to try to understand words like God, or the Unconscious. For instance, Nicolas Cusanus' attempt to define God follows the path of Ineffability and circumventing, with the three main concepts he uses to approach a definition of God.[25] This kind of external definition describes a constant dovetailing failing to reach a full and complete definition of God. In traditional negative theology, we talk about the attributes of God so as to avoid the obstacles of a clear positive definition. When the reference is clearly disputable, meaning operates mainly between the word and its concept for one part, but always under the intentional meaning of the speaker or writer. The

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[25] Nicholas of Cusa uses three words to define God: *Non-aliud*, *Posse*, *Possest*. The notion of unsayability becomes apparent when he attempts a new coining on the notion of God, by mixing a pure act, *Actus Purus*, with the idea of a dynamic possibility, *Posse*. This makes of God a *Posse Ipsum*. Arab Kennouche, Cusanus Project, 2017.

Freudian *unconscious* has never ceased to raise controversies up to our days because of the lack of clarity on the pole of reference.[26] With the unconscious, vagueness does not even include in its core a stabilized meaning, like with the UFO's, as the unconscious begins to be meaningfully understood through the use of other words involving other references, like the subconscious and consciousness. From the blurred phenomena of UFO's, we could ascribe at least a set of truly objectified and real traits to the word itself, the noumenal existence of which is even less doubtful. However, the unconscious or God have no center of meaning, no core patterns, only derived, external, and negative ones. With such words, the power of *Sinngebung* seems to be outstanding. God and the unconscious being inexistent on the level of reference, the donation of meaning would be tremendously powerful in orienting any possible interpretation of the terms. And Ineffability in such a context operates as a rich field for conventional and unconventional production of meaning.

4. Conclusion

The questions raised by the concept of ineffability were certainly not explored at full length in this paper. Yet, we were at least able to hint at a few obstacles when ineffability was perceived from a pure linguistic stance. Then, we could understand that in the more contextual interpretation of the linguistic sign, it was still hard to discard the predominance of the word as a marker of meaning. Being the conveyor of meaning through its form, and inserted in a general structure, it was finally language which dictated the form of thinking, hence the obligation to interpret ineffability with the logical sphere of language. Even a more

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[26] Apart from the already tricky problem of the definition of consciousness, the famous hard problem of consciousness. For a more detailed account of the stakes of the definition of consciousness, see Max Velmans Goldsmiths, "How to Define Consciousness—And How not to Define Consciousness", *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 16.5 (2009): 139-156. It seems also that the traditional opposition of consciousness to the unconscious overshadows a more realistic perception of consciousness (and not only pathological) in terms of levels or states of consciousness, including therefore lower or sublevels, to meta-states of consciousness. Piotr Winkielman and Johnatan W. Schooler, "Splitting Consciousness: Unconscious, Conscious, and Metaconscious Processes in Social Cognition," *European Review of Social Psychology* 22 (2011):1–35.

performative theory of language would enclose the concept of ineffability within the logics of infelicities as Austin did. Benveniste went as far as to proclaim unilaterally the existence of subjectivity, or of the speaking subject within the frame of language itself through the word "Ego." However, it was also easy to deconstruct the relation of meaning with the Sausurrean sign, between the three poles made of the word, the idea and the object, by abolishing the primacy of the formal sign. This was an occasion to rediscuss the place of thinking within this triad, without presupposing the determining power of the word, the idea or the external object, in the production of meaningful communication. The exposion of this linguistic compound to the more encompassing *Lebenswelt* was almost felt necessary in order to discuss the notion of ineffability, this time as a richer experience of consciousness, given that meaning, within the *Lebenswelt*, meaning could be stirred at any pole of the linguistic sign. Hence, the crucial importance of the subject, who, this time is not a product of language, but a pure Ego endowed with the power of sense-bestowal (*Sinngebung*). As a pure *Ich-Strahl*, the subject may transform any linguistic form into an intentional object, for which he may freely ascribe the meaning intended by his consciousness. The *Sinngebung* power of consciousness, an important aspect of thought, gives a renewed interpretation of the concept of ineffability.

II. PHILOSOPHICAL CLARIFICATIONS OF PSYCHIATRY

Shay's *Thymos* and Homer's *Thymos*: How a Failure in Epistemological Discipline Has Limited the Current Moral Injury Discourse

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Abstract

With the alarming rise of physical reductivism in contemporary psychiatry, philosophy struggles to maintain its place as an essential way of "knowing" and to challenge the epistemological incomplexities of neuroscientific theorizing as a foundation for human wellness. Given the opening that the "moral injury" discourse grants to philosophers interested in impacting contemporary psychiatric care, and given the underexamined importance of the Greek anthropological term *thymos* in Jonathan Shay's original moral injury formulation, this article critiques Shay's original missteps in cross-contextual application of the term, re-examines Homeric *thymos* in the original language, and offers avenues for re-vivifying the discourse by appealing to Homer with greater epistemological vigilance.

Introduction

In the past 30 years, survivors of various acute forms of adversity who develop any kind of painful or disorienting response are increasingly referred to a mental health agency or professional for care, after which they are increasingly placed into summary mental health programs which address their responses as mental illness, determined by criteria from the traumatic stress disorders spectrum of the psychiatric paradigm. Although it is certain that many survivors of adversity do ex-

perience one or more symptoms outlined within this paradigm, the literature suggests that the total number of survivors of any common category of acute adversity that are candidates for clear psychiatric diagnosis—even those in considerable pain or distress—totals less than 20%. This leaves a cross-section of at least 80% of adversity survivors whose painful or disorienting responses to adversity cannot be summarily addressed by psychiatry. To be clear, this does not indicate that the distress of this 80% is necessarily less complex or less painful than the other 20%. It simply indicates that the features of the distress of the 80% cannot be clearly and adequately addressed by the psychiatric paradigm alone, using its diagnostic criteria.

At least two dangers, then, have arisen, in managed care: (1) the pathologization of suffering, in which painful but expected responses to adversity are labeled as "disorders" without adequately complex scrutiny, and (2) the medicalization of extraordinary responses to adversity, in which the development of unusual features, which can perhaps be partly explained either physiologically or behaviorally under the psychiatric paradigm but which cannot be accounted for in their totality, become pressed into psychiatric categories anyway, for the benefit of introducing survivors to managed care as quickly as possible. Thankfully, these dangers have not gone completely unnoticed. Indeed, survivors whose complex distress has seemed resistant to professional care have gained notoriety in American society, especially in conjunction with a steady expansion in both research and practice around the philosophical-therapeutic category of "moral injury," first pioneered by Jonathan Shay.[1]

Moral injury as a contemporary discourse was made possible by Shay's expansion of the philosophical presuppositions of modern trauma care—presuppositions he did not find to be adequate. A career psychiatrist dedicated to veteran care, Shay claims to have found the grounds for his critique incidentally. In the late 1980's, while providing psychiatric care for a group of American Vietnam war veterans, he came across some significant similarities between his client's most complex features, some of which were not fully accounted for in the psychiatric paradigm, and Homer's description of combat-related distress present in ancient

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[1]   Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam* (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994), 20.

Greek warfare and homecoming. Shay carefully re-read *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, making notes on Homer's social observations, combat narratives, and homecoming narratives, and eventually published a book about their potential use in contemporary trauma care, as a hopeful contribution to better understanding complex conditions of rage, moral disorientation, and meaninglessness after combat.[2] Shay's challenge to the psychiatric community was direct: "[Homer captures] the bitter experiences that actually do arise in war…[and] has seen things that we in psychiatry and psychology have more or less missed."[3] His thesis was that Homer had an ability to understand the first-hand, existential descriptions of the distress of returning warriors because he had a broader understanding of the human experience than can be found in modern medical approaches to illness.

Shay's development of the moral injury paradigm was reasonable, thorough, and full of vignettes and concrete applications for veteran care. It was immediately received by many prominent scholars and practitioners alike, and, indeed, in the more than twenty years since the first publication of *Achilles in Vietnam*, Shay's category of moral injury as an application of the ancient Greek philosophical anthropology of Homer to the complex distress and disorientation of returning combat veterans has become an essential part of American trauma care. It has gained such prominence that the National Center for PTSD considers moral injury to be a major paradigm in PTSD care, regardless of its continued omission in the diagnostic manuals.[4] The landmark philosophical feature of Shay's application of Homer's epic poetry to the condition of contemporary combat veterans is the assertion that the violation of conscience in combat can affect veterans in ways that cannot be fully explained by modern scientific approaches to human anthropology.[5] Shay found this to be a constant theme among his veterans, who used distinctly moral and philosophical language in the description of their combat experiences and the difficulties of their homecomings. He also found it as a constant in Homer's writing, as the most disoriented of Homer's

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[2]   Ibid., xiii.

[3]   Ibid.

[4]   William Nash, T. L. Carper, and M. A. Mills, "Psychometric Evaluation of the Moral Injury Events Scale," *Military Medicine* 178.6 (2008): 646-652.

[5]   Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam*, xiii.

warriors were described as being injured at the place of *thymos*, or, in Greek philosophical anthropology, the seat of both human emotion and human moral instinct.[6]

As a professional psychotherapist, and educator who was originally trained in the classics, Shay's work has become a fascination for me ever since 2004, when I began traveling abroad to work with survivors of complex and acute political violence. However, perhaps unlike most other moral injury enthusiasts—in fact, unlike every other moral theorist I have found to date in the literature—my fascination has not been one of utility, in which I maintain the primary interest of applying Shay's ideas directly to my own work, or expanding upon them as a foundation for my own work. Rather, my interest has been in understanding his epistemo- logical movement as a dedicated physical scientist towards annexing a 5,000-year-old anthropological construction into contemporary psychiat- ric care. Shay abruptly interrupted his commentary on the Greek philoso- phical concept of *thymos* after the publication of *Odysseus in America* in 2002, and I can find no contemporary theorists directly addressing *thymos* in the literature today—in spite of the fact that it is easy to find theorists building on almost every other developmental foundation of Shay's origi- nal paradigm. Shay has, at least by evidence of the absence of the concept in his later publications, relegated his treatment of the idea of *thymos* to a lesser, perhaps originally developmental task, and one which no longer holds prime interest for him.

However, it is precisely his interrupted treatment of Homer's usage of *thymos* that proves to be Shay's most interesting work to me, and perhaps to other social philosophers as well. Certainly it was the closest Shay came to engaging the actual work of philosophy himself. After all, if seeking to develop cross-contextual, cross-cultural applications from ancient literature that might prove useful to a contemporary scientific practice, should not any scholar wish to do the work of understanding the original author's material in cultural and philosophical context? However, it is clear that even when Shay was developing the ancient idea of *thymos* in his works, and especially in *Odysseus in America*, he did so in a manner that did not privilege a clear understanding of Homer's contextual worldview but rather in a manner that more expedi-

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6   Jonathan Shay, *Odysseus in America* (New York: Scribner Press, 2002), 12.

ently supported his own work with veterans, including the use of contemporary concepts such as narcissistic stability, megalomania, and positive individualism. He is quite open about this in *Odysseus in America*: "in this book I have asked readers to adopt [my] modern definition of the…word *thymos*.[7] He describes why he has decided to depart from the context of the ancient and original context for the term, despite warnings from his colleagues that it would be a dangerously "ahistorical and universalizing approach to Homer's content."[8] His defense takes this form: "the content of *thymos* is historically and culturally constructed… I use Homer's words in this effort not because I believe that the ancient Greeks [had ultimate knowledge] but because…[they] were profoundly interested in *thymos* and we can learn from what they said about it."[9]

And here, in essence, we find Shay's undeveloped epistemology-of-approach in approaching Homeric *thymos*, which I believe may have been eventually corrected or improved upon if he had continued his pursuit of Homer and classical Greek philosophical anthropology. Shay remains self-consciously distant from the historical and philosophical contexts of Homer's presuppositions even while appealing to him for use of the term *thymos,* and his logic in justifying this seems to be that any term or idea from any time or place can be decontextualized and re-contextualized with impunity, because culture is always changing, and therefore no specific culture has the right to define its own terms indefinitely. That may be reasonable, from a certain point of view, and it is certainly connected to his understanding of morality, which he believes to be a constantly changing social contract that represents the fluid dynamics of convention, order, and mutual expectations in a society.[10] It may also be expedient for him as a scientist. However, there are of course inherent dangers to be navigated when using this logic. Primarily, there is the danger of one's own presuppositions becoming the only objective reality in one's research, to the point of subjectivizing all conflicting presuppositions. One of the most overlooked factors in research that can compromise reliable results is when a researcher carries phi-

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[7] Ibid., 247.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam*, 23-37.

losophical assumptions into the work which conflict with the assumptions of the persons or institutions under examination, and does not account for this conflict in his or her methodology. This warning almost goes without saying in the work of philosophy, but it does not appear clear that Shay has adequately heeded this warning, and the results in his works are, I believe, evident.

Shay's *thymos*

It will be my aim for the balance of this article to examine *thymos* in the Homeric literature in a summary manner, according to my own reading of the texts in the original language and bolstered at times by a few published classicists who seem to share my view—who of course share it from a position of greater scholarly scrutiny than I am probably able to manage. The reason I consider this piece a contribution to further discussion among social philosophers is that public scrutiny has not before been given to the results of Shay's seemingly inadequate epistemological approach to Homeric literature, as described above. I will continue by offering some respectful comments about where Shay may have missed the opportunity to fully apply some rich understandings of Homeric *thymos* to his work, due to his gaps in epistemology. After this, I will attempt to provide a definitive and coherent summary of Homer's use of *thymos* from my reading of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and to provide some suggestions for further exploration towards more contextual contemporary cross-cultural application, with an eye towards those who work with contemporary adversity survivors in the Western world.

In a number of places in his work, Shay succeeds in defining *thymos* in generally Homeric ways, for instance calling it the "noble fighting heart of a warrior," and the generator of "heroism, boldness, and courage."[11] Indeed, Homer uses *thymos* in this way more than 30 times in his epic poems. Shay also discusses *thymos* as the seat of emotions, and as "that which causes affection" and enables the self to love another.[12] Similarly, Homer uses *thymos* to describe emotional states such as fear, hatred, joy, sadness, love, and bitterness more than 150 times in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, by my count. However, beyond these broad

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[11] Shay, *Odysseus in America*, 12.
[12] Ibid., 158.

similarities, there are many distinct differences in Homer's use of *thymos* and Shay's usage, and these differences have an impact on Shay's ability to meaningfully appropriate Homer's ideas. Shay discusses *thymos* as that which rouses a warrior to fight for principles of honor that are culturally constructed and constantly changing, and emphasizes this concept of the ultimately movable cultural construction of a warrior's morality at least 12 times in *Odysseus in America*.[13] Although Homer does use *thymos* to describe the aggressive instinct that rouses a warrior to battle 33 times in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, in my reading, it is never clear that he is connecting the instinct itself to a *socially constructed* morality. Homer does regularly use the term to describe both an instinct that rouses a person to action and a person's moral sense, and also to describe the way that social expectations may influence a man's actions during combat.[14] However, there is certainly no place in which Homer insinuates that a person's moral intuition is a product of cultural construction. In fact, this would have been generally foreign to philosophers of Homer's day.

Although Homer does clearly associate *thymos* with both aggression and moral intuition, Shirley Sullivan makes clear that Homer's understanding of morality was akin to that of Plato, as a universal absolute rather than the product of social construction.[15] Shay's use of *thymic* morality as a social construction certainly reflects his philosophical presuppositions about how a human being develops and sustains a moral sense, but when these presuppositions are divergent from Homer's, the efficacy of Shay's use of *thymos* to discuss moral disorientation can be called into question. As another example, Shay reflects Homer's use of *thymos* as the seat of moral intuition, but explains that in contemporary terms this can be understood as the function of an "interior psychic mirror" which reflects the self's moral state relative to societal mores.[16] Again it is clear that, for Shay, the moral intuition of a person is essentially informed by historically and socio-culturally constructed content embodied in ideals, ambitions, and attachments, making the human person particularly vulnerable to social and cultural changes in the under-

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[13] Ibid., 12-251.
[14] Shirley Sullivan, *Psychological Activity in Homer* (Montreal: McGill University Queen's Press, 1988), 84-85.
[15] Ibid., 54.
[16] Shay, *Odysseus in America*, 156.

standing of right and wrong.[17] In fact, Shay's writings suggest that, in his opinion, this is the exclusive way that moral intuition is formed, because at no point in either *Achilles in Vietnam* or *Odysseus in America* does he offer an alternative idea. Shay's presentation of *thymic* morality certainly reflects certain cultural assumptions that were foreign to Homer's worldview. Sullivan suggests that, for Homer, *thymos* functions as a moral intuition that is not necessarily connected with moral reasoning, but which can be "open to divine influence," and can aid a warrior in doing what is right outside of what he has been ordered or educated to do.[18]

Another way that Shay allows his philosophical presuppositions to overshadow Homer's presuppositions occurs around the concept of the self, the "I," or the *ego* in its relation to *thymos*.[19] Shay describes *thymos* as essentially an ancient philosophical understanding of "narcissism," in that it involves a deep desire for recognition from society.[20] He argues that in a "fixed inflated state" it can produce megalomania, but in a regulated state it produces a healthy, differentiated position in relationships and social standing.[21] At one point Shay even suggests that *thymos* can be summarized as "the human universal trait of commitment to people, groups, ideals, and ambitions, and of emotional upheaval when these are threatened."[22] Accordingly, for Shay and the moral injury paradigm, when leadership betrayal occurs, it is essentially the warrior's ability to maintain a stable commitment to people and ideals that is damaged, and therefore complex mistrust and meaninglessness ensue. And further, when a warrior enters a "berserk state," it is his narcissistic stability that is compromised, resulting in an entry into a state of extreme megalomania in which his connection to society is damaged through the violation of cultural mores about humane behavior.

Unfortunately, these philosophical constructions are not present in Homer's worldview, because the oldest of them dates back only to the advent of the Enlightenment, which occurred more than 2,400 years after Homer died. Homer does use *thymos* in describing emotional distress

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[17] Ibid., 157.
[18] Sullivan, *Psychological Activity in Homer*, 117.
[19] Shay, *Odysseus in America*, 284.
[20] Ibid., 156.
[21] Ibid., 161.
[22] Ibid., 247.

some 25 times in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, but certainly these uses are con-
nected to ancient philosophical understandings of human disorientation
rather than contemporary psychiatric or psychological ones. Far from an
individual trait of commitment to others, Homer's original understand-
ing of *thymos* most likely reflected the opposite reality: that *thymos* is an
essential inner vitality shared between persons, and is most threatened
when one individual breaks from the community as a whole—a phe-
nomenon in Homer's writings which I will discuss later in the article.

In the examples above we see a clear presentation of the difficulty
of Shay's position. In both *Achilles in Vietnam* and *Odysseus in
America* he very clearly and convincingly links Homeric narratives to
several of the most complex phenomena associated with veteran disori-
entation. His work in drawing parallels between Homer's description of
the consequences of such events in the lives of ancient warriors and con-
temporary descriptions of the same consequences in the lives of modern
warriors is both thorough and unique in its contribution to the field.
However, in importing his own understandings of the human experi-
ence, using constructs that not only are foreign to Homer's worldview,
but which likely actively contradict Homer's worldview on some occa-
sions, his offering of Homer's ideas to the contemporary world are lim-
ited. In fact, it might be said that Shay uses Homer's narratives as sim-
ply colorful illustrations of his own personal ideas—ideas which are
doubtless profound, but which are also doubtlessly limited to his own
presuppositions, which differ considerably from Homer's.

One is frankly now left to question whether or not a fuller under-
standing of Homer's original context for *thymos* and its potential dam-
age could provide an account for survivor distress which is not ad-
dressed in either psychiatry *or* the moral injury paradigm. Although the
length, scope, and focus of this article is not sufficient to contain an at-
tempt to accomplish such an ambitious feat, it may be helpful at least to
present—as promised earlier—an examination of *thymos* in the Homeric
literature in a summary manner, according to my own reading of the
texts in the original language.

A Contextual View of Homeric Thymos

Although it is almost certain that the concept of *thymos* was in
regular usage in ancient Greece before the time of Homer, its earliest
place in surviving manuscripts can be found in Homer's *Iliad*. In both

Iliad and *Odyssey*, *thymos* represents an essential human capacity that is necessary for relationships. In Homer's work *thymos* represents (1) the seat of human emotion, (2) the source of instinctive action, and (3) the locus of moral intuition. Each of these essential categories of human functioning can be understood individually, in some way, but there is also in each a collective aspect, which transcends individual experience, and exists essentially within shared community life. By examining each of these three categories of *thymic* function in the writing of Homer, and by understanding their individual and collective elements, a general sense of the place of *thymos* in Homer's philosophical anthropology will become clear.

First, and most prominently, Homer uses *thymos* as the philosophical seat of human emotion. It is from this place of *thymos* that human beings are able to experience their vast array of moods, temperaments, and both pleasant and painful emotional reactions. Thaddeus Kobierzycki considers this function of *thymos* to be generally comparable to the functioning of "the heart" in other philosophical anthropologies, as it represents the place where suffering is experienced, and also the place where "liking, friendship, sensual love" and "feelings of hope" are stored, along with "pity, astonishment" and "courage."[23] Accordingly, *thymos* is also the locus from which humans can be driven to destroy relationships or alienate themselves from community during extreme emotional experiences of bitterness and rage. Bruno Snell notes that while Homer's use of *thymos* is sometimes "the abode of… love [and] sympathy," it is at other times the abode of powerful experiences of hatred that lead to murderous impulses or self-imposed exile.[24] This category of *thymic* functioning is distinct from reason or logic, although it ideally functions in synchronicity with reason. For instance, in Book 2 of *Iliad*, Homer's character Menelaus is said to have *thymic* understanding of Agamemnon's motives in preparing for war, and he is so moved by this understanding that he prepares to fight alongside of Agamemnon, though the prospects for victory are slim. This vignette demonstrates

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[23] Thaddeus Kobierzycki, "The Place and Role of Feelings in Homer's Description of the Corporeal and Non-Corporeal Soul," *Polish-English Quarterly* 4 (2010): 3-17.

[24] Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind* (Mineola, NY: Courier Dover Publications), 13.

Homer's understanding of how an emotional connection can take place between persons in which one shares the emotional state of another and becomes willing to act in response to that sharing. This is an important demonstration of Homer's understanding of the emotional capacity of *thymos*, as it contains aspects of both individual and interpersonal or social functioning.

Homer also writes about the potential for the actual development of communal *thymos*, comprising the emotional connection of an entire team or community, and usually aimed at a specific task essential to the well-being of all. For instance, in Book 13 of *Iliad*, a warrior named Idomeneus is about to face Aeneas in battle, and calls out to a number of his comrades to stand with him and fight. They respond to his call, and Homer describes them taking a stand together with one *thymos* in their chests. This sharing of *thymos* seems to account for the sense of community solidarity experienced when a number of persons share both an emotional state and a corporately understood urgency for action. There is also the possibility that once gained, shared *thymos* may be lost, as persons in community suffer disillusionment or defeat, or face some other adversity that leaves them isolated and alienated.

Secondly, Homer uses *thymos* to represent instinctive motivation to action in the human experience. Once a human being fixes on a particular objective, *thymos* can summon the motivation to act, and can also provide extra-rational instinctive direction to the human being in motion. This function is not purely disconnected from emotional functioning, since in the Homeric corpus emotion is usually present in any activity, but Homer certainly writes as if human emotion and instinctive motivation to action reside distinctly in *thymos*, each having a different purpose. Stephen Muse, a scholar and philosopher very familiar with the ancient Greek corpus, writes about this type of instinctive and aggressive function of *thymos* under the label of "proprioception," in which the inner sensations of the body connect with past physical experience in response to external stimuli without any analytical element, and move the body into appropriate action.[25] Both Snell and Kobierzycki comment at length on the association between *thymos* and instinctive

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[25] Stephen Muse, *When Hearts Become Flame* (Rollinsford, NH: The Orthodox Research Institute, 2011), 120.

motivation to action in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Snell calls *thymos* Homer's "generator of motion," and "that which rouses a man to action" in his combat narratives.[26] He also notes Homer's use of *thymos* as an animal capacity on some occasions, as if Homer considered the aggressive instincts of *thymos* in the heat of battle to be a "force of energy" shared by humans and animals.[27] This does provide some insight into the kind of beast-like aggression and unrestrained violence that develops in the character of Achilles in Homer's *Iliad*.

Kobierzycki describes the instinctual, aggressive aspect of *thymos* as being for Homer both "the seat of wrath" in the human person, capable of beast-like rage, and also the "repository of courage" that can aid a person in using principled restraint when using force for the sake of what he believes is right and just.[28] In Homer's usage, this martial or aggressive function can be either principled or unprincipled. That is, it can be restrained by a person's sense of what is right and good, leading to courageous action, or unrestrained by a person's sense of right and good, leading to beast-like violence capable of great inhumanity. Shirley Sullivan's work suggests that, for Homer, the difference between the two potentialities is in the connection forged between *thymos* and reason.[29] In her view, Homer seems to understand *thymos* and reason to ideally work together in decision-making as the relationship between intuition and logic, or the relationship between felt experience and linear analysis; in the case of broken harmony between the two, *thymos* can be either "bridled" by reason or overrun by it in any given situation.[30]

It may be helpful here to provide two illustrations of Sullivan's point, which are quite important in understanding the function of thymos in Homer's work. First, in Book 5 of *Iliad*, Homer's character Odysseus experiences a dilemma in the midst of combat, consulting both *thymos* and reason to decide on a course of action. This is not essentially a moral dilemma, but rather a tactical one, and Odysseus is using both his knowledge of warfare and his *thymic* intuition toward aggressive action to help him. Once his reason and *thymos* agree on an action, his *thymos* moves

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[26] Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, 9 and 13.
[27] Ibid., 11.
[28] Ibid., 6-7.
[29] Sullivan, *Psychological Activity in Homer*, 84-85.
[30] Ibid., 85.

him into combat. This is an example of harmony between reason and *thymos*, leading to a good outcome. In contrast, in Book 22 of *Odyssey,* Homer describes a character named Phemius who believes his life to be in danger and who experiences a division between *thymos* and reason in examining his options for survival. Specifically, Phemius struggles to decide whether to offer a sacrifice to the gods, which seems the conventional thing to do, or to trust an intuitive urge to rush to Odysseus to beg for his mercy, even though in doing so he will very likely be killed. Phemius decides to trust his intuition, and his life is spared. This is an example in Homer's writing of a break between the harmony between reason and *thymos.* In this particular example, *thymic* intuition triumphs over rational analysis after an internal conflict, and there is a positive outcome. In other places in Homer's writing, *thymic* intuition triumphs over rational analysis with disastrous consequences, and in other places still, reason challenges *thymos* and restrains *thymic* intuition. This interplay between reason and *thymos* is an essential part of Homer's anthropological understanding of the human experience in general.

The third aspect of Homer's anthropological use of *thymos* is as an extra-rational capacity for intuiting what is good and right, and in Homer's writing it is often coupled with the *thymic* functioning of instinctive motivation. More specifically, in almost every place where a person is *thymically* intuiting right action, he or she is also motivated to follow what he or she intuits to be right. Understood together, and when functioning optimally, this aspect of *thymos* can be summarized as the ability of a human person to intuit what is good and then to immediately summon energy to act on behalf of the good. Sullivan again notices an ideal harmony between reason and *thymos* in this aspect of *thymic* functioning. Specifically, she implies that in Homer's usage, *thymos* can (1) ally with reason to pursue the good, (2) struggle against reason to pursue the good, when reason has been compromised, or, tragically, (3) struggle against reason to pursue something other than good, when *thymos* has been compromised (Sullivan, 1988). In this sense, *thymos* can be considered as the human conscience in Homer's work.

In Book 1, paragraph 225 of *Odyssey,* the goddess Athena speaks to Telemachus at a wedding feast at his house, questioning the occurrence there of what she considers to be wanton and shameless behavior. She also questions the state of Telemachus' *thymos* in being able to let these things occur around him without seeing their depravity and putting

a stop to them. Her challenge seems to be on both fronts: can Telemachus not, by *thymos*, intuit the wrong in these events, and having intuited the wrongs, could he not by *thymos* be roused to demand a change? Telemachus responds with an excuse, arguing that the unjust and unfortunate things that have happened to the people of his house—including the politically forced wedding occurring at the moment of her challenge—have left him in a position of moral lassitude. In this example, it seems that Homer's character Telemachus has allowed a kind of philosophical fatalism to overcome his *thymic* intuition and *thymic* call to action against injustice. This also captures the practical interplay between reason and *thymos* in Homer's worldview, and the way in which either capacity, when not operating in harmony with the other, can subjugate the other—to either positive or negative consequences.

Snell, noting Homer's understanding of the moral dimension of *thymos*, describes it as a kind of moral will, and also mentions that a general pattern of the interplay between reason and *thymos* in a particular individual could be considered that individual's particular "character."[31] Shay speaks at length of the "undoing of character" after injury to *thymos* in combat, and uses the character of Achilles to suggest many consequences to this condition, but does not choose to use Homer's own philosophical presuppositions to describe the process of such a thing.[32] Understanding the philosophical relationship between human reason and *thymos* in moral functioning, and considering the potential damage done to a person's morality when this relationship is distressed, may very well offer fresh insight into how Homer saw injury to *thymos* affecting human persons in general.

Summarizing the areas of function discussed above, Homeric *thymos* is a human capacity which contains the emotions, and which ensures emotional connection between a human being and his or her social environment and allows a human being to respond to the perceived needs of others. *Thymos* also functions in instinctive motivation to action or aggression, motivating the person to appropriate physical action in response to stimuli in his or her environment. When aligned with moral intuition, this motivation can include courageous action, and

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[31] Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, 14.
[32] Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam*, 29.

when misaligned with moral intuition, this motivation can include inhumane brutality. Notably, Homeric *thymos* also serves as the center of human moral intuition, containing the ability to discern what is good, and oriented to this sense of goodness both through social connection and possibly, for Homer, through a connection with divine understandings of right and wrong.

Lost Functioning of Thymos in the Homeric Corpus

There are a number of examples of the loss of *thymic* functioning in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. In fact, by my count, more than 100 such occurrences in Homer's work. Homer's understanding of damage to the emotional function of *thymos* centers on the potential for a person in extreme adversity to become both socially isolated and emotionally overwhelmed. This potential becomes far more likely if a person's social isolation has been forced. Homer writes as if a person in such circumstances may suffer a *thymic* injury that culminates in both the dissolution of his or her ability to maintain long-term relationships and chronic difficulty with regulating emotion in the future. Snell notes that, in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, *thymos* can be "eaten away or torn asunder by pain" in "intense, sharp or heavy" fashion.[33] The pain that Snell mentions is profound emotional pain, brought on by extreme distress after such adversity as the loss of a beloved comrade or betrayal by a close friend or leader. In Book 6 of *Iliad*, Hector confronts Alexander for storing up bitterness and rage in his *thymos*, after being the cause of war for his countrymen. The object of Hector's rebuke is not that Alexander has simply felt bitterness or wrath, but that he is holding on to it, or allowing it to overtake him, and that it is causing him to abandon his subordinate warriors in their time of need. In response to Hector, Alexander reveals the complexity of his *thymic* disorientation, explaining that it has not been bitterness but despair that he has been nursing in his *thymos*, and that this is what paralyzed him in the midst of battle. As Alexander realizes that the battle does not go well for him and for his countrymen, and knowing that he is the cause of the battle in some way, he is overwhelmed emotionally, isolates himself from his fellow warriors, and begins to fall into despair.

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[33] Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, 18.

It is clear that damage to the emotional function of *thymos* has so-cial elements. For instance, Alexander loses heart when he considers the impact of his actions on his comrades, and isolating himself from them, begins to despair. However, it is also implicit in the vignette of Alexander and Hector that damage to the emotional function of *thymos* includes a disharmony with reason. When Hector challenges Alexander, he uses a reasoned argument to do so, urging Alexander to rouse himself and to consider the people dying around the city. Responding to the challenge, Alexander is moved to action, suggesting that his capacity for reason has become aligned with his *thymos*. This vignette illustrates the potential for damage to *thymos* in human persons in the Homeric corpus, especially in situations associated with armed combat. In *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, when warriors experience a powerful emotional loss in combat, Homer describes a kind of emotional injury that follows in the place of *thymos*, in which social isolation, fear, paralysis of action, hunger for revenge, and loss of commitment to other people related to mistrust of oneself and others become the common features.

Homer also understands the potential for damage to the instinctive, action-oriented functioning of *thymos*. In such cases, the aggressive instincts of the human person become disoriented, and are either (1) over-regulated, leaving the person with a feeling of "deadness" or extreme lethargy, or else (2) under-regulated, leaving the person with wild, un-controllable impulses to action. Both Kobierzycki and Snell notice these particular difficulties in *thymic* instinctual-impulse regulation following extreme adversity. Kobierzycki's work suggests that in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, a person's ability to move into action can be lost upon what Homer describes as the departure of *thymos*, after which follows a sensation of deadness and loss of passion or vitality.[34] To illustrate this, in Book 22 of *Iliad*, Homer includes a petition from Hector's elderly father to his son in which the old man speaks of *thymos* as the life force in his limbs, which can be stolen away. For Homer, after *thymos* departs, a sense of vitality departs with it, and a person can experience the sense that there is no life left in them, or a kind of living death.

Snell notices the other potential outcome when the instinctive, ac-

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[34] Kobierzycki, "The place and role of feelings in Homer's description of the corporeal and non-corporeal soul," 3.

tion-oriented aspects of *thymos* become disoriented during extreme adversity, noticing that this can cause a person to become unbridled by reason, and unable to control himself or herself.[35] He notes that, "when running wild" like this, an under-regulated *thymos* can lead a person to "beast-like" functioning, demonstrating brutal and compassionless behavior.[36] The final state of Achilles leading up to his death in *Iliad* seems to illustrate Snell's observations, as Achilles has essentially become a brute, dishonoring his enemies and engaging in shocking and dishonorable conduct in battle.

In one particular place in *Iliad*, in which Andromache has fainted at the sight of Hector's body being dragged around the city, she has to—in Homer's words—re-concentrate or re-center her *thymos* into her chest. Although it is not concretely clear, it could be surmised that, in Homer's philosophical worldview, it is possible during extreme adversity for *thymos* to be unseated in some way, becoming metaphorically dislocated, and no longer functioning in its proper place. During this dislocation of her *thymos*, Andromache demonstrates a subsequent difficulty in feeling alive and present in her circumstances. Although Homer does not specifically use this idea of *thymic* dislocation in his narratives of warriors experiencing under-regulation of impulses to action, the metaphor is helpful in those narratives also, in that it seems as if those warriors do not have the ability to *thymically* interact with reason in order to restrain them from inhumanity. It is as if metaphorically, in those cases, their *thymos* is no longer located in the correct place.

Homer's concept of *thymos* and the potential impact of its loss of function with regard to the use and regulation of instinctual aggression in the human person does seem to conceptually account for both a conscious disconnect from emotion and bodily sensation and the onset of a chronic, lustful rage. Under extreme adversity, the damage to or the disorientation of this aspect of *thymic* functioning can have lasting consequences, as demonstrated clearly by Homer's characters. One final and unusual example of Homer's use of *thymos* as the seat of instinctive motivation is a universal one. On rare occasions Homer uses *thymos* to describe a kind universal vitality common among all human beings that

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[35] Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, 13.
[36] Ibid., 13.

goes beyond instinct or motivation to action, and represents a kind of life force common to all people. This life force is extinguished after death, but can also be in some way lost while a person still lives. A brief vignette from Book 23 of *Iliad* provides a helpful illustration of Homer's use of *thymos* in this way. Odysseus has returned from the war and is speaking with his elderly mother, and he describes the process of death as one in which a disease may take *thymos* from the body of an ailing person. In the following sentence he describes how through longing for his mother and her compassion during his time away in combat he had also lost *thymos*, and with it a sense of the goodness of life. There are at least three notable aspects of this short passage.

First, there is the use of *thymos* as a kind of life force common to all human persons that is extinguished at the time of death. Homer uses *thymos* this way on a number of occasions, especially during death narratives, such as those found in Books 10 and 19 of *Odyssey*. Secondly, there is the use of *thymos* as a person's experience of inner vitality when living in a community, which may be lost while a person is still alive— especially if they have been alienated from their community. As Odysseus is describing his experiences to his mother, he is expressing to her his sense that, although he is still alive physically, he feels that there is a part of him that has died while he was away from home in combat. In Homer's writing, then, death is not the only experience that can rob a person of *thymos*; experiences in war are also capable of taking away *thymos*, through a disconnect with homeland and family. Third, there is a sense of the goodness of life that is missing upon Odysseus' return. Chapman translates Odysseus saying to his mother in this passage in Book 23 of *Iliad* that he lost the "honey-sweetness of life" while away at war.[37]

These three aspects or potentialities for the loss of *thymos* as representative of an inner vitality among humans may apply to an individual warrior, but the individual warrior clearly experiences them in relationship to their families, their comrades, and their fellow human beings in the Homeric corpus. The collective vitality enabled by *thymos* can be disrupted at the point of death, and can also be disrupted in the aftermath of an extreme adversity that leaves a person isolated and alienated from

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[37] Homer, *Iliad and Osyssey,* trans. G. Chapman (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth, 2000).

his or her home and community.

In certain cases, Homer's characters experience a moral disorientation of *thymos.* In such cases, those characters have experienced a disconnect between moral reasoning and the moral intuition of *thymos* in the midst of extreme adversity, and are no longer able to harmoniously understand or intuit what is good or right, leading to a breakdown in moral functioning. Snell demonstrates an understanding of this phenomenon, as informed by various vengeance narratives in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.[38] According to Snell, in Homer's vengeance narratives a warrior, having lost a comrade or loved one, can be *thymically* driven to seek revenge as a type of justice, even when reason tells him that such an act is not or cannot be justified.[39] If the warrior silences his moral reasoning and follows his *thymic* drive for justice anyway, he may commit an atrocity in the name of vengeance, in which his aggression is unbridled and he is unable to intuit the need for humane restraint in the passion of violent action.

Jonathan Shay actually gives a very helpful albeit undeveloped example of such a vengeance narrative in *Iliad* that includes Homer's character Achilles.[40] He quotes a scene from Book 9 of *Iliad* in which Achilles demands that other Greek officers help him cause pain to Agamemnon for reasons of pure vengeance. In this scene, Shay notes that Achilles, who sustained damage to the moral functioning of *thymos* after being betrayed by his trusted leader, is attempting to rally fellow leaders to break their own oaths of honor to help him pursue vengeance.[41] It is, in Shay's view, the beginning of the dissolution of Achilles' ability to know and do what is right:

> Before the [moral] injuries recorded in the *Iliad*, Achilles' habit was to respect enemy dead rather than defile them, and to ransom enemy prisoners rather than kill them. Achilles loses his humanity in two stages: he ceases to care about his fellow Greeks after betrayal by his commander, and then he loses all compassion for any human being after the death of Patroklos. The *Iliad* is the story of the undoing of Achilles' [morality].[42]

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[38] Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, 9-13.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam*, 25.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.

This understanding of Achilles' moral disorientation as a warrior is an important one. Through a *thymic* drive for vengeance, both in response to betrayal and in response to the loss of a comrade, Achilles is intuitively moved into action to combat injustice, but without the restraint of his moral reasoning. As a result, he loses his ability to use intuition and reason to harmoniously discern what is right, and also loses the ability to restrain himself in violent action.

Earlier in this piece, Sullivan was credited with noticing that in Homer's usage, the moral aspect of *thymos* can (1) ally with reason to pursue the good, (2) struggle against reason to pursue the good, when reason has been compromised, or, tragically, (3) struggle against reason to pursue something other than good, when *thymic* morality has been compromised. The situation with Achilles, as mentioned above, is Homer's most detailed example of the third of Sullivan's potentialities. In the aftermath of an aggressive, unprincipled *thymic* pursuit of something other than good, Achilles find himself more and more morally disoriented, and by the time of his death, his moral economy has become completely inverted from the moral economy of his fellow warriors and his society in general. Specifically, he no longer has any meaningful relationship with the ideals of honor, courage, humanity, compassion, brotherhood, or love.

There is one further sense of extreme moral disorientation that has not yet been mentioned in this article. Sullivan suggests that there may be spiritual overtones to Homer's idea of shared *thymos*, in its moral functioning.[43] She notes that in ancient Greek metaphysical philosophy, *thymos* seems capable of being "open to divine influence," in the sense of a person's inner moral intuition being guided by divine values, and that this capability might function both individually and communally.[44] This sense of *thymic* morality as a divinely informed function in human beings is certainly present in the work of Plato, writing centuries after Homer, and many Greek thinkers following Plato. It is not as evident in the writing of Homer, who makes use of divine entities as mostly minor, anthropomorphic characters in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Nevertheless, one unusual passage in *Odyssey* may be worth mentioning, on this topic. In

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[43] Sullivan, *Psychological Activity in Homer*, 117.
[44] Ibid.

Book 21 of *Odyssey*, Odysseus engages in some verbal sparring with Antinous. At one point in the dialogue, Antinous references the mythological story of Eurytion and Peirithous, and noted how Eurytion made his *thymos* senseless and insane after drinking too much wine, and proceeded to become a worker of evil in Peirithous' house—specifically by sexually assaulting Peirithous' daughter. It is the only time in the *Odyssey* in which the term *thymos* is directly connected with a Greek term whose plain sense in common translation can be rendered equivalent to the English word "evil." Even in this case, Homer's understanding of Eurytion's inner condition in the mythological text is one that evidences a relatively indirect connection between *thymos* and evil. Homer writes as if in certain circumstances, such as drunkenness, *thymic* morality can lose its essential connection with reason, and therefore become more likely to give in to impulses that are—in Homer's worldview—intrinsically aligned with a universally understood evil, such as nonconsensual sex with a youngster, in the case of Eurytion. Homer does not go on to discuss Eurytion's inner state after this series of events, so further insight into his understanding of the consequences of this engagement with evil cannot be deduced.

For Further Investigation

A summary of *thymic* disorientation in Homer's work—resulting from a hopefully more careful position of contextual observation—may be offered as follows. In addressing potential damage to the emotional function of *thymos*, Homer demonstrated a psychological understanding of how an adversity survivor may sustain radical damage to his or her ability to remain socially connected with community and to retain emotional stamina in relationships following exposure to adversity. In addressing potential damage to the *thymic* function of instinctive motivation to action, Homer demonstrated a psychological understanding of how survivors may experience a deregulation of their aggressive instincts, in extreme cases leaving them feeling either uncontrollable in their passion or else entirely without felt vitality. Lastly, in addressing potential damage to the *thymic* function of moral intuition, Homer demonstrated a philosophical understanding of how survivors may experience a disconnect between moral reasoning and moral intuition, leaving them unable to harmoniously understand or intuit what is good or right, and leading to a breakdown in moral functioning.

This interplay between moral, emotional, and motivational aspects of human persons in distress *within a single anthropological locus* is quite unique to ancient Greek world outlook—first evident in Homer but later also evident in the writings of the Golden Age of Greek philosophy, including the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Hippocrates. In my experience, no serious discussion of the cross-contextual and cross-cultural applicability of the ancient Greek concept of *thymic* health or corresponding discussions of such strange-sounding sub-concepts as *thymic* illness, *thymic* nosology, *thymic* hygiene, and *thymic* therapy exist in the literature. They do not exist in the psychiatric and psychological literature, and they do not exist in the philosophical literature. *Thymos* is in fact completely absent from contemporary public discourses, despite its clear potential for influencing a wide number of contemporary discourses, if handled with proper epistemological discipline. With the rise of an alarming physical reductivism in the social and medical sciences today, in which philosophy continues to lose its impact as an essential way of "knowing" in order to make room for ever-greater dependence on neuroscientific theorizing, any lost opportunity to exploit an existing opening for philosophical contribution in this arena is a heavy loss indeed. Given the fairly unique and still-existing opening for the moral injury discourse to impact contemporary psychiatric veteran care, and given the important-if-underdeveloped place of *thymos* in Shay's original paradigm, this article may serve as a call for further development, while the opportunity still exists.

III. TOPICS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The Rise of the Machines and the Future Proletariat

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Abstract

In this article I examine whether the rise of robotics will benefit the global workforce in the coming years; whether robot automation will allow workers to live a happier life — by working less or possibly by not working at all — or whether robots will bring misery to masses of unemployed workers who, without means of subsistence, will end up living in poverty. To this end, I contrast the views of Jeremy Rifkin, Dan Corjescu, Martin Ford, and of other thinkers from both capitalist/liberal and Marxist schools of thought. The literature review indicates that there are several divergent views on the issue of how the rise of robotics will change the workforce of the future. Yet, despite this multiplicity of views, general trends are noticeable; the results suggest that those comfortable with the idea of robot technology tend to be heartily positive about the social implications that robots and automation will have on work, whereas those who look at it with a certain degree of hesitation are not totally pessimistic with regards to the plight of the workers.

> *"The instrument of labour, when it takes the form of a machine, immediately becomes a competitor of the workman himself. The self-expansion of capital by means of machinery is thenceforward directly proportional to the number of the workpeople, whose means of livelihood have been destroyed by that machinery."*

<div align="right">Karl Marx</div>

Introduction

If there is one thing that all of us living in information societies experience daily, it is the continuous encounter with fellow citizens

who, in a devotional manner, dedicate most of their attention to a small artefact such as a smartphone, phablet, or tablet held firmly in one of their hands. In all cases, one can discern two distinct information streams: the retrieval of information from the Internet to the device together with the delivery of the information from the device to the user (the digital citizen).

I have started this *exposé* with the above observation not because I want to examine the flow of information which is continuously occurring in a globalised information society. Indeed, that is an area which I discussed at length in another article.[1] Rather, what I want to discuss here is the manner in which machines (as small as smartphones and as big as industrial digital printing machines) have become ubiquitous in our digital societies, and in which direction is humanity progressing due to such pervasiveness. In doing so, in this paper I seek to examine such rifeness with reference to some Marxist philosophical interpretations. This is the case, since the area that I particularly examine is one that is very topical to what contemporary societies might be heading to, that is a world in which humanity pursues a way of living in which it would be free from the need to work. This paper shows that there are those who believe that such an existence will eventually become a reality, whereas others have concluded that such an idea is overwhelmingly illusive.

The Technological Utopia and the End of Work

The affluent nations of the 21st century generate most of their wealth through modern technology. At the same time, organisations operating within the boundaries of such nations, are still dependant on human workers to operate and monitor the same technology. In this regard, in what can be considered a classic on the issue of machines taking the jobs of humans, Jeremy Rifkin writes that

> We live in a world of increasing contrasts. Before us looms the spectre of a gleaming high-tech society with computers and robots effortlessly channelling nature's bounty into a stream of sophisticated new products and services. Clean, quiet, and hypereffi-

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[1] Godwin Darmanin, "From Reality to Virtuality: The New Forms of Power and Governance in the Information Society*", Sofia Philosophical Review* IV.2 (2010): 52-78.

cient, the new machines of the Information Age place the world at our fingertips … On the surface, the streamlined new information society seems to bear little resemblance to the Dickensian conditions of the early industrial period. With its powerful new mind machines, the automated workplace appears an answer to humanity's age-old dream of a life free of toil and hardship.[2]

Indeed, the use of machines is rising fast and, as Juraj Kováč *et al.*[3] demonstrate, the global annual demand for industrial robots has almost quadrupled since the year 2000. Yet, amidst all the glitz and glamour of our technological world, Rifkin also alerts us that

This is the reality most often spoken of in the media, among academicians and futurists, and within the councils of government. The other side of the emerging techno-utopia, the one littered with the casualties of technological progress, is only faintly hinted at in official reports, in statistical surveys, and in occasional anecdotal tales of lost lives and abandoned dreams. This other world is filling up with millions of alienated workers who are experiencing rising levels of stress in high-tech work environments and increasing job insecurity as the Third Industrial Revolution winds its way into every industry and sector.[4]

This trend of portraying robotization in only a good light continues to persist in our days. This is mostly the case in literature of an economic nature, whose authors want to accentuate the advantages of automation in a cunning way. Similar fervour is also exhibited by authors — such as Kováč *et al.* — whose sole objective is that of targeting a technologically minded audience. Nevertheless, as emphasised by Rifkin, and as depicted by other thinkers in the rest of this article, our information society also needs to analyse robotization from sociological as well as from philosophical perspectives.

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[2] Jeremy Rifkin, *The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 181.

[3] Juraj Kováč *et al.*, "Industrial Robots and Service Worldwide", *Transfér Inovácií* 33 (2016): 166-168.

[4] Jeremy Rifkin, *The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 181-182.

Transformation Without Alienation

In fact, history teaches us that social structures change, and as Western feudal societies had changed to capitalist ones, similarly capitalist societies keep transforming themselves through the use of technology. Those on the left of the political spectrum might perceive such transformation as paving the way to a world where humans will no longer need to work. However, Dan Corjescu reminds us that what Marx had actually proposed was not a world where work would be eradicated, but a world in which meaningful (human) activity would flourish and in which, accordingly, man would not stay at home in idleness, provided with some sort of subsistence by the state.[5]

What Corjescu affirms is indeed very eloquent. In fact, this reminds us that, even though nowadays it is still impossible to have at our disposal an array of machines doing all that is needed, there is still a significant minority of people who possess sufficient liquid capital to employ enough workers, who, aided by machines, are able to provide almost all necessities that one could ever desire. Nonetheless, many of these affluent members of society still spontaneously decide (on their own free will) to engage in meaningful mental and perhaps even physical activity which generates further material profit. We must add to these wealthy individuals also those workers who, once they reach retirement age, continue to work on a voluntary basis without receiving any material compensation. However, it is equally true that many of today's workers continue to indulge in work which they only agree to keep on doing, not because of some personal gratification. For them, it may represent their only means of survival. What I refer to here is the kind of work that, in Marx's terms, is alienating for human beings.

Consequently, what Corjescu envisages through the rise of the robots is for dull, meaningless and dehumanising work to eventually become a thing of the past and he sees this transformation as still requiring human workers. Nonetheless, he realises that the latter will need to be more skilled, more educated and more informed than ever. He sees this transformation as a positive one and, while in principle I find myself in

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[5] Dan Corjescu, "The Rise of the Robots and the End of Capitalism?", *CounterPunch*, 2017, https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/08/25/the-rise-of-the-robots-and-the-end-of-capitalism.

agreement, his line of thought still leaves me concerned about what will happen to those, who, for various personal and social reasons, will not be able to acquire the skills, the education, and the information needed to work hand in hand with more technologically advanced machinery.

UBI: A Universal Basic Income

Accordingly, one should not dismiss the possibility that one day machines could either partially or completely replace human workers. In such a situation, a mechanism for direct wealth redistribution would need to be established. That is why Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams demand that a post-work society should adopt a Universal Basic Income (UBI), a mechanism through which every citizen receives a liveable amount of money without any means-testing (an official process to determine whether an individual or family is eligible for government assistance).[6] Thus, such a mechanism would essentially be activated to cater for the many workers who, due to robotization, would end up with no means of subsistence.

Some politicians, like Benoît Hamon (a Socialist Party candidate for the 2017 French presidential election), are convinced that such a mechanism can be put into practice. In fact, he had proposed that instead of funding a subsistence allowance for people out of work (by taxing all those in employment), government should be taxing robots. This does not imply that a robot itself would be asked to pay income tax, but rather that French citizens should be granted 750 euros monthly with funds coming from robot owners. Hence, such a mechanism would put into practice the notion of social responsibility: a business owner should not expect to replace a waged human being with a machine which requires minimal maintenance costs and then keep all the profit. Part of the yield should be transferred to all those whose job was eliminated by robotization.

At first glance, the above proposal certainly looks like a just mechanism. Nevertheless, it does not address the issue mentioned earlier by Corjescu. As a matter of fact, such a mechanism goes against what Marx had envisaged, that is having the proletariat involved in meaningful activity. Indeed, one needs to consider the fact that a worker receiving a mea-

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6   Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, *Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work* (London: Verso, 2015).

sly income for doing nothing has a better chance of becoming more alien-ated than a worker enduring harsh working conditions but nonetheless re-ceiving a more reasonable salary. Moreover, future governments might no longer be able to adopt such a mechanism in a somewhat distant future. For instance, neo-noir science fiction films such as Blade Runner depict a future where synthetics and replicants (very advanced humanoid robots resembling and acting exactly like humans) do the hard work for govern-ments and for corporations and, since they indulge in the same activities as human beings, require a monetary income. Such a possibility is cer-tainly too farfetched at the present, but, to quote Isaac Asimov, "Today's science fiction is tomorrow's science fact."

Universal Basic Income and the Post-Work Economy

Dinerstein *et al.* also discuss the notion of the Universal Basic In-come, but they look at it from a different angle.[7] Instead of focusing on the measure itself, they put it into the context of a Post-Work economy.

Essentially, their areas of contention are not the robotic automation and the Universal Basic Income *per se*. In fact, on the latter they state that, hopefully, such mechanism will keep millions from starving and, in principle, the authors are not opposed to that. Nevertheless, they argue that its implementation has significant implications in the medium and long term. Their apprehension derives from the fact that the system will not lead us to a post-capitalist utopia, but to a world that leaves us be-holden to capital, to the state, and to money. What particularly worries them is the fact that an idea which emanates from the free-market right, is accepted (and even re-proposed) by the left.

For them, capitalism is not about production, but about subordinat-ing life to the rule of money. They advocate the idea that money is not a neutral mechanism that just allows the buying and selling of goods, but rather a form of social domination impossible to escape. Hence, they ob-serve that, while a Universal Basic Income might indeed free humanity both from work and from the problem of unemployment, at the same

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[7]   Ana Cecilia Dinerstein, "A post-work economy of robots and machines is a bad Utopia for the left", *The Conversation*, 2016, https://theconversation.com/a-post-workeconomy-of-robots-and-machines-is-a-bad-utopia-for-the-left-59134.

time it will make people more reliant on money and on the state. Essentially, such a mechanism will pave the way to a state-sponsored foundation for unsustainable hyper-consumption. For them, this will result in a post-work dystopia, in which robots will be celebrated and in which humans will become zombielike under the total domination of the same money and the state.

Although Dinerstein *et al.* make a valid point, the fact remains that, in the long run, a mechanism such as the Universal Basic Income might be used as the main bargaining chip by capitalism to guarantee its survival in a world in which robots do most of the work, predominantly the work currently being done by low-skilled and low-educated workers. To use an analogy, it is like giving sweet candy to a child to keep her quiet and happy, with a total disregard of the harmful effects on the health of that child.

Robotization and the Common Good

Robotization is a process that affects both the public, as well as the private dimensions of social life. Hence any philosophical reflection on the subject matter needs to also take into consideration the concept of the common good. In this regard, Brian Green, director of technology ethics at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics (Santa Clara University), ponders on robotic and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and states that these technologies offer enormous potential benefits.[8] At the same time, he is also aware that these technologies include substantial drawbacks and dangers. In his analysis, he tackles the subject matter through five sources of ethical standards. One of these is the Common Good approach, which suggests that the interlocking relationships of society are at the basis of ethical reasoning and that respect and compassion for all others, especially the vulnerable, are requirements of such reasoning. In this regard, the unemployed are certainly considered to be vulnerable members of society and, as already stated in other parts of this article, robotization can definitely induce unemployment. Consequently, Green deliberates on how robotics and AI can both promote and endanger the common good. In order to do so, he proposes the example

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[8] Brian Green, "Social Robots, AI, and Ethics", *Santa Clara University*, 2016, https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/technology-ethics/resources/social-robots-ai-and-ethics.

of the self-driving car, also known as a driverless or an autonomous car. Through this example, Green demonstrates that the combination of robotics and AI can promote the common good, since currently tens of thousands of people die each year in automobile accidents, the vast majority of which are caused by human error.

He thus believes that, if autonomous vehicles were even slightly better than human drivers, then thousands of lives could be saved each year. He also affirms that drivers might not need to pay attention to the road, and thus be able to work or relax while commuting. Green likewise envisages a future where people might not even need to own cars anymore if robotic cars become accessible enough to always pick a passenger up whenever the need arises. He also states that such an arrangement could save immense time and resources. However, he does not elaborate on how this would be achieved, so while agreeing that his point on the reduction of accidents is a valid one, at the same time I find the idea of people not owning cars reminiscent to an unrealistic socialist utopia.

As regards, how the combination of robotics and AI could endanger the common good, Green states that if autonomous cars become so effective that drivers are no longer necessary, then millions of workers, ranging from taxi drivers to delivery and long-haul truck drivers, would be out of work. In this regard, he asks whether these unemployed drivers would become impoverished, and questions whence the necessary money would come from to provide for them or re-train them for new jobs.

A Society Beyond Work

Aaron Bastani also envisages robotization as being used for the common good, but has a more concrete proposal.[9] In fact, he states that industrial robots should lead to a society of leisure and that the surplus of new technologies should be used for the benefit of human beings. He adds that, as a consequence, workers might need to work only twelve hours *per* week, but that, to arrive at that number of hours, we require a new kind of politics as well as a shift towards a culture that does not value work as the unique source of spiritual nourishment.

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[9]   Aaron Bastani, "Publicly fund the transition to a Society beyond Work", *openDemocracy*, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/neweconomics/ publicly-fund-the-transition-to-a-society-beyond-work.

I think that Bastani approaches the issue of the consequences of robotization in a realistic manner. First of all, he is aware of the fact that jobs will be lost due to technological change. But, instead of reassuring us with what perhaps are illusions (such that everyone will nevertheless be re-deployed in jobs requiring high skills and education), he makes us contemplate the fact that a human being should not look at work as the only source of all personal fulfilment. Yet, for some people, work is truly an important source of fulfilment. Research carried out by Steven Reiss and Susan Havercamp, for instance, reveals that, in comparison with older adults, younger people consider career success to be very important.[10] In fact, results from their research indicate that aging is associated with a general decline in motivation for career success. Consequently, they suggest that (as regards personal aspirations) honour, family, and idealism are more prevailing for older than for younger adults. Also, Katriina Hyvönen *et al.* noted, that career driven people have many expectations and goals, and that such people are recognisable by their thirst to perform in the workplace.[11] Thus, they are very competitive individuals.

Consequently, although many are contractually required to work for not more than eight hours *per* day, they end up working even more. When asked about such behaviour these workers retort that it is because they need more money, or that they cannot finish all tasks unless they work over time. But most of the time they state that they can only feel self-actualised through their labour. While all three replies reveal various degrees of alienation (particularly for those with menial or repetitive jobs rather than those involved in creative or innovative work), the last one discloses the fact that, for many, work is the *raison d'être* for their existence. This comes as no surprise to those who, having been brought up in a capitalist culture, were told by their parents, their teachers, and their work supervisors that work is the key to open the doors to a successful life. However, we are now facing a situation where, due to

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[10] Steven Reiss and Susan Havercamp, "Motivation in a developmental context: A new method for studying self-actualization," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 45 (2005): 41-53.

[11] Katriina Hyvönen *et al.*, "Young managers' drive to thrive: A personal work goal approach to burnout and work engagement", *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 75.2 (2009): 183-196.

automation, a cultural shift is required so that the masses may realise that there are other sources through which one can attain personal fulfilment. What remains to be seen is whether or not those who will economically benefit the most from robotization (that is, the owners of private capital) will propagate such a cultural shift themselves or delegate the task to governments.

What I also find admirable in Bastani's vision of a society beyond work is the fact that he does not envisage a complete eradication of human work, but rather a state in which humans will continue to work for less hours. This is totally in line with the fact that it is highly improbable that all robots will be able to carry out all sorts of tasks. This leads us to the need for collaboration.

Collaboration, Not Replacement

In this essay, I have so far tackled scenarios in which robots and automation replace human workers. Such a one-sided view could easily make us forget that in most situations robots can actually work hand in hand with humans and not totally replace them. In this regard, Frank Tobe describes the so-called co-bots which are collaborative robots designed to work together with human workers, assisting them in a variety of tasks.[12] To highlight their potential, he refers to a human-machine study conducted by MIT researchers at a BMW factory. This study concluded that teams made of humans and robots working collaboratively, can be more productive than teams made of either humans or robots alone. Also, the study showed that the cooperative process reduced human idle time by 85 percent.

Some of these co-bots are used to aid human beings in the assembly of tiny parts such as micro-components used in consumer electronics. Human hands are unable to install tiny components with the required precision. So, in this case, it is essentially an issue of either deploying robots to do part of the work or not producing the required products at all. However, other co-bots are deployed to collaborate with humans by carrying out tasks that can be performed by other persons,

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[12] Frank Tobe, "Why Co-Bots Will Be a Huge Innovation and Growth Driver for Robotics Industry", *IEEE Spectrum*, 2015, https://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/industrial-robots/collaborative-robots-innovation-growth-driver.

such as packing finished products (produced by human teammates) into boxes, and performing rudimentary quality-control inspections. Hence, although in the latter case there is an element of robot-human teamwork, there is also an element of human replacement.

When taking into consideration the two types of collaboration described above (robots carrying out tasks that humans cannot physically do, and robots collaborating with humans to carry out tasks that other persons can actually do), one comes to realise that ultimately humans are the ones responsible for the proper use of robots, whether in favour of or against the interests of humanity. Indeed, in the above two scenarios, it is those in power (the owners of capital) who are the most responsible.

Working More Instead of Less?

Up to now, I have dealt with a few cautious approaches concerning robotization and the future of workers. But Jordan Pearson paints a more dismal picture of the future of humans living along with robotic labour under capitalism.[13] In fact, he writes that we will most likely be working more (not less, as most others state) and that the jobs that we will be doing will be unpleasant. In this regard, he states that in an automated world, jobs that offer no stability, no satisfaction and no acceptable standard of living become the norm. He refers to online labour as especially representative of this trend. To make his point he refers to work that increasingly depends on emails, instant communication across time zones, and machines that bring work home from the office. A lot of people might perceive this as a dream job, but he also adds that all of this creates a mental environment where time is no longer devided into firm blocks.

One might think that the above describes a possible future scenario, but this is actually already happening. In fact, nowadays it is indeed not so uncommon to find people working either from the office or from home during mornings, afternoons, evenings and even during the night. While, some of them work unconventional hours because they cannot find any better, others do so because they believe that such a

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[13] Jordan Pearson, "The Future of Robot Labour is the Future of Capitalism", *Motherboard*, 2014, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/vvbz7y/the-future-of-robot-labour-has-everything-to-do-with-capitalism.

work arrangement is far more convenient than working during normal office hours. Wihan de Wet and Eileen Koekemoer have researched such arrangements and their implications for work-life interaction within the context of South Africa.[14] They observed that South Africans are moving towards a continuously connected lifestyle, a condition in which Information and Communication Technology (ICT) seem to have become ubiquitous. The authors also interviewed several workers to better understand how these manage interaction between their work and family spheres, and participants said that they would either limit the time they use their ICT devices (particularly after working-hours and when on holiday), or else they would downscale the access to their devices (particularly as regards work emails). At the same time, the employees stated that the use of ICT devices provides them with flexible working hours and alternative locations for doing their work. The workers also acknowledged that the use of ICT allows them to schedule their work assignments in accord with their family demands. Hence, this amply shows that, if workers utilise technology thoughtfully, they can factually avoid working more hours.

The Underconsumption of the Masses

One issue which so far has not been covered in this essay is that of consumption. As we know, the information societies that we live in are also consumer societies. The owners of capital can surely deploy robots to increase production since robots can in most cases produce much more than a human can produce over the same period of time. Let us consider, for instance, the assembly of a plastic storage box, and assume that a human worker manages to assemble 10 such boxes in the first hour of the day with 1 box failing quality control due to some assembly defect. Let us also assume that a robot assembling the same storage boxes, manages to assemble 30 such boxes in the same first hour of the day with zero boxes failing quality control. In the second hour, due to increasing tiredness the human worker manages to produce only 9 boxes

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[14] Wihan de Wet and Eileen Koekemoer, "The Increased Use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) among Employees: Implications for Work-Life Interaction," *South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences* 19.2 (2016): 264-281.

with 2 of them failing quality control. However, the robot is still operating at full efficiency. So, once again, it manages to produce a further 30 boxes with exact precision. For the sake of simplicity, in my calculations I am not taking into account the fact that machines encounter technical problems. Suffice to say, that the reliability of a robotic system generally changes over its life cycle, but that, for most systems, the failure rate is only elevated twice: when the machine is first put into service and toward the end of its useful life, that is during the wear-out period.[15] Hence, let us continue to assume that, on a typical day, the same trend is repeated over the span of 8 hours with the robot assembling 240 boxes, and the human worker assembling less than 80 (80 being the amount he was supposed to assemble). In such a scenario, the owner of the factory might keep on employing the human worker or he might dismiss him and replace him with another robot. If the latter occurs, the assembly line would be producing 480 boxes every 8 hours. Hence, in such a case, production increases considerably. Nevertheless, there is one caveat. In capitalism, the owner of the means of production does not operate for the sake of producing more, but for the sake of making profit. Hence, the factory owner not only needs to produce more storage boxes, but also to sell those storage boxes.

Now let us imagine that similar scenarios occur in other factories in the same city, and that consequently many workers end up without job and without income. Will it make sense at this point for the factory owner to keep on producing 480 boxes every 8 hours, if less people have enough money to buy them? Concerning this, Michael Roberts asks whether it is this underconsumption of the masses that brings capitalism down.[16] He answers by stating that such a robot economy is not any longer a capitalist one, but that it is more reminiscent of a slave economy. This is the case since at that point the owners of the means of production can just consume without the need to make a profit, just as the noble slave owners of ancient Rome only consumed without running any businesses to make a profit. I

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[15] David R. Clark and Mark R. Lehto, *Reliability, Maintenance, and Safety of Robots in Handbook of Industrial Robotics*, 2nd edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999).

[16] Michael Roberts, "Robots and AI: Utopia or Dystopia?", *Michael Roberts Blog*, 2015, https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/08/29/robots-and-ai-utopia-or-dystopia-part-two.

contend that such an answer is only applicable as far as the owners of the means of production have either at their disposal an army of robots that will produce for them whatever they need to consume, or they have accumulated enough capital to let them buy from others what they need to consume. Also, what will happen to the unemployed workers who will neither have any robots nor any accumulated capital? An answer is provided by Martin Ford who states that

> There is really no way to envision how the private sector can solve this problem. There is simply no real alternative except for the government to provide some type of income mechanism for consumers. While this idea will initially, of course, be vehemently opposed, I believe that in time, this will have to be accepted as a basic function of government.[17]

Hence, as is usually the case, the state will have to solve a problem created by the private sector.

Can Robots Create Surplus Value?

The previous section needs to be also revisited in terms of "surplus value." According to Marx's theory, surplus value is equivalent to the new value created by workers in excess of their own labour-cost and this is taken by the capitalist as profit when products are sold. To clarify this, let us take again the example of the firm assembling plastic storage boxes. If the firm keeps on employing the worker, we can safely assume that after four hours of work he covers the cost of his wage. But, since he keeps on working for eight hours, he ends up producing more value than he actually receives back. This is the surplus value at the basis of the profit taken by the firm owner.

Tomáš Tengely Evans explains that Marx distinguished between what he called the "living labour" of workers and the "dead labour" of machinery.[18] He clarifies that machinery has and can pass on value,

[17] Martin Ford, *The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating Technology and the Economy of the Future*, vol. 1 (Scotts Valley, California: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, 2009), 160.

[18] Tomáš Tengely Evans, "Are robots taking all our jobs?", *SocialistWorker*, 2016, https://socialistworker.co.uk/art/42757/Are+robots+taking+all+our++jobs.

since it was made by human labour, but that, at the same time, it cannot add any new value. Thus, only the workers' "living labour" can add new value to a commodity. He further adds that machines and tools do not create profit since they have to be put to use by workers.

Hence, essentially, a robot (like a slave) is not a worker. Rather, a robot is fixed or constant capital, which does not produce profit, because only unpaid (the extra four hours in the previous example) human labour produces profit. And, as Thomas Hueglin argues

> Marx believed that in order to minimise the production cost per unit of output, and to maximise profit, capitalists will intensify the use of machinery. At some point, however, the productive capacity achieved by the intensive use of machinery, automation, etc., will produce more output than can be sold. Capital gets stuck or fixed in its current commodity form (machines, factories). It can no longer be reconverted into its money form, [let] alone into more money, and subsequently into a more profitable form of production. This is the essence of what Marx means by an epidemic or crisis of overproduction. Its corollary is underconsumption, hinted at in the Manifesto ... [19]

In view of the above, Tengely-Evans argues that full automation is unlikely to become a reality, because it conflicts with the fundamental logic of capitalism. One should now also better understand why Roberts asks whether it is this underconsumption of the masses that can bring capitalism down.[20]

All of the above are valid arguments, but will they still be valid if one day, as in the case of the science fiction film Blade Runner (which was inspired by *Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?*, the acclaimed novel by Philip K. Dick), robots will themselves start to consume and, like human workers, start to sell their labour-power to an employer in exchange for a wage or salary?

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[19] Thomas Hueglin, *Classical Debates for the 21st Century: Rethinking Political Thought* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Higher Education Division, 2008), 224.

[20] Michael Roberts, "Robots and AI: Utopia or Dystopia?", *Michael Roberts Blog*, 2015, https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2015/08/29/robots-and-ai-utopia-or-dystopia-part-two.

Who is Really Pulling the Strings?

The children of the 80s and 90s grew up watching science fiction movies and TV shows such as Star Wars and Star Trek. These fictional depictions nourished the imagination of generations with the idea that the not so distant future would be populated with robots. Many years have passed since then, and nothing so extraordinary has yet happened. So, in that regard one might ask the question as to why robotization has not advanced so much when other technologies (such as the communicator used by Captain Kirk) are now even found in the hands of children.

One person asking why in daily life robots are not yet abundant is David Graeber, an American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist. Graeber asks why the projected explosion of technological growth that everyone was expecting, such as the moon bases and the robot factories, failed to happen.[21] He answers that one of the reasons why we do not have robot factories is because roughly 95 percent of robotics research funding has been channelled through the Pentagon, which is more interested in developing unmanned drones than in automating paper mills. Indeed, in an article published by the Daily Mail in October 2017, it was revealed that the Pentagon's research branch had recently launched its Offensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics (OffSET) program. The latter was seeking ideas for new systems that could allow for what was being termed "human-swarm teaming" and that, through the program, the Pentagon had awarded contracts to design, develop, and deploy the technology in both physical and virtual environments. Eventually, the Pentagon was hoping to create drone swarms that could one day deploy more than 250 robots at a time.[22]

Hence, as the above example clearly illustrates, in the world's largest economy, a lot of research funding aimed at advancing robotic technology is being provided for military modernisation rather than for innovation in social policy. Thus, if one safely assumes, that in the big economies the rest of the research funding is being directed towards advancing industrial robots and consumer electronics, one cannot really expect a lot of progress

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[21] David Graeber, "Of Flying Cars and the Declining Rate of Profit," *The Baffler*, 2012, https://thebaffler.com/salvos/of-flying-cars-and-the-declining-rate-of-profit.

[22] Cheyenne MacDonald, "The Pentagon is developing drone SWARMS that could one day deploy more than 250 robots at a time," *Daily Mail*, 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5017931/Pentagon-developing-drone-SWARMS-250-robots.html.

with regards to the improvement of human welfare.

The Robot Unemployment Myth?

While most thinkers acknowledge the fact that robotization threatens jobs, Michael Suede tends to think otherwise. In fact, he argues that there is a countless number of causes to our present long-term unemployment problem, but that not even one of them is linked to technological development or the automation of worker processes.[23] He lists a number of these causes and, for most of them, he puts the blame on governments who, according to him, are pumping massive amounts of money into unproductive activities, and putting in place excessive regulations and taxation that limit the capacity of industry to increase its production of useful tradable goods.

While admitting that, throughout history, technology has rendered many jobs obsolete (which *prima facie* seems to contradict his main assertion), he tries hard to drive home the point that the displacement of manual jobs by machines is what has allowed the Western world to experience the tremendous rise in living standards that it experienced. Hence, for him, the means justify the ends. Moreover, like many others, he supports his thesis with the assertion that technological advancement has freed up labour resources and allowed them to participate in much more productive activities. In this regard, he reassures his readers by stating that, because robots are not capable of coming up with innovative solutions to the infinite number of human problems, humans will always find something productive to do. He emphasises his point by reminding us that robots will never be able to substitute the creativity of the human mind, which necessitates a consciousness absent from any machine.

Indeed, as far as we know, there is at present not even one single machine that could be considered conscious. But one cannot totally exclude the possibility that such a machine could be eventually built. As a matter of fact, the question of whether a machine can be conscious or not was first asked by Dennis Thompson way back in 1965, in an article published in the *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*.[24] More, recently Stanislas

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[23] Michael Suede, "The Robot Unemployment Myth," *Libertarian News*, 2012, https://www.libertariannews.org/2012/06/30/the-robot-unemployment-myth.

[24] Dennis Thompson, "Can a machine be Conscious?", *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* XVI.61 (1965): 33-43.

Dehaene *et al.* asked what constitutes consciousness and whether machines could have it.[25] They contend that, when making a decision, humans feel more or less confident about their choice and that confidence can be defined as a sense of the probability that a decision or computation is correct. They furthermore add that almost anytime the brain perceives or decides, it also estimates its degree of confidence and that learning is also accompanied by a quantitative sense of confidence. Moreover, they state that humans evaluate how much trust they have in what they have learned and use it to weigh past knowledge versus present evidence. In this regard, they conclude that they do not exclude the possibility that one day we might have a machine that would behave as though it were conscious, that it would know that it is seeing something, that it would express confidence in it, report it to others and that it could suffer hallucinations when its monitoring mechanisms break down. They also state that it may even experience the same perceptual illusions as humans. Unfortunately, their conclusion does not really answer the original question since the fact that something behaves *as if it were* conscious does not imply that it *is* conscious. Nonetheless, the fact remains that Suede's assertions could one day no longer be so much reassuring.

Automation and Gender Equality

As we have seen, different thinkers address the issue of robotization and automation from different perspectives and some of these viewpoints can be quite unique. For instance, Tim Worstall proclaims that he welcomes our robotic communist jobless future since we will get more leisure time, and everything made by the robots will be much cheaper.[26] Nevertheless, he ignores important concepts such as surplus value and other vital technicalities from Marxist theory. So, instead of debating his claims, I will focus on something else that he writes about, namely the issue of how much automation contributes to gender equality. To defend the thesis that automation positively contributes to gender equality, he distinguishes between unpaid work in the household and paid work in the marketplace and states that, while paid working hours have fallen for men since the 1930s, they have risen for women. Of

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[25] Stanislas Dehaene et al., "What is consciousness, and could machines have it?", *Science* 358.6362 (2017): 486-492.

[26] Tim Worstall, "I, for one, welcome our robotic communist jobless future.", *The Register*, 2013, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/09/19/say_what_you _want_about_marx_he_was_right_about_robots/?page=1.

course, he is not implying that automation or robotization forces women to work more. Rather, what he is stating is that household automation has done more for women's liberation than anything else. To support the latter claim, he refers to a survey in which it is reported that 80 years ago it took 65 hours a week of household labour to run a household, whereas nowadays it only takes 2 hours. Hence, the automation of household tasks, which were traditionally carried out by women, allowed for more women to get involved in paid work.

Thus, Worstall manages to adequately demonstrate that, through automation, both sexes have gained, since humanity has experienced a huge reduction in unpaid household working hours, a slight reduction in men's paid working hours, a significant rise in women's paid working hours and an increase in the number of leisure hours for both. Hence, one must admit that, in this particular area, automation has contributed positively and that, once household robots become the norm, the gains will be much higher, since we can fairly assume that everybody would like to have a clean home without lifting a finger. Nevertheless, as always there is the other side of the coin and in this case a pertinent question to ask is what would happen to the many unskilled workers whose paid work is totally dependent on cleaning homes and offices.

Robotization and the Skilled Workers

Throughout most of this article, reference has been made to thinkers acknowledging the probability that most (if not all) unskilled jobs will eventually be taken up by robots. This might give the impression that only unskilled workers are at risk, but that might not be necessarily the case. In fact, Zoltan Istvan states that in 20 years from now, everyone's job will be at stake, even that of qualified workers like his wife, who had trained 19 years in college to become a practicing Ob/Gyn.[27] In order to illustrate his claim, he hypothesizes that machines will eventually deliver babies and remove cervical cancer better than people, that software will do taxes more efficiently than accountants and that articles will be crafted better by news aggregating software rather than by living, breathing journalists. All of this had already been corroborated by Rifkin, who, back in 1995, had already observed that

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[27] Zoltan Istvan, "Will capitalism survive the robot revolution?", *TechCrunch*, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/29/will-capitalism-survive-the-robot-revolution.

Numerically controlled robots and advanced computers and software are invading the last remaining human sphere, the realm of the mind. Properly programmed, these new 'thinking machines' are increasingly capable of performing conceptual, managerial, and administrative functions and of coordinating the flow of production, from extraction of raw materials to the marketing and distribution of final goods and services.[28]

So, apparently no one is really safe from the perils of robotization. Indeed, Istvan's predictions are rather plausible. But, while some professions could be taken up by machines quite easily, others cannot, at least not in the short term. It is well known, for instance, that, through suitable software packages, machines are very good at computing complex calculations. But will a woman choose a machine instead of a human being to deliver her baby? Also, will it be so easy for a machine to write a well-articulated article that goes beyond simply aggregating news? Will a machine be able to write an essay or a book such as Tolstoy's *War and Peace*? To answer such questions, one would need to delve deeply into the realm of Artificial Intelligence, which is not the subject-matter of this essay.

Conclusion

This article presented an assessment of what various thinkers have contributed towards the debate of robotics and how the latter will affect the future of workers. Instead of finding two sharply divided camps — one embracing robotization and one rejecting it *in toto* — we find much more nuanced approaches to the issue. Essentially, those welcoming robotization tend to be more convinced about the positive outcomes, whereas those who look at it with a certain degree of uncertainty are not radically pessimistic with regards to the plight of the workers.

The motives behind such reasoning are various. First of all, there is the proposed Universal Basic Income, a mechanism that is to a certain extent viewed as a positive instrument that would act as a cushion against the demise of the unemployed workers. Secondly, there seems to be a consensus that less working hours would be beneficial even though on this issue one

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[28] Jeremy Rifkin, *The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 60.

thinker believes that most likely we will be working more rather than less. Nonetheless, in order to work less there needs to be a cultural shift, since working for at least eight hours *per* day is still ingrained in the *psyche* of most workers. Thirdly, it is highly probable that in the short to the medium term, humans and robots will be mostly collaborating with each other, rather than the latter totally replacing the former.

There are also those who welcome robotization insofar as it is used as an instrument for the common good. A prime example of this is how automation has overwhelmingly helped in the reduction of unpaid household work, which was traditionally associated with women. However, it was also observed that in the USA much of the research funds in the field of robotics are being provided for military purposes, rather than for the common good. Moreover, we also find those who look at the subject matter within a much deeper Marxist context and thus see full automation as leading to underconsumption, which in turn would lead to the fall of capitalism. But it has been observed that full automation is unlikely to become a reality precisely because it conflicts with the fundamental logic of capitalism.

Finally, there are also those who believe that unemployment due to robotization is essentially a myth, since robots will never be able to substitute the creativity of the human mind, and that, consequently, work will be transformed rather than eradicated. Those who believe in such transformation are aware of the fact that the future proletariat will need to be more educated and skilled. Nonetheless, even this cannot provide any assurances, since machines will be more than capable to do the work associated with today's educated and skilled workforce.

In the final analysis, I do believe that, through robotization, workers have much more to gain than to lose. After all, only a few are envisaging a scenario in which workers will need to revolt against the machines on a large-scale. Nonetheless, all further development in the field of robotics needs to be continuously scrutinised, mostly (albeit not only) by philosophers. Only through such a continuous watchkeeping we will be able to guarantee that the advancement of robotics leads the future proletariat on a smooth path, rather than onto a rough one.[29]

Contemporary Political Development:
Towards a Weaker Democracy

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Abstract

This article adopts Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson's view that political transitions are directly linked with the economic interests of the elite. The article describes four paths of historical political development as identified by Acemoglu and Robinson. A fifth path of political development is introduced as an addition to the authors' theory; a path leading from non-democracy to a democracy, which gradually disintegrates without however collapsing. The latter is arguably a path of political development that describes sufficiently modern liberal democracies amidst the impact of globalisation. Finally, the suggested path is parallelised with Zygmunt Bauman's theory of *interregnum* and of the separation of power from politics, but also with Colin Crouch's concept of *post-democracy*.

> The crisis consists precisely of the fact that
> the old is dying and the new cannot be born.
> Antonio Gramsci

Introduction

Out of 86 liberal democracies (i.e., free countries) in 2015, only 10 democracies existed in 1900, while only 24 democracies existed in 1950, which confirms that liberal democracy has followed an evidently expansive trajectory since the early 20th century.[1] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson suggest that the expansion of liberal democracy was a strategic decision by the corresponding domestic elites, who, by grant-

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[1]   "Our World in Data," *Ourworldindata.Org*, 2016,
      https://ourworldindata.org/democracy.

ing voting rights and liberties to the poor, aimed to avoid social unrest. Through a game theoretic approach to global political economy, Acemoglu and Robinson openly argue that political transitions historically depend on the threat of social unrest and in turn, on the elites' willingness to introduce democracy to the disenfranchised parts of society, in order to avoid the costs of revolution.[2] In particular, they argue that the elites bear incentives to sacrifice part of their *de jure* political power, when the costs of revolution seem to be higher than that of partial democratization. In other words, democratization is predominantly subject to the elites' interest rather than dependent on other sociological factors. However, democracy is a wealth redistributive political system and once instituted the elite might still bear economic incentives to mount a coup and revert a country to non-democracy, a typical example of which is the history of political transitions in Latin America in the 20th century.

To facilitate their democratization theory, Acemoglu and Robinson distinguish *four paths* of transitions between non-democracy and democracy.[3] The first path of political development is one that leads gradually from non-democracy to a stable long-standing democracy that does not revert back to non-democracy. The authors identify Britain as the most representative example of this path, where the relatively rich and the rural aristocracy made strategic concessions as of 1832 (initially only to the male population), which allowed the permanent consolidation of democracy to date. The second path also leads from non-democracy to democracy, but democracy quickly collapses, leading to a repetitive loop of political transitions between non-democracy and democracy. Latin American political history encapsulates the second path, while Argentina is an adequately effective example, having undergone various such transitions in the period 1912-1983. What is left to be considered are countries that remained non-democratic or democratization was much delayed, which Acemoglu and Robinson separate into two sub-paths. The third path of political development, or otherwise first sub-path of longstanding non-democracy, regards relatively egalitarian and prosperous countries, such as Singapore, where people are satisfied

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[2] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, "A Theory of Political Transitions", *The American Economic Review* 91.4 (2001): 938-963.

[3] Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship And Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.

with the outstanding political institutions and economic affluence and hence bear little incentives to revolt and request additional political concessions. Finally, the fourth path (second sub-path of non-democracy) regards highly unequal societies, where the elites bear strong incentives to supress coercively any social reaction to prevent democratization. The effective example of the last path is South Africa, before the collapse of the apartheid regime in 1994.[4]

According to the UN Human Development reports, in 1989 (the year of fall of the Wall), the richest 20% held 83% of global wealth, while in 2015 the richest 20% of the global population held 94% of global wealth.[5] *The finding is simple; after the fall of the Berlin Wall liberal democracy expanded throughout the world, but at the same time the rich became richer!* Acemoglu and Robinson argue that globalisation provides adequate economic incentives to elites to avoid preventing democratisation, simply because the governments are less able to impose policies that would reduce the elites' economic power. In any other case, the elites would have to invest capital in sustaining non-democracy that would come along with the costs of social discontent, unrest and continuous instability, thus damaging economic growth. In turn, they prefer to invest this capital in propaganda and lobbying with the governments within liberal democracy, this way increasing their *de facto* political power, while enjoying vast economic freedom, due to globalisation.

> Globalisation might contribute to democratization in a number of distinct ways. First, international financial integration means that capital owners, the elites, can more easily take their money out of a given country. This makes it more difficult to tax the elites and reduces the extent to which democracy can pursue populist and highly majoritarian policies. International financial integration, therefore, makes the elites feel more secure about democratic politics and discourages them from using repression to prevent a transition from non-democracy to democracy.[6]

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[4] Ibid., 1.
[5] "Human Development Reports. United Nations Development Programme," *Hdr.Undp.Org*, 2016, http://hdr.undp.org/en.
[6] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 40.

Zygmunt Bauman endorses the political economic view of Acemoglu and Robinson. In fact, Bauman says that due to the unqualifiable and unstoppable spread of free trade, the economy is increasingly exempt from political control.[7] The economy is the area of the 'non-political' and anything left of politics is expected to be dealt with, as in the old days (prior to globalization), by the state. But the state is not allowed to touch the economy. If a state does so, by introducing trade and capital barriers or Keynesian policies, it risks swift punitive action by the markets. Economic sovereignty is a thing of the past in the globalized world, but to that we also need to aggregate the developments after the collapse of Communism, which were marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The fall of Communism led many former communist states to become part of the expanding globalization project voluntarily and to succumb to global markets' appetite, in order to enjoy the benefits of economic growth and investment.

> There were now states which—far from being forced to give up their sovereign rights—actively and keenly sought to surrender them, and begged for their sovereignty to be taken away and dissolved in the supra-state formations. There were old or new nations escaping the federalist cages in which they have been incarcerated by the now extinct Communist super-power against their will—but only to use their newly acquired decision-making freedom to pursue dissolution of their political, economic and military independence in the European Market and NATO alliance.[8]

The advent of the 21st century after the fall of the Iron Curtain has enriched our understanding of political systems, while it confirms the gradual dominance of liberal democracy worldwide. Combining Acemoglu and Robinson's political economic methodology with Zygmunt Bauman's sociological work on globalization, *I hereby would like to propose schematically a fifth path of political development; one that leads from non-democracy to a stable democracy (like in the first and the second paths), but then democracy disintegrates gradually, without however collapsing completely.* In other words, in the suggested *fifth path*

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[7] Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 66.

[8] Ibid., 64.

of political transitions, democracy survives, as the elites do not bear adequate incentives to mount a coup. But at the same time, globalisation allows the elites to secure gradually rising de facto political influence within a country, due to the influence of global markets. In a nutshell, the fifth path is one that leads from non-democracy to a stable democracy, which gradually disintegrates and becomes weaker, without however converting to non-democracy. I would further suggest, that the *fifth path* is ideally represented by most Western nation-states that were democratic *prior to and after* the fall of the Berlin Wall (e.g., UK, France, Italy, etc.). The *fifth path* is a theoretical extension of the first path, as identified by Acemoglu and Robinson (case of Britain), by aggregating to it the fall of Communism and the expanding globalization, which allowed the elites to transcend the barriers of nation-state sovereignty.

The *fifth path* theoretical extension to Acemoglu and Robinson's political economic theory could be parallelised with Zygmunt Bauman's theory of *interregnum*, and Colin Crouch's theory of *post-democracy*. Free capital mobility and global market power rose to the extent that government policies are not adequate to constrain elites within national borders any longer. As a result, the high *de facto* political power that the elites used to hold prior to the fall of Communism, rose even further in the 21st century, as governments became decreasingly likely to impose policies against the economic elites, in fear of global market penalties and isolation. The global financial world seems interested in a world of fragmented, weak nation-states, whose economic authority will be limited simply to balance the national budget, without touching upon the capital mobility and market liberty. Governments either voluntarily or without even realizing have surrendered their authorities to the markets. Of course, the markets do not only comprise of private corporations and investors, but they are also supported by influential institutions, such as the central banks, the EU, and the UN, which are predominantly technocratic, elitist and insufficiently democratic.

The domination of market-oriented, liberal democracies within an ever-deregulated global economy, leads to a vicious mechanism of withdrawing political power from the poor and transferring it to the elites, which bear decreasing interest of influencing liberal democracy, as the fear of market isolation forces even left-leaning governments to impose market-friendly and elite-friendly policies to avoid economic penalties (e.g., through increased borrowing costs). In fact, even if govern-

ments want to act in favour of the poor, they risk devastating their countries by the markets, a very popular such case being the SYRIZA-led government in Greece in 2015. After the collapse of Communism, the markets bear even stronger incentives to isolate and make a paradigm out of governments which defy capital mobility and economic liberalisation. Such behaviour at the time of the Cold War, prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, would risk pushing a nation to the direct influence of the Soviet Union. As a result, politicians are now more than ever fully obliged to operate under a double-mind of trying to please the markets on the one hand, while, on the other hand, also seeking to please voters. This political paradox has intrigued Zygmunt Bauman, who refers to the 21st century as an era of *interregnum*.[9] Bauman derives the term from Antonio Gramsci, who used it to describe a crisis as the period between the old dying and the new not being born.[10] Interregnum in Roman times used to designate the historical period between the death of the Roman ruler until the enthronement of the next ruler. If a Roman ruler died at a relatively old age, most inhabitants of the Roman empire would have lived solely under his rule and as a result, the change of ruler would be an entirely new situation, both for the citizens and the new ruler. Bauman believes that what Gramsci called a period of *interregnum* is what the new generations will experience in the 21st century, due to a "divorce" between power and politics, which used for two centuries to reside within the territorial nation-state but were eventually separated by globalization. Politics has remained local, while power has become global.

> Power has evaporated from the level of nation-state into the politics—free 'space of flows'—to borrow Manuel Castells' expression—leaving politics ensconced as before in the previously shared abode, now degraded to the 'space of places.' The growing volume of power that matters (that is, the kind of power that has, if not the final say, then at least the major and, in the end, decisive

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9   Zygmunt Bauman, "Times of Interregnum," *Ethics & Global Politics* 5.1 (2012), http://www.ethicsandglobalpolitics.net/index.php/egp/article/view/17200.

10 Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, *Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), 276.

influence on the setting of options open to agents' choice) has already turned global; but politics has remained as local as before. Accordingly, the presently most relevant powers stay beyond the reach of extant political institutions, whereas the frame for manoeuvre in inner-state politics continues to shrink. The planetary state of affairs is now buffeted by *ad hoc* assemblies of discordant powers unconstrained by political control due to the increasing powerlessness of the extant political institutions. The latter are thereby forced to limit their ambitions severely and to 'hive off,' 'outsource,' or 'contract out' the growing number of functions traditionally entrusted to the governance of national governments to non-political agencies.[11]

Bauman's modern 21st century *interregnum* is in line with the *fifth path* of political development, as this was described earlier in this chapter, where I primary argue that liberal democracy has served as a convenient political platform for elites to push through the separation of power from politics. The *fifth path* and Bauman's work on globalization are also very relevant to Colin Crouch's theory of *post-democracy,* through which he describes the second half of the 20th century as the degradation of Western democracy.

The origins of *post-democracy* according to Crouch can be traced to the middle of the 20th century, immediately after the WW2.[12] Crouch explains that democracy reaches its peak right after a great political transition, when enthusiasm is widespread and when the system has not yet discovered how to manipulate the new demands.[13] As a result, we can derive that liberal democracy was at its most egalitarian form right after WW2. That was a period after the greatest non-democratic projects (Fascism and Nazism) had been defeated, when it became evident that the welfare of society was dependent on the population of wage-earning individuals. Such insights were evident even in the economic policies at the time following the postulate of John Maynard Keynes, as well as the

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[11] Zygmunt Bauman, "Times Of Interregnum."
[12] Colin Crouch, *Coping With Post-Democracy* (London: Fabian Society, 2000), 3.
[13] Ibid., 2.

dictums of mass production and mass consumption.[14] In order to ensure the survival of capitalism given the inequalities it produced, firms were subjected to the authority of national governments with limitations on their actions being evident. It was a form of political economic compromise between capitalists and working people. However, *post-democracy* emerged when elites realized that they could manipulate and manage more efficiently the masses, who were increasingly consumed by their daily activities. With time, issues in the political arena became more complex and the masses found it hard to know which side to take or which policies to support. Debates pertaining to public elections and policy agendas became closely managed by teams and groups of professional individuals and experts who could persuade the masses to believe their opinions to be indubitable. Therefore, participation of the masses in political debates declined, while even voting was approached with apathy, leading to a politically passive citizenry. The latter is highly attributed to media propaganda and new modern-life consumerism in the West, which is again promoted by global corporations. Thus, in the contemporary age—especially after the end of the Cold War—the opinions of citizens to decide the political agenda have been replaced by large globalized firms. In fact, globalization allowed firms to control and influence policies in most countries, which are part of the global market economy.[15] In many scenarios, they dictate the trend of regulatory and fiscal regimes, threatening to withdraw their support if their demands are not adhered to.

Post-democracy is characterised by extensive use of capital from corporate firms in election campaigns because they seek to support a certain regime that will respect their interests.[16] Moreover, it has led to a new system of lobbying characterized by corporate alliances that seek to assert their influence on certain issues such as lower corporate taxes, privatization and labour deregulation that would maximize their profits. With time, such tendencies lead to the fading away of the influence of institutions of democracy, with economics being the main subject be-

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[14] Ibid., 3.
[15] Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2004), 57.
[16] Wolfgang Merkel, "Is There a Crisis of Democracy?", *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association* (2013), 8.

hind policies and alliances.[17] Political parties have become dependent on economic interests rather than the electorate and slowly abandon policies that may improve social welfare. If the corporate elites disagreewith the policies they will threaten to go elsewhere, while the mass population is rooted in the nation state, having to obey laws and taxes, what Bauman otherwise calls globalization versus localization.[18] Crouch summarizes the effects of globalization and the influence of the elites on liberal democracy in a cohesive, simple, yet powerful argument: since the success of corporations depends on their ability to maximize value for the firms' shareholders, entrepreneurs and company managers must be expected to use their access to politicians and civil servants for the benefit of their corporations.[19]

Both Bauman and Crouch acknowledge that lobbying and the direct influence of elites over politicians is not the only way of distorting democracy and, as a result, they devote a considerable amount of their work on means of media domination and mass propaganda. Crouch believes that a critical moment for *post-democracy* was the development of the advertising industry after WW2 and the involvement of advertising in politics.

> Taken by surprise, first by the demand for, then by the reality of, democracy, politicians struggled for the first part of the 20th century to find means of addressing the new mass public. For a period, it seemed that only men like Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin had discovered the secret of power through mass communication. Democratic politicians were placed on roughly equal discursive terms with their electorates through the clumsiness of their attempts at mass speech. Then the US advertising industry began to develop its skills, with a particular boost coming from the development of commercial television. The persuasion business was born as a profession. By far the dominant part of this remained devoted to the art of selling goods and services, but politics and other users of persuasion tagged along eagerly behind, extrapolating from the innovations of the advertising industry and making themselves as analogous as possible to the

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[17] Ibid., 8.
[18] Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization*, 9-26.
[19] Colin Crouch, *Coping With Post-Democracy*, 19.

business of selling products so that they could reap maximum advantage from the new techniques… Advertising is not a form of rational dialogue. It does not build up a case based on evidence but associates its products with a particular imagery. You cannot answer it back. Its aim is not to engage in discussion but to persuade to buy. Adoption of its methods has helped politicians to cope with the problem of communicating to a mass public; but it has not served the cause of democracy itself.[20]

Crouch's view on the political impact of advertising reminds us of Bauman's referral to the *Synopticon*, a power mechanism identified by Thomas Matthiessen that emerged in the second half of the 20th century with the emergence of new technologies and media. Unlike previous power mechanisms, the Synopticon is not coercive, but it rather seduces the few to watch the many by following the mainstream media and trying to imitate the promoted lifestyle of depoliticization and consumerism. Matthiessen argues that it is predominantly the institutional elites who have access to the media to express their views and propagate their ideas; mainly male population, coming from the highest social strata and bearing influence over politics, private industry and the public sector.[21] Media allow the globals to seduce the locals into their lifestyle and attract support for their interests, according to Bauman, who is at bottom very sceptical about the immediate access that the authorities have gained into people's private lives through new technologies. The latter allows the enforcement of a parallel domination mechanism to the Synopticon, the *Panopticon*, which achieves social obedience through the fear of being watched. The Panopticon was Jeremy Bentham's theoretical architectural design, where all inmates of an institution can be watched by a single watchman, without knowing if they are being watched or not. The latter obliges inmates to behave according to rules, even though the watchman obviously cannot observe all of them at the same time. The Panopticon remerged in academia as part of Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*,[22] in which he tried to analyse modern types of social domination and redistribution of controlling powers. The

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[20] Ibid., 10-11.
[21] Bauman, *Globalization*, 53.
[22] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).

Panopticon, as a domination mechanism will regain much greater importance in the 21st century, after the exposure by whistle-blower Edward Snowden in 2014 of US and UK's government-led mass surveillance informational systems. Bauman contends that, whereas in the Synopticon the many watch the few through mass media, in the Panopticon the few watch the many through electronic surveillance, achieving remarkable social domination through both seductive and coercive methods.

Despite their remarkable critique of globalisation and social inequalities Crouch and Bauman do not engage extensively in providing answers or solutions, but rather limit themselves to locating the source of inequalities and injustices. In fact, the sophistication of power domination mechanisms, along with the power of the elites within globalization, led Bauman to become very pessimistic about the chances of collective action against elitism. The new global freedom of movement makes it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to re-forge social issues into effective collective action.[23] The 21st century should be a century when younger generations should attempt to propose ways of remarrying power and politics, Bauman publicly said in one of his academic speeches in 2010. This remains one of the most important political and academic elements of Bauman's legacy for all scholars dealing with social and political topics.

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[23] Bauman, *Globalization*, 69.

IV. BOOK REVIEW

Michael Marder, Heidegger: Phenomenology, Ecology, Politics, University of Minnesota Press, 2018, Paperback, 216 pp., $25, ISBN 9781517905033.

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Humans are essentially temporal beings. Our past informs our future, and our future draws us forth from our past. Moments, decisions, and events unfold in time and affect the path we take from past to future. With this in mind, Michael Marder reflects on a handful of collective shifts away from Martin Heidegger's philosophy – set into motion by Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazi Party, and his failure to speak on the subject. While the reckoning faced by Heidegger was not unjust, the repercussions were felt by the entirety of canonical philosophers following in Heidegger's footsteps. Soon, the whole tradition of continental philosophy fell under scrutiny for allowing someone like Heidegger to dwell in its midst. Marder takes seriously the criticisms put forth, and has constructed a timely response with *Heidegger: Phenomenology, Ecology, Politics*.

Readers familiar with the philosophy of Heidegger will find an engaging analysis of Heidegger's most influential works. Instances revealing the nature of Heidegger's anti-Semitism, Marder argues, share a common thread. In each case, Heidegger is deviating from his fundamental philosophical method. In Part I, Marder discusses the ways in which phenomenology, in Heidegger's philosophy, differs from traditional phenomenology. In Part II, ecology is presented as the framework of existence. More specifically, Marder describes what sort of ecological site is optimal for dwelling, and what sort of ecological site diminishes ontological possibility. In Part III, Marder incorporates earlier discussions of phenomenology and ecology into a discourse on politics, not shying away from the obvious problem of Heidegger's explicit remarks

about Jews in his *Black Notebooks*. Through all of this, Marder maintains that though his book has been divided into parts, each part is integral to the whole. Marder constantly points to the intimate triangulation of phenomenology, ecology, and politics in Heidegger's philosophy.

Chapters 1 and 2 are foundational to the entire book. This is not simply because they come first, but because the content remains relevant for each succeeding chapter. As already mentioned, Part I is on phenomenology. Chapter 1 discusses the essentiality of possibility in Heidegger's phenomenology. Marder begins with a discussion of existential possibility. He argues that existence is historical, so existential possibility is not abstract. Our existence is framed by our political and ecological "finite openness."[1] The political element of our existence is virtually inescapable, as we all dwell alongside others, and thus must navigate the shared space into which we are thrown. (This point sets the tone for Part III, on politics.) Marder shows how phenomenology, traditionally, focuses on actuality, which is limiting because possibility is then reduced and subsumed by the actualized. By reframing the focus of phenomenology on possibility, we are able to see how a crucial component of possibility is its efficacy. Marder maintains that efficacy cannot be equated to success. Rather, it leaves room for things like failure. Possibility itself is meaningless without the possibility of failure.

In Chapter 2, Marder shows how the possibility of failure sets forth the positivity of failure. The positivity of failure is seen in various "breaks": "break from," "law break," and "break down." The first variation of break is seen as leading to authenticity. When *Dasein* falls into listening to idle-talk, they are unable to hear themselves. In failing to hear themselves "one will listen away from oneself, to the 'they-self'."[2] This failing to hear one's own conscience leads to a break from failure – when *Dasein* must listen away from listening away, and attend to the call of conscience. Thus, Marder claims that authenticity is obliged to work with failure. In the second variation of break, Marder refers to the breaking out of a system. Law break does not refer to participating in criminal activity, which Marder says actually upholds a system. When a society operates within a set of laws, any instance of criminal activity is

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1   Michael, Marder, *Heidegger: Phenomenology, Ecology, Politics* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2018) p. 4.
2   Ibid. p. 37.

freeing oneself not from law as an institution but from the contractual relation to other people. Perhaps, instead, law break can be thought of as breaking from a confine or a system of limitations. Rather than breaking the law, one is breaking from the law. The third, and perhaps most important, variation of break is seen in equipment breakdown. Equipment breakdown leads to two accounts of positivity. Suppose you have a tool that seems ready-to-hand, but it isn't quite right for the task you had in mind – maybe a hammer is too heavy to put a handle on your dresser drawer, but you realize it will be perfectly ready-to-hand for destroying the old dresser for easy disposal. Now, suppose when you attempt to destroy the old dresser with the hammer, the head of the hammer goes flying off the handle. The hammer is suddenly present-at-hand, but this "non-understanding invites thought, in particular theoretical thinking."[3] Welcoming thought, for Heidegger, is always a good thing. The emphasis on possibility, and the possibility of positivity from failure, is underscored throughout the remainder of the book.

Overall, Marder's book provides a unique perspective for those who have questioned whether they have the right to pursue an engagement with Heidegger's thought despite his own moral failings. Marder displays a profound knowledge and commitment to the works of Heidegger, as well as his followers, namely, Derrida, Gadamer, Levinas, Krell, etc. By having a mastery of Heideggerian texts, Marder is able to hold Heidegger accountable in a way that few can. Marder acts on the notion that criticizing Heidegger is most productive when we are truer to Heidegger's philosophy than perhaps Heidegger himself. With an emphasis on phenomenological possibility delineated by contemporary ecological and political boundaries, he is able to combine three seemingly distinct fields of philosophical thought.

There is, however, a prerequisite for bearing witness to the synthesis put forth by Marder. He has high expectotions for his reader. His book requires, at minimum, experience with some of Heidegger's most famous works. His readers must bring with them a familiarity with Heideggerian jargon, as it maintains a heavy presence throughout the book. For these reasons, his book risks being inaccessible for the uninitiated audience. It would be to the benefit of the reader to also be familiar with

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[3] Ibid. p. 45.

some of the contemporary criticisms of Heidegger in the secondary literature.

While this book may not be *prima facie* appropriate for novices, it was not intended to be an introductory text. Instead, Marder was responding to the most pressing contemporary debates surrounding Heidegger's philosophy, so it is only fair to assume his audience would include those already aware of the discussion. With that said, what Marder demands of his reader, he rewards tenfold. Whatever level of background knowledge the reader possesses will be clarified, reinforced, and supplemented by Marder's extensive and precise interpretations of Heidegger's work and its secondary literature.

Michael Marder has succeeded in reframing the span of Heidegger's philosophy so that the reader can recognize when Heidegger is at his philosophical best, as well as the apparent breakdown in method when Heidegger is at his moral worst. Marder has shed light on suspicious inconsistencies in Heidegger's philosophy by revealing the triangulation at work between phenomenology, ecology, and politics. This book will prove to be enlightening for philosophers and non-philosophers alike, so long as they are willing to give it the attention it demands.

V. ANNOUNCEMENT. M.A. AND PH.D. PROGRAMS IN PHILOSOPHY TAUGHT IN ENGLISH AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOFIA

Master's and Doctoral Studies in Philosophy Taught in English at Sofia University

Sofia University was founded in 1888 following the highest standard of European higher education. Sofia is the capital standards of the Republic of Bulgaria. Bulgaria is a Member of the European Union (EU).

MASTER'S PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY TAUGHT IN ENGLISH

The MA Program in Philosophy taught in English provides instruction in all major areas of Western Philosophy. In addition, the master's thesis can be written on a topic from Eastern Philosophy - an expert in this field will be appointed as the supervisor. The program is structured, yet leaves enough room for student's own preferences. The degree is recognized worldwide including in the EU/EEA and Switzerland, the USA, Canada, Russia, Turkey, China, the Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Courses offered: The English Language for Philosophers, Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics, Axiology, Philosophical Method, Truth and Meaning, Philosophy of Intercultural Relations, Social Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Philosophy for Children, Philosophy of Culture, Logic in the Continental Tradition, Theories of Truth, Existential Dialectics, Philosophy of Subjective Action, Phenomenology, Renaissance Philosophy

Faculty Members: All faculty teaching at the program are approved by the Bulgarian State Highest Assessment Commission. They feature successful teaching experience in this country and abroad and are well published in Bulgarian and English.

Duration of Studies: two semesters of course attendance plus a

third semester for writing the master's thesis; opportunities for distance learning.

Admission Requirements: Bachelor's degree in any field of humanities, social science, science, or professional disciplines. No tests or application fee are required (for citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland applying for a state scholarship €16 fee is charged and an interview is held). No previous degree in philosophy is needed.

Tuition fee:

1) citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland – €815 per school year
2) international students - €3 850 per school year

Financial aid:

A) ***Citizens of the EU/EEA and Switzerland*** are eligible for state scholarships carrying a 75% tuition waiver plus a monthly stipend beginning from the second semester.

B) Fulbright Graduate Grants are offered to ***American citizens*** as a form of very competitive financial aid; for more information see www.fulbright.bg. It is possible for the American citizens to use some other sources of government financial assistance (please contact the Program Director for details).

C) Financial aid to ***Canadian nationals*** is provided in the form of Government Student Loans by the Province where they permanently reside.

D) ***Students from Turkey*** can receive financial aid within the Erasmus Student Exchange Program.

E) Financial aid for ***Chinese students*** is available within the bilateral Chinese-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Chinese Ministry of Education for more information.

F) ***Students from Russia*** (Financial aid for ***Russian students*** is available within the bilateral Russian-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Russian Ministry of Education for more information). ***Students from the Ukraine, Belarus, and the other CIS countries, the Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East*** receive financial aid in the form of inexpensive dormitory accommodation (about €50 per month including most of the utilities) plus a discount on public transportation and at the University cafeterias. The same type of financial aid is available for ***citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland, American***

citizens, Canadian nationals, Western Balkans citizens, students from Turkey, and *Chinese students.*

Application deadline: September 30, to start in October; January 31, to start in March.

Student Visa Matters: Sofia University in cooperation with the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science provides the necessary documents for student visa application to all **eligible** candidates outside the *EU/EEA and Switzerland.*

Cultural Life and Recreation: Being the capital of Bulgaria, Sofia features a rich cultural life. Movies in English can be seen in most of the cinemas. There are a number of concert halls, dozens of galleries, and many national and Slavic cultural centers. The streets of Sofia are populated by cozy cafés and high quality inexpensive restaurants offering Bulgarian, European, and international cuisine. Sofia is a favorable place for summer and winter sports including skiing in the nearby mountain of Vitosha and Summer Block See resorts. More about Sofia and can be found at http://www.sofia-life.com/culture/culture.php. You can follow Sofia and Bulgarian news at http://www.novinite.com/lastx.php.

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Doctoral Program in Philosophy
Taught in English

The Ph.D. Program in Philosophy taught in English, besides studies in residence, offers an opportunity for extramural studies (extramural studies is a Bulgarian version of distance learning). This Program provides instruction in all major areas of Western Philosophy. In addition, the doctoral dissertation can be written on a topic from Eastern Philosophy - an expert in this field will be appointed as the supervisor. The program is structured, yet leaves enough room for the student's own preferences. The degree is recognized worldwide including in the EU/EEA and Switzerland, the USA, Canada, Russia, Turkey, China, the Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Courses offered: Psychoanalysis and Philosophy, Philosophical Anthropology, Applied Ethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Social Philosophy, Philosophy of Intercultural Relations, Philosophical Method, Continental Philosophy, Philosophy for Children, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Culture, Time and History.

Eligibility Requirement: Master's degree in any field. No previous degree in philosophy is needed.

Checklist: CV, two letters of recommendation, standardized test scores are NOT required. No application fee (for citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland a €32 fee is charged and an entrance exam is held).

Tuition fee:

1) citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland – €1450 per school year; extramural: €2440 per school year

2) international students - in residence: €6 500 per school year; extramural: €3 300 per school year

Dissertation defense fee: €950

Duration of studies: in residence – 3 years; extramural – 4 years; opportunities for distance learning.

Financial aid:

A) *Citizens of the EU/EEA and Switzerland* studying in residence are eligible for state scholarships carrying full tuition waiver and waiver

of the dissertation defense fee plus a significant monthly stipend. For extramural studies only tuition waiver and the dissertation defense fee waiver are available.

B) Fulbright Graduate Grants are offered to *American citizens* as a form of very competitive financial aid; for more information see www.fulbright.bg. It is possible for American citizens to use some other sources of government financial assistance (please contact the Program Director for details).

C) Financial aid to *Canadian nationals* is provided in the form of Government Student Loans by the Province where they permanently reside. This type of aid is usually unavailable for extramural studies.

D) *Students from Turkey* can receive financial aid within the Erasmus Student Exchange Program.

E) Financial aid for *Chinese students* is available within the bilateral Chinese-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Chinese Ministry of Education for more information.

F) *Students from Russia* (Financial aid for *Russian students* is available within the bilateral Russian-Bulgarian Cultural Agreement. Please contact the Russian Ministry of Education for more information)*. Students from the Ukraine, Belarus, and the other CIS countries, the Indian Sub-Continent, Latin America, and the Middle East* receive financial aid in the form of inexpensive dormitory accommodation (about 40 € per month including most of the utilities) plus a discount on public transportation and at the University cafeterias. The same type of financial aid is available for *the citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland, American citizens, Canadian nationals, Western Balkans citizens, students from Turkey,* and *Chinese students.*

Application deadline: September 30 (for state scholarship applications–September 15), to start in October; January 31, to start in March.

The citizens of EU/EEA and Switzerland please check with the Program Director about the state scholarship deadline.

Student Visa Matters: Sofia University in cooperation with the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science provides the necessary documents for student visa application to all **eligible** candidates outside the *EU/EEA and Switzerland.*

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