
IV. BOOK REVIEW

Christos Hadjioannou (ed.), *Heidegger on Affect*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, 294 pp., €103.99. ISBN 978-3-030-24639-6

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In *Heidegger on Affect*, Christos Hadjioannou gathers recent and relevant philosophical contributions on topics at the intersection of Martin Heidegger and “affect.” “Affect” is selected as the best all-encompassing English word to refer at once to *Stimmung* (mood) and *Befindlichkeit* (disposition or attunement). Each of the twelve chapters presents and discusses a topic within the realm of affectivity, including contributions from some of the most eminent Heidegger scholars. All of the authors also provide their own translations of the key terms Heidegger uses to think the affective realm. Rather than unnecessarily muddying the waters, this editorial decision works well for each of the contributing authors, allowing them to develop their analyses, so to say, in their own terms. The contributions increase the philosophical attention paid to emotion and affect in Heidegger’s thought and make Heidegger’s unique terminology more accessible to the English-speaking scholarly community.

Mahon O’Brien’s opening chapter provides a grounding in Heidegger’s thinking on affect by drawing attention to Heidegger’s writings on nothing and nothingness. In referencing the 1935 *Introduction to Metaphysics*, as well as the iterations of Heidegger’s inaugural “What is Metaphysics?” lecture, O’Brien argues that Heidegger’s thought about “nothing” continues the analyses begun on anxiety/angst in *Being and Time*, thereby demonstrating the presence of a connection between these two periods of Heidegger’s work.

In the following chapter, Thomas Sheehan recapitulates the call for a “paradigm shift” in Heidegger studies that he had already put forward in *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift* (2014). He also situates his own contribution as an extension of Heidegger’s 1955 “What is Philosophy?” lecture. Briefly, Sheehan argues against the predominant tendency in Heidegger studies to understand Heidegger’s lifelong con-

tribution to philosophy as a reflection on the question of being. According to him, Heidegger's contribution was rather an attempt at defining the human project of meaningfulness or intelligibility. After resituating transcendence and intentionality within his own narrative arc, Sheehan argues convincingly that Heidegger's analysis in the 1955 lecture demonstrates that *πάθος* (*pathos*, emotion) might indeed be the "thing in itself" or, in Heideggerian terminology, the facticity of *Dasein*.

Niall Keane provides the next contribution by focusing on Heidegger's thinking of Aristotle's rhetoric in the 1924 lecture course, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. Keane argues that one of the keys to understanding *Being and Time* and the interplay of actuality/possibility therein is a reading of the 1924 lecture course, where Heidegger finds in Aristotle the "jolt" provided by conversational *pathos* (rhetoric) in our everyday speaking and interacting with others.

Hadjioannou's own chapter singles out Heidegger's analysis of angst as a pivotal departure from Husserl's phenomenology, which Hadjioannou describes as being committed to "mental evidentialism." According to this schema, Heidegger would be a quasi-evidentialist because he "repeatedly juxtaposes the kind of evidence supplied by angst with the kind of evidence supplied by the apodictic certainty of originary intuition" (p. 96). In short, the crux of the difference between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology might be found in affect.

Daniel Dahlstrom provides a well-warranted critique of Heidegger's account of affect by examining a number of points in *Being and Time*, wherein mood or emotion is remarkably absent. While scholars are correct in acknowledging the debt owed to Heidegger's analysis of angst in *Being and Time*, Dahlstrom notes that it is understanding (*Verstehen*) rather than disposedness (Dahlstrom's preferred term for translating *Befindlichkeit*) that receives most of Heidegger's philosophical attention, to the detriment of affect.

Denis McManus seems to answer Dahlstrom's call by providing a unique reflection on authenticity and the role of "owned emotion." McManus presents three models, including the all-things-considered judgment model, that provide insight into the possibilities of what authentic emotion might look and feel like in our lived experience.

The chapter by Katherine Withy marks a notable shift in the collection. Withy successfully argues in favor of translating *Befindlichkeit* as "finding" and, in retranslating the word, ends up transforming the tra-

ditional understanding of Heidegger's account of affect. While not attempting to reinscribe a duality that both Heidegger and Withy reject, Withy's contribution ascribes a markedly more active or actant quality to "finding" that occurs as an answer to at least two types of "calling" (there can be others, too): vocational and solicitous.

Andreas Elpidorou and Lauren Freeman provide a continuation of their ongoing and insightful scholarship into Heidegger's writings on boredom. They conduct a thorough analysis of Heidegger's concept of profound boredom in contrast to what they term state boredom and trait boredom, thereby weaving together contemporary psychological and philosophical perspectives on boredom.

Daniela Vallega-Neu also presents an extension of her ongoing project on Heidegger's non-public "poetic" writings that began in the 1930s. Building on her existing scholarship, which includes her book *Heidegger's Poietic Writings: From Contributions to Philosophy to The Event* (2018), Vallega-Neu presents an interesting reflection on "grounding attunements" and their relationship to truth and errancy (with an innuendo to Heidegger's politics), as well as bodily dispositionality.

In the next chapter, Tatjana Noemi Tömmel finds, in Heidegger's thought, an account of love that emerges not from his published writings or lecture courses, but in tandem with and in parallel to his correspondence with Hannah Arendt and his wife, Elfride. In short, Tömmel provides evidence that angst is not the only emotion that can help *Dasein* "find itself" or "be itself" — love can also serve as a fundamental mode of attunement.

François Raffoul locates a specifically ethical relation within the phenomenon of being "thrown" in a mood as described by Heidegger. This ethical response to finding oneself in a particular mood, as Raffoul suggests, encourages human beings to take responsibility for their "facticity and finitude of existence" (p. 248). A highlight of Raffoul's contribution is his suggestion that disposition or attunement (his translation of *Befindlichkeit* in this context) is synonymous (or equiprimordial) with relationality and therefore suggests the always already ethical comportment.

Jan Slaby and Gerhard Thonhauser conclude the collection with an analysis of Heidegger's account of affectivity in relation to questions of politics. In Heidegger's reflections on boredom, as well as in the

speeches delivered during his fateful term as Rector of the University of Freiburg, Slaby and Thonhauser find an intriguing standpoint from which to gain an ontological perspective on “political affect.” Given Heidegger’s own troubled lived experience with politics and the impact of his thought on recent French accounts of political life, the authors find Heidegger’s thought on affect unsatisfying for greater engagement with democratic politics.

In his introductory remarks Hadjioannou notes the significance of affective phenomena in Heidegger’s thought and the lack of a collection of essays on this important theme. *Heidegger on Affect* successfully fills this gap in the literature and all of the contributions enrich contemporary scholarship in this area of Heidegger studies. I cannot do justice to all of the insights provided by each of the contributors and would recommend anyone interested in this area of Heidegger studies to read the collection from cover to cover. Finally, my hope is that this volume marks only the beginning of a flourishing of philosophical work on the theme of Heidegger and attunement.