

Biopsychopolitics: A Marxian Perspective on the Society and Individual

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Abstract: In this essay, I introduce the term "biopsychopolitics" to provide a critique of biopolitics by Michel Foucault, in consideration of the term "psychopolitics" by Byung-Chul Han. I argue that biopsychopolitics signifies proper relations and dimensions a) between society and the individual, and b) between individuals' central nervous systems and thought. The main goal of the article is the re-establishment of a way of thinking about the relationship between society and the individual and the problem of individual accounts in society. Except for psychoanalytical attempts, mainly by Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse, biological and psychological processes of individuals have not been satisfactorily explored by the thinkers of the Marxian framework. It would be useful to point out that my article does not yet constitute a detailed framework; instead, it sets forth a progressive development tool of the concept by means of further studies.

Keywords: biopolitics, biopower, psychopolitics, biopsychopolitics, Foucault, neoliberalism, Marxism

Biopolitics of Foucault

Foucault referred to biopolitics during his lectures at the Collège de France. In this regard, he first began to give lectures in 1975-76⁷⁰ and continued to elaborate on this theme in 1977-78⁷¹ and 1978-79⁷². In fact,

⁷⁰ Foucault, Michel. *Society must be defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–1976* transl. by David Macey (London: Penguin Books, 2004). See Lecture 11 on pages 239-264 especially.

⁷¹ Foucault, Michel. *Security, territory, and population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978* transl. by Graham Burchell (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2009). These lectures, among other topics, discuss government and governmentality.

⁷² Foucault, Michel. *The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979*, transl. by Graham Burchell (Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2008). Foucault discusses neoliberalism at large extent in these lectures.

his lectures on the birth of biopower focus on several themes such as governmentality, liberalism, neoliberalism, and so on. It seems as if Foucault wanted to introduce such topics in twelve lectures and then elaborate on biopower in his last lectures. However, the content of biopower can only be grasped between the lines through the other topics he spoke about.

Foucault's philosophical framework is a negation of Althusserian Marxism, which is structuralist. Althusser claimed, without any convincing evidence, that the mature Marx distanced himself from Hegel in an epistemological rupture and break⁷³. On the other hand, he was not fully wrong in his claim, but his statement was vague; in fact, Marx distanced himself from Hegel, Young Hegelians, and Feuerbach; nevertheless, he retained the notion of sublation in Hegelian dialectics. I will not include this discussion in its detailed form in this study, but a rudimentary re-reading of *Grundrisse*⁷⁴ and *Capital*⁷⁵ (especially Volume 1) would suffice to refute Althusser's view of this constructed young-mature Marx distinction. Marx seems to appreciate the logical structure of the Hegelian system, declares himself a pupil of Hegel in *Capital* Vol. 1⁷⁶, and applies Hegelian thought to a large extent in his political economy studies. Foucault, on the other hand, seems to have had problems with the ideological and structural interpretation of Marxism and with Marxism itself. Instead, he sought to construct a genealogical framework fed by archaeological method⁷⁷.

Concerning surveillance and panopticons, we must admit one thing:

⁷³ Althusser, Louis and Balibar, Etienne. *Lire le Capital I* (Paris: François Maspero, 1973), 53, 111, 150.

⁷⁴ Meaney, Mark E. *Capital as Organic Unity: The Role of Hegel's Science of Logic in Marx's Grundrisse* (Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2002).

⁷⁵ Moseley, Fred et al., *Marx's Capital and Hegel's Logic: A Reexamination* (Leiden: Brill, 2014). This book entails several discussions about how Marx employed Hegelian logic in his *Capital*.

⁷⁶ Marx, Karl. *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 35* (International Publishers, 1996), 19. This volume of the Collected Works (CW) consists of the 1st volume of *Capital*.

⁷⁷ Foucault, Michel. 'What Is Enlightenment?' [1984], in *The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, ed. by P. Rabinow and N. Rose (New York and London: The New Press, 2003), 43–57.

today, what Foucault pointed out has an even stronger impact. We are more digitized, more controlled. In every macro- and micro-ecosystem, we see how the apparatus of control locates itself. When we use electricity, when we go on vacation—whether we consume unusual amounts of energy sources—all of this can be easily controlled through surveillance and monitoring. Whatever language we use- art, music, health, politics, or others - is easily and effectively monitored, and this is a perfect opportunity for cookie sellers such as Facebook, Google, and others to provide us with fantastically tailored advertisements. Maybe one crucial point should be discussed: most of us do not care about being monitored; therefore, the perception of surveillance has changed as well.

In an abbreviated form that is generally far from capturing the whole, Foucault emphasizes how the art of governing has changed throughout history. When he speaks of biopower, he attributes biopower to a population that has evolved into a different structure and concept than before. For Foucault, political economy constitutes a new concept of governmentality⁷⁸. Law means the external intervention of the state, while political economy is an internal factor: both a science and a new form of intervention⁷⁹. Political economy is based on the fact that the state should limit itself. For Foucault, this is what causes a great shift in governmentality. When we talk about liberalism, we should understand that it is a type of governmentality that is connected to truth based on this self-limitation:

What does “the self-limitation of governmental reason” mean? What is this new type of rationality in the art of government, this new type of calculation that consists in saying and telling government: I accept, wish, plan, and calculate that all this should be left alone? I think that this is broadly what is called “liberalism.”⁸⁰

For Foucault, liberalism is the precondition for understanding the concept of biopolitics:

⁷⁸ Foucault, Michel. *Security, territory, and population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978*, 106.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 108.

⁸⁰ Foucault, Michel. *The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978–1979*, 20.

Consequently, it seems to me that it is only when we understand what is at stake in this regime of liberalism opposed to *raison d'État*—or rather, fundamentally modifying [it] without, perhaps, questioning its bases—only when we know what this governmental regime called liberalism was, will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is.⁸¹

Lectures by Foucault

Throughout his lectures, Foucault explained to his audience the evolution of governmental approaches from punishment and discipline to liberalism, and how this evolution was manifest in a rational opposition to previous attitudes toward government. Firstly, Foucault claims to be going beyond Marx - a fair claim - and secondly, he sees that the Communist bloc, in his real experience, did not provide freedom to its own society - another fair claim. However, making fair claims does not mean that his analysis is true. The historical fact is: Foucault's methodology, partly inherited from Deleuze, did not last long and did not trigger the will, desire, and action for the transformation of society.

Let us now look more closely at Foucault's claims. When he claims to go beyond Marx, he falls back -anachronically- beside Marx, because he rejects the importance of the transformative forces. I cannot say whether he does this deliberately or simply because he cannot grasp the role of economics, but what he does in a lengthy manner is a change in the flow of historical facts. For Foucault, the change from the mercantilist to the physiocratic form of government was the product of thought and art. He refers to technological advances and urban transformations several times, but does not adequately emphasize the role of changes in modes of production as a shift in thought. He discusses governmentality as though it is an isolated art of governance. But he does not provide enough evidence that the shifts are based on either relational or causal developments; or, he does so only through the shifts in governmentality, and almost completely missing their connections to the modes of production. Foucault misses the major point: he only discusses the situation of the capital owners, not that of working class or oppressed people in a broader sense.

⁸¹ Ibid., 22.

For me, Foucault fits perfectly as a subcategory worker. He is very good at working out the details and has provided a lot of rich information about the archaeology of knowledge, the history of sexuality, the prison, mental illness, and so on. These details allowed him to challenge what Marx and other Marxist thinkers like Althusser said about the state. Foucault apparently found such statements inadequate. These kinds of accusations against Marx and Marxists are very popular today as well. Nevertheless, what Foucault declares does not bring anything justifiable into the light of day. The fact is, Foucault could never realize the method of Marx in *Capital*; Marx, in short, does not discuss the nature of the state and focuses his dialectical critique on the political economy of capitalist modes of production. Foucault obviously wanted to build a new system in order to abolish historical materialism and Marxism, but his ground was weak to support his false premises.

Using a scenario from everyday life, I will illustrate Foucault's method. Let us suppose that we are discussing football. I offer the general view that when both teams in a game play offensively, the spectators enjoy it and witness more goals in a game. I give some examples from the history of the World Cup or from national leagues and so on. I also mention that some exceptions can apply. However, my interlocutor says, "But there was a game between England and Germany, and although they both played attacking football, the game ended 1-0. Germany won. What the interlocutor says is not a refutation of my claim, but is a fair and justifiable example; it is an exception. Foucault generally plays the interlocutor in this example. He provides more details, more details, and more details, but to a great extent the result is still the justification of the historical material framework of Marx on the power of the state, on transformative modes of production, and on many others. Engels' *Dialectic of Nature* can also be considered. In his work, most of what he provided was valid at his time in terms of scientific knowledge, but is no longer valid today, as it is falsified. Some would criticize him today for having written about Kant-Laplace theories that are no longer true. But the methodology and proposals of Engels are still largely valid today because his methodology recognized the falsifications in the field of science. Therefore, it may always be useful to refer to Foucault on a particular topic, but it would be more meaningful to assess his historical analyses as material complementary to a given main category - e.g., economic and mercantilist history and prison conditions. What Foucault

tried to do, it seems, is create a new, definitely anti-Marxian framework from these exceptions. However, his premises are false or inadequate.

Although he mentions that his analyses are focused on Western societies and that the layers of punishment, discipline, and biopower can exist simultaneously, Foucault presents biopower and biopolitics as an art of governing that focuses on life. Perhaps unconsciously, Foucault provides a typical example of sublation (*Aufhebung*) in the Hegelian sense. What he offers as developments of governmentality are undoubtedly examples of Hegelian preservation in sublation. He does not deny that the right to kill can be preserved even in biopower, which focuses on life (*bio*). However, it is not through faith but through scientific knowledge that this preservation is justified. In other words, even the right to kill is justified in terms of scientific codes. Nevertheless, his emphasis on rationality is not justified in most cases. He seems to use the terms rationality instead of rationalization. What is defended under scientific justifications was not based on true scientific knowledge when the Nazis massacred the Jews. It was simply barbarism based on pseudoscience and manipulation of science. From the point of view of the murderers, there is no rationality. There is only rationalization.

Foucault's ambiguous use of language and his vague explanations have led to confusion among scholars. For me, from a historical perspective, there was a gradual distancing of Foucault from Marxism. This distancing was mainly due to his hatred of Soviet Marxism - including the attitude of the French Communist Party - but it went further and was directed against Hegel and Marx, in other words, against the whole Marxian framework. The attitude itself cannot be criticized just because it is anti-Marxist; however, the error lies in his interpretation of facts. For example, equating the scientific knowledge used by German Nazism to justify the Nazis with the entire framework of scientific knowledge is illusory and confusing. Foucault dismisses the oscillation between democracy and fascism simply in order to defend his own construct of power and governmentality. Then, he totally ignores the more robust analyses -e.g., those of the Frankfurt School thinkers- that existed even when he lived. He wanted to defend at all costs the "bio"-function of the so-called new governmentality, while he was forced to deny important facts that he was synthetically trying to overcome.

Neoliberalism and Foucault

Foucault's analyses of liberalism and neoliberalism are no different. He provides rich information and knowledge about these systems and their governmentalities. Foucault's analyses lie in his historical approach, which negates previous ways of exercising power and knowledge. Since it is more relevant to this study, it is more appropriate to focus on how he assesses neoliberalism in particular. Foucault speaks at length about neoliberalism in his 1978-79 lectures. He elaborates on the governmentality and rationality of neoliberalism, which for him is divided into two categories: first, the German neoliberalism of the so-called Ordoliberals, and second, the American neoliberalism: the Chicago School.

Foucault has a two-pillar construct: he criticizes Nazism as a defect of liberalism, while he praises German neoliberalism for its efforts to rebuild Germany after the Second World War. He praises the Chicago school because their common enemy is also the authoritarian, interventionist state. When we talk about the state, we mean a state that controls the economy by intervening when and if necessary. Although these two schools have their own peculiarities in terms of theoretical perspectives, their attitude towards the intervention of the state is common.

What Foucault could never understand is the difference between the appearance and the essence of neoliberalism. He assessed the neoliberal type of governmentality as a vehicle of a productive subjectivity that tolerates different identities, choices, preferences, and the like, as if it were a type of governmentality that opposes disciplinary governmentality in its essence. In the eighth lecture, Foucault begins to talk about social and political issues in France. When? At the end of the 1970s, when neo-liberalism was moving towards its own hegemony and globalism. In other words, France was at the beginning of the turn to neoliberal political economy while Foucault was giving his lectures. It seems that Foucault used this change to overthrow socialist remnants through the use of neoliberal governmentality and values. For him, social problems and poverty could not be ameliorated by socialism, and yet there was a neoliberal solution. Was Foucault unaware of Margaret Thatcher's TINA (there is no alternative)? Was he unaware of the coal miners' strikes in the United Kingdom? His allergy to those who mention state repression seems to have blinded him to what was coming. Defending society and providing tools did not seem to be about proposing better living conditions for oppressed people or social classes. The fear of the

Nazi or Stalinist states - as if they were equivalent forms - and the claim that only those who are state-phobic cannot see that the reduction of state power has taken place, is the essential part of the Foucauldian paradigm. Foucault could never understand that socialism refers to a society and not to the state. In fact, the state and its apparatuses can easily be replaced by other organs that may not be directly owned by the state. Therefore, when he criticizes those who criticize the concept of the state, he misses the basic point: what creates the state. Today, nation-states are back on the scene, and it can be argued that they are stronger than ever. Foucault completely misses the dialectic of economy and politics because of his false premise.

Foucault claims that sovereign power was mainly based on the right to kill, whereas neoliberalism is the negation of this type of power, and neoliberalism defends free competition and represents a relapsing juridical power. Thus, he argues that the law is becoming more normative, while the new technology of power is focused on life - not on murder⁸². For Foucault, this new governmentality could be a motivator for emancipation against the disciplinary sovereignty⁸³. Thus, Foucault's individualistic, subject-oriented approach describes the neoliberal subject as a self-interested, rational being capable of conducting an adequate analysis of the social domain that will yield rational conclusions and results. The subject will do this in order to maintain itself in the competitive environment of social life and its demands. It is simply a defense of the current social environment in accordance with capitalist realism. Foucault maintains a position that, at its best, can provide a critique of such a society to make some reforms only in some extreme cases. For Foucault, a radical transformation does not seem necessary, and some improvements in neoliberal governmentality can produce more rational people. Foucault considered and promoted neoliberalism as a form of governmentality that can be both opposing and governing. Interestingly enough, from the reverse angle, this means that the same statements could be made for, say, any political entity that supports Keynesian economics today because it opposes deregulated markets. What could Foucault think when the state intervened in the 2007-2009 crisis and when

⁸² Foucault, Michel. *History of Sexuality Vol. 1: An Introduction* transl. by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 144.

⁸³ Ibid.

Goldman Sachs, for instance, asked to be subject to regulations? Foucault cannot draw the line between intervention for pressure and intervention for the greater good – typical neoliberal attitude.

Foucault, exploring his own concept of governmentality, completely rejects the ownership and components of these forms of intervening governmentality. His aim may be different, but it is beyond his capacity to provide an adequate critique of capitalism or Marxism, since his categories are not relevant to them. His analyses of neoliberalism depict a secured competition that ensures the preservation of the free market and transforms the ethical and political environment of society and individuals. Individuals (or subjects in his words), while accepting this competitive order, act properly and learn how to make strategic choices, mathematical calculations and precise investments. Perhaps Foucault should have written a textbook on economics. It is obvious that such a book would have been one of the most popular even in today's educational system. He would also praise how individuals would settle into such a system. As Gabriel Rockhill mentioned, Foucault constructed a system not far from that of Ptolemy, who created a model of the universe that had the earth at its center⁸⁴. The content of his categories is rich and full of historical facts, but the categories themselves (in-themselves) are either false or irrelevant.

Concluding remarks on Foucault

Thus, we do not know whether Foucault did all these analyses on purpose. We are not mind readers, nor can we accuse anyone unless there is obvious information that justifies such accusations. One thing we do know about Foucault, however, is that he increasingly distanced himself from Marxism, especially after the failure of 1968. His hatred and despair of Marxism seems to have forced him, as it did other French anti-Marxist thinkers, to create a new framework that follows a completely different path of social and subject-oriented analysis. Another reason for this interpretation is that the historical trend of neoliberalism begins in the 1930s, even in Foucault's lectures -*Ordoliberalismus in Deutschland* (Ordoliberals in Germany). Nevertheless, Foucault chose to praise the governmentality of

⁸⁴ Rockhill, Gabriel, "Foucault: The Faux Radical", *The Philosophical Salon*, 12 October 2020. <https://thephilosophicalsalon.com/foucault-the-faux-radical/>

neoliberalism towards the end of the 1970s, when the world was entering a new type of capitalism that welcomed financialization and deregulation. The indoctrination and pernicious nature of neoliberalism was evident in 1979 when Foucault gave his lectures. It is hard to believe that such a thinker could have ignored what was happening in Chile, where a neoliberal government was taking power, even more so than in the United States and the United Kingdom. And today, we do not need to repeat it here in this section, but neoliberalism has since captured our daily lives with its economic policies, at the expense of the working class. To praise such a governmentality, in the naivest interpretation, can be considered a great failure in a thinker who claimed to be radical. In fact, for me, Foucault is the defender of the neoliberal system and fought against Marxism and the transformative forces of society.

Strangely enough, Foucault, who called Marcuse a pseudo-Marxist, claimed that the state is not only oppressive - I explained why above. For Foucault, this governmentality does not produce a uniform, standardized or, in Marcuse's words, "one-dimensional man". On the contrary, for Foucault, it encourages multitude, free choice and rational thought, through which we are our own entrepreneurs and competitors in a free market. Foucault's analysis goes back to where Marx began his analysis of the myth of the free market – unfortunately, inadequately and irrelevantly. Foucault completely misses the point and advocates neoliberal governmentality on the basis of appearances only - which is exactly what capitalist governments also aim to do!

Foucault's ontology is therefore as irrational as his approach to subjectivity. The dominant neoliberal governmentality does not offer us a free market; it only opens the gates for the owners of capital who, through their illustrious success stories, make us believe that we can become one of them in such a free market, where we can become entrepreneurs. Beyond the philosophical deficit of such a view, the Foucauldian framework could not offer a solution to the ecological catastrophe. It is a clear fact that destruction of nature accelerated after the 1970s, because of the insatiable nature of finance capital and financialization. Praising the neoliberal governmentality is only a contribution to these crimes from a philosophical point of view. To confront neoliberalism in this respect is also to negate the false arguments of Foucault about it.

Biopsychopolitics

Foucault challenged, perhaps gradually, the Marxist framework of power. Not only did he target Marxism, but he also challenged the efforts of, for example, Herbert Marcuse to bring a biological-psychological dimension to the Marxist framework.⁸⁵ Marcuse tried to bring in this dimension through his inspiration from Freud and his theory of repression. For Marcuse, life is a struggle between Eros and Thanatos - pleasure and death drives. Foucault rejected this model, arguing that it overemphasized repression. For him, power and the state were not only agents of oppression. On the contrary, they cared for the lives of citizens, sought to prolong their lives, educated them, etc. Interestingly, Foucault's defense is almost like that of a defender of capitalism. His false radicalism gradually began to defend and even advocate neoliberalism. Strangely enough, the years in which he began to promote neoliberalism were the years in which our planet first became much more vulnerable to the devastating effects of neoliberal politics and economics. It is obvious that the great defeats of 1968 and 1991 produced a new profile of intellectuals who tried to find irreparable gaps and setbacks in socialist theory and Marxism. Some of them, e.g., Laclau and Mouffe, aimed to transcend Marxism through radical democracy, and some seemed to replace demands with desires, as in the case of Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou and others. One of the commonalities of these radical thinkers is that they reduce revolutionary and transformative demands to desirability. They all promote subjective desire while distancing themselves from social transformation. And yet they claim to be on the left side of politics.

Biopsychopolitics has two main components: the first is the central nervous system, which receives impulses from the external world, such as the state, society, other individuals, and nature. The second is its internal processes that make the psyche work on it. This concept draws upon biopsychology. Biopsychology “*is the scientific study of the biology of behavior*”⁸⁶. Biopsychopolitics, in this framework, represents the

⁸⁵ Marcuse, Herbert. *Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia* transl. by Jeremy J. Shapiro and Shierry M. Weber (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970) 9.

⁸⁶ Pinel, John P. J. and Barnes, Steven J.. *Biopsychology* 11th Edition (London: Pearson, 2022), 28.

case of an individual who interacts with the external world while his internal world processes such interactions. This is the biopsychopolitics of the individual; it is built upon biopsychology and cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychology would be a good companion to biopsychology, defined as follows:

What is cognitive psychology? It is concerned with the internal processes involved in making sense of the environment and deciding on appropriate action. These processes include attention, perception, learning, memory, language, problem solving, reasoning and thinking. We can define cognitive psychology as aiming to understand human cognition by observing the behaviour of people performing various cognitive tasks. However, the term “cognitive psychology” can also be used more broadly to include brain activity and structure as relevant information for understanding human cognition.⁸⁷

As we see, cognitive psychology, too, is an important tool to understand biological-psychological processes. In addition, its components such as linguistics, perception and such consist of concepts that are elaborated in philosophy as well. The reconsideration of these concepts can enable philosophy to work based on more robust grounds.

The second pillar of biopsychopolitics is its societal level. In this sphere, one speaks of the formation of society and the individual in society based on upward and downward relations (upward, e.g., individual versus society; society versus state or governmentality, and downward; the impact of society and state on the individual; and mutual relationships among individuals in the society as well). This sphere would be closely related to other social sciences such as sociology. Sociology examines society while social psychology examines individuals in their connections to society. This pillar is also important given the fact that social psychologists also increasingly explore social cognition⁸⁸ - cognition at the societal level.

Freud, regardless of the validity of his psychoanalytic claims, was courageous in his attempt to revive the role of the unconscious in our eve-

⁸⁷ Michael W. Eysenck and Mark T. Keane. *Cognitive Psychology: A Student's Handbook* (London, New York: Psychology Press, 2020), 1.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

ryday lives. His emphasis on the pleasure and death drives is still important in our individual and social relationships. My aim, however, is not to put Freud back into a philosophical framework, as Herbert Marcuse did. My goal is to build on Marcuse's framework while using a different set up to transform society into a better reality than the existing one.

Biopsychopolitics should therefore focus on the following main points:

- a) The effect of society on the individual and vice-versa - social psychology
- b) The impact of the individual on the self through its own central nervous system in connection to other individuals and society – biopsychology and cognitive psychology.

These two points should be elaborated in their interconnectedness. They are not isolated from each other; on the contrary, they influence and complement each other. The main connection between the two was made long before by Marx in his famous essay *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*:

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.⁸⁹

Marx grasped the nature of society in its essence. He mentions the transformative agency of society and individuals, while being aware of the impact of the existing structures that happened in the past and still rule, guide, or direct society and individuals. Therefore, these essential aspects have not changed, but their forms have evolved and transformed throughout our history. Overcoming nightmares means transforming society and individuals into a society in which such nightmares are minimized and, at best, eliminated. What Marx brought to light was that institutions shape society and individuals, but individuals and society - from a collective perspective - can also influence and even transform

⁸⁹ Marx, Karl. *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, Vol. 11, Marx and Engels: 1853-55* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1987), 103.

structures. This requires the negation of the current status quo through perception and awareness gained through praxis.

Concluding remarks

Biopsychopolitics is based on the suggestion of the Marxian framework that theory itself should be revised on the basis of the ever-changing forms of society. We cannot deny that society, relations, and our perceptions are changing through geo-spatial and historical conditions, even if the antagonisms between capital and labor persist. Therefore, I believe it is necessary to adopt new critical frameworks. These frameworks consist of a critical and dialectical analysis of post-industrial society. And I propose that the psychoanalytical framework that is used for the level of the individual should be replaced by cognitive and biopsychological frameworks.

Today, interpretations of industrial society can no longer adequately analyze our one-dimensionality in the neoliberal framework. Our lives changed dramatically because of technological advances which pushed the service industry to its limits. Today, the service sector is the dominant industry. Finance has the upper hand over industrial production. Therefore, to evaluate all these changes, new approaches in philosophy and social sciences are inevitable. Biopsychopolitics, at both the societal and individual levels, could provide a framework for such analyses and critiques in philosophy.

Critical theory in philosophy is of fundamental importance. A major component of critical theory is to reflect on its own position and attitude. This requires an immanent and dialectical critique of the theoretical framework. Critical theory can provide adequate and progressive philosophical interpretations only through this self-reflective approach.

This essay inaugurates this philosophical framework, on the basis of the biological-psychological dimension. It should also be noted that I did not attempt to criticize Byung-Chul Han's psychopolitics. This is because psychopolitics cannot be isolated from biopolitics. They need to be studied together, as belonging to the same structure and as being interconnected. Han's work appears as an alternative and antithesis to biopolitics, and I think that is not relevant. As for biopsychopolitics, which is not a synthesis of Foucault's biopolitics and Han's psychopolitics, I will continue to work on it by thoroughly analyzing society and the individual as they currently exist and have evolved over time. In doing

this, I am going to consider Marxian and Marcusean frameworks. Therefore, it is not a fully established framework as of today, and it will require eloquent elaborations to follow.