

Hegel After and Beyond Kant

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Hegel restores the logos-contentuality of philosophy. The intellectual contents in Kant completely disappear as a consequence of the negative reaction against the dogmatism of the identity of thinking and being, which in classical rationalism reaches the ontological definiteness in a light-minded manner. Kant restricts the theoretical philosophizing within the range of the formalism although the transcendental cognition not only imposes intentionality but also blocks the approach to truthfulness for any cognitive act not directly related to the justification of experience. The result is cognitive illusiveness and a complex of paralogical components completing from end to end the framework of transcendental dialectics. It has a unique and paradoxical nature. And this is not due to any incoherence with ancient and medieval formulations but due to its transcendental sourcing from the primordial division between the metaphysical and empirical with the explicit intention to achieve *mundus intelligibilis*, which it not only fails to achieve but in doing so presents the intelligible world as theoretically impossible and unachievable. This is indirect - and to a certain extent direct - evidence for the inconsistency of the source formulations of the critical program. It looks perfect as an ambition and method; i.e., within the context of Descartes' subjectively formulated principle of doubt, but not from the position of a contentually reflective objectivity setting forth a methodology that is co-relative and effective with regards to the theoretical process of ontologizing.¹

Hegel restores the authentic dialectical sense of the logos as primarily and synthetically united formality and contentuality: "There is nothing, nothing in heaven, or in nature or in mind or anywhere else which does not

¹ Perhaps having in mind the illusive nature of Kant's dialectical ideas of reason, Goethe sagaciously noted: "Who fears the idea, finally loses the concept" - my translation.

equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity.² The primordial dialectical logos predefines a different cognitive way of development of philosophy when compared to the transcendental. It is traced by pure thinking as well but this is the thinking which is not restricted within its own metaphysical form, topologically laid as apriority but which “has free being-for-itself” within the element of science.³ The sense of the critical paradigm as an a priori metaphizing of cognition is preserved not as a pure form, thoroughly and completely separated from the contentuality of experience, but as a metaphysical positing of the immediate and mediated by its own contents thinking. It is realized as a type of contentual logic. But whereas transcendental logic (as contentual logic) only envisages experience in the quality of the necessary, objective end of the thought synthesis, Hegel’s logic makes it immanent by following a strict methodological and formal procedure. Thus logic is a metaphized and fundamentalized turning into a universal scientology.⁴ In it, ontology is a necessary architectonical element within which the phenomenal objectness is presented in the sight of its essential contentuality in a necessary and systematical appearance. Within a dialectical context it crystallizes in its own matter⁵, thus obtaining its genesis and sense becoming.

Thus in the field of the pure logos-ness Hegel is compelled to revive, in a new dialectical way, the fundamental identity of thinking and being. He does not comprehend it as a relatively facilitating means for building ontology but only and solely as an introductory principle, as a general and sufficient justification of thinking to think objects within its immanently

² Hegel, Blackmask Online, §92.

³ In the preface to the second edition of *The Science of Logic*, Hegel figuratively noted: In the silent regions of thought which has come to itself and communes only with itself, the interests which move the lives of races and individuals are hushed. §18, Blackmask Online.

⁴ Hegel, “Logic is pure science, that is, pure knowledge in the entire range of its development” §94. It could hardly be given a more concise, more accurate and more comprehensive definition of logic. Further below its heuristics shall also become apparent in the context of Hegel’s objective logic.

⁵ This obtaining its

progressing contentuality. This is different compared to the critical, expression of intentionality. Here, it is not an a priori direction of the pure activity of the transcendental synthesis towards the experience but is solely of the contentual logical thinking. It is not only discursive relating or a natural product of the primordial human ability of judgment but is a type of ontologizing. Whereas in the critical project there is a staging in the realm of metaphysics - the fundamental metaphysics of knowledge (critique as propaedeutics) and regionalized and oriented to the particular types of critical ontologies - the Hegelian Logos program simultaneously lays the cognitive, logical, and ontological becoming of identity. It does not connect cognition with its object in an abstract way, it does not unite the thinking and being in a coercively built construction, it does not mix the logical schemes with the phenomena of nature but experiences its own genesis as becoming and progression of the essence on the terrain of knowledge (phenomenology), logic (scientology) and ontology (a real system of philosophized spirituality). This is the tripartite structure of Hegel's philosophy conceived within the principle of identity of thinking and being, born as dialectical logos and deployed in a systematic appearance as an all-embracing ontology.

It is about a cardinal new metaphysical intuition and a new type of its discursive realization. They rely on *ratio* again, and again they are oriented to achieving beingness. Besides, theoretical results and mishaps of criticism are strictly taken account of. The consequences are the split of reason⁶ and the positing of the metaphysical isolation of its form. For Kant, reason is a source of ideas, the ability to relate them and the source of principles. But it itself has no genesis, no history, no progress. It has no being as well because in critical philosophy pure thinking is reduced to the transcendental apperception *I think*, which, however, is an empirical statement containing the statement *I exist*. Thus the form of reason turns into

⁶ It is fully logical to view each splitting as a result, as a consequence, of a certain cause. For Kant, however, it is a fact. Although pure and free, reason is split: "Here first is explained the enigma of the critical philosophy, viz.: how we deny objective reality to the supersensible use of the categories in speculation and yet admit this reality with respect to the objects of pure practical reason. This must at first seem inconsistent as long as this practical use is only nominally known." (*The Critique of Practical Reason*, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott.)

a typical fetish. On the other hand, reason is entirely oriented to experience, overcoming the uncontrolled game with ideas, imposing limits on itself. All this opens a projection for defetishizing its form. Hegel sees this possibility in the phenomenologizing of its pure becoming and in the historicizing of its cognitive objectifying. These two theoretical alternatives discover a methodological way to a new ontologizing as a systematic discursive achieving of beingness. They constitute the conceptual dimensions of a succinctly theorized post-Kantian dialectics, considering and comprising the consequences of a critical paradigm in the field of metaphysics of knowledge and a prioritized formalism. Logos once again expresses its heuristic potencies to realize the results of philosophical (metaphysical) intuition in a discursive way.

The classic rationalist principle for identity of thinking and being sets forth a logos of possibility for the successive and systematic building of ontology as a discursive self-cognition of being. This self-cognition can be conducted dogmatically as a direct imposing of the logical schemes onto the structure of objectness. The teachings of Spinoza, Descartes and Leibnitz show different versions of the rationalistic ontology, priority of which is taken by beingness-intuition, realizing itself via reason in a monistic, dualistic or pluralistic image of the world. These images bear the stamp of existence which has beforehand limited the self-realization of reason. Reason is not achieved in its own reasoning (cognitive) essence as it is beforehand limited to preliminary being images. They are laid externally against it in a way which, on one hand, violates and deforms the infinite openness and activity of thinking (Kant overcomes this by means of the essential and functional specificity of the transcendental synthesis); on the other hand, it erects a hard and insurmountable border in an ontological respect. Classical rationalism cannot overcome this border because it is *a priori* present as a marker of the metaphysical intuition that engendered it. And it is, above all, of being, although finding rational fulfillment which consequently ontologizes the reason itself.

Classical rationalism does not exhaust the discursive potential of logos because it apriorizes being with regards to thinking beforehand. The latter by itself is not and cannot be immediate ontology; yet, through its rational nature and activity, existence is conceptualized in the form of ontology. Going beyond this theoretical situation, the dialecticized logos paradigm can

rediscover a new and boundless field of realization of itself provided only that it finds that immanent discursive form through which thinking is self-presented as logically necessary and strict (about being). This principally new and essentially ontological projection of thinking is theoretified by Hegel in the dialectical essence, structure, and function of the concept. Word becomes concept. In it, the metaphysical intuition (the principle) for the identity of thinking and being finds adequate discursive expression whereas philosophy finds possibility for consecutive and systematic building in the bosom of the powerful logos tradition.

The concept is the absolute discursive expressive and explicative form of thinking through which it realizes itself in a way which is immanently inherent to it. It is not borrowed from anywhere and it is not formed by accident. It reflectively reproduces itself in the form of a logical, i.e. necessary, self-sufficient and internally non-contradicting structure. The empirical view of existence does not and cannot have these three predicates since by its own means it cannot manage with the problem of the phenomenal contingency. Therefore Hegel highlights the concept not only “as thinking in general, as something general”, but also as “the essence of things”. It is “an object, a product and content of thinking”, which has adequate topology in a new formulation of logic, “which constitutes metaphysics proper or purely speculative philosophy”.⁷

The second part of *The Science of Logic* (subjective logic) is started by Hegel with the curious statement: “The nature of the notion cannot be immediately indicated as the notion of another object cannot be immediately indicated.”⁸ Hegel took into account that in the identity of thinking and being the concept is the absolute ground of the process of ontologizing. But it, its nature, cannot be definitively immediate because the short-comings of classical rationalism are thus repeated (flawless and uncritical acceptance of every ontologizing as a simple reflection of logical rules). Taken in its general sense, the concept cannot be relativized towards axiomatic facts and accordingly restricted and defined by this terminological facility.⁹ But, on

⁷ Hegel, §35, §28. Blackmask Online.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Spinoza's is the final formulation of this specific logical condition: “*Omnis determinatio est negatio*”.

the other hand, in its quality of discursive justification and bosom of the rationalistic, principled knowledge, logic, and ontology, the identity of thinking and being, it ought not to be thematized as per something external to it. Therefore the concept ought not to be laid as a self-givenness - formally logical or cognitive - but it ought to pass the way of its own becoming. This can be compared to Kant's deduction of the pure conceptions of understanding performed in *Critique of Pure Reason*, but only by analogy and as a methodical intention. Both Kant and Hegel searched for the a priori theoretical sources of the concept but found them in different metaphysical ways: the first one - only and solely within the maze of the metaphized aprioral cognition form, and the second - within the logical scientified becoming of its contents.

Hegel perceived the naturality of logic rather negatively. He related it to human nature, which has thinking as its main feature. But left alone - in its natural state - it does not overwhelm the limited functions of consciousness, i.e., to think objects and thus to alienate from itself in an independent and foreign objectness (as much as consciousness is always consciousness of something, it is namely thinking wherein its primary designation should be sought for, i.e., only in the external relation to something else). This is the natural state of thinking, however, not the philosophical reflection of it.

The latter ought to be perceived purely metaphysically: "If nature as such, as the physical world, is contrasted with the spiritual sphere, then logic must certainly be said to be the supernatural element which permeates every relationship of man to nature, his sensation, intuition, desire, need, instinct, and simply by so doing transforms it into something human, even though only formally human, into ideas and purposes."¹⁰ *Natural Logic* (Hegel's title) cannot form otherwise than empirical notions. On their behalf, they, by no means, can perform the role of formal justifications of thinking and assign the necessity and stringency to thinking. Therefore logic itself ought not only to satisfy Kant's criteria for formality and contentuality (within the context of the transcendental logic), but also dialectically metaphize the essence of being in the paradigm of the logosness tradition. According to

¹⁰ Hegel, §14.

Hegel, logic such as this is not only contentual but also objectively contentual. Behind this qualification two types of necessity are hidden - the formally logical and the onto-logical. Thus logic is turned into a universal scientology in the sense of the ancient logosness (for instance, Heraclitus') and of the enlighteningly comprehended scienticity (for instance, Fichte's).

Under objective logic, Hegel comprehends logic which treats the sense of being (immediacy) and the essence (the reflexiveness as mediation and self-mediation). The important moment here is that this succession of theoretical thematizing indicates objective logic as a genetic exposition of the concept.¹¹ In the course of philosophical study it comes up at a relatively late stage. Before it, as more abstract and, accordingly, more incomplete and empty of contents, concreteness and truthfulness, stages of cognition are sensuality and experience, but in the quality of objective substantiality. The latter does not present a form of being that is self-sufficient, self-caused, etc. These are explicit (direct) views of being, specific to the representatives of the classical rationalism. Hegel substantiated the concept as a contentual cognition form which comprehends itself as a pure and a priori structure as well as a self-progressing being. Thus the concept becomes the justification of being knowing itself (via thinking as a natural property) and of the reflective knowledge (of the essence of being), i.e., a justification but also an element and a tool for metaphysical philosophizing. Hegel calls this concept of the concept: "Therefore the realm of freedom revealed in the concept. The concept is free as the identity, being in itself and for itself, that contains the necessity of substance, has at the same time being as sublimated or as a positing and this positing as self-reflecting is that same identity."¹²

These Hegelian formulations cease to be dark and incomprehensive after heeding to the specifically non-classical thematizing of the rationalistic principle

¹¹ "The concept is that absolute unity of being and reflection, that being in self and for self exists only through the fact that it is so much reflection or positing and that the positing is the being in self and for self. This abstract result is clarified through the exhibition of its particular genesis; this genesis contains the nature of the notion; but it should precede its formulation."

¹² Hegel's formulation of "concept of the concept" reminds us of Kant's "metaphysics of metaphysics": in a letter to Markus Hertz, Kant called his critical project a "metaphysics of metaphysics": "This type of study shall always remain arduous as it contains the metaphysics of metaphysic."

of identity within the context of the metaphysically dialecticized logos. It entails logic reforming which goes beyond the perceptions and forms of the traditional Aristotelian logic, captured in bivalent formality. Hegel's objective logic regulates the known rules for non-contradictive and consistent thinking so much as the necessity of the phenomenal expressions of existence. The latter indeed has a rational nature, not as a direct imposition of mental structures over it but as an explication of becoming of the system of being in the concept.

The key to this type of non-classical rationality is again the logos specificity of cognition philosophizing, character-ology of the specific metaphizing of thinking not only in its a priori form but also in its pure, dialectically expressed contents. This is principally a new phenomenology, which has nothing to do with the empirical systematizing of the phenomenon in and via the notions of experience. On the contrary, it has to do with the metaphysical experience of thinking, which expresses itself through explication of the progress of its immanent contentuality. The project is typically of logos and is set onto the non-classical deployment of the rationalistic principle of identity of thinking and being. Based on the metaphized dialecticity of the form and contents of thinking beyond the classical rationalistic paradigm, Hegel's scientology predicates the real possibility for non-conservative extension (contentual progressing) of ontology beyond the narrow limits of bivalence and, consequently, it opens a projection to reforming the traditional logic within formality. Hegel succeeds and achieves the most significant, cognitively principled, formally justified and dialectically developed monistic ontology as a complete system of being in the history of philosophy.

Already on the first page of *Phenomenology of Spirit* - the first major writing with which he starts his colossal philosophical system - Hegel notes that philosophy presents the universality which subsumes the particularity. Behind this seemingly trivial moment, an eminent cognitive intuition is hidden according to which the forms of cognition and their relevant contents are of the same necessity, "that constitutes the life of the whole". Kant defends such a view which disproves the unnecessary arranging of cognition (against the capacity of the senses, experience and rationality to attain the truth) by empiricism and rationalism. But whereas he arranges the forms of cognition and judgingly "exercises" their interrelations regarding the experience, i.e., as a justification of its necessity, sufficiency, and verity, Hegel stakes on the cognitive becoming of truth itself. It is not a "minted coin" (A. Beshkov says

that it is not “an upright stone”), but is becoming along with all transitional forms of the singular and specific universality of knowledge - not, however, as a “broth of color” (Hegel) but as an attained end along with all its key steps.

The difference is huge. The project is not transcendental, it is not conducted as an embracing of something living (experience) by something “dead”, fixed, unchangeable, pure, etc. (the chart of once and for all deduced categories). On the contrary, Hegel is after the living whole, without knowing what it will be at the end of the system. In fact, he knows well that, by the force of the initial principle of identity, at the end of the study of absolute knowledge as a form, absoluteness as an object shall conform to it. Even if it can be speculated that God shall necessarily present this absolute, infinite and eternal object (of knowledge), in no way it can be known through what phases, turns, stages and territories knowledge shall pass through in order to achieve the complete system of beingness. One thing is certain, it must not miss a single expression nor a single independent object structure. Thus knowledge expresses itself, however not in the transcendental way, externally towards objectness and invariably within its own structure, but as a realization of its own self, based on the principle of identity. The second essential point here is that in this way the starting principle does not stay far from the cognitional course and its result but is methodically knitted in both. An intention of logos has always been the unity of principle, knowledge, method and ontological product (finalized in the universal and true judgment for absolute existence). However, something has always been missing for the consistent and continual realization of this philosophical potency.

The new expression of logosness in the field of the theory of knowledge is called by Hegel phenomenology. It is not a system of cognitional forms, external to phenomena (such as Kant’s chart of the pure conceptions of understanding), but is becoming and a progression of knowledge to its supreme levels, solely as self-abandonment in objectness. The latter is meant by Hegel that knowledge is achieved neither as a pure form nor is completed via a certain preliminary aim. It is such a self-abandoning ontologizing as an immanent logos structure of phenomenon: “For the real issue is not exhausted by stating it as an aim, but by carrying it out, nor is the result the actual whole, but rather the result together with the

process through which it came about.”¹³

In this logos, formulation of cognition is about to rise to the thought of object in general. This corresponds to the genesis of the concept which is to “live”, i.e. to ford across all forms of conceptualization of the specific expressions of a given contents so as to be able to highlight its general sense not so much against the background of all the rest (according to the abovementioned formulation of Spinoza for definition¹⁴) as a finite form of self-progression. Thus the concept ceases to be external structure referring to its foreign sensations, visions, perceptions, etc. (from Aristotle till Kant it has been comprehended like this) and becomes mentally born contentuality, which, however, within the cognitional evolution of objectness, has reached its immanent universality. In his peculiar terminology, Hegel calls this motion from “in-self” (natural thinking of external objects) through “for-self” (reflection of thinking on its own nature in relation to objects) towards “in and for itself” (concept presenting the nature and existence of the particular universal object). This is the self-same contents knowing itself in its universality. Or, in other words, the concept is the substantial contents in its “logical nature” (Hegel). It is its internal nature since it is an expression of the universal in the particular. “With this introduction of the content into the logical treatment, the subject matter is not things but their import, the notion of them”.¹⁵ From an activity, constitutional and constructive over the experience within the transcendental paradigm, in Hegel, thinking turns into a slow and persistent work in the maze of objectness until reaching the expression of the concept however not as a mechanical synthesis of thinking and objectness but as a substantial identity of their internal contents.

Hegel comprehends the activity of thinking (“Reason is purposive activity”) not as an imposing of its schemes over the empirically summarized structures of sensitivity and experience, nor as a closed within the formal rules game of notions, judgments and inferences, but as an immanent becoming of contentuality. Therefore, the philosophical method

¹³ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A. V. Miller.

¹⁴ Hegel’s qualification is indicative: “According to the formal, non-philosophical method of sciences, a definition is initially sought for and required for the sake of at least the external scientific form” - my translation.

¹⁵ Hegel, §28.

relevant to this non-classical rationalistic concept is not an *organon*, not an external tool for handling a material given in an unknown way, not obtained according to the subjective assumptions and moods of this or that, being a private person, philosopher, allegedly not objectively dependant on an objectness foreign to it. The method is the self-reflexive activity of thinking which highlights its progression as objective becoming of the world of concept. Hegel presents this cognitional process as phenomenology which starts from the abstract opposition between consciousness and object and reached to the absolute knowledge. The results of this long phenomenological way is the concept of science. It is a notion deployed as a systematic concept which implies the ontological nature of existence.

This is the new logos form of the objective logic as a universal scientology. It not only unites the known but also form and matter, already differentiated by Aristotle. But based on the methodologization of the principle of identity, Hegel builds a new vision of scienticity: not only as its “face” but also as its whole “body”. In *The Science of Logic* Hegel admits that this reminds him a little bit of medieval metaphysics, for which “the real truth” in things is their intellectual unity with thinking. In this respect it seems as if the Modern Age steps back in theoretical terms because it erects an insurmountable barrier between them which it then surmounts either by means of arranging the forms of cognition and mechanical identification of the supreme amongst them with the essence of objects (this is how empiricism and rationalism proceed regarding the truth) or (as in Kant’s) reason simply surrenders to the unknowability of their nature by itself (the so called *Dinge an sich*), although it is namely the supreme cognitional ability (this is also supplemented by its entanglement with immanent paralogisms so it cannot by itself truly complete its own knowledge potential).¹⁶

However this allusion of Hegel ought to be understood only as an

¹⁶ Hegel always insists on the seemingly simple rule that true in philosophy is the correspondence between notion and reality. Behind this correspondent requirements stands the theoretical statement that the reasonable philosophizing of the object is not its external observation, it is not the internalization of reason into it but “the object is for itself reasonable” as “science only has the task to bring this proper work of reason of things to consciousness” – my translation. §82.

analogy to the older metaphysics. His objective logic has nothing to do with Logos-Christ, with the divine intellect, with the tenets of the Christian mentality, with the revelation of the religion. Externalistically viewed, it is a typical product of the Modern Age, of its liberating and enlightening ambitions and initiations. Internalistically presented, it is a conceptual development of a new form of metaphysical intuition which, within the tradition of logos, theoretifies in a new rational way the principle of identity of thinking and being. As an ontologem of this objective logic the spirit is presented: "That the True is actual only as system, or that Substance is essentially Subject, is expressed in the representation of the Absolute as Spirit, the most sublime Notion and the one which belongs to the modern age and its religion. The spiritual alone is the actual; it is essence, or that which has being in itself; it is that which relates itself to itself and is determinate... The Spirit that, so developed, knows itself as Spirit, is Science; Science is its actuality and the realm which it builds for itself in its own element."¹⁷

In this way an intellectualistic comprehension of the progress of world history is imposed inasmuch as a voluntaristic methodologizing of freedom in the spiritual nature of the human interrelations. This moment is given heed to by Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Montesquieu, Wolff, Kant, and many other philosophers of the modern epoch. They bind the will with freedom and search for their realization in the social forms of consciousness. For all of them, will is an element of reason and is incorporated in the rational structures. Hegel is no exception to this rule; but he not only thematizes the universal interest against the background of the different particular aims and subjective passions and actions but dialectizes the self-reflection of the spirit in the transition from the natural state in itself, i.e., the realization of the common universal aims as a spiritual nature of humankind - to the reasonable state for itself - i.e., the substantialization of the spirit as an immanent nature of the existence. This transition requires comprehension of will less as a blind element, mad passion or flaming enthusiasm and more as the moral essence of the spirit.¹⁸ Kant also presents practical reason as a

¹⁷ Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

¹⁸ For this study it is extremely interesting how, by means of the will, Hegel demonstrates the self-expression of the spirit as a kind of ontological continuation of

realm of action for free will which goes beyond moral problematics and even rigorously forms a universal moral law. However, the great Konigsberg thinker does not succeed to connect the intellectuality with freedom although he subsumes them under the common “auspices” of reason - as a theoretical (speculative) and practical (postulative) reason. Therefore he normally does not reach the totalizing ontological formulation of the spirit as a logos master of world history.

The objective spirit is projected contentually (phenomenologically) as a moral reality of civil society and state in their multilayer structure. This is a particular spiritual contents which is the essence of the state law and world history. Hegel analyzes in detail how the principle for unity of the logical and historical is deployed in an absolute sense of the idea (categorical contents of the concept) of the given social being in its historical (and, to a certain extent, social) progression. Freedom and truth become world which reaches the form of necessity. The law reflects the universality of the reasonable will not only to acknowledge but to persist and impose the moral nature of the freedom in the world. This is the right which regulates the validity of good and evil in social life. Therefore, according to Hegel, morality is the completed being of the objective spirit, phenomenally projecting itself as vital wisdom and spirit of people. In the context of fundamentalized freedom and normativized definitenesses of obligation the objective spirit maybe slightly reminds the features of Kant's practical reason. But unlike the latter, as it was already shown, it has definitively ontological nature, besides, it is essentially implied not in the abstract purposive activity but in the particular “self-determining and self-realizing notion”.¹⁹

the intelligence: “The spirit is initially intelligence and the definitions through which it advances in its progress - from the sensation through representation to thinking - are the road of its manifestation as a will which, as a practical spirit, is the successive truth of intelligence” - my translation. §53.

¹⁹ In his usage of the notion spirit Kant is either quite sparing or quite sceptic. In the first case he treats the spirit only cognitively and comprehends it as a general human source of knowledge. The spirit is a primordial essence of knowledge but it has no usage. Kant reduces this essence to the receptivity of perceptions and spontaneity of thinking. In the first *Critique* they have no transcendental or empirical usage but rather have psychical roots of knowledge. In the second case, the spirit is

The being of this substantiality of the concept (which, as a logical procedure, is the final step of the ontologizing power of the principle of identity of thinking and being) is the constitution of the absolute spirit. Hegel reminds us of this in the seventh chapter of book twelve of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, in which the self-cognition of Reason is defined through its "participation in thought" as the two are the same thing. Because reason is active, "when it possesses [thought]" and its divinity is hidden exactly in this, in the reality and not the possibility of the possession. And this is the life "for the actuality of thought is life".²⁰ Hegel defines the concept of the spirit as a spiritual reality and the spirit itself, as a free in itself and for itself intelligence which, in the process of overcoming its alienation in its own objectness, achieves the form of its concept as an immanent reality. The spiritual substantial essence completely passes the differentiation (alienation) of subject and object, of knowledge and matter. On the way back of reflexive self-liberation from the external objectness, it achieves the identity of the total contents (obtained as a result of the phenomenological methodology of the sublating synthesis) with the pure logical form of its concept.

This is the absolute spirit which, in distinction to Kant's critically carved pure reason, does not close itself in apriorized and metaphized spaces of cognition but in the form of scienticity (the concept as a logical structure of the idea thinking of itself in abstract contents) it conceptualizes the substantial essence of being as an ontologem. Hegel views art and the religion of revelation as phenomenological expressions of the absolute spirit. The immediate beauty, the genius element, the sublimity of the ideal belong to it on one side and the particular singularity of divinity, the substantial power of the creator, the salvation might of the paraclete - on the other. As their consecutive and completing synthesis, the great German thinker indicates philosophy. Not in terms of love of wisdom, esoteric rumination or a deep insight imposed on the experience, but as a true logos realm of the unified absolute spirit in its reality giving substantial essence of the existence of the world.

comprehended more generally in metaphysical terms. But then Kant observes the spirit as an empty and wrong notion, as "a notion for a bodiless thinking creature" - my translation.

²⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1072 b 19-30 (translated by W. D. Ross).